Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ... Appellant, William Satele, Reply Brief - California Courts - State of ...
that matter, but as a demonstration ofa contradiction in Kelly's testimony as a means of questioning Kelly's credibility. If the prosecutor was actually either wrong or disingenuous in his explanation to the jury about the use of this evidence, clearly there would be a danger ofconfusion to a lay jury which might similarly misuse this evidence of wrongful conduct of appellant's fellow gang member as evidence of appellant's guilt. Finally, respondent argues there was no prejudice in admitting this evidence. Respondent makes several arguments in support of this contention (RB at pp. 127 128), all of which are unavailing. None of the reasons suggested by respondent dispel the likelihood ofprejudice discussed in Appellant's Opening Brief. (AOB at pp. 161-163.) For example, respondent argues that the evidence was not "unduly prejudicial" because Kelly was not on trial. (RB at p. 127.) To the contrary, the fact that Kelly was not on trial increases rather than diminishes the likelihood ofpotential prejudice and confusion. The only people against whom the evidence could be used were appellant and Nunez. The prejudice does not accrue to the witness, but to the defendant on trial. Similarly, respondent contends the evidence was not unduly prejudicial because in Phillips' alleged quotation of Kelly asking Battle to say that '''we' get along," the meaning ofthe word "we" was never defmed and Kelly admitted he was a member ofthe same gang as appellant. (RB at p. 127.) Again, these are facts that increase the danger of prejudice. With the term "we" undefined and the jury knowing that Kelly was in the same gang as appellant, the danger is increased that this attempted bribe would be attributed to appellant and/or Nunez. As explained in Appellant's Opening Brief(AGB at p. 157), evidence ofefforts by a third person to fabricate evidence are admissible against the defendant only if done in the defendant's presence and/or the defendant authorized the conduct of such a third person. Because these elements were never shown below, attributing the bribe 86
itself to appellant would be improper. However, with the term "we" left undefined, the jury was likely to improperly attribute these acts to appellant. Respondent's contention that the danger of confusion is mitigated by the fact that appellant and Kelly are in the same gang indicates that respondent does not understand how a jury is likely to misuse evidence of misconduct of other gang members. The danger of prejudice and confusion is increased by the fact that Kelly and the defendants are in the same gang because the prosecution expert witnesses explained to the jury that gang members act on behalf of the gang. Therefore, co-membership in the same gang will create a danger of prejudice, rather than dispel it. Contrary to respondent's argument (RB at p. 127), the fact that other witnesses also testified that appellants got along with African-Americans does not alleviate the prejudice from this error. Kelly testified as to other important facts relied on by the defense-notably, that Contreras was a frequent methamphetamine user, thereby suggesting that his testimony was unreliable due to the influence ofmethamphetamine on Contreras's mental state. However, with Kelly's testimony improperly impeached by evidence of an attempt to improperly influence a possible witness, the jury would be likely to improperly dismiss other aspects ofhis testimony. C. Conclusion In summary, the trial court erred in overruling the defense objection to the rebuttal testimony by Glenn Phillips to the effect that Lawrence Kelly offered Warren Battle $100 to testify that members of the West Side Wilmas Gang "get along" with African-Americans. Because this evidence improperly undermined the credibility of a defense witness, and because of the likelihood of confusion of the issues, appellant was prejudiced by the introduction ofthis evidence, requiring a reversal ofthe judgment ofconviction 87
- Page 49 and 50: as the prosecution's first-degree t
- Page 51 and 52: F. Conclusion In summary, by failin
- Page 53 and 54: As appellant explained in the openi
- Page 55 and 56: in the manner suggested by responde
- Page 57 and 58: Furthennore, it is well established
- Page 59 and 60: Appellant has explained above and i
- Page 61 and 62: Cal.App.3d 970, 992.) Instead, resp
- Page 63 and 64: 3. Appellant's Did Not Forfeit His
- Page 65 and 66: In Argument V of the Opening Brief,
- Page 67 and 68: IV IN FAILING TO REDACT PORTIONS OF
- Page 69 and 70: People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Ca1.3d
- Page 71 and 72: have been unreasonable for the jury
- Page 73 and 74: shot Fuller and Robinson, and that
- Page 75 and 76: find 'intent to kill'" on the basis
- Page 77 and 78: THE COURT'S ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTION A
- Page 79 and 80: Robinson's wounds indicated the sho
- Page 81 and 82: caused great bodily injury or death
- Page 83 and 84: use enhancement, the statutory lang
- Page 85 and 86: 192-193), but fails to explain how
- Page 87 and 88: Then we have the words "personal us
- Page 89 and 90: trial and had therefore forfeited t
- Page 91 and 92: merits of appellant's claim. (AOB a
- Page 93 and 94: jury trial. (People v. Gottman (197
- Page 95 and 96: Respondent argues that another theo
- Page 97 and 98: needs to rely on the penalty verdic
- Page 99: may not cross-examine a witness upo
- Page 103 and 104: B. The Court Erred In Refusing The
- Page 105 and 106: egarding the intent ofthe non-shoot
- Page 107 and 108: B. Respondent's Arguments Are Mispl
- Page 109 and 110: ut is only being allowed for use ag
- Page 111 and 112: x THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTI
- Page 113 and 114: XI THE PROSECUTOR'S MISCONDUCT IN A
- Page 115 and 116: "guarantee." Appellant is not proce
- Page 117 and 118: v. Berryman (1993) 6 Ca1.4th 1048,
- Page 119 and 120: Contreras. Viewed in this context,
- Page 122 and 123: overwhelmingly showed that only one
- Page 124 and 125: XII GUILT AND PENALTY PHASE VERDICT
- Page 126 and 127: Where Juror No. 2211 is concerned,
- Page 128 and 129: The jury in Cruz was given a versio
- Page 130 and 131: PENALTY PHASE ISSUES XIV THE TRIAL
- Page 132 and 133: B. The Flaw In Respondent's Content
- Page 134 and 135: participation ofall jurors. Contrar
- Page 136 and 137: confuse[d]" (Harris) is no more tha
- Page 138: It is submitted that these instruct
- Page 141 and 142: inherent power to review an issue i
- Page 143 and 144: prospective jurors who were found t
- Page 145 and 146: (Id at p. 821.) This court has char
- Page 147 and 148: church. (18RT 4448:4-6,4451:11-14.)
- Page 149 and 150: (18RT 4450:12-14) or her mother (18
that matter, but as a demonstration <strong>of</strong>a contradiction in Kelly's testimony as a means<br />
<strong>of</strong> questioning Kelly's credibility. If the prosecutor was actually either wrong or<br />
disingenuous in his explanation to the jury about the use <strong>of</strong> this evidence, clearly<br />
there would be a danger <strong>of</strong>confusion to a lay jury which might similarly misuse this<br />
evidence <strong>of</strong> wrongful conduct <strong>of</strong> appellant's fellow gang member as evidence <strong>of</strong><br />
appellant's guilt.<br />
Finally, respondent argues there was no prejudice in admitting this evidence.<br />
Respondent makes several arguments in support <strong>of</strong> this contention (RB at pp. 127<br />
128), all <strong>of</strong> which are unavailing. None <strong>of</strong> the reasons suggested by respondent<br />
dispel the likelihood <strong>of</strong>prejudice discussed in <strong>Appellant</strong>'s Opening <strong>Brief</strong>. (AOB at<br />
pp. 161-163.)<br />
For example, respondent argues that the evidence was not "unduly<br />
prejudicial" because Kelly was not on trial. (RB at p. 127.) To the contrary, the fact<br />
that Kelly was not on trial increases rather than diminishes the likelihood <strong>of</strong>potential<br />
prejudice and confusion. The only people against whom the evidence could be used<br />
were appellant and Nunez. The prejudice does not accrue to the witness, but to the<br />
defendant on trial.<br />
Similarly, respondent contends the evidence was not unduly prejudicial<br />
because in Phillips' alleged quotation <strong>of</strong> Kelly asking Battle to say that '''we' get<br />
along," the meaning <strong>of</strong>the word "we" was never defmed and Kelly admitted he was<br />
a member <strong>of</strong>the same gang as appellant. (RB at p. 127.) Again, these are facts that<br />
increase the danger <strong>of</strong> prejudice. With the term "we" undefined and the jury<br />
knowing that Kelly was in the same gang as appellant, the danger is increased that<br />
this attempted bribe would be attributed to appellant and/or Nunez. As explained in<br />
<strong>Appellant</strong>'s Opening <strong>Brief</strong>(AGB at p. 157), evidence <strong>of</strong>efforts by a third person to<br />
fabricate evidence are admissible against the defendant only if done in the<br />
defendant's presence and/or the defendant authorized the conduct <strong>of</strong> such a third<br />
person. Because these elements were never shown below, attributing the bribe<br />
86
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