Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ... Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
IX THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING APPELLANT SATELE'S REQUEST TO GIVE THE JURy LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING EVIDENCE THAT ONLY APPLIED TO CO-APPELLANT NUNEZ The trial court erred in refusing appellant's request to give the jury limiting instructions informing the jury that certain evidence only applied to co-appellant Nunez. In particular, as detailed in Appellant's Opening Brief, the facts giving rise to the instructions contained in CALJIC Nos. 2.04 and 2.05 related to the testimony that Nunez tried to influence the testimony of Ruby Feliciano and Esther Collins. Because this evidence only applied to co-appellant Nunez, appellant requested that the jury be instructed only to consider that evidence as to Nunez. This request was denied, and the denial was reversible error. A. Appellant Has Not Forfeited This Claim. Respondent again claims the constitutional aspects of this issue are forfeited because they were not raised at trial. (RB at p. 197.) Once again, respondent is wrong. Under the principles discussed more fully above (ante, at pp. 21-27), this issue is not waived. These principles include the fact that an appellate court has inherent power to review an issue in spite of a party's failure to perfectly phrase that issue; the fact that there is an exception to the waiver rule regarding issues relating to the deprivation of fundamental, constitutional rights; and the fact that there is an exception to the waiver rule that provides that an objection may be excused when the issue involved is a pure question of law. Finally, because, as noted above, whether the waiver rule is to be applied is largely a question of the appellate court's discretion, this court should address the constitutional aspects of this issue. 92
B. Respondent's Arguments Are Misplaced Respondent argues that the denial of the requested instruction was proper because "'a trial court need not give a pinpoint instruction if it merely duplicates other instructions.' (Whisenhunt, supra, 44 Ca1.4th at p. 220.)" (RB at p. 203.) However, the instruction requested by appellant's counsel was not duplicative of other instructions. None ofthe instructions given at any time in the trial informed the jury that the evidence giving rise to these instructions related only to Nunez. The instructions given to the jury at the end oftrial regarding evidence that was limited in its scope specifically stated that "at the time" certain evidence was admitted the jury was instructed that it could not be used for "any purpose other than the limited purpose for which it was admitted," and the jury could not consider the evidence for any other purpose. (CALJIC Nos. 207 - Evidence Limited to One Defendant - and 2.09 Evidence Limited as to Purpose -, given at 37 CT 10725, 10722, 14 RT 3162-3163.) However, as explained in Appellant's Opening Brief(AOB at pp. 183-184), at the time that the evidence giving rise to CALJIC Nos. 2.04 and 2.05 was introduced, the jury was not informed of its limited use. As a result, the crucial aspect of the instruction appellant was requesting - Le., that the jury be informed this evidence could only be used against Nunez - had not been explained to the jury in other instructions. In fact, by restricting limiting instructions to evidence for which an instruction had been given at the time of the admission of the evidence, and by not giving a limiting instruction at the time ofthe introduction of the evidence of Nunez's alleged behavior, CALJIC Nos. 2.07 and 2.09 as given had the opposite effect. In other words, because there had been no limiting instruction given at the time the evidence was introduced, the jury could naturally assume it was not limited in any way and could therefore be used against appellant. Respondent further argues that there was no error or prejudice because the evidence giving rise to CALJIC Nos. 2.04 and 2.05 involved the actions ofNunez. 93
- Page 55 and 56: in the manner suggested by responde
- Page 57 and 58: Furthennore, it is well established
- Page 59 and 60: Appellant has explained above and i
- Page 61 and 62: Cal.App.3d 970, 992.) Instead, resp
- Page 63 and 64: 3. Appellant's Did Not Forfeit His
- Page 65 and 66: In Argument V of the Opening Brief,
- Page 67 and 68: IV IN FAILING TO REDACT PORTIONS OF
- Page 69 and 70: People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Ca1.3d
- Page 71 and 72: have been unreasonable for the jury
- Page 73 and 74: shot Fuller and Robinson, and that
- Page 75 and 76: find 'intent to kill'" on the basis
- Page 77 and 78: THE COURT'S ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTION A
- Page 79 and 80: Robinson's wounds indicated the sho
- Page 81 and 82: caused great bodily injury or death
- Page 83 and 84: use enhancement, the statutory lang
- Page 85 and 86: 192-193), but fails to explain how
- Page 87 and 88: Then we have the words "personal us
- Page 89 and 90: trial and had therefore forfeited t
- Page 91 and 92: merits of appellant's claim. (AOB a
- Page 93 and 94: jury trial. (People v. Gottman (197
- Page 95 and 96: Respondent argues that another theo
- Page 97 and 98: needs to rely on the penalty verdic
- Page 99 and 100: may not cross-examine a witness upo
- Page 101 and 102: itself to appellant would be improp
- Page 103 and 104: B. The Court Erred In Refusing The
- Page 105: egarding the intent ofthe non-shoot
- Page 109 and 110: ut is only being allowed for use ag
- Page 111 and 112: x THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTI
- Page 113 and 114: XI THE PROSECUTOR'S MISCONDUCT IN A
- Page 115 and 116: "guarantee." Appellant is not proce
- Page 117 and 118: v. Berryman (1993) 6 Ca1.4th 1048,
- Page 119 and 120: Contreras. Viewed in this context,
- Page 122 and 123: overwhelmingly showed that only one
- Page 124 and 125: XII GUILT AND PENALTY PHASE VERDICT
- Page 126 and 127: Where Juror No. 2211 is concerned,
- Page 128 and 129: The jury in Cruz was given a versio
- Page 130 and 131: PENALTY PHASE ISSUES XIV THE TRIAL
- Page 132 and 133: B. The Flaw In Respondent's Content
- Page 134 and 135: participation ofall jurors. Contrar
- Page 136 and 137: confuse[d]" (Harris) is no more tha
- Page 138: It is submitted that these instruct
- Page 141 and 142: inherent power to review an issue i
- Page 143 and 144: prospective jurors who were found t
- Page 145 and 146: (Id at p. 821.) This court has char
- Page 147 and 148: church. (18RT 4448:4-6,4451:11-14.)
- Page 149 and 150: (18RT 4450:12-14) or her mother (18
- Page 151 and 152: had in fact reached an impasse at t
- Page 153 and 154: There is an impasse. It is hung. Bu
- Page 155 and 156: establishes, for example, that, whe
B. Respondent's Arguments Are Misplaced<br />
Respondent argues that the denial <strong>of</strong> the requested instruction was proper<br />
because "'a trial court need not give a pinpoint instruction if it merely duplicates<br />
other instructions.' (Whisenhunt, supra, 44 Ca1.4th at p. 220.)" (RB at p. 203.)<br />
However, the instruction requested by appellant's counsel was not duplicative <strong>of</strong><br />
other instructions. None <strong>of</strong>the instructions given at any time in the trial informed<br />
the jury that the evidence giving rise to these instructions related only to Nunez.<br />
The instructions given to the jury at the end <strong>of</strong>trial regarding evidence that<br />
was limited in its scope specifically stated that "at the time" certain evidence was<br />
admitted the jury was instructed that it could not be used for "any purpose other<br />
than the limited purpose for which it was admitted," and the jury could not<br />
consider the evidence for any other purpose. (CALJIC Nos. 207 - Evidence<br />
Limited to One Defendant - and 2.09 Evidence Limited as to Purpose -, given at<br />
37 CT 10725, 10722, 14 RT 3162-3163.)<br />
However, as explained in <strong>Appellant</strong>'s Opening <strong>Brief</strong>(AOB at pp. 183-184),<br />
at the time that the evidence giving rise to CALJIC Nos. 2.04 and 2.05 was<br />
introduced, the jury was not informed <strong>of</strong> its limited use. As a result, the crucial<br />
aspect <strong>of</strong> the instruction appellant was requesting - Le., that the jury be informed<br />
this evidence could only be used against Nunez - had not been explained to the<br />
jury in other instructions. In fact, by restricting limiting instructions to evidence<br />
for which an instruction had been given at the time <strong>of</strong> the admission <strong>of</strong> the<br />
evidence, and by not giving a limiting instruction at the time <strong>of</strong>the introduction <strong>of</strong><br />
the evidence <strong>of</strong> Nunez's alleged behavior, CALJIC Nos. 2.07 and 2.09 as given<br />
had the opposite effect. In other words, because there had been no limiting<br />
instruction given at the time the evidence was introduced, the jury could naturally<br />
assume it was not limited in any way and could therefore be used against<br />
appellant.<br />
Respondent further argues that there was no error or prejudice because the<br />
evidence giving rise to CALJIC Nos. 2.04 and 2.05 involved the actions <strong>of</strong>Nunez.<br />
93
Change language