Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ... Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
infer that appellant's being in the company of Caballero and Nunez - a fact beyond mere presence at the crime - was evidence of his guilt. The instructions given would not correct this false impression, which was why the requested instruction was needed. In summary, as explained in Appellant's Opening Brief (AOB, at pp. 169 170), the standard instruction prohibits an inference of guilt from mere proximity to the crime, whereas this requested instruction prohibits the inference of guilt by association. Because of the danger of the jury accepting an inference based on association, as opposed to mere presence, the trial court erred in refusing the defense request for this instruction. c. Appellant Was Prejudiced By The Denial Of This Requested Jury Instruction. Respondent argues that appellant was not prejudiced by the denial of this request. This argument is based on the contention that the trial court gave numerous other instructions informing the jury as to relevant principles of law connected to the case. (RB at p. 199.) For example, respondent notes that the jury was given instructions relating to the burden of proof, witness credibility, informant testimony, the elements of the charged offenses, and numerous other instructions. (RB at p. 199.) However, as previously explained, none of the instructions listed by respondent relate to the principle contained in the requested instruction. None of them deal with whether being in the presence of someone who committed the crime is a sufficient basis for a fmding of guilt. They cannot seriously be viewed as adequate substitutes for the requested instruction. Respondent again refers to the supposed "overwhelming evidence" of appellant's guilt and contends this rendered the denial of requested instruction harmless. (RB at p. 199.) However, while it may be true that the evidence that either appellant or Nunez fired the fatal shots was overwhelming, the evidence 90
egarding the intent ofthe non-shooter was ambiguous. Furthermore, ifthe crime was the result of a rash, spur-of-the-moment act by the shooter, whose identity the prosecutor admitted he had not proven, the issue of guilt of the non-shooter was far from overwhelming. Thus, it is important that the jury be told that merely being in the presence ofthe shooter was not a sufficient basis for a finding ofguilt. This is particularly true in gang cases, such as this case, where the action of one gang member is likely to be attributed to his fellow gang member. The other evidence of guilt was not "overwhelming. As previously explained (AOB, at pp. 39-40), the prosecution's two main witnesses, Contreras and Vasquez, both had credibility problems which may have given the jury pause in reaching its decision. Respondent also contends that because there was "overwhelming proof' that appellant was the shooter, he was not prejudiced. (RB 199-200.) This contention is utterly without merit. As noted previously (ante, at p. 7-9), the evidence was at best ambiguous as to which defendant fired the shot, and the prosecutor admitted he had not proven who fired the shots. As previously explained, (ante, at pp. 7-9), a party is not allowed to present one theory at trial and another on appeal. Because the People at trial argued that they had not proven who the shooter was, respondent is estopped from now arguing that the evidence "overwhelmingly" proved appellant was the shooter. Because respondent argued that the constitutional aspects ofthis claim have been waived, respondent only addressed the question of prejudice under the standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Ca1.2d 818, 836, holding that an error is reversible only if it is reasonably probable that the defendant would have obtained a better result in absence ofthe error. (RB at pp. 129-131.) However, because this error adversely impacted appellant's constitutional rights, the error must be evaluated under the standard of Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18. As discussed in Appellant's Opening Brief (AOB at pp 176 177) it cannot be shown that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the conviction entered below must be reversed. 91
- Page 53 and 54: As appellant explained in the openi
- Page 55 and 56: in the manner suggested by responde
- Page 57 and 58: Furthennore, it is well established
- Page 59 and 60: Appellant has explained above and i
- Page 61 and 62: Cal.App.3d 970, 992.) Instead, resp
- Page 63 and 64: 3. Appellant's Did Not Forfeit His
- Page 65 and 66: In Argument V of the Opening Brief,
- Page 67 and 68: IV IN FAILING TO REDACT PORTIONS OF
- Page 69 and 70: People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Ca1.3d
- Page 71 and 72: have been unreasonable for the jury
- Page 73 and 74: shot Fuller and Robinson, and that
- Page 75 and 76: find 'intent to kill'" on the basis
- Page 77 and 78: THE COURT'S ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTION A
- Page 79 and 80: Robinson's wounds indicated the sho
- Page 81 and 82: caused great bodily injury or death
- Page 83 and 84: use enhancement, the statutory lang
- Page 85 and 86: 192-193), but fails to explain how
- Page 87 and 88: Then we have the words "personal us
- Page 89 and 90: trial and had therefore forfeited t
- Page 91 and 92: merits of appellant's claim. (AOB a
- Page 93 and 94: jury trial. (People v. Gottman (197
- Page 95 and 96: Respondent argues that another theo
- Page 97 and 98: needs to rely on the penalty verdic
- Page 99 and 100: may not cross-examine a witness upo
- Page 101 and 102: itself to appellant would be improp
- Page 103: B. The Court Erred In Refusing The
- Page 107 and 108: B. Respondent's Arguments Are Mispl
- Page 109 and 110: ut is only being allowed for use ag
- Page 111 and 112: x THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTI
- Page 113 and 114: XI THE PROSECUTOR'S MISCONDUCT IN A
- Page 115 and 116: "guarantee." Appellant is not proce
- Page 117 and 118: v. Berryman (1993) 6 Ca1.4th 1048,
- Page 119 and 120: Contreras. Viewed in this context,
- Page 122 and 123: overwhelmingly showed that only one
- Page 124 and 125: XII GUILT AND PENALTY PHASE VERDICT
- Page 126 and 127: Where Juror No. 2211 is concerned,
- Page 128 and 129: The jury in Cruz was given a versio
- Page 130 and 131: PENALTY PHASE ISSUES XIV THE TRIAL
- Page 132 and 133: B. The Flaw In Respondent's Content
- Page 134 and 135: participation ofall jurors. Contrar
- Page 136 and 137: confuse[d]" (Harris) is no more tha
- Page 138: It is submitted that these instruct
- Page 141 and 142: inherent power to review an issue i
- Page 143 and 144: prospective jurors who were found t
- Page 145 and 146: (Id at p. 821.) This court has char
- Page 147 and 148: church. (18RT 4448:4-6,4451:11-14.)
- Page 149 and 150: (18RT 4450:12-14) or her mother (18
- Page 151 and 152: had in fact reached an impasse at t
- Page 153 and 154: There is an impasse. It is hung. Bu
egarding the intent <strong>of</strong>the non-shooter was ambiguous. Furthermore, ifthe crime<br />
was the result <strong>of</strong> a rash, spur-<strong>of</strong>-the-moment act by the shooter, whose identity the<br />
prosecutor admitted he had not proven, the issue <strong>of</strong> guilt <strong>of</strong> the non-shooter was<br />
far from overwhelming. Thus, it is important that the jury be told that merely<br />
being in the presence <strong>of</strong>the shooter was not a sufficient basis for a finding <strong>of</strong>guilt.<br />
This is particularly true in gang cases, such as this case, where the action <strong>of</strong> one<br />
gang member is likely to be attributed to his fellow gang member. The other<br />
evidence <strong>of</strong> guilt was not "overwhelming. As previously explained (AOB, at pp.<br />
39-40), the prosecution's two main witnesses, Contreras and Vasquez, both had<br />
credibility problems which may have given the jury pause in reaching its decision.<br />
Respondent also contends that because there was "overwhelming pro<strong>of</strong>'<br />
that appellant was the shooter, he was not prejudiced. (RB 199-200.) This<br />
contention is utterly without merit. As noted previously (ante, at p. 7-9), the<br />
evidence was at best ambiguous as to which defendant fired the shot, and the<br />
prosecutor admitted he had not proven who fired the shots. As previously<br />
explained, (ante, at pp. 7-9), a party is not allowed to present one theory at trial<br />
and another on appeal. Because the People at trial argued that they had not proven<br />
who the shooter was, respondent is estopped from now arguing that the evidence<br />
"overwhelmingly" proved appellant was the shooter.<br />
Because respondent argued that the constitutional aspects <strong>of</strong>this claim have<br />
been waived, respondent only addressed the question <strong>of</strong> prejudice under the<br />
standard <strong>of</strong> People v. Watson (1956) 46 Ca1.2d 818, 836, holding that an error is<br />
reversible only if it is reasonably probable that the defendant would have obtained<br />
a better result in absence <strong>of</strong>the error. (RB at pp. 129-131.)<br />
However, because this error adversely impacted appellant's constitutional<br />
rights, the error must be evaluated under the standard <strong>of</strong> Chapman v. <strong>California</strong>,<br />
supra, 386 U.S. 18. As discussed in <strong>Appellant</strong>'s Opening <strong>Brief</strong> (AOB at pp 176<br />
177) it cannot be shown that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.<br />
Therefore, the conviction entered below must be reversed.<br />
91
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