Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...

infer that appellant's being in the company of Caballero and Nunez - a fact
beyond mere presence at the crime - was evidence of his guilt. The instructions
given would not correct this false impression, which was why the requested
instruction was needed.
In summary, as explained in Appellant's Opening Brief (AOB, at pp. 169­
170), the standard instruction prohibits an inference of guilt from mere proximity
to the crime, whereas this requested instruction prohibits the inference of guilt by
association. Because of the danger of the jury accepting an inference based on
association, as opposed to mere presence, the trial court erred in refusing the
defense request for this instruction.
c. Appellant Was Prejudiced By The Denial Of This Requested Jury
Instruction.
Respondent argues that appellant was not prejudiced by the denial of this
request. This argument is based on the contention that the trial court gave
numerous other instructions informing the jury as to relevant principles of law
connected to the case. (RB at p. 199.) For example, respondent notes that the jury
was given instructions relating to the burden of proof, witness credibility,
informant testimony, the elements of the charged offenses, and numerous other
instructions. (RB at p. 199.)
However, as previously explained, none of the instructions listed by
respondent relate to the principle contained in the requested instruction. None of
them deal with whether being in the presence of someone who committed the
crime is a sufficient basis for a fmding of guilt. They cannot seriously be viewed
as adequate substitutes for the requested instruction.
Respondent again refers to the supposed "overwhelming evidence" of
appellant's guilt and contends this rendered the denial of requested instruction
harmless. (RB at p. 199.) However, while it may be true that the evidence that
either appellant or Nunez fired the fatal shots was overwhelming, the evidence
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