Quartermaster Supply Operations - US Army Combined Arms Center ...
Quartermaster Supply Operations - US Army Combined Arms Center ...
Quartermaster Supply Operations - US Army Combined Arms Center ...
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
MSSION: Prepare 3eport end Reoomenilotions Covering<br />
the Q.uastermaBter <strong>Supply</strong> <strong>Operations</strong> in the<br />
European Theator of <strong>Operations</strong>.<br />
The General Foord wca established by General Orders 128,<br />
f’eadquarters European Theater of Operatlona, 113 <strong>Army</strong>, dated<br />
17 .Time 1945, aa amended by mnsral Orders 182, dated<br />
7 .~u,.uisu~Cl9/+5and General Orders 312 dated 20 November 1545,<br />
Headquarters United States Forces, European Theater, to<br />
prepare a factual analysis of the strategy, taotics ant:<br />
ailministration employ4 by the Thtted Statas forces Jn the<br />
Ruropean Theater.
n.L.,a.L.r%.A.L,. A .h -"<br />
TABU? OF COtTEETTS<br />
S"CT FAGE<br />
.- Pnrt One: Introduction . ............ 6 ................... 1<br />
Part Twcr General <strong>Quartermaster</strong> <strong>Supply</strong>. Transportation.<br />
Labor and <strong>Supply</strong> of Other Than Us <strong>Army</strong> Fcrcae 4<br />
Chapter 1: Classes of SupDlg........................ 4<br />
Section 1 .''Jar qepartment Definitions ............ 4<br />
Section 2 .Definitions Developed in the Euro-<br />
pean Theater of' OperationEl ............ 5<br />
Section 3 .European Theater of <strong>Operations</strong><br />
lkperience with Definitlons ........... 5<br />
Secticn l+ .Conclusions and Secomnendations., ..... 9<br />
RiblloRraphy ...................................... 10<br />
Chapter 2: Levels of <strong>Supply</strong>......................... 11<br />
Section 1.Existing Definitions., ................ 11<br />
Section 2 .Determinetion of Levels ............... 12<br />
Section 3 .3xperience in the European Theater .... 15<br />
Section<br />
!+<br />
.Conclusions and Recommendations ....... 16<br />
fliblioAraphy ...................................... 1U<br />
Chapter 3:- Daily Telegram........................... 19<br />
Section 1.Preocribed Use ........................ 19<br />
Section 2 .Use in the European Thecte-r of<br />
Operetions ............................ 19<br />
Section 3 .Conolusions and Recommenfintionu....... 23<br />
Bibliography...................................... 24<br />
Chapter 4 : quartermaater Depot 3perations in Coinmunioatigns<br />
Tone ......................... 25<br />
Section 1.rlepot Systev ......................... 25<br />
Section 2 .Requisiticning and Replenishient<br />
Procedure within the Theator., ........ 29<br />
Section 3 .Inventorying and Stock Accounting ..+ .. 31<br />
Seotion 4 .Conclusions md Recomment ations ....... 32<br />
Ribllo$raphy...................................... 33<br />
Chapter 5: Quartormaster Transportation., ........... 31.<br />
Section 1.quartermaster Wuok Company........... 34<br />
Soobion 2 .Other Units........................... 36<br />
i<br />
R-E-9-T-R-I -C-T-E -D
R -E-S -1' -R -I.G-T.E-D<br />
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)<br />
S<strong>US</strong>JYCT PAGE<br />
Section 3 .Discussion..........................38<br />
saction 4 . Conolusions and Recommenaations .....40<br />
Biblio$raDhy .................................... 41<br />
Chapter 6: Quarternaster Labor Service............ 42<br />
wction 1 - nuartcrmaster Service Company .......42<br />
Section 2 .Other Labor ......................... 4-1<br />
"ection 3 .Conclusions snC Recommendations ..... 47<br />
RjbltopraDL.. ....................................49<br />
Choptor 7: 'upply end Service for <strong>US</strong> MYToroes<br />
and 'iupg!y of Othtir Thnu ITS &my Forces 50<br />
Section 1 .Sunply and scrvlces for Vnited Stat=<br />
Air JrorcBs, European Theater of<br />
Operntions..........................50<br />
Section 2 .TJnnltcd States Navy., ................ 54<br />
Section- j .Axmerican Rcd Cross.................. 55<br />
Section 4 .Civil AffairB ....................... 57<br />
saction 5 .suppl8 of hllisd Military Units..... 64<br />
Taction 6 .Conclwions and Rcoo;.v.iandations ..... 63<br />
PJ bliograpliy ....................................70<br />
pax* mee: Class 1 sumlg...........................71<br />
.--- Cliaptcr 8: sntlons................................71<br />
4ectjan 1 .Types of Pations....................71<br />
Section 2 .Operational Rations .................72<br />
Clection 3 .Eulk nations ........................74<br />
Scction /+ .Conclusions and Recommendations .....77<br />
Qibliographir .................................... 77<br />
Chrrpter 9 : Operating Frooedure . Proourenent<br />
and ISSU...............................7~<br />
owtion 1 .Gomunicutions Zone .................78<br />
neation 2 .Field Forces ........................ 83<br />
section 3 .Bakers and Cooks Sahool, Catering<br />
Semioe ana Yess Teams., ............84<br />
Section l+ .Conclusions ana Recommsndations.. ...86
--<br />
R-5-S-T-R -I -C -T-E-D<br />
.TABTX OY CONmlTs (Conttd)<br />
SWECT PAGE<br />
Bibliography .................................... 88<br />
Cheptsr 10: Operating Facilities. ................. 8Y<br />
Section 1 - Refrigeration Units ................. 89<br />
Section 2 - Raking and Ooffcc Roasting .......... 91<br />
section 3 - nuartemaster Railhead Company.<br />
(T/O & 9 10-197).................... 92<br />
Suction 4 - Conclusions and Rscommondations ..... 94<br />
Rlblioaraphy .................................... $7<br />
?art TOW: Class 11 p-. supply ...................... 99<br />
Chapter 11; q.uartermaster Class I T p: IV Operatiom.<br />
Communications Zone............ 99<br />
Faction 1 - Kission. Or#canizations en& Functions 99<br />
Soction 2 - Determination of Requirencnts....... 100<br />
Section 3 - Requisitioning Procedures........... 102<br />
Section h - Control an8 Distribution............104<br />
Section 5 - Conclusions and Recommendations.. ... 104<br />
Riblionraphy....................................105<br />
Ci-mpter 12: Class I T & IV Operatione, Tiold<br />
903.088................................106<br />
Section 1 - fl.partermastor. .%?.my Group........... 106<br />
Section 2 - Class IJ. b IV Section. <strong>Quartermaster</strong><br />
<strong>Supply</strong>. <strong>Army</strong> ................. 106<br />
Sectlon 3 - Operation of <strong>Army</strong> Class I1 & IV<br />
Depots ..............................109<br />
Section 4 - Conoluelons and Recozmendations.....111<br />
Rib1io.raph.J .................................... 113<br />
Chapter 13: quartermaster Depot COmpWY. .%j>ply.<br />
(T/O L 110-227)......................114<br />
Seation 1 - 1”lssion and Organization............ 114<br />
Tection 2 - Employment in the European<br />
Theater of <strong>Operations</strong>.. .............114<br />
Bectlon 3 - Conclusion8 and Recommendations..... 116<br />
BiblioRraphy ....................................118<br />
iif.<br />
R-F-S -T-R-I4 -T-E -D
R-E-S-T-R-I -C-T-E-D<br />
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont’d)<br />
SUBJECT PAGE<br />
Chapter 14: Beech Maintenance Sets 2nd Beach<br />
Follow-up Sets........................119<br />
Section 1 .Chnractarlstics and Usa............. 119<br />
Section 2 - Oneration...........................121<br />
Section 3 .Conclusions and Recommendations ..... 1.22<br />
Bibliography.................................... 123<br />
Chapter 15: Clothing ond EqUiDiIlfXlt ................ 124<br />
Section 1 - Allowmce and Yalntenance ...........124<br />
Section 2 - Winter Clcthing ..................... 1-27<br />
section 3 - ~oriclusionsand Recoruendetions ..... 129<br />
Bibliography....................................170<br />
Chapter 16: ‘7, uu^rtarrastor Bales <strong>Operations</strong>........131<br />
Section 1.nuortermaster Selus Conpnny.<br />
(T/O & E 10-157).................... 131<br />
section 2 .~ llctsStore Operatious .............. 132<br />
section 3 .~onclusionsana BeCOnJ?lt?UdCtfGns..... 173<br />
Bibliography....................................134<br />
Five: Class 111 <strong>Supply</strong>..........................1.35<br />
Chcpter 17: Putroleurn, Oil nnd Lubricnnt<br />
0per.i:iona ............................135<br />
section 1 .Introduction ........................135<br />
section 2 - Ekchwtics of <strong>Supply</strong>.................136<br />
Section 3 - prinripol Functions of Or retiag<br />
end Planning Agonci..a ...............143<br />
section 4 - ~onclusionsand Recoamendntions., ... 146<br />
Ribliography....................................148<br />
chapter 18: Logistical Fcictcrs .................... 150<br />
Conalusions nnd nrcoi ;lF..sndationa................. 155<br />
Ribliogra.)hy ....................................1%<br />
Cha?ter 19: Pasoline <strong>Supply</strong> Cofcpiny...............157<br />
section 1 .Misflion. Organization :ind Function. . 157<br />
ssotion 2 - Europmn Theoter of OperaLions<br />
mpcrfence .......................... 158<br />
section 3 - Conclusions and Hecomond.$tions. .... 160<br />
Riblioeraph. ....................................151<br />
lv<br />
B-E-S-T-R-I -C -T-E-D
3-E-S-T -R-I-C-T-E-D<br />
TABU OF COSTEVTS (Cont'd)<br />
SUBJXT PAfZ<br />
Ctapter 20: class TII (So1j.d Fuels) <strong>Operations</strong>.. i i; 162<br />
Section 1- ~eneral..r.r.....................rl..<br />
162<br />
5ection 2 - Ogerations.. ......................... 163<br />
9ection 3 - IConolusionE and Recomendationz.. .... 165<br />
Bibliography ...................................... 167<br />
mETDLcm :<br />
1. 0,uartermaster Levels of Supi>ly, Zurogean Theater I<br />
29 Vovember 1942 to 3 March 29b5<br />
2. Letter, Eq 12th D,rol.,l Froup, file 400.312 (e-4<br />
"U?) Bub : Requisitioning and !:ovencnt Of Supplzee,<br />
2$ October 1gb/,<br />
3, Form for 'lailg Telegrm<br />
4. Letter, Iin, Seventh v9 ?my, fi1e.M lt00.213 OXJ<br />
sub3 : nuarteraaster Ren,uiremnts, 7 Cctober 194.4<br />
5. I"ettor, To, Seventh <strong>US</strong> !myJ file AG 400.213 nL7, .<br />
subj: nuarternester Clem 111 Eequireiaents,<br />
7 October 1944+<br />
6. Letter, ZTq Cown"cntiol8 Zone RT0Us3A, Office<br />
of the Chief ~uartermster,subj: lllssion of<br />
Tho Charleroi Lle?ot; 4rea, '-)-lc3,2 kurch 19q.T.<br />
7. Letter, Supreme qoadcunrtom, -41liod Xxped itionary<br />
Porc8~1, subj: Allocation of Credits -<br />
Civil Affaire Supnlies/Eltores - Operation<br />
OIZRLORD - 7 plus 91 to D plus 120, doted<br />
9 July l9/+4<br />
a. Letter Suprovc I-Tcadquartcrs, Nlicd Zxpsditionasg<br />
Forcm, subj: Ulocetion or Credits -<br />
civil ?ffoirs Supplies/Rtoros - Oporetion<br />
OERLORD, dRtod 19 Oc1,obur 191Jt<br />
9. Lottor, xq scrpicos or T'iupvly, :TO .Office of<br />
tho Chiof ?uart~r.r\astor, filo &,SOa? Fub, subj:<br />
Coinposito Rattion for E.T.0,U.S.I. I 27 April<br />
1943<br />
10. Contants and P-llmranoos of Ration 4ccossory<br />
Convoiileice Dackots I<br />
11. Ovxissuo of Rations to 7.T3 trmy Forces<br />
12I htloil Issue 'kporionoe on hropean Coiitinont<br />
13<br />
OraRnrzation of the British Irmy CatcPine; Corps<br />
Published by the "rar Offios (S.T.) Octobor 19b2<br />
R-E-S -? -R-I-C -T-E-D
R-E-S-T-R-I-0-T-E-D<br />
T.IBLX OF COTBTTS (Cont'd)<br />
lk. List of I tsms to be Carrted in %del Stock<br />
for Mvanoe Denots<br />
15. ovorlay of' Major Pipslino Systams in tho<br />
European Theater 62 Ogor=tions<br />
16. Chaptor 3, ?uartermnstcr Servicc Referencc<br />
Data, Volume I1 (Revised), Operationa-Plan-<br />
ning 1January lql+l+,'publishad by Hq Soxvices<br />
ol SQpDly, 3'110, 0-Vice of the Chief<br />
0,uartcrmaater<br />
17. Chaptcr 6, fiuarTerinaster 3ervioe liefcrcnce<br />
Data, Volume I1 (Revised) Operatdons-Planning<br />
1 January i944.,'pu'>lishad by He Services<br />
of Supp1y, ETO, OffiCc of the Chief<br />
n,uartermastQr-<br />
18. Report of Class I11 Consmption Rates of<br />
FoIV3g in Final Ldvanse to tho Rhine, prepared<br />
by Suljrcme'Hoadq~~srters , illlied Expoditionary<br />
Forces. 25 Ap3l 1945<br />
vi<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
Prepared by:<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I-0-T-E-D<br />
THE GENERAL BOARD<br />
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATEI<br />
APO 408<br />
REPORT ON<br />
QUARTEFMABTER SUPPLY OPERATIONS<br />
Col Thad A. Broom, 016246, Chief, <strong>Quartermaster</strong> Section<br />
Lt Col Raymond H. Tiffany, 020348, <strong>Quartermaster</strong> Section<br />
Lt Col Dan L. Hiller, 0189278, <strong>Quartermaster</strong> Section<br />
Lt Col Felix J. Gerace, 023954, <strong>Quartermaster</strong> Section<br />
Lt Col Wilmer C, Landry, 020238, <strong>Quartermaster</strong> Section<br />
Major Walter S. Kiebach, 0406256, <strong>Quartermaster</strong> Section<br />
Najor Thomas D. Blackwell, 0405117, <strong>Quartermaster</strong> Section<br />
Najor Arthur B. Johnston, 015773E8, <strong>Quartermaster</strong> Section<br />
Captain Ernest C. Vincent, OlStM456, <strong>Quartermaster</strong> Section<br />
PrZncipal Consultants :<br />
Brig Gen ;mines W. Younger, 08335, <strong>US</strong>A, 12th <strong>Army</strong> Oroup<br />
Quart erma ster<br />
Brig Gen John B. FranBS, 021063, <strong>US</strong>A, Office of the<br />
Theater Chlef Quar termaater<br />
Brig Gen Robert M. Lee, 018483, <strong>US</strong>A, Deputy Commanding<br />
General in Charge of <strong>Operations</strong>, 9th Air Force<br />
col Charles N. Howze, 018506, @4C, <strong>Quartermaster</strong>, 9th<br />
Air Force Service Command<br />
col Albert 0. Duncan, 0120888, QMC, Office of the<br />
Thester Chief Quar terms tar<br />
Col Robert P. Ilollis, 015079, QIC, Office of the Theater<br />
Chief <strong>Quartermaster</strong><br />
Col John M. Kenderdine, 0316467, QMC, Office, or tha<br />
Theater Chief Quartermasbr<br />
Lt Col Morris M. Bryan, 0410965, QMC, Office of the<br />
Theater Chief Quar tormaster<br />
Lt Go1 Ralph Y. Hower, 0920754, QlrlC, Office of the<br />
Theater Chief <strong>Quartermaster</strong><br />
Lt Col William F, Schultz, 0265729, TC, Office of the<br />
Chiof of Transportation<br />
Lt Col Benjamin H. Evans, Jr., 0315369, WC, <strong>Quartermaster</strong><br />
Section, Fifteenth <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong><br />
Major Jmee T. Catlin, 0366031, WC, Office of thc<br />
Theater Chief <strong>Quartermaster</strong><br />
vii<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-I!-E-D
1. Gcncrol.<br />
PAQT ONE<br />
INTRODUCTION<br />
a. Tho purposc of this study is to yroscnt in concis0<br />
but dotnilod form thc brocd phnsos oi? tho probloms<br />
lacod by tho n,UQI%On"tor Scrvicc ill tho Buropccn Thcator<br />
of Oporntions in tho porfommco of its suDply nission, End<br />
tho orgmizntions, motlicds and proooduros tho ~,unrtmi"tor<br />
Somrico ovolvod tc moot thoso probloms.<br />
b. El tho prcpnratlon Of tkiS Study ClOSG coordinnticn<br />
wc.s effcotca bctwocn the Quartcrunstc?r Boctf@n ol The<br />
Gonornl Boer8 rnd tho Thentor Chiof n,u?.rtornclstar, 'Riontcr<br />
Sorvico Forces, Europor?n Thw..tcr. In ordcr to aasiat Tho<br />
Gcnorcl Bonrd, the Chiof Qu"crm*?stor projxrod a group 01<br />
study melysos of vnrious phnscs of Qunrtomnstor supply<br />
activitioa in tho Curopoon Thcatcr of Op-rations. The<br />
StudiQS hnvo boon Cnro%lly fOllOWOd; CXgOt quOtcltiOnS VLPO<br />
mdo where n7pmprlnto and propcr rnnotatisas mdo to thb<br />
indiviAun1 studics in thc bibliogrrLphy. Tho following io n<br />
list of dccumcnts mado nvailcblo by thc ChiLf nunrtomnstor<br />
to tbo ounrtcmtstor Sooticn of Tho Goncrnl Board in tho<br />
propnmtlan of this ropcrt:<br />
(1) Critique of oucrtowsttr Fkwning for<br />
Continontol <strong>Operations</strong>,<br />
(2) ogorntionnl Study t?mbor 1 - Ddinitions<br />
of n,u-rtcrmc.stor SUppliGS,<br />
(3) Oporntional tltudy Nuribor 3 - Lovols of<br />
SUPPlY *<br />
(4.) Oporntioncl Study ITumbcr i- Qu?.rtrimastur<br />
Logistical Datfl.<br />
(5) Oporrtioncl Study Nunbor 5 - Quortwucstor<br />
<strong>Supply</strong> Oporatioos in tho Comunicntions<br />
Zono During Coribe.t.<br />
(6) Oporntional Study nmbcr 8 - Manpowor in<br />
Rclation bo <strong>Supply</strong>.<br />
(7) Oporntionnl Study Numbor 9 - Roquisitioning<br />
Procodurcs for 8upply of m. OvcrsGaa<br />
Thontor fYom tho Zono OP the Intorlor.<br />
(8) Oporc.tlono1 Study Nunbar 11 - <strong>US</strong>B cf Fbrsonncl<br />
othor thin Unitod Statcs TIilitnry<br />
in tho Eurogorn Thoator of Oporntions.<br />
-1-
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D<br />
(9) Oporotionnl Btudy Numbor 13 - Broad Phcscs<br />
of Orgazizntion cnd Oaercticn for <strong>Supply</strong>.<br />
2. Quartomastor OrRdnizntion for <strong>Supply</strong> in tho Europonn<br />
Thontor of <strong>Operations</strong>.<br />
n. Tho nission of tho qumtonastcr Scrvicr; in tho<br />
Xuropom Thentor of Oporations was slmilhr to th-t of thc<br />
?unrtcrr?stcr Corps.in tho Uiiitod Mxtos, ' Tho Chiof ?uortornastcr<br />
wns chzrgod with tha procurment, storago cad issuc<br />
of nll ~.u~.rtomastcr supplia
R-Z-S-T-R-I-C-T-$-D<br />
3. gy"one. Tho planning of tho invasion of tlic<br />
continont , ?ad the opcrations thet occuTrOa nftor D-Day, roquirGd<br />
close coordinntion by tho Chiof qunrtemastcr with<br />
othor stcffs md. scmiccs to ovorconc tho problem thnt ,?ram.<br />
The prnblm of shipping the initial rcquironcnts 37<br />
low priority Clrlss 11 supplics to thG continent cftclr D-D,?y<br />
w.S P,VCFC"rG by tho devclopncnt of becch rlaintonnnco and<br />
bcwh follow-u:? sots. Thorc waa c, cmtinucus problcii of<br />
ri-.intn.iiinR stock lcvois in tho dCl3GtS. Xmy chmgos in<br />
stock lovcls wcrc m.clc noccsszry by chrnging situr.tions,<br />
'-"her:! w?.S P. constcnt sl1.oi-taGo ?f transportation which , p
R-E-9-1-R-T-C-T-EkTr<br />
-PART TWO<br />
----<br />
GEENBRAL QtJARTE;XFIIASTEB SUPPLY, TRA.NEPORTILTION, LABOR<br />
AND SUPPLY OF VPHER TI”<strong>US</strong> ARMY FORCES<br />
-<br />
B&4Pl?ER 1<br />
OLASms OF SUPPLY<br />
SECTION 1<br />
WAR DEPARWNT IIEFINITIONS<br />
5. Definitions in har Department Field Manuals.<br />
a. The War Department has established five classes<br />
of supply which apply to all Servicos. T ey are defined in<br />
Field Manual 100-10 and are quoted below: P<br />
‘Class I Supplies. Those articles whiich are<br />
consumed at an approximately uniform daily rate<br />
irrespective of combat operations or terrain<br />
and which do not necessitate spcial adapta-<br />
tion to meet individual requirements, such a8<br />
rations and forace.<br />
Clays I1 Supplies, Those authorized articles<br />
not included in Class IV, for which allowances<br />
are established by Tables of Basic Allcwanced,<br />
Tables of Allo~vanceB, and Tables of Equipment.<br />
Class 111 Supplies. Puels end lubrlonnts for<br />
ell pur1,oses except aviation, inoludlng g:o$oline<br />
for all vehicles, diQ8el oil and aoal.<br />
Glass 111 (A) Supglies. kviation fuels and<br />
lubricunts.<br />
Class IV Supplies. Supplies and equipment<br />
for which allowances are not prescrihed, or<br />
which require speoial measures of control<br />
and are hoc otherwioe classified, Normally<br />
such supplies include fortifioation materiols,<br />
construotion materials, aircraft and article8<br />
of a Similar nntura.<br />
chss IV (b) Supplies. Complete airplanes,<br />
airplane aguigment and all spare pnrta and<br />
supplies required to maintain the oomplete<br />
airplane in oommrlssion.<br />
Claas V Supplies. Amunition, pyrotechnics,<br />
antitank minee and chemicals, It<br />
b. The following Jarinitions for olassee of supply<br />
are listea In Field Manuals 10-5 and 10-10:?13<br />
Class 1 - No change from definition in Field<br />
Manual 100-10,<br />
- 4 -<br />
R-E&-i’-;2-I*C-X”-E-D
R-E-S-T-R-I-C -T-E-D<br />
Class I - No change from definition in Field<br />
Manuel 100-10.<br />
Class I1 - Those authorized articles for whick:<br />
allowances are established by Tables of Basio<br />
Allowances and Tables of Allowncea, such as<br />
clothing, gas masks, arms, trucks, radio sets,<br />
tools, and instruments.<br />
Class I11 - Engine fuels and lubricants, inoluding<br />
gasoline for all vehicles and aircraft,<br />
diesel oil, fuel oil, and coal.<br />
Class IV - Those articles of supply which are<br />
not covered in Tables of Basic Allowances and<br />
demands for which are directly related to<br />
operations contemplated or in progress (except<br />
for articles in Classes Inand V), such<br />
as fortification materials, construotioo<br />
materials, and machinery.<br />
class V - No change from definition in Field<br />
Manual 100-10.<br />
SECTION 2<br />
DEFINITIONS IJEVELOPED IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER OB OPERATIONS.<br />
6. Definiticns prescribed by the Chief Qua-temaster,<br />
European "heater of <strong>Operations</strong>. The Quartermsstsr Service<br />
Reference Data. Volume 11. Office of the Chief <strong>Quartermaster</strong>.<br />
European Theat& of' <strong>Operations</strong>, dat8d 1 January-1944, gives<br />
the following definitions for classes of supply.4<br />
a. Class I - As stated in Field Manual 100-10, War<br />
Deprtment, 15 November 1943.<br />
b. Class I1 - Those supplies and equipment for<br />
which allowances are established by Tables or Allowances,<br />
Tables of Equipmeut and Ow Circular 1-18; namely, clothing<br />
and equipage used by the individual and also organiza-<br />
tional equipment such as heavy tentage, axes, field ranges,<br />
and any other items to be used for the whole of the organization;<br />
also items of an expendable natura such as soap,<br />
stationery and brooms.<br />
c. Class I11 - Petrol (Gasoline, oil and lubricants<br />
ana solid fuels (coal, coke and wood).<br />
d. Class IV - Miscellaneous articles of supply<br />
such as post exchange items, special sales store supplies,<br />
repair supplies and equipment, depot equipment or other<br />
such supplies whichae not covered in documents establish-<br />
ing Class I1 allowances and the demands for which are di-<br />
rectly related to the operations contemplated or in progress.<br />
e. Class V - Ammunition, pyrotechnics, antitank<br />
mines and chemicals. These are not supplied by the Quarter-<br />
master Service.<br />
SECFON ,a<br />
FROE" THEAmR OF OPERA'I?ONS Em,R"CE WITH IIEFIKITIONS<br />
- 5 -<br />
H-E-S-T-R-14-T-R-D
7, Class I Suppl&.<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D<br />
a. The First <strong>US</strong> "rmy carried and i sued solidi-<br />
fied alcohol heat units as Class I supplies,? in contradhtion<br />
to Circuler 23, tieadquarters European Theater of<br />
<strong>Operations</strong>, listed tbs as an item of expendable<br />
Class I1 su;? In the Third <strong>US</strong> Amy the Class I section<br />
waa responsible for the issue of gratuitous post exchange<br />
supplies, whersas the Class I1 and IV section was responsible<br />
for the distribution of post exchange sales items.7<br />
In the report for September 1944, the Third <strong>US</strong> Kcmy C'uarter-<br />
master stated that h'e was iszuing gratuitous post exchange<br />
items through Class I channels but that the stocks of those<br />
item were stored in a Glass I1 and IV depot,<br />
b. Due to inccr.sistenoies and misconceptions such<br />
as these that &rose throuehout his experience in the European<br />
'i'lieuter, the Chief buartermaster recommended the following<br />
definition of Glass I supplies:9<br />
Vlass I - subsistence rations, subsistence<br />
ration accessories, &nu those items which<br />
me distinctively necessary and exclusively<br />
used in the hmdling and preparation of the<br />
above products, such 8s bread sacks, solidi-<br />
fled alcohol hQat units, ooifee bags, etc."<br />
8. Class I1 and IV Suppllez.<br />
a. Research failea to reveal any definition of<br />
these two Classes of supply publjshed by any of the field<br />
forces. However, the field forces were not always clearly<br />
decided as to what exsctly was tbe difference betereen Class<br />
I1 and IV items. One ,.my Luartermaster, on being<br />
ashed to separate Class I1 end IV itoms an the daily tele-<br />
gram, stated that ne can determine which are to be<br />
Oluss I1 or IV itez:.8 This confusion results from the<br />
existing deficltions of Class I1 and IV supply. Keavy<br />
tentage is listed under Class I1 because its issue is provided<br />
i'or ip Tables of Equipment. Tentnjie for housing<br />
purposes, $oweyer, wa3 cmsidered by sme agencies as Class<br />
JV supply.<br />
b. Class I1 and IV Supplies were colc.bined and<br />
made the responsibility of one sub-section both in the<br />
Offices of the <strong>Army</strong> CLuartermasters and also in the Dffioe<br />
of the Chief Guartcrmaster, European Theater of <strong>Operations</strong>.<br />
Maximum levels of supply for these two classes wra prescribed<br />
for the combined group in terms of days of supply.7<br />
Reports of levels of sup1,lg on hand were made for %hecombined<br />
group arid wera also given in days of sup@y.lO I;OWever,<br />
sinao Class I1 supplies were procurd prirnariig orr<br />
the basis of allOwdnC6S, and Class Iv sup-lies were procured<br />
on the basis of speaific needs for planncd <strong>Operations</strong>, the<br />
procurement of these two c.lasses required that each class<br />
bs separated on requisitior-s to the Zone of the interior.<br />
The lack of a clear distinction between the two clnsses made<br />
such separation difficult, nut only at the higher levels buij<br />
also among the conbot trcop, and caused further confusion<br />
when opimons differed.<br />
c. On the basis of tkee yoarstexperVence th~<br />
CClef &,,,uartermster, European Theater of <strong>Operations</strong>, re-<br />
R-Ea-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
R-E 44 -R -I-C -T-E*D<br />
comended be following definitions of these two classes<br />
of supply: B (1) "Class 11 8UPDlie3<br />
''4, Th Esuipmant:<br />
Individual or organizational clothiq<br />
and equipment, allowances of which axe<br />
covered by T/IC1s and T/A1s.<br />
Exatemplea:<br />
Clothing - shocs, overcoats, socks,<br />
underwear.<br />
EQIlipri"t - individunl equipment a8<br />
authorized by T/E 21 - blankets,<br />
web equipment, shelter halves;<br />
organizational eguipaent as<br />
authorized by T/O's and l'/E's -<br />
field ranees, heavy tentage,<br />
cots, G.I. cans, eto.<br />
Q. Exmndablez:<br />
Expandable supplies covered by allowances<br />
coritained ir, official War Department<br />
or Theuter publioations .<br />
@x.aIzplw:<br />
Oleaniug and preserving materials -<br />
soap, broome, mops and brushes,<br />
Orrice supplies - stationery, pencils,<br />
paper clips, etc.<br />
~~~, Spare P~ta:<br />
Haintenunoe and repair parts, and<br />
component parts for the sbove Class 11<br />
item.<br />
Exampies:<br />
Field rawu p6rts; ham" and saws<br />
which are oompoueuts of' oarpenter's<br />
tool kit, QXC.<br />
qmue of any Glass I1 Items in excess<br />
of tho allowencea prescribed in T/Els<br />
nnd T/A.'s or aocwnts coveriM expendable<br />
supplies does aot change its<br />
supply claasific~~tion.Such issues arc<br />
known as Claso I1 issues in eXCI3BS of<br />
authorized allownoes.<br />
VChose items which are contclned in Th's<br />
or other documnts menzioned in (I)A, 2<br />
aud J above, but which ere used exolusively<br />
iE the retail handling of basic products<br />
of othcr olasses will not be considered<br />
es Clasa 11, but will be oonsiderad<br />
as ao item of the class iIl which its<br />
- 7 -
R-E-S-T-R-IdC-T-E-D<br />
related item falls,<br />
Example :<br />
Gasoline cans 826 T/E equipment yet<br />
they are used exclusively i n the<br />
handling of' gasoline and are<br />
therefore to be considered as a<br />
Class I11 item.<br />
(2) rrclass 'fv Supplies,<br />
Phose articlcs of supply which are<br />
not contafiiud in dccumsnts which establisl;<br />
Class LI allownoes:<br />
A. Officers, nurses and WAC offioi-rs<br />
'Ci:stinctive items of olothing, oad<br />
acccssories.<br />
E. Iteirs procured spceif'ioally for<br />
such &rsonr&l as merloan Red Cross, War<br />
Correspondents, &ne sold t o such parsonnel,<br />
C. Supplies firocured for spxific<br />
projcFts for a nonrecurrirg operation;<br />
exaples, ,merican fls~arm bands, nausba<br />
bags, etc.<br />
-G. Medal9 and ducoratjons.<br />
L, Material handling e uipment items<br />
which-we ~iotcantainud in l'h and, T/A<br />
ellowttnces. '1<br />
9. Class 111 Yu lies. The field forces in the iiuropean<br />
T h e e ~ & ~ m & ~ ? ofollowed n s gonorally tho concepts<br />
of higher headquarters in the definition or Class 111 supijliee;<br />
The Shiof kuartermastcr, howevar, took excoption to<br />
the existine; definition of 2lass I1 supply and statcd:q<br />
TtGasclinu cans undor the iiar Department deflnitiori<br />
arc. Class 31 itas; yet the yrocuruxent,<br />
storage u d issue of gasolinz oh116 is dircctly relcted<br />
to tho proouramcnt, Storago and issue of<br />
gasolino. Gaaolino cans =E out 01 glaou in a<br />
Class I1 depot, c a a Class TI dtrily train, or a<br />
Class I1 ruGulsiticn. They am required nt ClasG<br />
I11 dump and should bo included 810n.g with othor<br />
items us00 in the rutail distribution of FOL uder<br />
the olussificztion of Class III supplies, Examples:<br />
Gcisoliae CL~R,.gasolinedl.aponsers, gasoline hose,<br />
uto. 1'<br />
He timrc ore recomanded that the Pollowine: dfifinition be<br />
adopt a;pt<br />
n3lnss III - Gasoilnf!, oil, lubricant8 and<br />
solid fuels (ooal, ooke 8Pd VfoOd), Uld Suoh i tem<br />
as arb distinutivoly necessary and exclusively<br />
use4 in thu rotail handling o f tho above products.<br />
Gxaqilcs: Gasoline cam, gaseline ciispensars, gesoiine<br />
hose, at6.71<br />
- 8 -<br />
R-E-9 -T-R-I-G-T-R-D
10, Post Exchango Items. Regardingtho issue of post<br />
exchange new and the establishment of ar, aaditional class<br />
of supply for those items, the Chief Uuartcrmster stated:<br />
I'One other difficulty has beeo the lack of a<br />
clear cut golicy on the classification of articles<br />
which are sold anC distributed through <strong>Army</strong> Exchange<br />
facilities. This group of items could be<br />
termed. as follows: Those items necessary to promote<br />
morale and personal hygiene, which are pro-<br />
cured by the Cuartermzster Service but which are<br />
turned over in wholesale lots to the <strong>Army</strong> Exchange<br />
Serviae, or to agencies such as the Kavy, Red<br />
Cross, etc., for distribution and sales purposes.<br />
These items have beensclassified both in this<br />
Theeter and by the Zone of Interior in Glass I,<br />
I1 and IV. There is no clear-cut official classi-<br />
fication of these items. They presenG a special<br />
probleln in that under sae circmtnnces they my<br />
be issued as a daily or weekly ration, wPJle in<br />
the majority of cases the items are distributed<br />
througli sales facilities. They are procured,<br />
stored and sold in buUc by the Luartermaster Service<br />
to the <strong>Army</strong> Exchuiige. tinlike all other items<br />
hwdled by this Service it is nut the responsibility<br />
of the Luarterraster Service to insure their<br />
delivery to the individual ccznsumer. For this<br />
reason it is advistble to establish an additional<br />
class of supply Isnorm as VX Itenis".<br />
"The additional class of supplies should be<br />
referred to simply as TX Items" aiid should be<br />
defined as follows:<br />
nnhose items , necessary to yromote moral e<br />
and prsonal hygiene, whlch are proaured by<br />
the Cuartermaster Service, but whioh are turnea<br />
over in wholesale lots to the <strong>Army</strong> Exchange<br />
Service or to other ageiicies slioh as the IL'avy,<br />
Red dross, etc,, for distribution and scles<br />
purposes. The sum items 1:" distributed gratuitously<br />
b) the C,uarternas*uer Service retain<br />
classification as a 'PX Iten'. 11<br />
11. Concluslo-- Various inconslsteiicies and problems<br />
arose throughovt-Ekii 1:uropean Theater of <strong>Operations</strong>, due to the<br />
many interpretations of definitions of the olassea of supply.<br />
12. Recomhiend~~Lc)q~. That appropriate aeencies of the<br />
\/alar Department ennead pertinent kvar Department Field Uanuals<br />
to standardize definitions far classes of supply in CoMormity<br />
with the reaomndations submitted by the Chief (Luarterrcaster,<br />
European Theater of Oprations. (Tar 7b, 80, 9 and 10).<br />
- 9 -<br />
R-E43 -T-R -1-C-'P- E-D
1. m 100-10 (Fa).<br />
2. Fld 10-5, 29 April 191;3.<br />
R-E-S -%R-I-C-T-E -D<br />
Bibliography<br />
Chapter 1<br />
3. l?M 10-10,2 Xarch 1942, Chaiige. i, 8 October 1942.<br />
4. Qhf Service Reference Data, Vol 11, OCC#~TO<strong>US</strong>A, 1 Jan 44.<br />
5. SOP for Operation of Glass I Truckheads, First <strong>US</strong><br />
20 EOV 44.<br />
6. LTO<strong>US</strong>A Cir 23, 4. Ihr 44.<br />
7. Kfter Action Report, Third 'is amy [QX Section).<br />
6. 1st Ind. h00.312 (G-Li Sup) Hq 12th <strong>Army</strong> Group to CG,<br />
Communicutiona Zone, 25 Deo 44 and '%emo for Hecord"<br />
attached theretv by 12th <strong>Army</strong> Gsoup.<br />
9. @: OprhtioiLal malysis Study ti, Subject: nDeflniCions<br />
of Classes of <strong>Supply</strong>;' ~q BF,ETO, OIV~ (Rear) APO 687,<br />
undate d1<br />
10. Ltr Hq 12th &my Group, rile 400 (C-4 Sup) 13 Peb 45,<br />
subjoot: "Levels of <strong>Supply</strong>n, to CG. Communications Zone.<br />
- 10 -<br />
R-E-4-T-R-I-C-T-E3
cwm 2<br />
-XTKLS OF SUPPLY<br />
SECTION 1<br />
EjCISTLlTG ~3FImTIOm<br />
13. Day of <strong>Supply</strong>. A day of sua2ly is thL ostimatcd<br />
avorage oxgenaiturc of various itoms of supply per day in a<br />
campaign, exprossod in quantitios of spocific itms, in<br />
rcrunds per weapon, or in punas pcr man par day.1 In doaliw<br />
with 0,uartLmastcr su>p,plias, the following dGtailcd dofinitions<br />
wora amployod in tho EwoDoan Thoator of Oporationa:<br />
a. Class I. A ration is thG food roquircd to subsist<br />
oni man for onc day, A flay of sunply for on3 m n of<br />
Clam I therefore was Sot at one ration.2<br />
b. Class I1 & N. h dag of supply of Cle.38 XI<br />
could not bo oomputd accurately, and was theroforc only<br />
regarded as a unit of muasuro. Actual cxporionco shwod tho<br />
cxponditures of various itorus to bo variable under campaign<br />
coneitions. Class N itoms aro those roquircd fa' special<br />
or .\articular typos of oporations, and roquirements variod<br />
considerably as tho combat conditions changed. A day of<br />
supply or Class I1 or N bannot be exprosso3 in ?ounds, but<br />
must bo exyxased by itom. Days of sup>ly Wcro,computod<br />
basod on tho '7ar nopartmcnt roplacomont factors, which avo<br />
tho cxpootud avorago mor-all exponditwe of oach itom.&, 5<br />
The allowances as authorizcd by those rsplaoomont factors,<br />
convortod int pounas, providod a figuro of .85 pounds Dcr<br />
man per day.17<br />
c. Class 111. A day of supply of Class 111 was<br />
bascd on cxpcrionco and consumption data coqilod throughout<br />
tho*campaign, Tho figurc, oxyroased in pounds pGr man<br />
por day, variod frbm 15.47 gounds por mar, por day to the<br />
final flguro of 11.38 gounds por man >cr day, This figuro,<br />
hO-NOVGI, was also rOgardGd as a unit of mcasuro. It was<br />
not to bo considorad as on0 day's rcquironenh of any givon<br />
command, but as an avorago d&y of Sup31 which woulG m ot requirements<br />
ovor a eiven period of timo,T<br />
14. Lcvols of S U I . A lovul of supply is tho luan-<br />
tity CT suppliea hcmat a givm point; bnso, dofonso command,<br />
8qartmont , thoatw of o,ioraticns, or similar aotivity,<br />
measiirod in days of supply or in spccific guantitios of an<br />
it0n.l Iovols aro proscribod by tho ldar DcDartnent for tho<br />
thcatcr of opcratlnns, and by tlic thoatcr for the various<br />
dopots, sections and amios. Lcvols a8 prescribad by tho<br />
War Departmnt woro of throo pincipal typos: Minimum, Oporating<br />
and Maximum ~OVclS.<br />
15. lfinimum LOVO~B.<br />
a. The minimum levo1 is tho quantity of su7plios<br />
(in daya) nocdcd to maintain an everseas command priding re-<br />
- 11 -<br />
R-E -3-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
R-E-S4-R-I-C-T-E-D<br />
prescribe3 by the Var Departnent as being the stookage<br />
necessary to provide for the replacement of the nomal supaly<br />
rontine due to interruptions in transportation, enemy<br />
aotJoc, and other unforeseen demds. The stookage of this<br />
reserve in echelon provides for distribution and envisages<br />
the asse-bly of adenuate supplies Lmediately behind coinbat<br />
operetions to insure a aonstant flow in the event of an lnterrnption<br />
In the nomal operatinR level.<br />
b. The iinimum level is therefore governed by the<br />
need to have levels spread frun the rear to forwar? areas,<br />
and by the Quantities needed to iiaintain the supply pipe<br />
line P'ratl ports md base depots to Pozward supTly install-<br />
ations. The quantity In the suyply pipe line itself is<br />
.governed by the length of the lines or commuttication and by<br />
the transport an& handline fhcilities available. r'Jb.en the<br />
pipe line is short, the field forces are supplied direct<br />
frora base depots and levels are relatively easy to mintain.<br />
ks the line lengthens, ana the time fnotor for dellvory increams,<br />
Advance and Intwrmomte depots beoome neosssary. Kin.<br />
&num* levels lnust be established and mintaimed at alldepts tin<br />
order t9 mintaln a sufficient flow oT supplies to the field<br />
foroes .O<br />
16. Oparatinp Level. An ogerat!.ng level of supply~is<br />
the quant~ty of supplies (in days) necessary to aintain an<br />
overseas command duriQg the interval between recaipt of<br />
shiprsents from the zone of interior.5 The operat ng level,<br />
therefor%,is based on the frequency of sailings,lQ and on<br />
the tirie reouired to wrfom the following:5<br />
a. Initiate and forward a requisition to the Zone<br />
of Interior,<br />
b. Load and ship the supplies from the zone of<br />
interior.<br />
0. Unload Lhe supplies in the theater of operations.<br />
(The number of days lnvolved from the initie.tlox of<br />
the i:onuisitton to the receipt of the supplies in the thes-<br />
ter is called the "order and ahippinp time1?$<br />
17. lraximum Ieval. A maxi" level of supply is tne<br />
maximum quantity of supply aermitted on 3and at my given<br />
time in au overseas command, an& is th6 sum of the ninimum<br />
and operating levels, expressed in terms of days of supply.5<br />
18. Although naxhum, operating, and<br />
minimum levels of supply were presoribea for the lhropean<br />
5%-atar of <strong>Operations</strong>, all stocW of Qwrtermnstor supplies,<br />
from the tlme of their arrival, were Considered to foru<br />
part of a Siu@.Q leml. There was no physical segraplntion<br />
of stock betiweex operating and ninimum love1 stocks. Depots<br />
Woro not concerned with oporsting and milvrnun levels, but<br />
were interested only in the total fiqurs, in assuring themselves<br />
that requireQents For so nany days wcre availablo,<br />
RGquisltions to the BOnQ of interior were based on so many<br />
day6 of supply, and not on operating or minimum levels. ~ll<br />
incoaiw %"crrnaster suplies formed one European Theater<br />
stock pile, oontrolled and aistributed by the Chief Q,uartermastar,<br />
Zlthoufih tho factors considered ir, the detQ2hIinotiOn<br />
of tho rininwn and operating levels are essent5al to tho<br />
final detomination of' the maxinzum level, tho suropem meater<br />
of Operatione avoided confnsion and excessiv6 records by<br />
confinin itself insofar as <strong>Quartermaster</strong> supplies were con-<br />
cerned, &o only the one level.<br />
- 12 -<br />
R-E-El-T-R-I -C-T-E-D
n-w-0- &-n-~ -U-I -a-u<br />
SECTION 2<br />
DETERFUNATION OF LZVEX.8<br />
lg, Necessity for Establishing a Level.<br />
a. A level of supply Is essential to provide protection<br />
against interruption in*tha flow of supplioa. Convoys<br />
are s w , delayed 02 lost, daily trains fail t o arrive<br />
and truckg break down, Stoclc levels must be Inaintain-<br />
ed in all echelons to provide continuous supply in spite of<br />
suoh interruptions.<br />
b. A level of supply is essential to provide proper<br />
distribution. Every soldier, regardless of hi&position,<br />
requires q,uartermastcr supplies every day, and in<br />
order t o meet these dQm-dt3 thore must bG concentrntions of<br />
stock at various ventage points throughout the area in<br />
whlch'troops era located, Each item of olot:iing, in all<br />
sizes, though not issued to every soldier every day, aust be<br />
available in stock to meet the damands. Supplies flow<br />
through many channals. Troops are widely disporsed, and the<br />
problem in distribution throughout all ochelona soquiros<br />
stock levels to met the deJminds when placed.<br />
6. A level of supply is essential to meet unerpooted<br />
dmands. Supplies aro repuisitionod fromtho zone of<br />
interior basod on speoific plans n?d on astimates of noeds<br />
end oonsumption YatQ8. Actual consimption of sup?lics in excess<br />
of tho anticipated rate results in a foiluro to moet<br />
damanas of tho anticipated roto results in a failure to nimt<br />
domnds solely from tho supply stocks ordorod for oonsurflptioi<br />
purposes. In April and Yay 194.5, the number of prisoncrs<br />
of war taken by the United States forces was doublo the anti<br />
oipated rate, Thore wore sevcral instanoes of largo soale<br />
dostruction or supplies, necessitating imadiato roplaoe- .<br />
"lt. Several factors cause unoxpectod dowds to be mde,<br />
and stock lovols munt be sufficient at all tines to meot<br />
such ron_uiremants.<br />
20, SiZo Of the LOVOl.16<br />
' a, In dotomining tho size of the bvol to be<br />
carried, the froquency of'convoy arrivals must bo considored<br />
Xach ship, or oaoh convoy, cannot oarry u balanced load of<br />
a number of days supply of oach itm, and tho intorvnl Potwoen<br />
oonvoy arrivals therefore cannot bo mathcjmatically<br />
calculotod into thc dotormination of %?a l ~velto bo carried<br />
Ilowcvcr,it is a factor for oonSideratSon duo to probablo intorruption<br />
of convoy arrivals by suharino nnd bombing aotivitics<br />
of tho onemy.<br />
b. During tho eerly days of tho Europoan Theator<br />
of Ogorations a poriod of 180 to 210 days wag roquircd from<br />
the time of plaoing a roquisition on the zone OP fntorior<br />
until supplios wcro rocoivcd. Tho ordor and shipping timo<br />
was oonsiaorably roduooa to a poriod of 120 days in tho lattar<br />
phases of the ce?ipaign, and spmially hndlod roqulsltions<br />
roqIdircd even leas timu. Tho Sizo of tho IsvoL, thoro<br />
fore, io reduced in proportJon to reduction in the order aqd<br />
ehippine the,<br />
c. nistribution problams also offoat thc Si20 of
R-E-5-T-R-I-C -T-3 -D<br />
lovcls, and spcoial problcms pcculiar to oooh class of Bupply<br />
must be considered ssparately. In general;however, supplies<br />
were distributed by means of the depot system. The larcat. the<br />
flraa and tho proator tho dispcrsion of troops, the prrcatcr<br />
tho numbor or dopots rcquirod. Tho cstablishment of additional<br />
dogots to satiefy this distribution roquircmont waa<br />
n 00118idCrF.tiCn in tho rucmcnded estebl3.shnont of my Snorcamd<br />
thcatcr lcvcl. Tho lovol in each clopot is also depcndcnt<br />
u3on the transportation facilitios aveilab1.e for<br />
brinuing in stock, making intor-depot sizipmmcnts, end for<br />
maintaining a propor stock lovol.<br />
d. Tho principal problcms in tho distribution of<br />
Class 7: supp1.i~~ involvod tho xrcontap.o of moh type ration<br />
to bc cotismod, the ncoossity for maintaining ~3. balanced<br />
diot, and tho supply of pc!rishablos. Tho nlllnCI'OU8 BiZQS<br />
of clothfnpl itemxi ronuiruc? thc distribution anC maintailanoo<br />
of balancod stocks of all sizes in aocordwco with<br />
tariff tablcs, anc! othcr itcnis in Class I1 onc! IV, such RS<br />
spnrc parte, prosoxtcd siniinr poculiar Froblcrts of stockago<br />
and distribution.<br />
o. Unexpootod demands on sup2lics affcct tho sizc<br />
of tho lcvcl to bo oarricd. As mor6 axporionco was Gain&<br />
In tho Suropoan Thoatcr of <strong>Operations</strong> roquirencnts nru mor0<br />
noouratoly ostimatcd and. uncxpoctud dcman?.s docreased .<br />
21. Levols as Proscribed.<br />
a. Yerious lovols wcre proscribod for tlic Zuropom<br />
Thoator of Oprations from thG tho of its inccption.<br />
aosoriboa.levols for Clam I variod from 75 days on 29 Fovmbor<br />
1942, to 50 days*on 3 ?larch 1945. Othor clacsos VRriod<br />
botwoon 45 rind 90 days, with a 60 day 1r:vol a8 avcrago. Tho<br />
Chiof ?uartorrmstor voluntarily cleotod to maintain n 60 day<br />
1svol.of all classcs, and Q 45 day luvt11. of ?ost Rxclianffc<br />
itom, until Naroh 1945, whon conformod to thcso prascribcd<br />
by the "'ar ~,oi~,artLncnt.<br />
1%<br />
b. Tho."rar ncpertucnt proscribod tho thoator levols<br />
to bo maintalncd, direotcd thnt thoy not ba axcooded, and<br />
indicctod tho point at which inco n u plioc would bo included<br />
fimt in the thoater Ic.vols?;f~~~BTho proscribod<br />
lovols wcro subjoat to tho review and rooommcndations of tho<br />
XuroDoon 7!hZ€itC Y Commander. ( AppGCdiX 1)<br />
0; Tho Goinding Ccnernl, .&ropean Theater of<br />
O~oratlena,nroscribed t he lovols to bc. rncilntainorl within<br />
tho thoator. €IC recomixondad, In T'cbruary 1945, tho follow-<br />
.nR lcvols In days to bo luaintainod within the thoatur; 10<br />
-Class<br />
Armp Rorvico<br />
Area<br />
Mvanco<br />
Section<br />
IntGmOdinto<br />
Section<br />
Base<br />
Sootion<br />
T 7 10 18 15<br />
IT 15 15 20 10<br />
SI1 (MT-90) 7 10 10 3<br />
III (Nliod Products) 7 10 18 10<br />
Iv 15 15 20 10<br />
-u-<br />
R-E-3-T-it-I-C-T-b-D
H-r: +"lL&l--mfi-u<br />
The balance of theator stocks not included in tho <strong>Army</strong> Sorvioe<br />
Jcea and Advance Section worc to bc divided betwocn the<br />
Intomodiate and naso Sec%ions, but the lovols in those SOCtiona<br />
were to be brought dcvm ns soon as prccticablo to the<br />
levels preSCribGd.<br />
a. The ronction to tho Thontcr Commder's recommondations<br />
varied in tho field forces. Tlie Third <strong>US</strong> Iu?ny<br />
desired to reduce tho Class I levo1 of thc <strong>Army</strong> Sorvlco<br />
kre~from seven to five dnys in order to retain mobllity,<br />
and at the eamc timo to inc ose the lavvL1 in thc Rdv-nco<br />
Scotion from 10 to 15 dnys.ff Tho Pirst <strong>US</strong> kmy, howcvm,<br />
desired to incronso tho Flmy Tervloe Aroa levo to 15 days<br />
since thoro woru 15 days in tho ration cgclc,lh mc %id<br />
<strong>US</strong> lrmy dcsirod thnt sxpondnblc in tho krmy Servicc :?roc<br />
bo increased to a 30 day lovolJf(l wliilo tho First <strong>US</strong> .'.ray<br />
dosirod ci 30 day love1 for a ll Clnss I1 and 1V supplies.<br />
Each desired a hiqhor stock lcvcl in tho combat zono, OithGr<br />
in tho tray Rcrvico 4rea or in tho Advnnoo Scctioii.<br />
e. Tlic 12 h <strong>Army</strong> Group roComndm3,od a-sliqhtly<br />
highor stoclc l ~ v ~ but l , the ~ Thonter Comnder, cn 12 March<br />
1945 proscribod thnt the following lovsls be cstablisbod<br />
nnd naintainod at the oarlicst practicnblc dnte:l?<br />
<strong>Army</strong><br />
-ClOSS sorvico<br />
-kea Section<br />
AdViXlCQ<br />
I: 7 10<br />
I1 15 15<br />
JII 7 10<br />
Iv 15 15<br />
He stated thet thoro was on obvious advmtage In hnvlng<br />
uniform stoolc levels authorizod and maintninod in 4rmy Garvice<br />
Areas and h tho Pdvanoe "oction, and thnt tho levols<br />
presoribod werc set; to afford mnxinum suliyort to tho ardea<br />
whilo still mnintnining their mobility. Xxooptioas to theso<br />
lcvele wero authorlzod only on spscjfic Clam I1 .and N<br />
itams noooesnry for opcrationnl roquircncnts, -md subjoot<br />
to agreement botwoon the 12th Axmy Croup and the Comnuni-<br />
cntlona Zone.<br />
22. dncfinition. Basod upon oxporioncc throughout the<br />
cmpaign, tho Chibf Quhrtamnstor rocomionded thnt-thc cxlst-<br />
ing dofinitions of lcvols of supply be disrogcrdud, c.n that<br />
only one lcvol b@ cstnblishsd rad defincd as follovm:l%<br />
LOVCl Of SUPPLY - that DLlOUnt Of SUp?liOS IIOCOSs~ryto<br />
bo stocked undcr.contrc1 of thc using agon-<br />
cy (Thcnter, .-, Corps, oto. ,) to provide for rill<br />
requiromonts for a given period of tjr.0 in tho<br />
futuro. Its purposo is t o provido protection<br />
agalnst intorrruption in the rogul-r flow of supplfos;<br />
to provide for M own bnlmoad dlstrlbution;<br />
and to provido n resGrvc t o ineet unoxpootod dcmnndd.<br />
- 15 -<br />
R-E-8-T-R-I-C -T-E-D
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D<br />
23. Ekproasion of LCVG~, of <strong>Supply</strong>. A level expressed<br />
in days of supply should be R realistic forocnst of ?upply<br />
roquirmnts, end should not bo basod on such factors as proaont<br />
mpowor or rcplacomont factors olcno. A day of su-pqly<br />
of Clnss I1 cannot bo oxpresnod as a wholo as cach itom<br />
mst bo nnalyzad aepcratcly, pad tho us0 of c purcly roplacenant<br />
factor levcl is inaccurnto duG to tho groat nuqbur OP<br />
initial'issuos whichwere made. Tho uso of pmsont manpowor<br />
fipwes, in coinputing days of auoply Tor all classcs, was<br />
a150 inaccurntc ma .mapower wn$ subjoct to constcnt change,.<br />
Othcr Tsctors, such as nn incorrect tariff of sizos on hind,<br />
thc diffcront :ionus to bo scrvod to difforont cfitu&orii;-s of<br />
parsonni.1, nnd fUbWG p1,nnncd ogorctions suoh ns thosc cclling<br />
for tho omploy" of lnrgo nrmorcd forcos, must bo connidmcd<br />
in co?:iputing dnvs of supply. Thc lcvcls of supply<br />
woro thoreforc nnc.lyzod in E ronlistic fcroccst of require-.<br />
mdnts which took 011 influoncing fr.ctors into considoration,<br />
nnd th.0 lcvols w;ro exprossod, not.in tams of replacomant<br />
factor cnd monpowor dnys of supply, but in n foro r.st of the<br />
nmbor of dngs tho supplics vould probably inst. 18<br />
24. @vels on Fand.<br />
. a, The lcvcls down to nrmiea woro genorrilly maintoinod,<br />
insof::r as priorities rad trensportation would pormit,<br />
tovols v;ithj.n tho nimics, hOWCVGr, vzriod considornbly.<br />
In Auguat i9&; thc Thirc! <strong>US</strong> .mny had on hnnd two dc.ys supply<br />
of Clnss I, onc day of Class 111, and four days of Class<br />
I1 nnd TV, while tho lovols of tba Firs6 ,"my woro rolntivo-<br />
Ly high, In ncptemtcr 19&, thc Ninth ?my bocama oporcitlon-<br />
nl with hiEh lovols, vhila thoso of the First and Third<br />
Irmics wrc crtromoiy low. Thc disproportion bf3tWGGn the<br />
lcvols .of tho various amios (Sradunlly dscrcc.scd a d im- ,<br />
proved until by tho cnii of tho cm aign 6xccl.lcnt propcr-<br />
tioucito dlstributlon w7.s cffeotcd.~~<br />
b. Lovela throughout tho opcrntions in Southurn<br />
Frrmce ware goncrnlly higher, P1:ins. cnllod for tho landing<br />
of fivo d.nys su~plyevory thrco days, building up a two dny<br />
ntook cnch ttw. Tho plcns wcro cnrricd out, but tho ex9sn-<br />
dituro of 31csB I11 was honvior thnn :inticipatod. In Octobor<br />
194L stock lovols in tho .Firray Borvicc .&Tor. woro cstnblishoa<br />
at fivo d?.y.yc for Class I 2nd I11 r!nd 15 days for<br />
Clnas I1 end IV. A l5-dcy ?.Lvcl or a11 cl.ossce was cetnblishod<br />
for %?lo nLdvr.nce Roction, Thc shortncc of transportntion<br />
lncilitics provontod tho octunl build-up of thoso<br />
lcvcls in thc Eonvctrd c.rc?.s until January 1945, whon tho foriwrd<br />
rilovomont of tho Seventh <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong> and tflc First Fronch<br />
.Rmy he.d slorvoa dovm.15<br />
25. Conclusions.<br />
0. Thnt tho Turopcnn The-tcr or Oporntions wns<br />
only conccrnod with on6 lcvol oP supply. Thnt tho LWSQof<br />
throe typos of levcls ceuses oonfusion cnd prcscn'ts m incorrect<br />
pioturo of $hi. situation.<br />
b. Thnt the computntion of days of mp"ly, bnsod<br />
pwaly on rcplncomcnt factors and proncnt manpowor, is nooossarily<br />
c.n incorroct figure.<br />
- 16 -<br />
R-E-S-T -R-I-C-T-E-D
R-E-S-T-R-I-C -T-E-D<br />
c: nrt lcvols must bo established to moot 211 raquirmonts,<br />
stocked through -11 ochelone, and nL?int,dnod in<br />
such bnlnncc and sizo r.s to moot requiremonts without impding<br />
mobility.<br />
26. Recommendations,<br />
n,' That oxisting dofinitions of lwcla oP supply bo<br />
diarogardod, ond thct only Onc lovcl be catahlishecl in ccnforrlity<br />
with the definition as rocomcndod bjr the Chicf<br />
fiunrtom.stor, Ruroncin Thontcr of OporcCions.<br />
b. Thnt the conputction of day8 of supply, bzsul<br />
on roplnconont fact,ors and prosont monpowcr, bz mended to<br />
Include constecsz.tion of all roqulromonts, .<br />
- 17<br />
R-E-S-T-R-1-0 -T-E-D
R-E-S-'P-R-1-C-T-E-D<br />
Bibliography<br />
Chaptcr 2<br />
1. Chaptcr 1, FM 100-10, Ficld Sorvico Regulations - Ab.<br />
2. Adm Inst No. 9, 21 August 1944, 12th <strong>Army</strong> Group.<br />
3. PVX QX 23281, Ogl905A Nov l+J+ from 12th <strong>Army</strong> Group.<br />
4. A h Inst No 13j 27 August 19k4, 12th <strong>Army</strong> Group,<br />
5. Part 111, ?M 38-205, lf<strong>Army</strong> <strong>Supply</strong> Proccduroll, 15 May 1944.<br />
6. Ltr, Hq ASF,'Wsh, D.C. , SPX 400 (16 ,Tun 44) OB-S-SPDDL-14,<br />
19 June 1944, subj: "Adhorenac to Authorizod LoVOl6" .<br />
7. LtP, WD Wsh, D.C., AG 400 (15 Nov 44.)OB-S-B3rI, 23 Nov<br />
44, sad: qqLcvclsof <strong>Supply</strong> for Ovorsilae Aroa9, Dcportments,<br />
Thoators, Bases".<br />
8. Ltr, WD, Wash, D. C., AG 400 (21 Doc 44) B-S-E4, 29 Duo<br />
44, subj: qbvols of <strong>Supply</strong> for Oversons Arons, %partmcnts,<br />
Thoators and B860S".<br />
9. TWX, EX-99501, G-4, C O ~Z, 02DQ30A Fob 45.<br />
10. Ltr, Hq Third U3 <strong>Army</strong>, f41o AG 400 (Gon) GNMCD-3, 8 Fob<br />
45, subj: 'rLovola of <strong>Supply</strong>ql.<br />
11<br />
'Dm CX e28, First ES &my, 08104OA Fob &5.<br />
12. Ltr, Hq 12th <strong>Army</strong> Group to CG, Com 2, filo 400 (G-4 Sup)<br />
13 Feb 44, subj: "Levels of <strong>Supply</strong>fl.<br />
13. WJg EX 19609, Hq BTOGSA, 121600A March 19C5.<br />
1L. Periodic (WocXly) Q-4 Reports, 12th <strong>Army</strong> Group (Aug 44 -<br />
May 1945).<br />
History of Oontincntal Advanoo Section, Comunicntiona<br />
15 Zona, ETQ<strong>US</strong>A, August 1944 - May 1945.<br />
16. Oporational,Analysis Study No 3, undatoa, ItLovols of<br />
SUPPlY", TSFET, TCC&<br />
3.7 QM Oporational Analysis'Btudy no 4, undated, V'Quartormaator<br />
Logistical Datal!, TSFET, TCQM.<br />
- 18 -<br />
R-E-8-T-R-I 4 -T-E-0
R-E&-T-R-I-C-T-3-D<br />
CHAPTER 2<br />
DAILY TELEGRAM<br />
SECTION 1<br />
PRESCRIBED <strong>US</strong>E<br />
27. Definition. A Dally Telegram ie a messap dis-<br />
patched da y p d visions, air force service command<br />
and larger'hitbs reiquesting Class I and 111 supplies.f'It<br />
Is the basis for the supply of these lasses from the Communications<br />
Zone to the using unlta.16<br />
28, Procedure.<br />
a. Individual units submit dally ration requests<br />
to their next hlgher headquarters. Divisions (for divisional<br />
and attached troops] and corps (for corps troops only) con-<br />
solidate unit requests and estimate their total ration requirements.<br />
They then prepare the daily telegram, giving<br />
the strength of the conmand, total rations required, and a<br />
report on the status and requirements of Class I11 suppliee.1°<br />
b. Corps and division daily telegrams are submitted<br />
direct to army. <strong>Army</strong> prepares a consolidated army<br />
telegram, based on the requirements of all subordinate units<br />
including army troops, on stock levels on hand In army supply<br />
points, and on estimated requirements for intended<br />
operatlons. <strong>Army</strong> submits its telegram to the regulating<br />
station, stating the mount of supplies deeired at each<br />
auoply point, The regulating station notifles the appro-<br />
priate Communications Zom depots whioh prepare an8 deliver<br />
the ehlpents to tie designated arm supply pointe.10<br />
c. In the event that there is no regulating sta-<br />
tlon, divjsion and corps may submit their telegrams direct<br />
to the army supply point, which in turn consolidates<br />
and forwards st" to the army. The army may either submit<br />
it8 telegram direct to the Communications Zone depot, or<br />
'GO the depot through the Advance Section, Communications<br />
Zone. 11<br />
SECTION 2<br />
<strong>US</strong>E IN THE EUROPEAN THEAm OF OPERATIONS<br />
29. Procedure.<br />
a. The preparation, routing, and use of the daily<br />
telegram in the European Theater of <strong>Operations</strong> followed<br />
generally the procedure prescribed by the War Department.<br />
Class I and 1x1 supplles were procured by means of daily<br />
tebgrams which included the strength of the command and<br />
an outline of the Class 111 situation.2 The field armies<br />
prescribed that divisions, for divlslon and attached troops;<br />
oorps, for corps and attached trcope; and each unit of<br />
army troops would submit daily telegram,? Telegrams were,<br />
- 19 -<br />
TI-E-3-T-R-1-0 -'I-3-D
howevor, norlully subrlittec' to tho supgly points instoud<br />
of dircct to urIqr.<br />
h. r.ftur rcgulatinp stctionn wore establisho2, thc<br />
Quartormoster subtaitted his d~ilytclcgrdm diroct to<br />
tho reculotinp station. ':ith roforenoo to tho Turtiicr routiq<br />
beyond tho ro[,ulotinG station snc? tho nhnncr in vhioh<br />
s~~pplics mro nclturally ship2ed from tho domunicotions<br />
Zona forrrurd to tho m~e8,thoro vas o [rddu~~l ovolution<br />
to tho syf,tam whereby the rey,uletinf stution rcocived the<br />
ddlg tolcrron fro51 tho eruios biid routod scme to jhc clo ot<br />
ifhioh actudly mado shim" to thc fiold forcos. The<br />
evolution of the crpcoss cms dlrooted to thr lassaniw of<br />
thc interval bctnocn the tino tho amy subriittod the daily<br />
telcgru dnd tho tfno su>,plios wcrc ectunllg dolivmWl, 12<br />
Duriwe the only gbrt of tho coiri:) icn, cvm for Class 1<br />
supplies, this intcrvd rrmgod fro i oipht to 15 iuys far<br />
thc ariiios of the 12th xfliy Froup.7,c,$<br />
0. Outlinocl balor, l o tho history of thc cvolution<br />
of the iwoccdurt lor wopgrini rinE routinc, thc A,,Fly tclo-<br />
Frem in Conuunicotioco Zono, Zui+opo;ln ThoutcjP of Oar~,itions:<br />
(I) Durine July-Octobor 19&, tho daily telo-<br />
[ran frori tho arrlios wna aubdttud diroct<br />
to I:undquntcrs, :omnuniciitlone Sone. Tht:<br />
crltical ougply situation pcvuiliny ut<br />
tho tine woe thc bt.sin for adoptinp this<br />
hithly controllod orocodurc. ClL>8sII<br />
mqfplioo, in u0.clition to Clues I and<br />
Class I11 su;i?lios, wcrc ordorcd c71soby<br />
the trruios in tho ddly tologrun.li T:ourevcr,<br />
instoed of cdllinG for such suo~~l~os<br />
by iten, tho cull, in dcoordunco qiith<br />
thc Ygsteri OP tonuipc ullocutionn arcscribotl<br />
e t t tho tlim, wu5 w,dc lor J ccrtuin<br />
nuibcr of tom dT Class I1 itcims.<br />
Such 2 polioy prov~a incffootive. Tho<br />
Chicf C$uarl.onulstor stntcA: ':my do,u,nrl<br />
for Pun?ly must bi, liy itc 11 .nd not liy<br />
ton. Pc,r::on.icl in thc Coruiunicutims<br />
;hi ii must bc ~1~ncr: llg f'di1i.r xith tho<br />
rcquironcnts in for\, r(i uroa::, yot novcr<br />
tL thr, s?cclfio iiacds<br />
(2) Durinr d?tUiltjGT 194.4, L duvico for f,cilitho<br />
calla of tlit, tirciios for Clnss<br />
Jlios vC.s doptcc? in Coniunic~tione<br />
Zoni., Surolwun Tlw~torof 0:)orationb.<br />
Class I1 Quortormstcr nanic lhintandncc<br />
Sot tvus dram uti, listiny tho vc8rious<br />
Class 11 itom dnd lctturinp them rdth An<br />
olphuboSio&l system. Tho claily tclq raia<br />
thcn roguostod a numbor of bs,sio moiltonmc.?<br />
sct~, rilnuo cart .in itilma not nol>dcb,<br />
plus o~rt~iii itom not listod In ddoounto<br />
ousntitios. This TxrocLduro eliminutcd tho<br />
dieudvuntofo of ordcrirq Cluas IJ FJA 7Am.os<br />
by tons, but oinoc thi. duiLy toloprarl ifas<br />
still routod direct frori thu ropul~tinl<br />
stution to Xeadounrtezc, Coritiunicqtions 2 OWJ,<br />
tho Systoiu WGD as hichlg controlled LIS<br />
before. I.?<br />
- 20 -<br />
R-E-3 -T-R-T -0-T-E-D
R-E-S-T-I7 -I-C -T-IC -D<br />
The system outlined above was predicated<br />
on the Idea that the records in the OPfice<br />
of the Chief Qusrtermaster, Comrounj cations<br />
Zone, were sufficiently complete and upto-date<br />
to enable the <strong>Quartermaster</strong> <strong>Supply</strong><br />
end Distribution Division to rscaive the<br />
daily telegram from the armies and to<br />
parcel out to the various <strong>Quartermaster</strong><br />
supply Installations the demands of the<br />
armies. Such provea not to be the case<br />
in frequent instances. Directions for<br />
shipnent were sometines made by the Chief<br />
<strong>Quartermaster</strong> on depots whose stock condl-<br />
tions were insufficient for the shipAents<br />
required. This was partioularly true in<br />
Class I1 and IV sup~lies.l3,15 Adding<br />
to the difficulties of the situation, shor-<br />
tage of transportation did not permit<br />
adequate stocking of forward depots from<br />
port ar8as and, for the same reason, it<br />
was also lmoossible to make inter-depot<br />
shipment beeween forward depota .I3 Backorders<br />
for Class I1 and IT items increased<br />
to serious oroportions. The armies, in<br />
order to be certain of suppl -requisitioned<br />
back-ordered itms.Y3,3f By<br />
December 194b the situation was so serious<br />
that the 12th <strong>Army</strong> Croup caused an investigation<br />
tc be made by Its own personnel<br />
(See Appendix 2). Representatives from<br />
the <strong>Army</strong> Service Forces in 'Vashington<br />
visited the Comunications 'Cone Headquarters<br />
to examine tho procedure.l4,15<br />
In December 1944, the Class 11 section<br />
wqs eliminated from the dally telegram on<br />
the basis that a daily call was a too Prequent<br />
requisition for Class I1 supplies,<br />
back-orders being too numerous. The prpcedure<br />
was also adopted whereby daily talsgrams<br />
wore routed direct Prom the rogulating<br />
station to depots previously desig-<br />
nated by the Chief nuartarmaster 30 supply<br />
each army. In addition, the Class I11<br />
solid fuel section was eliminated from the<br />
daily telegram, and it we8 also prescribed<br />
that Cl8,ss IV end Post =change tens would<br />
not be included on the telcgmm.:3<br />
Throughout the remainder of the campaiqn,<br />
the prooedure adopted in December 19l+,4for<br />
the preparation and routinpl of the dailv<br />
telegrai wagyetained anti isad in supplying<br />
the armies.<br />
d. Commmting on the procedure finally evolved<br />
whereby the regulating station reoeivsd the daily telegram<br />
and directed shipment from spec3.f ic depots oreviously deslgnated<br />
by the Chief <strong>Quartermaster</strong>, the ideal ooncept of the<br />
regulating station which would facilitate this procedure was<br />
outlined b>v the Chief "unrternsster in a memorar?dum to The<br />
Penrsal i3oerd Ssrvice Section, 17 November 1945!1p Rroa&<br />
Phases of Organization and Cperation for <strong>Supply</strong>.<br />
- 21 -<br />
R-E-8 -T-P.-I-C-T-E-D
R-3-6-T-R-J -G -T-E-D<br />
"The teaching& of the <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong> that the impetus<br />
of supply shall be from the rear are sound. The connecting<br />
link betweea the Cammunicatlons Zone and the <strong>Army</strong> or the <strong>Army</strong><br />
Group should be an improved regulating ste,tion. The mission<br />
of the improved regulating station should be carefully rede-<br />
fined and broadened. It should be the contact agenoy with<br />
the b.rdes and the <strong>Army</strong> Groups. They need Pew troops. A<br />
small staff having a knowledge cf all depots - knowing on<br />
which depot to place requisitions and being intimately associated<br />
with all phases of military transport, can, in my<br />
opinion, best accomplish the mission. The improved rep-<br />
lating station referred to by me herein must know at all<br />
times the status of requiaitibns placed - the status of supplies<br />
shipped, tht is, their location enroute, thsir time<br />
Of delivery to the Armias and other troops forward, etc.<br />
l'hs vqq&iting ststfon as outlined by me should serve direct-<br />
ly under, and receive its command orders frob the Commanding<br />
neneral, Communications ?one. Its technical fnformatlon<br />
should come from the Deputy Chiefs of Service located at<br />
the Headquarters, Communications 7Z~ne.9'<br />
30. m.<br />
a. There was no form presaribad for the daily telegram<br />
by the War Department. Eaoh army devissd its own form<br />
for the use of its suborahate units (Appendix 3 ). This<br />
procedure wm generally satisfactory from the standpoint of<br />
both the armies end the subordinete units, with the exccp-<br />
ticn that the forme were changed from time to timt and varied<br />
mong the ardes, thus causing oonfusion emong the units.<br />
Some forms were clonr and simple, while others gave break-<br />
downs by types of retions and listed reserve and maintenance<br />
stocks. Others, Lcter in the campaign, listed by oatcgory<br />
the personnel for whom rhtlons were roquired.<br />
b. In calling for supplies from the Comunlcations<br />
Zone, the <strong>Army</strong> Qmxtermaster utilized no standard form. The<br />
Sevbnth IJR Arq vuortermastbr submitted his requests by<br />
letter (Appendlaas I+ & 5). Since the <strong>Army</strong> quartermastor,<br />
unlike the nuartsrmaster or supply of'ficer of his subordinace<br />
units, is concerned with stocking a number of instnllatiohs<br />
rather than a single unit aupply dunp, and alnce he muat<br />
maintain a oertain level of' supplies in order to furnish<br />
day to day requirements for immediate consumption, his daily<br />
call for supplioa can not h6 reduced to R standard, simpli-<br />
fied form suitable under all conditions.<br />
31. Fditin The question of the authority or advisability<br />
ofe&un$ications "one to edit the daily telegram<br />
submitted by the field forces arose when the Communi-<br />
cations Zonc requested thnt Class I1 and Tv SUpplieB be<br />
separated on the dally telegram. The guartermaster, Third<br />
Us <strong>Army</strong>, stated "It.would be difficult to explain the tao-<br />
tical reason for which much of this equipment is required,<br />
,, and the Commandiq General, 12th <strong>Army</strong> Group,<br />
in a le ter to the Commanding General, Communications Zone,<br />
stated: s<br />
"Thls headquarters recognizes the fact that<br />
you, 8s the supply agency for this theater,<br />
must odopt measures which will insure an equi-<br />
table distribution of the aveilable supplies<br />
to all wmmands of the theater. This is accomplished,<br />
insofar 8s the elements of this com-<br />
- 22 -<br />
R-ES-2-R-I-C-T-3-D
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E -D<br />
nand me concerned, if requisltlons for sup-<br />
plies are kept within authorized allowances,<br />
Under existing instruct ions of this heedquarters,<br />
elements of the 12th Arm Group are not<br />
permitted to requisition items in excess of<br />
authorized allowances without priot approval<br />
of this headquarters. Therefore, the editing<br />
of requisitions by you is considered to be not<br />
only unnecessary, but could VEW well develop<br />
into procedure which would seriously limit the<br />
prompt shipment of supplies. '1<br />
It was decided that the Communications Zone did not hEve<br />
authority to edit, and that the <strong>Army</strong> <strong>Quartermaster</strong> would<br />
be limited, in his call for supplies only by his own judg-<br />
ment, his estimate of the situation, and by any limitations<br />
imposed by higher h6adquarters, based mainly on shortages<br />
in supply stocks and transportation.<br />
SECTION 3<br />
GOhTL<strong>US</strong>IONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS<br />
32. Conclusions.<br />
a. That in a supply system featuring a oentral,<br />
highly controlled supply procedure, the success of the daily<br />
telegram in aupply operations from the Communications Zone<br />
to the field forces demands an up-to-deite, aoourate stock<br />
control system in the headquarters exercising central control.<br />
b. When the situation permits of decentralization,<br />
the greatest succe8s in scpply operations based on daily<br />
telegrams is achieved whsn the supply organization provides<br />
for a regulating station whose variqus sections are sufficiently<br />
lnfbrmed on the looal eupply and transportation<br />
situation to permit routing the dally telegram direct to<br />
the supply lnstallation capable of shipping the supplies<br />
raqbeatcd..<br />
a. It is not practicable to ordctr nuertermastsr<br />
Class I1 and TV supplies by means of thc daily telegram.<br />
33. Recommendat ions.<br />
a. That in future operations similar to the condi-<br />
tions that existed in the European Theater of <strong>Operations</strong>, the<br />
supply organization be so constituted as to provide for<br />
routing the daily telegram direat from the regulating station<br />
to the supply installation designated to make shipment.<br />
b. That Class 11 and IV supplies not be included<br />
in the daily telegram.
R-l2-S-T-R-I-G-T-I-D<br />
Bibllogrnphy<br />
Chap'ter 3<br />
1, Paragraph 16, FM 10-10 (Quarteraester Field Manual).<br />
2. Cynrtermastsr Service RefGrenCQ Dsta, Volume 11, OW,<br />
ETO<strong>US</strong>A, 1 January 1944.<br />
3. AdministrQtive Stsnding Operating Procedure, Third <strong>US</strong><br />
<strong>Army</strong>.<br />
4. Letter, Eq Ninth <strong>US</strong> Amx, 400 GNMW-3, 1 Bczmber 1944,<br />
Rubjoct: Non-Shipment of Items Requested on Daily Tolegram.<br />
5. 1st Indorsement, Hq 12th <strong>Army</strong> Group, file 400.312 (G-4<br />
Sup), 25 Decambor 1944, to CG, Con 2, and "Memo for<br />
9eoord" nttachsd thoreto,<br />
6. After Actjon Report, QE" Section, Thiid <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong>.<br />
7. P-fter Action RCpoTt, n,N Section. 12th <strong>Army</strong> Group.<br />
5. TW, CU-828, 081040A February 45, First <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong> to 12th<br />
<strong>Army</strong> Group.<br />
9. Inclosure 110. 7, to Ltr Hq 12th <strong>Army</strong> Group, file 400,312<br />
(a-4. Sup), 28 October,, 1944, Sub jact: *lRequlsitloningand<br />
Movement of Supplies.<br />
10. FII 100-10.<br />
11. w 101-10.<br />
12. Operational Study Number 13 V3road Phase of Organization<br />
Rnd Operation for <strong>Supply</strong>f1,Hq MFET, OTCQM, December lc5.<br />
13.<br />
<strong>Quartermaster</strong> Operational Analysis Study Number 5, l'Quuartermaster<br />
<strong>Supply</strong> Operstions in the Communications Zone<br />
during Gombat", Rq TSF':T, OTCQM, December 45.<br />
14. After Action Report, Quartrrmaster Section, 12th <strong>Army</strong><br />
Croup, August 1944-Xay 1945.<br />
15. Study Nmber 27, Mechonica of <strong>Supply</strong> in Fast Moving<br />
>Siturtions, file 401/4, General Board, <strong>US</strong>m, APO 408.<br />
- 24 -<br />
R-Z-S-T-RrI -C-T-E-D
R-EFS -TbR-I-C-T-B-D<br />
SECTIIlr 1<br />
DEFGT LYSE71<br />
34. Ceneral Ilission of the De?ot Swtem. In the Comunioationv<br />
Zodi?,Tui?j&n Theater ; m o n s , the do lot<br />
systcm was the leans by which e8ch soldier iras supplied<br />
svery dag with ruartermster sii:>plies, regardless of his<br />
position in the Thejter of Opcr-tions and his assigned<br />
mission.<br />
35. Classifioation of Depots.<br />
a. Severe1 different interpr_ettltions of’ depot<br />
olbRfiffioetions viere publinhed ia tho ,,urogJ;.i: The:..taP Of<br />
@:)crctions by v:,risus epncie5. ?..oh charge in tominology<br />
c:!uaed confusion and neoessit::ted a reeducztion of all<br />
field. and staff personnel. Claesific.,tion uf depots and<br />
degot teminol.o$y must be standadfzed cnd chfinees therein<br />
kept to rn absolute ninimun.<br />
b. The Y x i)egnrt.ment Piald Tbnunl 100-10 states:<br />
“Cormunications Zono depots ore a180 designated as Aclvmoe, ,<br />
Intermediate or Ease, dcpendonb upon tho Section in which.<br />
l0c:ltod.”<br />
0. Standing Operating Procedure Ilunber 7, Buropean<br />
Theoter of pwation-J, 19 ::arch 1945 rive0 the follmtine:<br />
dufiniticns:<br />
“(1 Issue Depot. I, &pat norrmlly in un<br />
aiivunoo section, assigned rcsponalhility<br />
for storing suiplias within prescribed<br />
levels and for iosuinr,- supalj?.s .. reqilirod<br />
to neet the nods of:<br />
(a) Arden and other troop and orpanlzations<br />
in li dwignated SroG of tho<br />
Combat Zone.<br />
(b) Trocps rind organizations in e dasignatod<br />
moa of tho Comiunioatlons<br />
zone.<br />
d-<br />
(2) Fillor De ot. A depot, norrally in 8n<br />
ntcrricd a e section, ac~signsd rosponsibility<br />
for atorin6 tho principal portion<br />
of theater sugp1:os within prescrlhcd<br />
lcvols and for:<br />
(a) Replsnishing supplios upon roguost<br />
frcn Imue Dopots.<br />
(b) Iosuiq- supplies to troops end organizations<br />
in (I dcsigmtod ama of<br />
the Comunic!itions Zone.<br />
(a) Recaiving and. storing so??lics<br />
- 25 -
R-E-S -T-R-I -C-T-Z-D<br />
reccived from local procurer" in<br />
the area.<br />
(3) BsseiDepot. A depot, nor:laIly in a base<br />
sect on, ansignod rosponsibilitp for:<br />
(a) Receiving, olascifyine, and storinc<br />
supplios shippod frori porta or frori<br />
local manufacturers ,<br />
(b) Serving as a warohousc. to clctir ports<br />
and for storage of excess thcatcr<br />
atooks.<br />
(0) Roplofiishing supplies of Pillcr Dcpota<br />
upon direction of thc Chief of<br />
Servico conezrned.<br />
(d) Issuing supplios to troops and organizations<br />
in a desippatod are@of<br />
the Corununioations Zone.<br />
*<br />
(4.) Ice ,De ot. A dopot assigned rosponsibi-<br />
(a) Centrally storing tho entiro Cormuuni-<br />
cations Zono stock of selected items<br />
and/or their components.<br />
(b) Issulna suplioz1 upori request from<br />
isistolletions and orgenizations .'I<br />
d. Tho Thatlter terminology as prescribed above is<br />
misleading from a Fuartormastcr standpoint, end tands to<br />
falsoily imply thc mission of the v rious doppts. All<br />
9,uutormster depot8 hem an issuo rospomibilitg. Bone<br />
aapots nust ioauo in retail to troops in tlioir locality.<br />
Furthernore, a base dcpot has tho aemo typo of niobion ac<br />
a ftller dopot inasmuali as uuppliss in filltr dopots or0<br />
roplonishod by shipments fro3 baso depoto. The '!sr Eepertmnt<br />
tominology mora correctly dosignatas thri dopots.<br />
Uov+over, the dcfinitiona as oontainnc in Fiola Iianual 100-10<br />
should be mdo more spooiflo and a t thc 8x10 tirae rotain<br />
tho neccsoary flosibility.<br />
Q. Classifying LL dopot as a Keydopot ~EIScaused<br />
oonfusien from a Cuarterimstor standpoint. Tb-e def inltion<br />
states that a Key (tepot is rQRpOnSiblQt or storing the entire<br />
stools of sslootod items - thb purposc boing to oonoentrato<br />
thovo item whioh are required in ana11 quantities<br />
such as flags, officers' inaiynio, etc. and those itsms which<br />
might be oonsidorcd of o. sonsitivo nature and ousily pilfes-<br />
able, such as ~ 0 " ~ olothing, s atc. The 0,uartonastcr<br />
Scrvice doos not huvo H Sufficient number of itom requiring<br />
this centralized atmago to nocoeuitato a depot with ehe<br />
oxolusive niusloii of recovering, storing, a d isouint: onZy<br />
thoso items. This boing tho cam, it was uacesa ry to give<br />
a doublo olssslflcation - A goy depot and a fillor dopot,<br />
etc. Furthernore, the classification of a f!cpot as a koy<br />
depot mons nothing uiiless tho solected itom ?vhich ire to<br />
bo oontrally stored there arc dcfinod. This points to tho<br />
fact thst It is tho item which reauiros dofinition sild not<br />
tho depot. Tho rnisoion Of OBCh dopot StlOUld Stotc the item3<br />
- 26 -<br />
ReE-9-T-R-1- C-T-E-D
!vihic!i 610 to bo cxclusivcly rQcOiVOd, storcd and issued by<br />
that insttllution.<br />
f. Dept classifications for a Thcater of Dpcracions<br />
which would bcot fulfill the roouiromcnts os" tho martcrmr;tor<br />
Scrvioc aru:<br />
Base Dopot. A Qopot nornallg at ar in tho<br />
vicinity of (I port having tho res2onsibi-<br />
litg for:<br />
[a] Recoiviq, classifying and storin[: of<br />
su?glics shipLxd froE ports.<br />
(b) Roalonishine auEplicb of Intcrnediato<br />
and Xdvnnce Dopotu.<br />
(c) ~ssuingsupllics to troops and organizations<br />
in a docienpted moa of thc<br />
ComunicGtions Zone.<br />
Intcrmodistc Dcpot. 1 depot fiOri,mlly in<br />
an Intaruediatc SectIan assigned the<br />
rosponsibility Tor storing thl: principal<br />
portion of '?hater supplies within proscribed<br />
levolG and for:<br />
(a) Rcplcnishing slrpplica upon request<br />
from IidVbnCO Depots.<br />
(b) Issuing supplies to troops und organi-<br />
zetions in a designated ure8 of the<br />
Golltumications Zone,<br />
Mvanco Ijcyot. A dapot nor!lelly in on<br />
Mvance Sr,ction, aasi@od thc rosponsibi-<br />
licv for storinr: sumlios within nrascribod<br />
levels ?or ivbuin8 su~pl.ios<br />
rcguirod to wet tho noods or:<br />
(a) Psnios end othcr traops md orgeinizations<br />
in a dasignatod arc3 of Chc<br />
Conibot Zcno.<br />
(b) Trco~so:ic? organizations in a dcslgnatod<br />
ci~aof Lhc Coruuiiceticine<br />
Zonc.<br />
36. Nood for Port Dopots. :Ihonovr.r the trsnsportution<br />
fricilitics for novin~, off locdcd siipplios frsii thc? port to<br />
supijlg instullntions outside the port area aro ineufflciont<br />
to Iccitp tk ports cloar, thcra is a noed for n port dopat.<br />
P!ithout a port depot to invontorp off loac?cd stocks ut ~orts,<br />
them 3tooIc3 cannot bc oonsidurcd svailoblc for wyglyina,<br />
t!ic traops until thoy arc shl.ppcd to inland dopots, warchoused,<br />
2nd invont oricd. Prior to this, them uninvontorica<br />
stocks wem just so uany tons, and not' item w required<br />
bv troops. In thc lurop3aii Thaetor of Opcrntions trdnopor-<br />
&tion facilities WCrO searoe and tho ,?,unrtei?naster service,<br />
to&:othcr wltli otlior sc-rvicos, wos givau R daily allocation<br />
of so tons for rorward riovoncnt from port arcus to<br />
inlalft dopots. At the lar&o port of Antworp (J-65951 thorc<br />
\vas no port 0.apot to sogreento 3nd invcntory stooko that woro<br />
- 27 -<br />
R 4-43-T-R-I -C -!S 4-D
off loudcd and awaiting shipwnt iniond. 'iith no knowlocigc<br />
of tho compoaition of thcse oPf lo,ded stocks, tho lixited<br />
tr-.naportation ?acSlitics woru often used to transport inlala<br />
fron ports itor.rs thnt wcrc not ncoded at thc tine by the<br />
ficld forem, while other itom for which n critical nocd<br />
cxiotod wro left unideiitifiod ot tho port. In addition,<br />
bulk shipriata of uninvontoriod tons of oup~lic~ from ports<br />
to ialund depots ortcii i-esul:ed in undesirable dic tribution<br />
of otoc1:a. 'Ihcn tr~nsport~tion is sliort, inter-ciopot ahipmilts<br />
cannot be mide for tha purpose of rrdintributing stocks.<br />
37. Ths %pot System in Dogth. As thc lino of comunications<br />
longthenod, cnd it beccmc ncccvsury to suyply tho<br />
ficld forcoo by formrd depots, thL sdootivo stocking of<br />
forvard ciiid iriterrlediatc dcpots w3s begun. Fact noving<br />
itons wrc sclLcted out of the msa of toncagc at thc baoa<br />
dcpoG md worc .tockod in forirard clnd ir.tcrmc2isto depots.<br />
Tho slow-moviny. bulk item romining; fit tho Lase depot aore<br />
moved forvrard only as reguircd. Generally, interniedintu<br />
dopots rsplonishod tho oclvanoc dopots and stockod certain<br />
itcls thot tldvalicc depots did not stock. Howcvcr, it llrils not<br />
until about Novcmher 191& that depot opcretions coescd to be<br />
tlod. down to tho boachcn and thc intcrmodiato dqot systm<br />
UBS set up.<br />
38.<br />
fl. In the European Theator of Oportitions tho gcncrftl<br />
adxiinistrntion of depots waa govowed by the P,uortcr-<br />
milter Depot Opcrationa Manuril. dated 1 Dcccnbcr 1943, and<br />
by othcr storage puaphlc tz tlnrl uppopriato texts. €lowovo~,<br />
oncli dcgot had 3 spocific and detailad I@iSSloi1 thnt oould<br />
not bo set forth in publicfitions in gonerel tcrms. Coriscquontly,<br />
a letter mission wuu propcrred for each dopot<br />
explaining in sufriciciit dctoil crectly tho specific miskion<br />
in each cuco. Thcsc lsttcr lnissions worc proparod by the<br />
Chiuf Qm9ii;r:instor, so thdt the opcrflt!.oii of tha depot<br />
could bo intcpetcd in ,tho antiro dopot ogntcni. Thosu lottcrs<br />
YKWC simplc md briof and. provideti for Plcxibility in<br />
tho opcrrtion of -the dopot, diid furnishcd esocntiel inTomtion<br />
to thc depot corumndcr. (Appendix tlwibcr 6)<br />
b. Exporicncc in thcr Curogenn Thcotcr of Oporationn<br />
h:ie brought out ccrtain Essentials ro,rardinp dcpot misslons.<br />
X'hc ndssion must bo pr3percd und pub,lished o:i tho thoatar<br />
headquartcru LcvoI. It must bo Tloxiblc, siiqh, and. brief.<br />
T ~ Qdorot eormmdcr must iae!! thc folloviii& Tawts:<br />
TonnogcB to bo rccoivcA d,:ily by SOCLTCO.<br />
Tomages by Class thot munt bc stored.<br />
Troops to bu sc~cdon D rotuil basis and<br />
those to bc 8orwB hy wholcsalo bulk<br />
shipmmonts.<br />
"hetiler tile dopot will. storo tho entire<br />
2hoater stocks of n cc,rtain item.<br />
He must be given the mans (basic nodcl<br />
stock) by rvhich ha cdn oalnulutc, by item<br />
the quantity of stock vhich is to bo<br />
atorad.<br />
- 28 -
SECTION 2<br />
39. Contrzlizction or Docontmlizotion. In sulplying<br />
ii-ld forwori tho Coi>?~~ona Zone the '3road policies<br />
rcl::tin6: to prscuduros to bo uscd in roquisitionirq und ropiishing<br />
oper-itions nrc dotmninod by ttc dograo of ocndxliced<br />
oontrol exorcised by tho hichsr hcrrdquor'tcra . Vhcrc<br />
thc suiply sittiation is critic31, centrsbizcd control is csssntirl.<br />
::h2ro SU!.>ply conditions are nor" fnvorcblc, o<br />
cnrtcin mount of dcocntrdizction is pornittod. In thr! Suro-<br />
?can Thostrr of Oporotiors ci poiicy of proerosnivo deccntrnllzotion<br />
of supply control was followed.<br />
40. ProKrcso or Dccontmlizction.<br />
n. PTior to 5 Dccenbor 1944, vvhcn Circular Lattor<br />
.Xs. 97 vms pubiiohca ky thc Offioo JP tho Chiof Qu:~rtcrilc,s'l;cr,<br />
hiEhly contrulizod oontrol of su?gly operiitions rms e fecturo<br />
of tho 8?ufluortcrm:;tzr supply nystoii in tho Europoon Thonter of<br />
Opcrstions. Thc Offico of th3 CLisf ::u: rtcrfiustcr rccoivod<br />
through chomcls thc daily fe1cpu.l from the fiold forcoo nnd<br />
collod on apccific dopots to mko dhipiwncnts. Owing thit:<br />
timo nu??ly vias prgctioolly tiod to tho dopots near boaches<br />
?.nd ports, 2nd tho field forcno '11cx-c sup2licd lrirgoly by<br />
diroot ehipmont frca bum dopots through thc ,:idvouo.o Section<br />
of the Cofiuiiunicotions Zailc. This ocntralizcd control in the<br />
Offico of' tho Chicf C,usrtcrmater node it ncoossary to muintui:i<br />
in that offico tho centrd stock rzcord filo of ~ 11<br />
dopoto undcr thc Thc,ator C.u;.rtnrm;atcr's aontral so thut<br />
only t;hJsc depots copoblit of m::klne shipmnte to tho advance<br />
dapots ;.nd the field forocs ~foulclbo dirootod to m-kc suoh<br />
shipracinta.<br />
b. Aftcr 5 Docamtor 1944, L supply control co:isid-<br />
crctbly dccontralizod frm th )t proviously 511 ol'fcct ivos proscribed.<br />
The iriprovin( ouaply situation, lurgclly tho rosult<br />
of tho:o?oning uf thc htiiorp (2-6595) port, meo tliis poseiblc.<br />
Irl IjUDplginF the crdcs, tho d.iilJ tcloeran PIU~<br />
routcd dirGOt fron tho rdgL\ln';;iiiy st;.tion to doiyts :vo-<br />
viausly dusign;;tcd by tho Chiof QiirJrtermotcr to sii.>plg<br />
s;>ccific ur .ian. The o&v:.nco depnto \:ern sup?liod C1::os T.<br />
by irAtor:icliJtu &'lot8 aT. tho b.;Citl of C.3tinK;.iXIE aubr!ittoC<br />
?miodic Ily by thc ..dva~:cc aoctloii. Chss 11 raouirc;lr,aits<br />
for aGv.mcc dogsta wro obtoi-:cZ on roouinitlsn to she O Wicc<br />
of tho Chicf 3,ucrtcr:ioster. Gil tho hzis of ostinrtas<br />
whriittd to the Chisf ?unrtcrm.stcr, i.:it,cr!iadlntc dnpots<br />
su:>ilicd Clnss 111 (ictrolou , oil, nd lubricants) to ua-<br />
~31100dc:)ats. Thc flow of eUn7,?liJi? to intcrfilcdlato clowto<br />
ims co;tzollcd by thu Chicf Qu;rtcri.ustcr :I iccordnnoc<br />
vith c' 5mur 1 p l~nGra.,!.n. up 1 Dccoiihor 1944.<br />
c. 01: 9 itobruory l9b5, Cusrtorrtcster Circulrir<br />
Lo'ctcr 3,l4., YES gublialrcd ;?roscribinc Purthcr docont-<br />
r.llzatiw cf supply conCro1. Iristcad of the Chiof cuortwriastcr<br />
daslgnLting 3l;CCifiC dogats to sur;ply tho fiold<br />
forocs, thc. 3dvc!lOo SOCtii!n \J:lS GhnrF,Cd vlth tho function<br />
of nllocztine ::dvanco dsqots to tho supply of each psrticu1;r<br />
:riiy. Evcn tk su]>);Ly of coritrollod itclas WE docc:itrslizud<br />
to the v' riaus soctio:ls of thc Co!u,iL~nic,:tions<br />
Z3ila. Thle dogrce of doceiitr3Limtic,n roprosontod thc<br />
- 29 -<br />
R-X-8-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
R-ES-T-R- I-ET-X-D<br />
fiiici systm of oontrol In tho Coixiunicotions Zotlc .,nd it<br />
fuctioned satisfactorily.<br />
4.1. Lovonont Allowtion of Torui..gc.<br />
ti. xtor tho roquisitionlcg proccduro end dopot roplonishont<br />
system h3d bow estoblishod, tho prob1er.i involved<br />
the i!lovi;mcnt of fIu?plios in order to fill thc roquisicions<br />
,ad rcplocishncrit dee: nds , ".'ith -Lr:dwportntion critical,<br />
'thCrQ shonld >e strict coxtrol of tonncgo ollscatians.<br />
Durine the period June to October 191,4 cll toim:gc moveIicnts<br />
were coi~trolled by ormies. Tho trmsportctim for tho nwo-<br />
mont of rescrvos that accurmlutcd on thz bcnchcs wyns not zv-<br />
:;iloblc. Evcntuolly transportation did bcccrb :ivailablc for<br />
tLo gradu :1 novomcnt of r;upplios ti, ir.tamcdir,tc. ilopota.<br />
';hen no st amy roquircments wuro baing mat frori intormodiotc<br />
donots, il change VI.^ !'~(tc in the tonr,;gc o1locr:tion procodurc.<br />
Thc 2roblon thcr. bocwe one of Lllocoticg. tonncge for tlio<br />
luovonont frill ports forward, nd frorr ii:torradictrt depots<br />
f 0rrrGl-d.<br />
b. :Lllocations frou hrts to Inturiicdiete lhpatz.<br />
Until 10 January 194.5 allocctions were made ctaily at rieetings<br />
coiducted by the Assistant Chief of Stoff, G-4, Headqusrters<br />
Comuriicatioiis Zone. The priiiclpdi f'ullacy In t,he method<br />
cf allocating this toimc:ge was that G-4 allocitod the Qutrt-<br />
eniaster Ysrvice so many trains for eech class of su:)ply.<br />
The Quarterraster vas not allocated the trains far shipiients<br />
of OlaSSeS a8 required. Cn 10 January 1945,<br />
letter, subject: "Procedure fm Planr?int, Reception<br />
Xovanent of 3u>ply, Equip! :ent arid Per8anne11' :>ublished by<br />
Headquarters Comunications Zone .zlrovided a nore satisfactory<br />
basus far the allocatiori of tonmpe. The followin&<br />
is quotea on overall moverlent plans:<br />
"(1) On or before the 23d of each month, the<br />
Chief of Transportation vi11 subr,iit to<br />
the loting Chief of Staff, G-4, Atterrtion;<br />
Ports, 2oads dnd Bailronds<br />
Branch, recomendatisns for.:<br />
Allocatioa of' shiL7pin(2 t o pai*ts<br />
showinp the number of & hip ,,rid nvorsfe<br />
daily Loiinclge to be discharged,<br />
by Olasv ar supply.<br />
Vltn for Port clearonce and movement<br />
sf euqlies to de,mt.s showing<br />
ori;in, aver ge daily tormlge,<br />
deEtinatiX and ty7e of transportdtlor!<br />
for eoch class of supply.<br />
Pler, for noverient of BU >plies from<br />
de7ots to forward destinationn shsaing<br />
origin, averace daily tonnage,<br />
Cestinstion und type or trans2ort-<br />
8tio:i for each class (if supply.<br />
In the developmnt of plans for<br />
Zovemnt, the Chiel of Transyxtatior.<br />
will ciriifer directly vlth<br />
supply services in deterninntion of<br />
-. 30 -<br />
R-Ea-T-R-I-C -%E- D
allocation of ships by name and nuiber<br />
to ports and in the determination of<br />
special requirements for movement of<br />
supplies from ports to dspot~.~*<br />
(illocatjons frm InternGdiate Depcts to Consum-<br />
;..i$,~o!i;4;s. Class 1 alia supplies iiere handlcd on a<br />
ci-y te eiram basis. The CoialerGlinf+ General. Ldvonce Sac- .<br />
tiou, arranged for t!ie transportatis; of Clash I an; III-re-.<br />
qr;ircnents from the advance depots in his area. Class I1 and<br />
IV oiid Post Gxchango requirments we,-e h~iidled011 a oeriodic<br />
requisitioning basis. The Coxunder of the Base Section in<br />
whish the shipment originated was responsible for providirg<br />
noaessdry trarisportotion in accorda:ice xith the provisions of<br />
Circular Letter Bunber 1L, Office of tho Chief Qartomustcr,<br />
9 February 1945.<br />
42. Docunontation of Ship:~enta. Documentotion is the<br />
process of mbr':ine ond recording shipntuts on various paper<br />
docwnts for tile purposo or identifieition end control.<br />
Since it is i,4~psssiblcto su2ply tcns of supplics to fill<br />
specific denanda of the field, it is nocessary thit the tuna<br />
be cor.vertc8 int? items. The spacific tons of cach item<br />
should be hiO!qa. By inventoryirg, supplies are convertod<br />
lron a tmragc to an itori basis. Proper documeatation provides<br />
a nwns of rotainin& this identity while the aupplios<br />
are in trmisit betwen tho depots or from Gho depots to the<br />
con.siulii*g uyenciss.<br />
43. Gcr.ora1. The hcnrt of 011 supgljr cporetions in a<br />
Thcntor o m t i u n s is thc principle af Laowirlg Ivbt supplies<br />
cro un ha~dand whoro thcy LTG located. Inventorying<br />
is a periodic nctivity; stock accounting is i cocticuous<br />
sctivity. The corMnc,tion f urnishod tho Chief Quartermistar<br />
with itifarmation that ves csscntiol to hili i!i porfoming tho<br />
following functions :<br />
a. ;dvjsinG the I'hootur of Oporotions CollrnnCcr in<br />
formulatiiz tagtical plans.<br />
b. Distributiug stocks i:l tho Curopo-n Thoctsr of<br />
O?crhtioas.<br />
c. Advising pcrsonncl suoh as hrily ani1 Brny Group<br />
Co:unandorn on comlitions acd locations.<br />
44. ;lit;? Depoy. The mctiiods of imontorying and<br />
stook cccouli ng efip oyed by Bcpots in the Xuropan Thoator<br />
of Oporations fsllowod tho basic principles proscribod in<br />
!.:a- Dap:irtrlont publications.<br />
45. Reports to Ce.rtru1 Thootcr Rocords.<br />
a. T'ho office of the CIdef Quartornostor mintairled<br />
tho Ceutrol Thentcr record of Qmrternastor stocks. Stock<br />
status reports wore siibmlttod p6riodlctrlly by Quortermstor<br />
ciopots in thc Thoator of Opcro-ciono ucoardiug to the follow-<br />
- 31 -
ing schedule:<br />
R-ES-T-R-I-C-T-Z-D<br />
Class 1 Cupplies - Weekly<br />
Class I1 and ZV - 1st and 15th of the month<br />
Class If1 - 1st and 15th or the month<br />
More frequent reporting was found to place too great a burden<br />
on the depot. Invento;ries tere normally reported by the<br />
depots by item and quantity.<br />
d. Reports to Other hqencies.<br />
a* %lie the depot reported direct to the central<br />
records of the Office Of the Clzief n,uartermaster, copies of<br />
the stocks Status reports were also sent to the ?unrtemaster<br />
of the interested section of the Gomunications Zone. It<br />
was essential that the sectiOn 7uartermaster be kept informed<br />
on the stock status in his own section.<br />
b. In addition, there were certain item oi which<br />
the stock position for the whole theater ahould be known<br />
from time to time by all seotions of the Comunications Zone<br />
and the armies. Lccordingly, special stock status reports<br />
were from time to time disseminated by the OfPice of the Chief<br />
<strong>Quartermaster</strong> to interested agencies.<br />
SECTION 4<br />
CONCL<strong>US</strong>IONS AND RECOMMnaDnzlI~s<br />
47. Conclusions.<br />
a* The olassifioation of depots set forth in European<br />
Theater of <strong>Operations</strong> Standing Operating Procedure No,<br />
7, L9 March 19L+5aisnot suitable for nxartemster ma.<br />
b. The port depot in the European Theater of <strong>Operations</strong><br />
was essontial'to efficient sup~ly operations in the<br />
Communications Zone, and where it wa8 not established ef'ficioncy<br />
of tho supply system suffered.<br />
0, During combat cperetions, the field forccs reooive<br />
increasingly efficient supply support when supply<br />
stocks arc largo and control of supply is decentralized.<br />
DocontralizaCion of control of supply cmn brj acoomplishad<br />
~nlyvhon tho lines of oommunication and channols of supply<br />
aro sufficiently well organized to warrant woh decentralization,<br />
d, Regardless of the degree of daoentralized control<br />
of supply operations, an up-to-date central stook<br />
accounting systeni Is easential in the Offioe of the Chief<br />
Quartormastar of the Theater of <strong>Operations</strong>.<br />
48. Rooommendations.<br />
a. That the classification of dcpots In tho Oommunications<br />
'lone be redefined to lndicate thoir goncral fluzction<br />
a8 base, intomediate, and advasoe depots, and that pertinont<br />
War Department publications be amonded accordingly.<br />
b, mat in oporations similar to those in the Euro-<br />
- 32 -
!I-E-B-T-R- I-C-T-E-D<br />
Theater, provision bo mde for tho establishment of<br />
bmo dopots R t porta.<br />
Bibliapaphy<br />
Chapcor 4<br />
1. Quortcrmstor Operbtianol fimly8i5 Sturiy liumbor Fivo,<br />
dotod 1 !:o-mmbcr 1945, Mq OTCQJ:, TSETT.<br />
- 33 -<br />
R-E-S-1-R-I-C-T-3-D
49. Mission and Orfanization. The mission of the <strong>Quartermaster</strong><br />
Eruck oom>any, or trooptransport dompany, is tu<br />
provide transportation for the haulin6 of carbo and for the<br />
m0Ve"t of personnel by motor transport. It is a mobile,<br />
flexible unit, and is orLanlzed into a company headquarters<br />
and three operating ulatoons. Each platoon operates 16<br />
trucks, two and one-hlf ton 6 x 6 oargo, with 16 trailers,<br />
1-ton, 2 wheel, and each platoon has suffioient equipment to<br />
perform liolited claintenanoe. The maintenance section, equip-<br />
ped with complete second yhelon equipment, operates under<br />
the company headquarters.<br />
50. Allocation and Con-.<br />
a. In the Communications Zone the TPanBpOrt€itiOn<br />
Corps assumed camruand and operational control of the truck<br />
oompanies.2 In the Combat Zone companies were allocated by<br />
army pup to armies, and Brrcdes to subordinate QOrpB and<br />
divisions, In some instances allocation or oorapanies was<br />
made direct from Lamy group to division. The <strong>Army</strong>, Corps<br />
and Division <strong>Quartermaster</strong>s norually retained oyerational<br />
oontrol over the companies, subject to the allocation and<br />
dispatch control exercised by the G-4.3<br />
b. Of the 464 Quarterblaster truck oomA,anies in<br />
the European Theater of O;rerations, 170 were allocated to<br />
the 12th <strong>Army</strong> Group. The troop basis for this allooation<br />
was as follows:3<br />
Type Unit Basis of Allocation Total Type Total<br />
Number Cwi;*anies Units in 12th Companies<br />
<strong>Army</strong> Group Allocated<br />
<strong>Army</strong> Group Hqs 1 1 1<br />
<strong>Army</strong> Hgs 1 4 4<br />
Corps Hq6 2 11 22<br />
Divisions 3 44 132<br />
Additional for<br />
new Armored<br />
Division 1 11 11<br />
Total 170<br />
cy The 12th <strong>Army</strong> Group recommended an increase of<br />
11 truck oompanies in the allocation based bn the fact that<br />
each Armorsd division required, and had attached to it, two<br />
truck companies throuehout the operation. These truok ampanies<br />
were organic in the old-type Armored divisions,<br />
During actual operations on the continent, however, the<br />
total allocation of 170 companies was never assigned to the<br />
group and serious motor t asportation shortaEes existed<br />
throuoout the operati0n.t This sane shorta,e of truck com-<br />
panies, compared with proposed allocation, was experienced<br />
throughout the European Theater, Twelve oom:.anies were on<br />
the continent by 18 June 1944 ana by the end of operations<br />
May 19L5, there was a total o 164 companies assiqned to<br />
unite in the 12th <strong>Army</strong> Group. 5<br />
- 34 -<br />
R-E-S-T-R-14 -T-E-D
R-E-8 -T-R -I-C -Td-D<br />
auarterriaster 36 5-<br />
Ordnance 2: F<br />
-hiineor 11 4;<br />
Lienal 3<br />
Other 0 :d<br />
5,<br />
TermnimI<br />
hll bervlces 19<br />
Total lo@5<br />
52. Cor Lrol .in8 Dis,mtch.<br />
a. *ha quhrtermclster, 12th .".YJ.I:T Croup, coord1nn:od<br />
rymrtornsstor transjortetion nettar:> botwen tho urddes cf<br />
thp Proup, furniohad fldvicc on the distribution of traneportotion<br />
units dnd furnished the b~flisuhan necessary for<br />
soourinp bflditiondl transnortution unit:: fro i tho Coclnunlcations<br />
LOSQ irhen nesded.14<br />
h. The method of coiitrol . /.11 requeets for tmnsoo~.tationlmrc p.t'ooosaed<br />
throwl. the C-4 for wovcl mc' to the "ruortercL-st-r
R-E-S-T-R-1-0-T-E-D<br />
for dispatch.15 In addition to the d:,ily G.is?atch, can?aniea<br />
were at t1rir;s dispatched ta Staff Sections or aubordlnbte<br />
units on a wrianent hasis.<br />
c; :i dally motor transqortstion uvitilabilitg re :,art<br />
vias subnitteG by the Array Quarterrwster to tho G-L,, shouin:.<br />
the status of 011 Quarternaster truckc of tho arfiw. 1~<br />
weekly tOiUlr.ge-,2lilQ re+" was subrllittea edCh I:cnduy for<br />
transmittal to the 12th ..my Group civin! t$e totdl tollu.,ye<br />
hauled and rfilos trsvoled dUriu6 the F.reck.lo<br />
d. In the First dnd Fifteenth <strong>US</strong> .miies tho r-&<br />
Tranagortatioii Seotion exercised au:w~isory conti-ol crrly<br />
over D,uartarmuter t'ransportition o.xir&tions.2,17 In the<br />
Third <strong>US</strong> ..my, the G-4 Trans lortation Section, which vaa<br />
staffed by B Eieadouartcra dd headnuartern dituchmnt,<br />
P.uarterm8tor group, exercised o?oration coatrol over tho<br />
<strong>Quartermaster</strong> truns:isrtation, wbilo tho :Lrr.vquartsrmatcr<br />
maintained cuutml only over those units assigned to @.la%ermster<br />
liork.9 In the Levanth <strong>US</strong> .,,imyall transportation<br />
onerated directly undcr the Trtirts:~ortetinn Caotion, a sc2arate<br />
speci 11staff soctisn ort,iir?ieod for that purposo.5<br />
53. o=ti?n?.<br />
a. Thoro ~YBSa o~umt~nt .!id coptinuoua silortuga<br />
of trucks throuphout tho owr.;tions. l!ai,itunanco m y penorally<br />
poor, tind qure ports at ti.mort h.d bo obtain.2<br />
5. Duo to the shoi%uc,c of trhnstiortation, dnd<br />
hasud u-pon road conditions, tho overloadinr of tho curgo<br />
truoks ua to 100 :.ercont WRS authorizod. The condition of<br />
thc roads one. terrain, and rostriotions due to operntions<br />
limitad the <strong>US</strong>G of trailors, and uhen unod, loading HBS<br />
rostriatctl ho rated capcity. 6,7 Driver treinlnr \J<strong>US</strong> oftr:n<br />
found lackiw , und nutllified driver rcglocmcnts wCT6 of tan<br />
dlffioult to obtaig,( Those Cirivcrs actually ,~ssip~od wr'o<br />
too ofton of a typo laclciw. in intolligcnce Fina 8onso OP<br />
ros,ionsihiiity. Trainin[ co: .sistca of on-tho-job o:?crations.9,lO<br />
e. In tho ogeration in Youthorn Fratice, Itallan<br />
sorvicc unit geraorlnol waa oxtonslvcly usoc! to ibn tho<br />
Quarternaoter truck corA2auios. 5<br />
?any tnblo of organization and e0,di nC WQS a teluT,orsry<br />
cxxdlent vcndinp ex>srImntation dnci d6vclopirnt+ AR a<br />
ftnal orgaifLzetim it was a Trans ,ortutian C O ~ Scrmmny<br />
('P/O E 3 55-37), vith seven offioora c.n? 1'73 onllut;t2d rid,<br />
cc3sistinr oi tlfo !>l.toons tiith thruo soctlons crach, ..rid<br />
rdth eipht trxks, 2$ ton, 6 x 6 em-ihibibn (coLionly cailoa<br />
DU::''s), ?or soction. It wag ea entlellp u f- rbor C rLft<br />
oomany ind o7Lr- tad grinoi*J-lly Jbh port battblioiis, Its<br />
function lids tc transfer cargo fro91 shiyicie to shore<br />
dui:m or boactas, Tihero pier fncilitios wro not tlvuiloblo.<br />
Each cbrquny, ovcr D pcrioa of 24. hours, vas cagubla of<br />
- 36 -<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
R-E -S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D<br />
- 37 -<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I-C -T-E-D
R-E-S-T-R-I-C -T-E-D<br />
1 cur do tolu~cnt CA 10 t trucks ,l/l+-ton<br />
1 truck d~tocluaent CD Y 1 truck, 1/4-ton<br />
2 trucks,<br />
3/4-tOn, ' C<br />
4 truoks,<br />
2,'*-ton, 6 x 6<br />
cilrfo<br />
57. Dincumion.
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D<br />
parts r:.SUltc!d in tho OpcrstloU of trucks :,ithoat j!ropGr<br />
ropairij, thus ceusinc o::ccs!,ivc ::oar on otl,nr ?arts.<br />
d. Tho Buartornastor 3battnlion, hobiic, h3edTuari;or3<br />
(T/O t.C 10-5h),was lockin( in ~i uotor officx to gr.02crly<br />
sup-rviso and coordinoto rlclinfonancs activitiocl in<br />
truck companiw. Iicvfcvcr, d notor officw was ridded aftor<br />
htmtilitics CebSod, (chaiigc; 2, T/O P 7 .l0-56, i-atud 2 :.uf'ust<br />
1945).<br />
0. Kiicrally, officar por:ionni;l in truck coli-1 riios<br />
wrc! not sufficicntly troixd in riotor trans>ort;-:tion slid<br />
ririiicipal ii:>?liad pxurnl1.y to cor& ian$~ pointfl within roeoh of tho using<br />
units *<br />
c, Truck com?anics em cjqi:ipod with thrcu tool<br />
SC~S,sooond ocholon, nubor ona (.OOi*iOII) on tho hasis of<br />
ono pcr plbtc7on, cind one Cool stt, wcond ec!iol.on, nwibzr<br />
two (conuior!) for thc maiiitouonoi soction. ::c;ch oonyny is<br />
also oquipDcC; rri,iih onc tmck, 3/4 ton, 4 : l+ llij3:)ons cilrriur,<br />
and ono Cruak, ?$-ton, 6 x 6 cargo, rilth :finch, for uountiw<br />
supx-str:mturc, hoi.et dnd tovir?;: Lor, for thc mintontlnoc<br />
ecction. Tho rroc~ridochclon sot nunbur ono is dosimoc3<br />
to bc usod by V.10 ruch$nicn onC 5~ tr8tlS.?"08 in a<br />
3/4-ton k x IC uoaponu oarrior irith tho nocossary oils and<br />
Brousos t o tdlx ourc of 15 trucks, "ith platoons trooel-<br />
ing in diffaront diroctions, it is in:Jractioablc to p;ivo<br />
iiro?cr maintznoncc to oech platoon. Zach pLtoon nhould<br />
thoroforc bo onui!>pcd with B 3/l+-ton, 4 ;; 4 r'ioajmis carriol',<br />
to adcquatoly :?crf orn mintononcc of vchiolas lihcn ollortltine<br />
individually in convoy and to proporly :x~intaiii tho tools<br />
assignod.<br />
- 39 -
R-E-S-T-H-I-C-T-E-D<br />
il. That Quuartcrrtcstcr octlvitics throughout tho<br />
op:rction in the Zuroydn TJioatur wcro handica?>ad duc ta<br />
CIU s1iorttq.t OT trann:mttttion both in ths Comunicc;tiolls<br />
Zono and in th ~rnyareas.<br />
b. That, in C::ncri:1, offiwrs, drivcrs und riochanics<br />
wrl! inzd,f,flustcly trsixd, and th..t quallricd TGplaoacnt<br />
ilarsoniiol wxo soldom uviiileblo.<br />
0. Thrii; division Quortcrrnestors raquirs sufficicnt<br />
organic traiisportatian under tlloir dircct control to ticconplish<br />
thcir mission, one that oor;?s Quuortcrrastcrs roouiro<br />
sufficiunt tranaportLtion to p"o closc supgort to corps<br />
troops attt~clicd divis. ons. ,:.riy quartcrmgtcrs riust ILVO<br />
snffioiont trnnoZortatlon at tbair disposal to irerq) do;~ots<br />
ana siin:]l., point8 stockod und .Jrithin rcaoh of tho using mitt<br />
59. ;:ocoiuiundations<br />
8. TJiilt, boginnine )with tha activation of t?uclc<br />
units, a imru ctiroful selection of both offioors, drivers<br />
and mcohan3.cn bo raadz.<br />
13. Thiit mor6 timo he pj,vcn to thc proper trainin(:<br />
of offioors in motor maintcnonco and convoy opcrations;<br />
drivure in :?rcvijntativc r.iuintcn$noc an6 clrivinp;; ,ncl nochonFc5<br />
in notor +:n8 vchlclu rapoir.<br />
0. That ro~ilaccimmt dopots contain miile drivers<br />
and mrlhanics Froperly trainrtd in maintonanca and oprhtion<br />
for rcplaccaant 3r euflmntklion purposcs.<br />
(1. That oach truck corJ?nny hG oc.ui,la;ld itit11 t1;O<br />
r.dd.iticr!al. trucks, 3/4-toP., 4 : I+ -.rc;apons ciirriors nith<br />
vincti, to :JroviBL o. niintmoiicc truck for mch ?lotcon.<br />
, Thjt Chs oopratc Quortorr~-.stcrcar platoon bo<br />
nd OrgQlliZCd undcr (1 so?sr:rtc tcblc of wgarization<br />
and evui?:icnt.<br />
- 40 -<br />
R-E-5-T-R-I-0-I-E-IJ
1. T/O L C 10-57<br />
Eih1iopru:ihZ<br />
Gllaptcr 5<br />
2. Praliininary kJft Truck Comlisny (Trool) or 7' Fro03<br />
Transport Company 10-57", 0%': -, Octobor 1945.<br />
3. f'otcs on bcrvics Troops, Oraa Brmch, ('-4., 12th f,rrJy<br />
Group, 1C July 1945.<br />
0. ':cckly 0-4 Poriodio hpcrts,<br />
1944-IW 1945.<br />
5.<br />
6.<br />
7.<br />
c.<br />
9.<br />
12th<br />
,! rlw<br />
Croup,<br />
..uyuet
R-2-S-T-R- I-3-T-F D<br />
CWG?’ECR 6<br />
@. RidXd &Z. UEOR S.Il+VICES<br />
S2CTZCII 1<br />
$UARTJAASTuR Su2VVXLr- COtJ&E<br />
60. Kission and 0rtanLzation.l The miseion of the auartermastar<br />
garvice Com,bany {TjO & %, 10-67) is to provide milltary<br />
personnel for ,enera1 labor and Tor the su,,ervision of<br />
labor-when civilian-or ,gisonsr of war labor is-utilized. The<br />
coapn? is orjanixed into a company heaaquarters and two oner-<br />
Rth: platoons \tith n total atreu4th of four officers and 2.06<br />
enlisted Icen. &oh plbtoon, with 80 laborers in acldltion to<br />
platoon overhead, is capible of oleratin& indegendently and<br />
~<br />
has a rated capaoitg of handling 400 tons of su*>;liea eacu day.‘<br />
61, Xciulament. Ortanixational ekuipnmant of the service<br />
company is confinedL to the equi$nent necessary for the ahinistration<br />
of the company and for the use an6 protection of the<br />
individual soldieys. The major items of eiui:)ment are the<br />
fallowing: 1<br />
a. Trailer, 1-ton, two wheel, car60 1<br />
b. Truak, 2-1/2 ton car-o 1<br />
c. Truck, 3/4 ton weapons carrier 1<br />
d. Truck, 1/4 tOA 1<br />
The con:,an:- is cor,+letelj1 lockin& in mobilit: a and translortation<br />
mat be furnished by hiaer head-unrters or by T;he unit<br />
Lo diich the company is attached. Basnuoh as transidortation<br />
IILS critical thuu,hout the campuLLns in the Xuroyean Theater<br />
of <strong>Operations</strong> additicnel trucks Por the tiiovemnt oi the comptny<br />
weie often difficult 60 obta5n.b It is believed that the oompanj.<br />
would heve been able to ogerate mole efficiently if sufficient<br />
trucks had been assigneh or-nnically to tho cm:any to<br />
pernit tlie siiuttlirit of’ work details iron the cmp” bivouac<br />
area to place of employment. A total of Pour tiyoks, P-1/2<br />
ton caxLo, woulcl pravide one truck for trms.ortinL labor detailo<br />
for each o-eratin& platoon end two for canpctnp headquarteis.<br />
It Is also believed thet the ompany should be nuthorized<br />
cue additional tl’uck, 1/4. ton. Jith f ~ orficerv ~ r assipe6<br />
to the conp”, this auditional vehicle would be available<br />
to the two platoon leaders for su-mvising and ohecking on labor<br />
details,<br />
62. Allocution.<br />
a. The troop basio in the Zuro,san Theater of Operahions<br />
povided Tor a total of 276 seivioe cokpanies, with lo3<br />
allotted to the 12th Arm: Group. The basis for this aliotment<br />
P~RBas follows:~~b<br />
For eaoh crm:,, two companies - or a total of<br />
ei@t conpaaios in the lour amles of the<br />
12th <strong>Army</strong> Group.<br />
For each corps, one corgany - or a total of 11<br />
ompanies for the oorps in 12th &my Group<br />
- 42 -<br />
R-E-5-T-R-I-0-T-3-D
R-C-S-T-R-1-0 T-E-U<br />
For each armored division, 1.5 cordiany - or a to-<br />
tal of 17.5 companies for the I3 armored<br />
divisions in tho 12th h y Group.<br />
For each irsantry division, tvuo oonpnies - or<br />
n totaZ of 64 companies lor the 32 inidintry<br />
divisions in th6 12th Arlr;. Group.<br />
b. At no time, howev~r, were 103 COinEbniea sssiknea<br />
to the group. In Se,tember 1944, the 12th Amy Grcug hfla h total<br />
of 30 service oampcnios, of which i9 were assiLaed to tno<br />
First <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong>, 14 to the Third <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong> and five to the ldnth<br />
<strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong>. It was COIlSiderQd that a mininun of 19 cor&pnibs for<br />
each arniy was reguired for operations in libexted territory<br />
and 25 for o$eratiana in Oefllany.4 Towards &he lbttav 3hRsas<br />
of the Camkaim each of the three armies wllich croavcd thc;<br />
Rhino River had ap-jroxioiataly 25 companies assi~nud.3<br />
c. AllOaQtion of Quartermastar Service car~p”ms<br />
within the 6th Amy Group was liriited. In the initial lending<br />
in Southern France in &Lust 1944, the Seventh <strong>US</strong> Arw,r vJGs hondicappcd<br />
in labor operations on the bencha due to the small nunber<br />
of sorvioe companies available. Throuehout. this campaijn<br />
tho Continental Advance Section and The Dolta Base Section of<br />
the Southern Lines of Cammudoation dependea heairiiy on Italian<br />
service units, prisoqer of w&r labor unittl, and, to e 1hiteU<br />
degree, on civilian labor.12,14<br />
63. Method of -mploynenti.<br />
a. The Quarte,mastsr Service Corn$" was normallj<br />
employed in thu guropean heater of <strong>Operations</strong> t o perfortu &Qnera1<br />
labor and kuard duty, sopervise prisoners cnd prisoner of<br />
war labor, and to suppLement or replace uopot suyply and railhead<br />
cohlpanies in suppl;. oyerations.2<br />
b. typical cxanple of the asoianment of service<br />
companies was that of the First <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong> on 7 liarch 194.5 with<br />
a total of 21 companies available:6<br />
(I) ~uartermsterdeDot oderations - 7<br />
(2) One to each of threc corp~ - 3<br />
(3 ) Cometery work - 2<br />
(h) Solid fuel labor -1.<br />
15) class I11 ogerations - 1<br />
(6) Si,pal supply operations - c<br />
(7) Ordnance depot operations - 4<br />
(8) &&inoer depot ojerations - 2<br />
At other t‘mes connanies were assimned to auUUcnt labor at<br />
hospitals,+ operat; or supplement railheads ana trookheads,lO<br />
and supplement personnel De Lravea registration companies for<br />
field operatsons.<br />
c. In the ComunLoations Zone serviou Collpanifis<br />
were utalized primarily to buard and 6.tpperviue workin& prison-<br />
ers of war. As oporationa ppocxessed dee&eP inside NrrJanY,<br />
- 43 -<br />
R-334-T-R-I 4-T-J!LD
R-Ea-T-R-I-C-T-E-D<br />
the field forms found it im~ractlcablo to sdcure the area in<br />
the rear of the army service areas. This additions1 security<br />
nission was assianed to service coinpaniee. The company was<br />
enyloysd to juard both tho supp1:- and semico installations<br />
and the prisoners of war who wero lwploged therein. Prperience<br />
indicated that under normal conditions the service company<br />
could ade Uately kuard and supervise 1,500 working pisoners<br />
of war.yl<br />
d. In addition to beink attached for labor at yuartormastbr<br />
depots, railheads or other ins8allations. (1 limited<br />
number of companies WBM sttached to Ordnanca and lhgineer<br />
SerViCQS for ceneral labor at ammunition and snhinoer depots.<br />
Some oampanies wuro also attached tc prceido labor for hand-<br />
ling sensitive items which for security reasons could not be<br />
handlea by prisoners of wm or civilian labcr.2 In other<br />
cases spooially qualified servioo companies mro used to supplement<br />
or replaod depot and railhand companies in supply operations<br />
8. Normlly within thb urmies, acrvice companies<br />
werg controlled by the &my 2uarturmaster and assi~nod to Quartermastor<br />
Battalions for administration and operations,839<br />
<strong>Army</strong> sgecial staff sections in need cf labor placod their rcque$ts<br />
with the &my Quartormastm. The <strong>Army</strong> Quartermastor<br />
allocated servicu companies to tho staff sections Either dircotly<br />
or through tho battalion to which the ConlpanLeS wertl<br />
attached, The <strong>Quartermaster</strong> also as8i;ned sorvioe COmp4niea<br />
to depots, railheads, and other army installations as requlred.<br />
In each case, whether horkink for a "taff soction or an<br />
installation, the service conpany okerated direocly under the<br />
staff section or installation concerned. In one army whom<br />
the service company commander was senior to the railhead officer,<br />
OP to the officer comndinl: the &aa supply company to<br />
which it was assienw3, the service company comnder norolally<br />
assumLd ccntrol.5<br />
SECTION 2<br />
oTmx WBOR<br />
a. Civilian and other indiLenous types of labor<br />
were utilizad by tho Quartcrmasttr Corps to auuJnont military<br />
labor in the European Theater of Oporations for tho following<br />
principal rLasons:ll<br />
(1) A shortaeo of' &uartsrmasfer Service units.<br />
(2) Thu neoesaity fo? furnishinC supplius to<br />
purscniiel othbr 'than United Status Ulftary,<br />
such as: civiliaz: omployoes, prisoners of<br />
war, and liborated manpower.<br />
(3) The necessity for utillzinC incra8sin&ly<br />
lar e numbors of Quartormastor sorvico campanics<br />
to guard prisoncrs of war and survioe<br />
installations.<br />
b. The various categorioa of parsonncl used by tho<br />
Quartormastor Uorps in thu Communioationa Zone and tho extant<br />
- 44 -
R-X-7-T-X-I-C-T-E -D<br />
tu wiiich each was mnloyad at Quartermstcr Installations at<br />
tlrc ocssotion of hos%ilitios vrerti as foiiows:11<br />
65. Civilian Labor.<br />
CatOFor,v PLrodnt of Total<br />
United Statos Uilitory 21 $<br />
Ennomy Prisonas of Wnr k6 4‘.<br />
Civilian Labor 26 $<br />
Itnlian Sorvlco Units 6 $<br />
Liborated Wnpowcr 1%<br />
TOtd 100 6<br />
a. On 26 1@1y19k4, iiaadqmrturs &ropeon fheatcr of<br />
Oprations publiahcrd Stnndink Opdratlq Procoduru Numbor 29,<br />
entitled ftProourwr”t, Utilizntion, cnd ACirdnistrction of Civllien<br />
Labor in Libcrated or Ocouciod Countrlonw. Undur these<br />
re~ulatiun8 tho Corps of En,inoors was Chm-Qd with procuring<br />
oivilina lnbor for tho usiaC swvloos, cnd ostcblished rugiona1<br />
labor offloas end local unploymunt officus throughout the<br />
arca under control of tho United Status Forcos. k a usiny,<br />
survlco, tho (lunrtdmaster Corps was ohorjcd with: 82<br />
(1) UtiliainL civilian lcbor as much as praotiOQbl@undcr<br />
conditions that provailud.<br />
(2) DesiLnp.tInC Labor Adiuiniatratlve Officers<br />
for closi&natad projuots or arm.<br />
(3) Submlttln~ esthatcrs far civilian labor<br />
roquirenonts.<br />
(4) Requisitioning and ndministerine civilian<br />
labat prsonnd.<br />
b. Each laborir WLS initially clesslfiod ne unslcllldd,<br />
oxcupt In unusual oiroumsi;anccm, with a tcntntive clessi-<br />
ficatinn indicotad by the mgloymont offloe. Clnsaificntion<br />
was $a& by tho usinL sorvlco aftor dmonstaatod skill on the<br />
job.<br />
c. Statio labor was that labor which renidod within<br />
the area where tho work was parformcd and for which tho United<br />
States FOrcQS assumed llmitcd responsibilitg for fetdlny,<br />
clothing. and 6hdtGrinL. Liobile labor was that labor which<br />
was or,anlzud Into mobile units undor military control, aubjoot<br />
to bblng moved from placo to glacu, and fcm which tho<br />
U11it6d Status Forces assumod responsibility for olothing , foodinL<br />
rind sholtorinc.ll The bnsio mobile unit was tho mobile<br />
hbor oompcny, whlob 0rlLinall;- conslated of fivd officurs and<br />
23 onlistoa men with 300 laboiwrs. Later, urder cho EIilitary<br />
Labor Sbrvico Administration the campan:- strenLth iffls changed<br />
to four oifiours and four oniistod mtn with 250 laborors. The<br />
company w e divided into threo platoons of four soctlons eaoh.<br />
Esoh swation was capahle of operating lndcrpohdontlg, As the<br />
qwrations protrussed lnt o armany, thl: oompanlos wcro largely
R-T-CT-R-1-GT-li!-D<br />
conpostd of displaced persons of soveral naticnalities.6<br />
66. Employment of Civilian Labor.<br />
a, Thc Quartoranstw Corps, or othor usin, sdruioe,<br />
prciarod roquisiticns for civilian labor end procosscrd tho individual<br />
laborers. The usinc scrviou completed the individual<br />
contracts, employment idzntificction cards, snd othor records,<br />
and nssumLd coxtrol until thc work was oompletad.12<br />
bl Civi3i:ns were CUD loyod by thc: Quuartumastcr<br />
Corps in administrative caprcitfes such Clbrks, interpreters,<br />
key tochnioluns cnd yrds. They wore nlsc emaloyed<br />
ns laborers in depots, ropl r mstcllations, hotols, ieesses<br />
and other installations. At the peak, agproximatoly 58,000<br />
civilinns, incluaing British clurical pcrsonnol hired on a contract<br />
basis, were om loyed by thG yuartdrmastcr Survica in the<br />
Communications zone .P1<br />
c. In the Southern France operation, civilian labor<br />
was difficult to obtain. !Che Base Purchosin& Mont, a sugarat0<br />
staff officvr, wcs charLad with the procuramtnt of oivilian<br />
lcbor, and thc G,uart,rmnstcr Corps was again murely a usiq<br />
c&ency. Although ralinnoc was plsccd mainly on Italian<br />
sbrvice units and prisoners of war, tho Quartvrmastcr, Base<br />
Soction, at one time cm_nloyed 15,000 civiliuns in the sklllcd,<br />
unskilled and olLricol oatu&ories.l4<br />
d. Civilian labor was normally not fls u~fioientas<br />
prisonw of wnr labor, and the use of civilians usually moant<br />
e. hi& rnto of pilforcge. They could be usod, howsvor, on projocta<br />
wllare tho <strong>US</strong>G of pisonars of war wna either impractioal<br />
or restricted by thu GQnEV& ConvLntiOn, and, in audition, they<br />
roquirrtd no Luuords ,11<br />
67. Military Labor Service. The ILilltary Labor Sorvioe<br />
wns ustablishod latu in 1 44 ne a sgccial stcff section of<br />
Hcadquartws, European Th:ater of <strong>Operations</strong>, for tho ovor-all<br />
stnfl" coordination nnd suporvision of labor oryflnisations, exclusivu<br />
or UnltGd 8tatus Yvrvico units and static civiliun labor.<br />
It rucomrkindod ollocation, aWiuistration and prooodures<br />
for the umploymcnt of Italian sorvioe units, .prisoner of war<br />
work units, and for all othor formlly orLanized labor ulemcnts<br />
utilizud by thf United Status Forces in the &r'opeM Theater<br />
of Opclrotions. 1<br />
68 Gonevu Conv~ntion.~*a~~ The Goneva Convontion of<br />
1939 e0;or-e use of prisonor pf wnr labor, r.nd practically<br />
rustrioted tho uac of prisoncors of wv to the Comiunicntions<br />
Zoncr. Some of tho rostrictions fls prcvidod in tho convuntion<br />
arc as follows:<br />
p. They can not be uscd st inutnllflt2ons within 12<br />
ruilus of' tht. nvarost orgnnizcd unurjy fCrOe.<br />
b. They cfin not be usud forward of tho Communico-<br />
tiona Zone at any establishmat which constitutod log-* objective<br />
for hostilc cviation.<br />
C. They can not be used to trnnsport matorial intendud<br />
for cmbat units. This was normnlly interprcrtod to pornit<br />
locding and unloading of nll mturiill excupt arms and ammunition,
69. Prisonorb of .Jar,<br />
?-2-S -T-R-T -C -T-Z-D<br />
a. ThL Provost Idmshal Was chorOLd with th,, gcncral<br />
nbinistrztion of prisoxrs of war nnd with sup2lyinr prisonor<br />
Of war labor to the uain; sorviccs as rquiriid. Prisoners wore<br />
assiknod cithtr on a tmporary or permanent basis. If tsmpor-<br />
nry, the Provost ldnrshal rotained cdninistrativa control while<br />
tile usink scrvicc assumcd the rusponsitility of ~uardingand<br />
aupcrvising thit prisonLrs durin' tht perioa of tmporcry assignuunt.<br />
If ernanant, tht using service nssumd oonplcte rospon-<br />
Sibilitg.lf<br />
b. Early in 1945 prieonw of war labor survioe<br />
units wtrd orgenizcd to repicoe losss6 of United Stetos units<br />
caused by rtdeployment to the Pacific Thoctor of Opuratians.<br />
Th6 units were dbsignctcd nocordin, to nationality and func-<br />
tion such as: "Prisoner of :?akbor Compan (Ccrman) Qucrtern;sttr<br />
Lnundry". In Ap-11 1945, 26 cmganfcs were cssiencd<br />
to thd Qu$unrt~rmc:stcr Sfzviw in the Advance section of the<br />
Scuthdrn Linos of Comunicntion.11<br />
c. Thd first prisoners of wnr employed werd usud<br />
3s labortrs in ciIitltori*s in STormmdy nnd as lnborers in baoh<br />
supply dumps in Southern Brnnoe , Shortly thortr?fttr, they<br />
wme used in salvaCe and 1f.undry pctivitios, wood cutting, and<br />
in do ots. Later, prisoners of war were classifiod accordin&<br />
to skflls. Tailors, cobblus, tinsmiths, :a&othvr skilled<br />
ptrsonnel wcr@ crpnized into SGlVftge repair oampcmics. Porfcrmnncs<br />
of' prisontr of warilabor was rwdioore when employed<br />
in lerku groups, hut in general, prisoners of Mnr were suparior<br />
to indigonous civilien labor in tlie quality of work produced.<br />
Approxhately ll5,OOO prisonor of war were usod by the<br />
Quartormastor Servioe nt tht peak of <strong>Operations</strong> in tho Commun-<br />
ications Zona ,11<br />
70. Italian Sorvice units.11<br />
a. Italias pursomol wurc OPcanf26d into ten different<br />
kinds or QuartormstLr Service units under stnndard <strong>Quartermaster</strong><br />
Tables of 0rLnnizP.tion. At the peak there were 50<br />
oomgnni6s on duty in thu Euro oan Thuoter of Operitioaa and<br />
they su plied ap roxirmtoly sfx >arcant of thb labor survioe<br />
u1 the Bo"unics!ions zone for Qunrtcrwster operations.<br />
b. Originally, some Italian Sorvlcu Units operated<br />
under the supervision of Lhginter Ti!ohnicnl Suparvisory Hsgiwnts.<br />
Othurs wore allocated diroct to the serviow. hcn the<br />
Military Labor Survice was or,anized, thct abuncy suporvised<br />
the Ittrlion Survicu Units.<br />
0. In cenornl, Itnlian Sorvioe Units wiire found to<br />
bo lass satisfactory than other type8 of labor in tho European<br />
Theater of <strong>Operations</strong>. Their grentost efficlmcy was echiuved<br />
in thtt receigt, storage, and issutt of gasoline nncl in laundry<br />
nnd srtlvago oporations. Thdy were ratod et npproximately hdf<br />
tho cnpucity of thu comparable United Stntca Military unit.
Q-%-S-T-R-f-C-T-3-D<br />
at the cessation of hostilities mre than 75 percent of the<br />
labor sorvice of the <strong>Quartermaster</strong> Corps in the Gomunica-<br />
tiono Zone was performed by other than United States military<br />
pasonnel. b. Thct thc rulativo efficiency of th, vmiou6:<br />
[rou>s of labor _eorsorm.lvms na follosg:<br />
(1) UnitLd Str.tcs military wits.<br />
(2) EnenJ~prisonurs of wur.<br />
(3) Civilion labor.<br />
(4) Italian 3urvic.t. Units.<br />
C. That thc ndvantnfos of tho uao of labor other ’han<br />
U.S. military units outwoighed the disadvantages of its use.<br />
8. Thr.t the &nrterrmstm Scrvico Corqcny is a Tlcxiblu<br />
unit capablu of vnrioue operations, but completely lacking<br />
uobility.<br />
72. Rcoomendations.<br />
n. That cdditiom-,l trnnsportatim bb assibnnud to<br />
tho Qum%rmaatcr Survico Coupmy (T/O & E 10-67) to provide<br />
at List ono truck, 2-1/2 ton ci.reo, for mch plctoon for<br />
trnnsporting lobor dutails, at least on2 addiZ;Lond truok,<br />
2-1/2 ton cargo, for company bcadquarters, on8 at hest onc<br />
truck, 1/& ton, for the uae of the platoon lmders in chuokinL<br />
and supervisink labor dotc.ils.<br />
b. That pertinent doctrinca, techniquoa and Tables<br />
of OrLaniaation nrid Equipment be amended by uppropriotecies<br />
of th6 Wr Depurtmont.<br />
- 48 -<br />
R-E-8-T-R-I -0-T-E-D
L.<br />
2,<br />
R-ES-T-R-I-C-T-E-D<br />
BiblioLrnphg<br />
Chapter 6<br />
3. Notos on Sorvico Troops, Oreanisation Branch, G-4, 12th<br />
<strong>Army</strong> Group, 18 July 3.945.<br />
4. War Dcipwtricxt Obsurvers RGport Nuubor 981, 22 May 1945.<br />
5. VCJ Ddprtwcint Observers Rqort Hubx 773, 9 April 1945.<br />
6. 'Vcr Utpnrtrient Observers Report Nuriber 975, 22 May 1945.<br />
7. ;mr Dupcrtnont ObsGrvurs Rbport Number 7.58, 24 ?$arch 1945.<br />
8. War Departriont Obsomwrs Rdport Xubur 934, 10 W.y 1945.<br />
9. Jar Dajartiwnt Obssrvors Report I?um.ber 756, 27 March 1945.<br />
10. :(firDsportnunt Observurs Rolort hiber 967, 10 Uap 1945.<br />
11. QM OporetioAml Study iu'o. 11, Wst) of Pcr60nnul Otuer than<br />
<strong>US</strong> llilitary in thu Eurojoan Theator".<br />
12 * ETO, SOY Kuber 29,<br />
md changes.<br />
13<br />
26 Eny 1944: Hondguartors, STO<strong>US</strong>A,<br />
Lytter, Hbadquarters, PTO<strong>US</strong>A, f ilo AG 383.6 OpGA,<br />
joct: "Prisoncr of War Labor", 21 SvL)twmbor1944. sub-<br />
Hiat or? of Contincntal Advanoo Sootion, Gomumicat ions<br />
Ronu. ATII<strong>US</strong>A. Aui_ust 1944 - May 1945,<br />
- 49 -<br />
R-l$CEI-T-F!- I-O-T-E-D
R-E-5-T-R-I-C-T -E-D<br />
ti. Wnrtarimster su,pply to the Uriitcd Dtotcs Air<br />
Psrcos fol1waG thc sane gcncml prccofiuro QS suply t3<br />
,',my Grouid ohd Service Forcos. Csmkndcrs sf Base 8cctiws<br />
af Cornuiicatiann Gonc on the cwitincnt :and in the<br />
TJoitod liinGdani v!erc rospor:slblc for thc auiply of all tho<br />
3nitcd Stntcs forces assignuci ar within tho p?Eruphicol<br />
moil, irrcspoctivo of whotha: sucb units wrc nir, jirmnd<br />
or sorvico fnrcos. NL,rrally, tdr Fiirce units werc assicnod<br />
specific depots far supply, CithGr in tho carviunicatims<br />
Z:no i)r amy arqas. ?Tnrml roquisitirming ma supply proccdurcs<br />
vorc followd in aocordanco with Instructlms issuod<br />
by tho Corxmding Conorzl; BJudquclrtcrs , Europun Thc.1tcr<br />
aP Oporutions.<br />
b. Pri:r to D-Day it was docidod that no Air<br />
F.rca urdts vsuld stoa!: ar carry any lovol ,df gucrtcriustcr<br />
aupplics 3thcr thi.n ormrgoncy stacks of PatiiJnS, rril ..nd<br />
lulriconts. Tho Cawxindinp GLnorcls df tho army mons :.nil<br />
s af Cosc, IntcrLicC.icte and .wTJnCo sections<br />
icatinns Zimo ncrc rcs:!onsiblo for thc supply<br />
cf .%irBcrcc units locotea iiithin tlioir rcspcotivo nroas.<br />
Diroctivcs i~suaGby ITondqucrtcrs, Euriipcan Thcator i1P<br />
Ggarstians, proscribed th-t ths su:ply oeancios ooncornud<br />
plnco su:iplios vithin 1~0rlilos tho nlr Borcc iwtnllntions<br />
within thoir rcsgcctiva zi,lics. Thc serviac bcri<br />
!$artormator uf tho Air FU~CL Scrvico Coruxnd wcs rzspm-<br />
siblc fdr picking up the sujpliils 3t tho pc)ints dcsip3tca<br />
by tha <strong>Supply</strong> cQncy.<br />
7h. supply 0pcratisns.l<br />
CI. pI',wliolLy, r:iti.cin issums wrc mido as dircctcd<br />
by udp-clgri:,to Zuropcm ThesLcr nf Gyorctinns circulars<br />
.nd oniondriunts, 1Znti;rns WOXT c,intrallc;d by tho opplic3tion<br />
of tho dully mnu ;ttcndance figurcs. @porc!ti::nol ratij sns<br />
~'{oruusod by tho Air FijrCo princi.plly c.8 n travol rctiw<br />
by tho f,viutlrn truck coripnias ;.nd cir ooribct crows ::n<br />
tho iiovo. Bpocial ullotr~imts of sholl ocgs, orangus,<br />
povrdorcd riilk :ad ougur verc furnishcd ccribat crow during<br />
.;ir oTcroticns an a nacossnry Liugrxcntntia., bath fro?i a<br />
:iodic.:l :,n& ti mr.:lc stcndpoint. Spocir,l issuos i>f omdy<br />
,..nd cui wcro uddo ;vail;!blc for use by cor.ibat crows on<br />
10% niissians. A spocial box cf rich ollnaics w3s imufncturod<br />
in Jtnglnnd for this purp..sc, but invcstig3tik.n rcvcalod<br />
thrit oo;rb:.t croim pruforrod rcgulnr condy bzrs<br />
ovnil:lblo tit post uxohmgos .<br />
b, In roguisiticminc nutharisod su!?plioo the air<br />
n 50 ..<br />
R-E-9-T-R-I-0-T-E-n
R-E-S-T-R-I4 -T-E-D<br />
bese Quarteri-ster dealt directly with assigned denots. Controlled<br />
Itens, ar item In short sug?lg such as certein<br />
itena i.f eeneral purpose equipnent, and itans in excess<br />
nf outhorized alldwances, were requislticmsd thrswh the<br />
~$mrter,?aster,Air Farce Service CO inad. The Milith Air<br />
Vorce Service Calmand Quarterilaster appoved the recuisitis$n<br />
where aDprapriate and fonm-de6 it tu the Quarter-<br />
:mster, Otniriunicatims ZL.ne, f x final approval nnd weessarg<br />
actiirn.<br />
c. Cluss XI1 requirerients f )r each Air Pmce<br />
statiam were 0.nt;;rlldated a d subriltted tk thr? nearest<br />
depdt IJr amy suiply p int. Claso if1 (aviati n) requirerrcnts<br />
tiere cnof reti.,n factt;rs during the<br />
r.A crnservatlivi progran vas w Irked :Jut by the linth jLir<br />
F;!rco with C~-~ImiderRble diffiouJ.ty because personnel<br />
effected by different reducti,.n factms, a8 ne11 66 OKeiiptod<br />
prsmnel, were eating in tho 6ar.e ~~,u~cliil~tod<br />
.;om, m.ktne, It phynicel.ly I:zp.\ssibln tn differentiato bctwccn<br />
sedciitsry and hard r:srlcern,<br />
b. The Quartermetor parsr~ilnalin tho petorial<br />
Wuaarfin (T/O 1-456Ri..of the a1k- servioe group .were<br />
cinsfderod nwiorically suffioidnt, Earever, under the<br />
idd tabla of organizatlnn for tho air .dOj)ot eroug, cnly<br />
23 enlisted non and tw;, sfficors wero outhLirisod far the<br />
quertermestor dopdt pl8tr.m. T!ila nurkber praved Insurfioiont<br />
tc provido Ear pcak l?ado and to caro fm distrfhutitla<br />
points vhlch harl t.) bo ostnblishcd et air depot<br />
p:cups t,:j c,?pe with critical auggly situations.<br />
c. BW-J~CQ tuan Querteraastcrc; at tirtoa 13%porianccd<br />
uxtrenc di!’fioultioo dno to the fact that thay<br />
end tho r.ir Pkrcu !hito vrhich they suppliod ~ G V Q in ~ rapid<br />
succossl~%back and fmth through arqy 8108s and AaVanCu<br />
;:ne intcrnodiato Soctims ;’fCzuuniehti us Z-m.:. In smo<br />
ORSOD, tho sorvlco tusn Quortornastcr vkuld bo in ono ar.ly<br />
arcs vrhflc the cicbat units ho served $;ab .j.?uruting In<br />
c m the arca. This, tagother xjith the mvonont8 ixf tho<br />
smios and 6i30ti .ns s~f Ca%aunicotiibne Zmc, resulted in<br />
tho scrvico tear3 Quarto~-%e~otors riakin$; mny onntacts with<br />
do.!c?ts and ,,thor Buartcrmstors. In this c,-,nnectL?n, they<br />
lcarncid whcro supplics wore XJcatod ijn the ct.ntinont, and,<br />
if sui>plicsv ~ronot ovaileblc! at mo placo they wiuld e3<br />
t;i Flll;.thChcr dco. t. This rosuiltud in cmsidorablo c;?nfii8i;m<br />
which c
a. Difficulties were enbountered, in socle army<br />
areas, by mobile sales store pemonnal refusin to sell to<br />
Air Force officers. Usually, this was straighfened out<br />
when it was brought to the attention of the sales officer<br />
by either the Air Foroe Service Command <strong>Quartermaster</strong> or<br />
the <strong>Army</strong> <strong>Quartermaster</strong>. In some cases, <strong>Army</strong> Ground Force<br />
peraonnel were favored over Air Force personnel. Notices<br />
of the itinerary of army sales stores smethes were not<br />
received by A ir Force unlts anti1 the store had left the<br />
locality and, on other occasions, were not received at all.<br />
This was primarily,due to low channels of communications.<br />
Forceg. 9<br />
76. <strong>Quartermaster</strong> Servioes for the United States Air<br />
a. The methods and procedures for handling sal-<br />
vage collection and salvage repair in the Arey Air Forces<br />
were essentially the same aa that for other United States<br />
<strong>Army</strong> forces. Air Force units were not normally responsible<br />
fer the collection and segregation of Air Force salvage.<br />
scrap which accumulated at Air Force stations was disposed<br />
of as directed by the Communications Zone Section Commander<br />
in whose area the Air Force unit was located. Preliminary<br />
segregation and classif'ication was effeoted by the station<br />
salvage officer who moved the salvage material to the<br />
appropriate <strong>Quartermaster</strong> dump or salvage collecting point<br />
as directed. Air Force installations maintainea a Salvage<br />
and Conservatian officer who supervised salvage activities<br />
with a view of conserving material as well as disposing of<br />
it. Unserviceable <strong>Quartermaster</strong> individual and organiza-<br />
tional clothing and equipment at Air Force installations<br />
Was processed through assigned depots in the base section.<br />
If replacement was required, the salvage items were turned<br />
in to a depot and a requisition for replacement in kind<br />
and quantity was Submitted.<br />
b. The evacuation of <strong>Quartermaster</strong> salvage was<br />
not normally a function of Air Force units. The Air Force<br />
wae only responsible for forwarding salvage to base section<br />
depotg or salvage oolleoting units, which in turn segregated<br />
and classified the items for evacuation as directed<br />
by that unit.<br />
c. Salvage repair service for <strong>Army</strong> Air Force<br />
units was furnished by salvage depots and <strong>Quartermaster</strong><br />
salvage repair units allocated by the Chief <strong>Quartermaster</strong><br />
to units near Air Force installations, The Salvage<br />
officer at Air Force installations maintained facilities<br />
within the station for minor repairs such as tent patch-<br />
ing, but, in general, he secured replacements for unserviceable<br />
items of <strong>Quartermaster</strong> equipment while the<br />
salvage depots performed the necessary reclamation or<br />
disposal. Clothing repair facilities were allocated by<br />
base section headquarters and normally consisted of<br />
quartermaster repair units or civilian agencies in<br />
Allied countries.<br />
.d. <strong>Quartermaster</strong> laundry service for A ir Force<br />
units was normally secured through the Communications<br />
Zone Section <strong>Quartermaster</strong>s or, in the United<br />
Kingdom, through base section <strong>Quartermaster</strong>s.<br />
- 52 -<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
Air Psrcc units WQro nssigncd to Quartorpustor nsbilc<br />
Lundrp installations in arny urec,s ;rr t,; civilian ~~gcncic3<br />
lii Allied c(1untrics whore nwg rnoilitios \$or0 lirdted.<br />
Tho Station C,uartarnasters at Nr Force bases were ro8pon-<br />
siblr: for the osllection ;.IT laundry for all wits at<br />
their stetions and for dolivery to the assignad laundry<br />
installotian. 811 specification0 as t:, the method of<br />
budline, quantity nf itOru3, etc., were followed, and the<br />
wper wrk involved, asgeoially where civilian agsncias<br />
wurc concernod, was processed throwh tho Btatisn Quart-<br />
errmstor, Under rcciprocal bid agrcenont in Allied<br />
ciuntrics, the civilian eguncy subnittod a bill f;;r scrvi003<br />
ti tho l;tatiOn Quartcmsstur u:ir;n ci;mIglotiirn nf the<br />
wrk. Tho f3tatI.m r?uartcrrmel;cr authenticated the vnuchcr<br />
dnd forwarded it tcJ tho bas0 scctiia f:sr f ind auditing<br />
and psyricnt.<br />
e. Dath fslcilitioa were al1:cated ti) boac ROCtlclns<br />
by tho CliFcl" Quartorrustor. Air Firrcc units wore<br />
assi&ned to instullatl~~ns vithin thcir rosgirctivc 1p3aso<br />
ae 0tions.<br />
77. Discussi- a n .<br />
a. Shm ropair and lcundry scrvicca often were.<br />
nj;'c a-milablo trJ Air Porco units in army arcaa bccauso<br />
thcsa eorvicos wre nurally placcd fur the cavenicnoc<br />
i,f amios, prticularly to scrvo fratlinc divisiuns.<br />
During the advancc into bemany, sorvico t~sriand air<br />
dOpCt Quartorraastcrs arrarqcd lacally with civilian c.:ntractma<br />
fsr laundry und sh;x ropsir, t-mk mer nd w?oratod<br />
1:ocal loundrios d d shoo ropair shopa with civilian<br />
labor ai, whore this ccjuld a:,t bti dmc, thoy sent the<br />
shoos to be ropairod and lui&clry Co Belgim cr France,<br />
s,xioti;los for distencsa sf somrul hundred niles.<br />
b. Air Fcrm c~~~bot units nccuylod either<br />
newly crnstructed. landing strips or airficlds taker ovcr<br />
fram tho Gcmna which Yycro, in m-ist cases, dostmgcd<br />
and wit,h(:Ut bethinp fucilitics, end in such CQSC~Sbathing<br />
iecilities wore inpravisod.<br />
78. Gravos Hoc'istration Sorvico.l0<br />
a. Tlia nothoas, policies and procedures far<br />
Gravos Rucistration Sorvice for the Unitod Status Lir<br />
Fnrccs in Europc wore ossentislly tha sam as that pravidod<br />
lor bmny Ground Bilrcos.<br />
b. The Graves Rc-gistroticin Scrvicc in thc Unitod<br />
Statss Air 7cJrcas in Euroio iporatod uneor tho Caixmnding<br />
Gonorel, Noadquartors I: Air Paroe Gervico C3.a" This<br />
sorvicc owsistod ,?f a Unltod Stetos Air Fnrcas in Europe<br />
Grevos Cogistratiun L?fficc.r wiii: was liicatod in tho '&artcrnaatcr<br />
Saction, IIcadquartors 1;: kir Borco Sorvico 0ar~r.1and.<br />
Thoro was ulsa grcvidod a corimnd gavna 'z'oEistration<br />
iifficcr far oach Quartcrmat3tor socti'm of all<br />
rJaJrr subnrdinato csmnnas af Hcadp.iertors United States<br />
?,ir Fnrcos in Curspc. qravos zogistraticn nffioers wre<br />
also prijvidcd far scrvico p;roups, Etir dopt &?.;ups, scparata<br />
grLrtips,end any unit nat scrvicoa by D Quar:ormster<br />
aorvlcc toan. Numally, $uartormstcr officars<br />
ytcrc) appoiJntod 6s grams rogistratirm CJfficcrS and aaswiGd<br />
- 53 -<br />
R-E-5-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
K-E-S-T-Hcl-lj-y-g-D<br />
this responsibility in addition to their other duties.<br />
C. "'hen teeth occurred in the Vnited Xinpdom,<br />
the deceased' 8 inadiate oomaendinr: offLcar pro4q2tlg<br />
evacuated t5.e relains to the nearest siiit ..r;r ceinetery or<br />
to an awroved c!.vilian unasrteker. If the remains were<br />
.rtthin 50 niles of a hited Vxtes wilitery cei,letery they<br />
vere nomally dispatched to that cemetery. 1.ooal Ixuials<br />
were authorized in emerRencies when it was L3possible to<br />
transport the remins to any one of the desipnated military<br />
cemeteries. For euercencies, s.-laLl plots vere re-<br />
served in various civilian cemeteries tb.rou,?::out the Viiittcd<br />
LYn$.oii. In case of enermnoy burial In fi local cealutery,<br />
tb.6 'merlcan crives Registration Tervioe wm '.?ro:ptly n.oti<br />
fied in order that necessary action coulC be takeii,<br />
d. "Wen death occurred on the continent in tlie<br />
Zumpean Theater of C!?era.tions, the noma1 ncthod of evacuation<br />
to estsblishsd id1itr.V ceizeteries was follovred iT<br />
at all possible. The rsnains '''ere normlly transnorted to<br />
the oenetery by unit transportetion.<br />
e. The nethods, policies ancl. 7rooeCures followed<br />
by <strong>Army</strong> Cround Forces on tha continent were nonmlly uaed<br />
by the llnited States .?.ir,Forces in ZUTO?E in thu iflentirication<br />
of deceassd ?ersonnal and the handlinm of personal<br />
effccts.<br />
f. k?erience indicated thAt all .ini"or:imtion of<br />
my asslstnme in iaent3.f iaction of unlrnoam deceased shouid<br />
be colleated in one ?lace by a saecicl researoh section<br />
unaer th,e fi.d.jUtxnt noneral Gaflualty Seotion. Tho section<br />
should. ~RVGaoaem to ;?rlssinc, Air Crew ?.c?orts*', 4djutant<br />
Eeneral Casv.alty ':crninR rie.,ort locator car& , teeth charts,<br />
finaernrints, clnd any other identifyinr mter5.al available.<br />
79. AuJ&rJ>po-Sy>1..2 On 6 TTovc.iber 1S13, the<br />
Joint LocTatioal teff' on ttee, "ropean Eiceter of<br />
<strong>Operations</strong>, nuhlidied R su.)plg plan to novorn U9 Irmy<br />
responsibility to U' ?'ami Borces in %rope, which str ted<br />
"The Commanding General, Servloes of qupply, is responsible<br />
for sumlyinfl to the <strong>US</strong> Maval forces In Europe<br />
those itens which are COiLWn to the 4rqy mc' KaVy, and<br />
which er6 aQproved for suoh 6u3 'ly in the tray cnd Naval<br />
Porce8 in Turo?e'7. Under t'le ?inn the Chief quarternaster<br />
was charged with supplyin0 Ltem of a ?"eraaster nature<br />
as called for or tirected.<br />
a. The ?Tavy prepared estimtes of its requirements<br />
and sublttcd these from tine to tiine to the General<br />
Purchasinf! Agent, The Peneral Purohasinr, .%en t furnished<br />
the Chief Pluartermster with A lirt of t'-e Fava1 requiremente<br />
pertainin- to tbe ?uar%er?aster seWJ.ce. The Chief<br />
nuartemster ini'icated thereon which itenS would be .n-ooured<br />
fpom the Inoy in the %ropean Thecter of QperatJons
R-E-S-?!-B-IC-T-E-D<br />
bg' Cavy 3)moh. sing 8&noieS, and tho reminifie, itom \.rhich<br />
vwuld be reyuisiticmed by the Navy froa thc Unitcd Statos<br />
by nproval of the G-4 Socti;.n cf the<br />
hosdnuartors af the am8 in which tho navy unit 1va6 a yrating,<br />
and all raquisitions far o. ntrollcd iCms roquirod<br />
tho a!iqraval iif thc Chiof Quartsrnastor. Class 111 requircrionts<br />
in large quontitics nlea roquirod tha approval<br />
For <strong>US</strong>Q in -&"can Xed Cross clubs)<br />
theso itons wro c;.nfincc! tu 1;hc iq.redicllts,<br />
oxccpt rdlng.ti, the currant ricmu LJr purchcsod<br />
cxccsn itens ;.fsubsistunoc. Tho<br />
c11ngewas 75 ocrnts per mti;n.<br />
b. The Q2uai%CrmStCl' 1106 OUth?JriZOd t
84. Accruntinc Pracadurd. C;lLect~.cn frcn thc Red<br />
CroSs far itens sirld ims the res?snsihil.ity i.f tIic hccnmtin&Divisian,<br />
Offico sf thc Chior cpucrtcrrzstor. Druphnut<br />
flour and bamk mtches and othor sirrilrr iteris of Rcd<br />
Crdss prsperty Btcrca by the Quzrtowntcr wire ng t cntorc-d<br />
,mtollios vith itcL-s sold. Gratuit\us issues t3 the Rod<br />
Cross wro also placed tn separnto tollics. All tollion<br />
fJr iteris issuod n o rcinbUrsf3ilcnt basis were fawsrdcd t a l<br />
tho Acciunts Diviaix for c.)llecticn, All prapcrty hold<br />
by thc Rod Crms in mmrandu receipt was records& in the Bnpply<br />
Divisiun, Office df tho Chief &uertor mstcr, tct wh,u<br />
all pertinent dobit ond crcdit tallics ware for. ordd.<br />
85. Idisoia~nclnd Authvity<br />
a. In a lottor to tho Sccrct?ry -3 "YIP, dstit 10<br />
H,mnbcr 19k3, tho Prcsident )f tho Unitad St~tos fv-mlly<br />
chargod the Anw with tho rGSj1 nsibility, until such ti m<br />
9s oppr7priLto civilizn deuncios woro propcrod ttJasswo<br />
it, If shi.pin@ and distributing aupplics far thr! rolicf<br />
(2nd rohnbllitoticm f libbr,tcd o utrioe. Until that<br />
ti-10, tho orrj had roccgnizcd its pctcnti, 1 rcsiv nsibiliti-a<br />
frr o. certain a:i unt -f civil raliof tc:<br />
(1) Prcvont civil unroat which \i. &le bndancor<br />
lines cf c-xmuniootiims and ohnnncls f<br />
supply, and<br />
(2) Frevont dinoose which ieipht ondungcr<br />
tr,ops.<br />
Hcwwor, full rasponaibility hod mver bcun cloorly definocl.<br />
In his lettor to tho Sooretary of 'hr, Lho Irosident stutitd:<br />
".llthsugh athor bgonolos sf tho 0 wcm lent uro<br />
preparing tbilselvos far thc wdrk th-t ikust he d no iu cmnoctiqm<br />
with tho reliof und rohabilitoti in C llberatod<br />
mms, it I8 mite apprrent if Pr3:Ipt rcsults [ire ti bo obtained<br />
the Amy will hnvc tcJ usaurie tho ivitidl burdcn .>f<br />
shipping rind di stributine raliJf supplios. This will m i t<br />
mly bo tho cos0 in thL ovont thirt notivi. riilit,ry 3pcrctions<br />
arc under way, but alss in tho ovcnt d t CIerilan<br />
ool1,pso. I ciivisngo chat in the cvcnt nf' c Gcrum cullapso,<br />
tho nocd Tor tho mny LAunclortckc thin w rk will<br />
bo all tht rime appnrcnt.<br />
T~wQ~.-I~c, I direct thrit y~u hovo tho hruy undortalro<br />
the planning ncccssury to onoblct it t L 8 carry nut this<br />
task to tho ana thit it shall he prcporud tc garforri this<br />
functiin, pending such timo 2s civilion agcnclios iiust be<br />
propored to carry .ut tbo lnngcr rungo progroii if roliof.<br />
You m y t.iko this lottcr 08 riy uuthdty ta y-u ta<br />
0011 upon 011 othor nguncios 3f the G vorinriont for such<br />
plans and assfstmcu as you n.~y noad. F m a11 mttcrs ai'<br />
policy that hcvc t-1be dctorninod in connocti n with this<br />
work, mu will consult vvith the State Department<br />
for anp politioal advice, and upon the Treasury<br />
- 57 -<br />
R-E-9 -T -R-I-C-T-E -1
R-E-q-T-?-I-C-T-&D<br />
for such oconomic and fisoel direction as you m y nood."<br />
b, This lottcr brought up the prcblom of roliof<br />
RUpplios for thi Pcoplc of 3uropc and onvisagod prinarily<br />
rilictf of thcso pboplo raiding in 1-iberated countrios.<br />
%E thc militcry opcrutions progrossod, tho additional<br />
oroblom arosb of furnishing, roliof to thosc .pcoplo of Allid<br />
Netions who had bccn tmnsportcd into GG"~ for<br />
B'.QVC labor cnd othcr purpo8os. Tho bnsio eupply mission<br />
of Civil Affairs m y thoroforc b+ statcd as follmm:<br />
(1) To provide suy;plius noccssarg for imcdiato<br />
rcliof to the people of liborotod<br />
comtrios.<br />
(2) To provide thc cseuntinl supplics ncce-<br />
ssary for tho hcalth and maintonanca of<br />
dis?laccd'pcraons founa inside ammy<br />
oomtrios, and also thosc supolics neccssary<br />
for tho rcpotriation of thcse<br />
pooplc bock to thcir native lands.<br />
86. Rcsnonsibility.<br />
a. To acoomplish the nruy's res~onsibility in tho<br />
?urop=an Thcntcr, R Civil Mfaira section was orgmizod 011dor<br />
tho (7-1, Hcsdquart:rs Turoponn ThC&tLrof <strong>Operations</strong>,<br />
nnP onorntLd undcr and in77acccrdancc with tho oolicios an&<br />
1-iroctivos Zssuod by thc ,>uropcanThcntor Caandor an6 by<br />
the Sivi1 hffairs nivision in tho ''ar Wportmont. Civil<br />
lffg.lre ims lcter givon penern1 stcff status by inclusion<br />
on thc goncral stcff BS G-5. It oTGrutcd through fill echclons<br />
down to and including divisions and through local<br />
clctaclmcnts sot up in vnrious pats oh libcratd and OCCU-<br />
?i&icountric,?, These Cictachmonta wcrc known as Civil 4ffairs<br />
dctac)lrzLn6s rvhcn oporctina in libcrat6d countries and<br />
as ?Tilitarj GovCrnmont dctocl"cints whcn oporeting in occuoivd<br />
tcrritory. The 0-5 was chcrgtd with tho res7onsibility<br />
fer planning and ostimnting roquircmonts ; ccordinktion<br />
with thL sorvicos for procuroncnt, storago md issuu of tho<br />
sunp1.i~~; coordinntion with nipopriatc. agcncias of tho<br />
govormcnts of libcratud and occlipicd countries for*storaga<br />
spaco and othor matters portnining to Civil .Vftlira, nnd<br />
with tho local safoguurding and retril isms OP tho suyplios<br />
to civillan rocinionts.<br />
b, Tho mothods, policios QRd wocduros for<br />
Civil Affairs surmly wom publishca by the Comn;ing Conornl,<br />
Xuroponn Thcntur of Opcretions, as Sto-lding Opirating<br />
l'rooodure ?hubor 28, dctcd 2 Juno 1944. In this, thc RUPply<br />
objcctivo was statu3 ns fol-lows:<br />
?'The priln'ry >bjcctivc of Civil 'dfnirs opcr. tiom<br />
is tho cffoctivo oontrol of tho civilian gopulntion to prcvont<br />
i t B intorfcrcnco with military o?Lr?tions and to aakc<br />
thc naximufi iiao of local rosnurcos for tho bcnofit of thGS0<br />
opcraticns. A corollary of this objoctivc is thL furnishing<br />
of cortcin niniinun~suoplios to tho oivllinn -mpulotion to<br />
GatabliSh ndcouqto stsnflnrds of vubl ic hbnlth end to DrLvCnt<br />
thc civL1 ?onulntion from b arming a bur on upn thc A l l j l i t a v 4<br />
Of thoscr mincmm suvplios tho ranximum mounts nrG to bc obt-inod<br />
from inddgunous rosourcca, rnd nnly thG<br />
- 58 -<br />
R-E-S -T-R-I-C-T-E-D
R-E 4-T-R-I 4-T-E -D<br />
deficiency, if any, is t o be provided from stocks under<br />
military control."<br />
Under this procedure, and in accordance with instructions<br />
iesued from time to time by Headquarters, European Theater<br />
of <strong>Operations</strong>, the <strong>Quartermaster</strong> responsib ilities for Civil<br />
Affairs were as follows:<br />
87. Prior Planning.<br />
Deterininaticn of Re uirements. No responsibility.<br />
Reequiremh--~corr@uted by<br />
higher authority and passed to the Chief<br />
<strong>Quartermaster</strong> for procurement.<br />
Proowement. A meohanlcal responsibility.<br />
m - s were placed on the souroe as<br />
designated by higher autliorities for the<br />
quantities and items as designated by<br />
those authorities.<br />
Stora e Complete responsibility for all<br />
d k f a i r s items of a <strong>Quartermaster</strong><br />
nature.<br />
Distribution. Full' responsibility fcr dLstribution<br />
to depots from ports and between<br />
depots.<br />
Issue. Bulk issue to Civil Affairs detach<br />
merizs only. NO responsibility for retail<br />
issue or distribution to the civil population.<br />
a, Early In 1943 the Unlted States ana Great<br />
Britain began a study of the problem for civilian supply in<br />
liberated and occupied countries. The work W88 carried on<br />
under an Inter-Allied Codttee known as the "Administration<br />
of Territories of Europe" (A.T.E.). Ita object was to<br />
study the problem of providing food, medical supplies, and<br />
clothing for civilians in countries under Axis oooupation.<br />
The a odttee agreed thht stock piles created for Civil Affairs<br />
or relief purposes would be available for joint British<br />
and American use, with no division between United States and<br />
British responsibility, In their planning, the noamittee<br />
members Used largely the American proposed basic ration for<br />
Class I requirements, while for Class I1 and IVsequirements<br />
they utilized the Erritish experience gtrined in handling relief<br />
in bombed areas of the United Kingdom. krcm this they<br />
determined the clothing, footwear, sanitary equipment and<br />
emergenay feeding equipment that would probably be required.<br />
No reference was made to factual information available In<br />
the Office of the Chief Quartermster, and the requirements<br />
a8 determined from British cxperlenoe alone were publishefi<br />
by Supreme Headquartera in a catal0gue entitled "Catalogue<br />
Civil Mfairs Stores and Suppliestt.<br />
b, The roquiremente as estimated for food, 010thfng,<br />
blankets and emergency feeding sets wore generally<br />
satisfactQry. The requirements as estimated for sanltary<br />
and expendable supplies, tents and cots were not satiufaotorg,<br />
and in some cases the figures were lacking entirely,<br />
As a result, the Quartermastar service was often called
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E -D<br />
upon ts furnish mny zf those itons frnn rcgular arrly stock<br />
to Cnl;qs for displcc-d pcrs. ;is. If sulipllcs vore nvr.ilc;ble,<br />
this was ncit ~~hjoctioniblc, but it woa frequcntl’y ncccsscry<br />
to nbteir? a osmmd decision W.n IkQdouartcrs, Zuroponn<br />
Thoater ;if Opcfntisn, prim tcr thc issue :If ccrtnin 1tor.u<br />
required for wlitory o:ierotiims. In a fow cssos civil<br />
.UfairS stcck had to be issusd to met <strong>US</strong> i*r:iy raquiretienta,<br />
and D. grwt clonl ?f ndninistrativc work HCS invnlvcd<br />
in accmnting fI)r tho tronsncticns t,) cnnblc suhscqucnt<br />
rctsanslor frm amy to Civil E,fI’airs std?k.<br />
88. Raticns.<br />
e. Tho principal ommdity suyplicd by tho Chicf<br />
QUdrtCriluBtBr thr.q:h Civil Aff.?irS chnnncls 8<strong>US</strong> f .id.<br />
Fliiur, fats L;nd ?nrbahydratcs fsirricd thu x i ji:r oc.rgoiicnCs.<br />
Far tho rmst part, thc itom nerc ic?cnl;ici;l with thi.fia<br />
fmnd in the nunus fcr pris:,ncrs {if war, civilian .Eab:,r,<br />
mcl othwr sirdlar cntcgmlos iif pcrsi:.nnol au qlic:d by the<br />
Quunrterrmstor. It was thorcr,.ro nocosscry t:) ostnbllsh<br />
ad naintAn sopar:.ta mcdds, sogcrctc str-ck pile0 4’<br />
supplies in dopsts, 2nd sepnrntc ou:>ply pr;lcoduros rijr<br />
1acntici:l itms.<br />
h. Initlolly, it wns noccaocry ta dovelnp n basic<br />
rjticn ss o br.Sis Inr tho procurmicnt sf SUpplio6. The Civilian<br />
flugply Bronoh, Intarn:..tL:);hl kid Divisi;n, !Ioadqunrtors,<br />
Aniy Sorvloc Farom, LnshinEtcn, D.C., bcsod tho<br />
rcquircaonts n thc follL.uingfnct.ws:<br />
(1) Tho ration hod n nutrit1;n:l vzluo .?f at<br />
lunst 2,000 c3L)ries.<br />
(2) kll item :in tho Unitoil States sohodulc<br />
were 3lrcadg in use by thz United Stntos<br />
Arriy, in units :i.nS. c::ntaincrs ri~hiohGho<br />
amy wrls nccust ,moB to hondlin(l.<br />
(3) Initiul shi:nont vcs t::, IIG rixlo frsxi<br />
rcguhr amy Stocks, a d incraaaod priduotim<br />
ijf thCSB itons IJ .uld ni,t 22srupt<br />
the rogulLrr flw amg ,.rdors.<br />
(4) Quantities .!iitam wcro :Iv^iiloblc in the<br />
United Stntos without l.ny scri,)us drain<br />
in civi1i:;n supply in tho wuntry.<br />
b. Tho 8tucliuS crf tfic j?int o
R-E-S-T-R-I-C -P-E-D<br />
'-oisht Calvrics<br />
_c_<br />
PL ur 35.00 nunccs 1,515<br />
);est 6: Vogctablo Stcw 2.45 65<br />
Salt .50 --<br />
L;; up, c?ohyclratcd 2.00 178<br />
Pulsos 1'00 100<br />
Cbocso .50 55<br />
BAt3 - e 5 0 - 127<br />
Toto1 21.75 rluriCcS 2,G40<br />
Burploncntol Itm ::tight Calmi3s<br />
1_1<br />
$;ilk, avnpiratod 2.00 f75 ?orcent :-fthc t,.jt:.l.<br />
d. This basic rctid was usotl inly 05 0 guide,<br />
:,ne issue tvcs ii::t?c ..nly iif tt;m itcis ncoossnry In osrtain<br />
acns tc supploiicnt civllicn stilclrs til briny tho roti;,n up<br />
t:) tho prosoribac: st-;ndnrC. Substitution wss froquont,<br />
p-;r%icuhrlyiu tho iiout c:r?ipon::nt of thc ri.tion. Thc<br />
'Unitoil Kini;don substitutod mny itcins in :TdEir t? use up<br />
thc l:;r50 Dtocks ,-.fccnnod no3t tk.t h.8. bcon Bt<br />
In thc Unitcd 1;icgd':il in tho f Ira .if "Blockogo"<br />
vnsi.,n 2:Cscrvc~'. All thoso canno6 m~ts,hi:wcver, hod bcon<br />
packaged fn r oonrlf.rcSol uac al.:r, with rosult;int, tr$Iuhlo<br />
nd difficulty in hmclling, ship>lng ..ml star .ei:in can-<br />
tincntnl dc?i.ts, Tho corroroi:.l tygc gickxinc did nnt<br />
st .nd. up which rcsultcf. in o~nsidornblc lC-ss. Tho Issue<br />
dia, htwovor, carry ,'vcr the civil .;ff:.iru pdprxi until<br />
shipcnts fr-n tho Unitod Stctc8, !iach~oi: tho sane ns<br />
rcgulx nm~ysuylios, begun to nrrivo on tho o;,ntincnt in<br />
sufficient quxitity.<br />
89. Roquiroriwts.<br />
cl. Roq,uirononts fi,r 011 sui!plics 1'Jcro cirnputocl<br />
::nc! L-?pr:wo?L by thG G-5 Bcctic n, Sup" I:cadquurters,<br />
Allioc? Expcditl .n:.ry F~!rocs, innsnuch cs rcpuircnonts wor'o<br />
ci;:tl:I1 t . 2 bilth Ariorici,n ::nB British Ziince of Actbn. Tho<br />
initk.1 roqulrcimnts for tho perird D-Dby to D plus 90 vore<br />
ostinr.teC I nd fsninrc?od trr tho C,,nbinod Civil .':ffL~il-sCam.1ittco<br />
in *.:::shirigtiin, D.C., for :,jlprovzl and nacasaory acti$m.<br />
Rcquirorionts for lotor pericds ucro nct conputod until ,opcrc,tims<br />
hxl c8?rlriencoflan tho .o. ntincnt, nnc! wcrc thon bosod<br />
upirn rowrts na roc,utnonAati~as of tho fiold farcos.<br />
b. Each 5r3y thrxqh miy '@,;up a d Caununicotions<br />
z;.nc rop:rtcd tltcir rcspcctivc foroc sts df rcquiromnts for<br />
tho f..urth, fifth :,nd sixth n nthe subsqquont t.?tho ai'nth<br />
in rrhioh tho rt?i.rt was iir,~Is, TliU5, tho roquircr.icnts for '<br />
the sixth ni'nth..vxrc tvico rcviscc? before finel dotorrlina-<br />
ti
R-E-S-T -R-I-C-T-E -D<br />
saruencc?, estirtted snd subnittea by Suprene Headqwrtors<br />
tn thr; C8-mbinoC Civil Affcirs Crdiittce for apprav,il znr; ol-<br />
L-1c~ticn .<br />
91 Pr,curo:?cnt,<br />
a. ''.'hen thc G-5, He2CqLVJrtor8, Euri gam Thoctcr 3f<br />
Opcrr;tic.ns, rccciveil cqics fif thu clloc!ition lettcrs , copies<br />
vroro fozwrdod td tlio Chicf Qu.,rk"mtor thrt.ugh tho G-L,,<br />
Koidquartcrs, Emi poan Thector ;9 Opircitisns. The O-uzrtor-<br />
ncstcr :liiinot icitiato procurmient on thesa lcttors, hswcver,<br />
until instructod tc. dit 8:) by thc C-4.<br />
b. F'i>r thcsc itcrls tu be pri:curac? in thc Vnitod<br />
SCntos tho Cbiar '$xnrti.rmstcr pruporcd roquisiticns In the<br />
nxxal mnnor .:ne folwarecc!. thorl t.1 th 1 ~ Ymk s ~ Port or<br />
n dlhi,rkc,fi ..<br />
u, ,which in turn forwcrclod than tc tho Tnbomot<br />
I m L 1 Divisiijn, hrrq Serviac F rcas. The Internatiinnl<br />
Divisi;.,n prnccsscd tho rcoulsitims and returnac! ciipics ti<br />
the IJcw Y~rkPort .,f E!xbm-htii;n, which c&lleclthe supplios<br />
f inwiird mi; .rmr?c shipxnt.<br />
c. F.:r th:m itails trj bo prxurcd in tho United<br />
I:hnCdsri, tho Chi.cE 9?xrtanas hr preporor? n roquisiticn an<br />
:.: spocial. fl:rii;ad subnltted it to tho British 1'hr Office<br />
f;.r zction. Tho special f(,mVLS sc propsrod JS tc cnnbla<br />
thc !lcr Ot'fico rad thc Chicf O,uc..rtcrrastc:r t:) c( nsnlidate<br />
oll tho hfc.rintim niicessnry an onc Ellnet. The Chiaf Quuortoriwatcr<br />
listcd tho ulloontisn nuthority, on?. tho itons and<br />
Sumtities ijf anch rcquiro2. Tho British War OfYiCu can-<br />
plc'c~c!tho f . ~ i<br />
by shi-wing the Gopat, pL~i30, itcn, typo of<br />
packnee rind wci&hi;, on6 roturncd tho Torn tc tho Chief<br />
r.unrtorrustor. Dnsot c,n tlic inf;?rrhti?n, coctoincd in the<br />
ram, tho Chiif O,uortcrrnstor praporod &pi,t supply o.hipping<br />
ZLota [DSSD)onC subriittcd It to the Offico of tho Chief if<br />
Trmspmtntion. for action.<br />
92. Shipnent of ,Supplfcs.<br />
a.<br />
All supplies shippoi! Trori thc UniteC States<br />
wcro in p~clc3gosspccia1I.y mrked fdir Civil .Wfairs to rliffomntiatc<br />
thCii frm ,ithor supplios. Tho rrtw Ywl: Ptat of<br />
- 62 -<br />
R-E-5-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
EmbarkatIan shipPcd the supplics bascd on pric;ritics ostob-<br />
lishod by tho G--4, IIcndguartors, CQrLUUIIiCcitiCnB Zona, whvhi.<br />
ales desi6notod, in cnnjunctim with tho Chiof Qu::rtcrmstor,<br />
the ports of cntry :.nc:. tlzo n,uartcrrq.aetor .?en>ts ts be utilizer?<br />
for stornge. The shcrtago oi’ shipping-space ant! the<br />
oongosted ports of off loac‘hg prcvontcd the civil hffclirs<br />
Supplle8 frou bciw ploceil In priority’!&” 36 the nee?. for<br />
nilitary supplios was considorccl to bo nore urecnt. Consoquently,<br />
but few Civil Afffdm ~u_n?lioswcrc rcaeivcc! ?.urin[t<br />
tho first sir months of thc operation. Tic ;?ocuxntation<br />
of supplies fron the United States wi?s thc rosponsibility<br />
of tha depot of shipping origin.<br />
b. Supplies shippc?. frori tho Uidto?. ??in(;clon vmru<br />
31co spLcislly rizrkeCt, TJLCG-4, Ilndquartcrs, Cc.mnicr;tiona<br />
EO;^ ellocatofi shipping ap~cofor Civil !:ffairs suip;bliaa,<br />
m G the Supgly S..2tion of tho Civil Lffnirs Br ;,ch, 1k.Lquarters,<br />
Co . uniotitions Zone, cstablishoc; pricritics af cor-<br />
toln su~i~lics within tho allocution. ‘L’hhLse priorities wra<br />
given to tho Chisf of h.?nsnortntion, an& us the supplies<br />
were cclllcd forwart on dcpot Bup_nly s;,: ,pine da$: , wro<br />
locded nnd stipao?. ooccrdingly. On about 15 Octobar 1944.,<br />
tho systnri wc.s chongei. in thnt sug;;lics rvhiob cEp,rogatod<br />
lese than a trainioca lot weFo shippet: frori thc British depots<br />
conccrncc; in tho United KingBon to UAtcC Si;.tas al‘ by<br />
clcpots for consoliCation into ono lmgo ship.nent.<br />
93. Discrlbutlon.<br />
a. iw supplics urrived at Q,d..rtonmster depots<br />
norrial proooduro wcIs followc! in cccounting unC ro2orting<br />
for Civil Axfairs sup$ios. Comonly wed ilcxs ivorc not<br />
stored soparote fron Amy stocks. Itons pcpuliar t o Civil<br />
Arfnlrs, or food itans bolow army stunLards, Were storcc‘,<br />
scpnratoly. Scpurata recorile wru kept of tha reccipt,<br />
starago and issua of all Civil 11.4; irs itons.<br />
b. ISSUcS O f Civil AffoirS SUlIpliOS WePU mBo to<br />
Civil Affairs dotaohnonts, basc motion, .ari:dos r:nd IJationol<br />
Authorities (bweous or agcnoios cstoblishoZ by tbc cxiatin<br />
f.lliod or libwatccl Govornlonts to nclniniatcr Civil AffcirS?.<br />
All issuos wmo rmde on requisitions npprovai: by tho Chicf<br />
Quiirtormstcr or on distribution r!.ir~tivis ionucr! by hin,<br />
All lssuos wro mCo frori the c7apots unc!cr tbc RW~Coystcri<br />
ns for rsculcr nrrly sugplios, with the cxooption thct two<br />
axtro coplcs of tha tally-outs woro forwirc:.cd to the Chicf<br />
q,ucrtorrigstor for trnnsnittal to tho 0-5,k‘i,Cquortcrs, COIInunications<br />
Zono, for the rnintonanca of his rocords.<br />
C. Rcquisitions wort! norrwlly subrdttuC. by tho<br />
vcrious acancics to the 0-5, Eanclquarters, Corxmicstiona<br />
Z,one, who sc~ccnod,oCitoO ona trCnsiiittaL? tho a:~provod<br />
requisition to tho Uhief r?,uc:rformstitr through G-4, &adqunrtors,<br />
Cotmunic::tions %one, The Chiof Quartarnmter actocl<br />
only on rcauieitions cpprovocl by tho C-5 nnC Q-4. Upon a?provd,<br />
thc CMcf Cu.Jrtorrastcr checkec! ovnilabillty of<br />
Civil Affairs stocks, Lotcrr.inoc’. if the shipiont woulc~ be<br />
within the approved tonnaga allocation, snc! elthor iSQUed ii<br />
distribution directive to tho dopot conoerncd fcr shiprmnt<br />
or opprovod tho requisition if pick-up wns to bo nor?.c 4t<br />
tho dopot.<br />
94. Discussion. Tho Chiof “,ucrtcrciastm had tho<br />
R-E-6-T-R-I 4-T-E-D
osaonslbiilty of ostlxating font, clothing, tentaee, insccticidcs<br />
ond othor shdlar type iten requirements for United<br />
at,ites nilitary fOP2CS, Itclim servioc units, libcratcd<br />
ilrnpwar units, civilian Lbor, cmry prisoners of war,<br />
libcrntad AlioA prisonsrs of m.r, r:n2 other sinilcr cnte-<br />
Corics or gorsorml. For thosc, Civil Affairs hod no rosgon-<br />
sibility. Civil Affairs Zid hovmor, hnc the rosponsihi-<br />
lity of ostimting rcqulrcnonts of the 8E:rio itons for<br />
prJcticully tho Sam ty2o of porsonncl. The division of<br />
responsibility vrns very ?.ifficult to :'raw, and tho rosulting<br />
prooo[lurcs rmd circunstcncco cruntcd D spsten which ltokecl<br />
flcxibilitjr both frOn n staff stundpoint and froi? fiold<br />
opamtions. ':hiLC in a fuw msas it was nccossery to atilizi?<br />
civil hffnirs stocks to wet U!iitocI St,:tcs I,rriy coixiitm-<br />
ents cons-derable quantities of Ar.g sugplics wore issuoi:<br />
to m G t Civil Affcirs ras?onsibilltics. This ma pnrtioul-<br />
:nip truo In Xi0 su:xily of rliaplacofl. psrsons in Gorminy.<br />
This pas clue$ not Only to unilorestilwtlon of rcquirononta<br />
-an? to thc lotr priority of that class of sulyly, but to thc<br />
inibility or difficulty In ostablishing thc ihontity of on<br />
indlviaunl as D fiiSp1,locod porson or as on0 of the categories<br />
for whlah the :mny was rospor.sIb1o.<br />
95. CloOScs of Allitm'. I:illt3rp Units.<br />
c.. W thc on?, of h-ostilitiss I.n I'zy 194.5, :.llioc:<br />
ri:iU::a:uer LIS in?ici.tcc: bolow vi39 bc,iny suylioC by ths Ur.iteC<br />
Status Forcos:<br />
Fronoh I:ilitery (incluCinE.Iloslu~~a) 355,551<br />
Continontt.1 hllioZ (libsrotecl mnpovwr) 79,617<br />
Italicri oni; Salvogo Sorvico Wits 41,967<br />
cI_<br />
Tnt:1.l 477,155<br />
b. On 3 Docncbcr 1944, Suprcmc H6ncl.quarters, A'+loil<br />
3qcc:itionary Porcr;o, prosaribo?. cl.;oses of ~ lliut?ililitsrg<br />
orpnizstiona bused upon thair formtion nnc? aquipriznt.<br />
lIilitary and pnrn-rdlitary forccs woro Civifle(1 into<br />
tilo Pollortin;, tyccs :<br />
(1) Typo "A" f'orcos wcro tho80 refplcrly constitutoc?<br />
tlrmd @-ounl! lorcov cctivatiid,<br />
aquigpch, cnt; w?plic.L?in zooorclnnce vith<br />
appvvcri rommxnt prograis nnc? 01)Gl'oti.ilg<br />
un6.c~ thc Suyrciio ComanC;, idlid. SxzoCitionary.Forcos.<br />
(2) Typo IW forcco woro thoso nilitciry units<br />
roiscc! froi.1 libcratcc! mngotror snt'. oqui;)ncd,<br />
in :iooordnnco with Coeibinoc? Chiofs<br />
of Staff
R-E-S -T-R-I4 &%E -D<br />
orrifjd forccs of liborated nation8 nnd not<br />
eroupud unecr Typc trhrtand W' forces.<br />
(4) Typo W1forccs includd 511 militury .In6<br />
pra-nilitn-37 forces enrl. Lgoncies of libcrntod<br />
nations not incluc'cd iR other cst-<br />
cgorios.<br />
c. On 15 Lpril 1945, tho Colxlonr?ing: G,\noro1, Xuro-<br />
11s3nTheater of <strong>Operations</strong>, further clefinci; thcsc clasccs<br />
as follows;<br />
(1) Ty~uiiA:l rorccs wcrc rogularlg oonsti-<br />
tutcc'. ar:iy ficlrl ;nC air forccs orconizd<br />
ani. oquippod in nccorGanc: with<br />
ap;>rovo? Coabincll Chiefs of Stsff re- m'inmnt<br />
j7ropn:i aril! su1;3lic(? on .
R-E-S -T-R-I-c-T-E-D<br />
established by the Chief <strong>Quartermaster</strong> with the exception<br />
of those units operating in r;he 6th <strong>Army</strong> Group area which<br />
fed the French-Moslem ration. Type rIBrI units operating<br />
inside Germany were given a modified Post Exchange issue.<br />
Those operating outside Germany were authorized no issue<br />
of Post Exchange items.<br />
C. Type "C" forces were supplied rations insofar<br />
as availability permitted, from Cormunications Zone or =my<br />
dumps when operating under direot United States command.<br />
Type forces were supplied when specifically agreed up-<br />
on between the government concerned and Supreme Headquarters,<br />
Allied Expeditionary Forbes. Type nD*t forces when supplied<br />
were fed under the same procedure as for Type llEfI units in<br />
training. During later stages of operations, types '*DtI and<br />
fIC" units, operating under United States control, exoept<br />
those of the 6th <strong>Army</strong> Group, were issued a special Conti-<br />
nental Manu for nllied Forces operating with the United<br />
States, Units in 6th amy Group were furnished the French-<br />
Moslem ration. Eo Post Exohange items were authorized for<br />
these units.<br />
97. Class I11 Su lies. <strong>Supply</strong> of Glass I11 roducts was<br />
furnished in the same'ianner a8 for United States gorces ta<br />
Type SA1' units, operational type ftBII units, and type llC"<br />
forces under direct command of a Udted States comander.<br />
Type ltBrf units in training and type 'IDtv units were supplied<br />
when specifically agreed upon between Supreme Headquarters,<br />
Allied Expeditioqary X'oroes, and the government concerned,<br />
If supplied, the procedure and priority system established<br />
for the supply of rations to type rrBtrunits i n training<br />
were followed.<br />
98. Class I1 and IV Supplies.<br />
a. Initial issue of clothing and equlpment to<br />
type "A" forces was as prescribed by the <strong>Combined</strong> Chiefs<br />
of Staff. The War Department established the polioies<br />
with regard to replacement and maintenance of Type<br />
forces operating with United States Forces. Units in the<br />
approved French rearmament program established by the War<br />
Department received combat maintenance on the sane basis<br />
as United States Forces.<br />
b. Initial issue of clothing and equipment; to<br />
type tfBll forces was made by the Chief (.Luartermaster after<br />
approval by Sujreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary<br />
Poroes. Clothing and equipment required for maintenance<br />
by type llBI1 forces were supplied by the British Far Offioe.<br />
The supplies were held in the United Kingdom until called<br />
forward by the Communications Zone. Responsibility for<br />
Clasa I1 and IV supply of' these units was later placed<br />
entirely on the British War Office. Type V" and riY<br />
forces were given initial issuss of clothing and equipment<br />
only when approved by Supreme Headquarters in accordance<br />
with agreements between the governments concerned and the<br />
Communications Zone, No replacement issues were authorized.<br />
99. Owerations.<br />
a. The definitions of the various types of units<br />
- 66 -<br />
R-E-8 -T-R-I-G-T-E-D
R-E 4-T-R-I 4-T-E-D<br />
mro odoruato, as wcro thc doscz-ipticns of tho aoalcs on<br />
vhich each gr,nor*jl t yw i:aa to bo su plicd. The grcatcst<br />
difficulty meountcrod by tho Chidf Guartcrmestir in tho<br />
sunply of those units, iiovwmr, was in obtaining thc: propcr<br />
018: sifioation and 6tronp.th fieUroS of thc units involvcc?.<br />
Thc Chicf Qumtcmastcr ststod that tho burden of mnpwcr<br />
&tin. tos fcll ahost cntiroly on his officr., and that tho<br />
i-portancc of thiE function was ncvcr fully re,ilizod by tho<br />
staff of Ibadouartcra, ZuropLan Thcctor of Opirotions.<br />
Prior to furxishine, suoglies tc LI unit, the Chiof QuartLrmstcr<br />
mst know its oatugory cind its strcwth. Prior to<br />
thc sul>ply of a numbor of units it was ossantiil thbt tho<br />
Chiof Quartcrnastor roocivc information os to numbor, oat&<br />
qorp and strcn@Ae far onouph in dvanco of issuo to 1wrmit<br />
addcuate stockaeo of dogets to mcct the requiromonb.<br />
as they arosr). Yct throughout most of tho opLrations in<br />
the Cur0 wvn Theator thL Chicf Quartcmastcr 1189 furniskcd<br />
noithcr tho strength of tho unit, the classification, nor<br />
tha scalc of issuo until dircctivcs wrc roccivcd from<br />
highor hoad?uartcro to mku thc issuus.<br />
3. The ’lrCopartm-nt, lata in 19k.4, turmd<br />
down a renuisition cubnittcd by thc Chicf Quartermustor<br />
oovoring supplios noadod tc roploniah stocks issuod to<br />
rion IJd pOr80lmC1, and directcd thtit tho rcquircments bo<br />
resubmitted in project form, Thc Chief Quartctrmastor vJa8<br />
unablc to comply as ho did not hevc tho nooesnary troop<br />
strbngths and classifications on ?rhich to basc roquirrjncnts.<br />
In tin cfrcrt to obtain thc information ma cstabllsh<br />
a system for thc flw! O f that information in tho<br />
fuwro, th Chief Qunrtcrmastor, in J&nuG ry 1945, notified<br />
thc P-l+ Ecsdqusrtcrs, Comuniestions Zonc, of his dccd for<br />
information, and submittod to him tho followinf chart<br />
which includrd all tho information 0vsiJ.ablo to tho Chiof<br />
Qunrtcrmastor on tho units to bo suyliad:<br />
Closs of <strong>Supply</strong> StrenE*th known<br />
Authorized Tor to tho 2uarter-<br />
Cntcigorg Issue I’RStCr<br />
(1) Liboratad !;anpowor<br />
Type A All Clanacs, p.S Unknown<br />
Typo R<br />
( 090ratiGnRl)<br />
?yp I3<br />
(In-trainin&)<br />
l’ypo c<br />
I and III<br />
Unl-Jlown<br />
T and 111<br />
Ihilcnocdn<br />
Unknown<br />
Unknown<br />
Typo n unknown ITnknown<br />
(2) bench Pw~onnel<br />
Fioncor Com-<br />
panios Unknown 22,030<br />
Li&t Isfantry<br />
Dattalions Unknown 5 3 200<br />
Gnrdo E!obile<br />
Gondarneiro Un.hown 3,000
Gondarniora Unknown<br />
French Forces<br />
of the Int-<br />
crior. Un.knoim<br />
(31 Dol.~iun7crsonncl.<br />
Bclqi dl LIC,t<br />
infantry units Unknown<br />
Bclgiun Pusil-<br />
ier Bottulions Unknoirn<br />
c. On 16 E'cbruary 1945, tho informetion c7,esirod<br />
illss still ihcking in the office of thc Chicf Quartormstor.<br />
!IC thoref or0 vrotc to thc Corhnandiny Gmcrill, Connunications<br />
Zone und rcquest,d thc follot,inf;:<br />
Conploto clarification cf tht. Quartor-<br />
master res?onsibility for the supply of<br />
non <strong>US</strong> units.<br />
Confirrmtlon that thc 2uartLrmstcr was<br />
to takr: no dction in the prograii for rocquippinp<br />
the Brcnch i.rmy.<br />
IIonthly pcriodic troop projection six<br />
iJonths in adv,nco.<br />
That no cormitncnts of 2uartornoster supplioa<br />
Bc nada dthout oonsultiny, thc Chiof<br />
c\,uwtormaster to dctcrrrlnc if the supplius<br />
rcquirod 6ro actuailg 011 hund 2nd chn bo<br />
.,llocntod for a spocific purposo.<br />
d. In u lcttcr on 5 Karch l%5, thc G-4, IIoadquartcrs,<br />
Cormunications Zonc, notificd thu Ch-iof '\,uartor-<br />
rwntcr thst thc ::ontrol Division, Comunicotioils Conc, w38<br />
conductinp: t? Study to dctdrrninu which stGff scotion i*ould<br />
bu rcszonsiblc for the ruonthly prcpnutlon of maripo~rcrsstirmtos.<br />
Tho proviouo duy, hovdcver, thc G-4 ha& roquestcd<br />
informtion by 6 IPrah 1945, as to the amount or clothiny.<br />
tho Chicf \uortirrrmstar could furnis:~to alliaa IailitLry<br />
units, indicdtlve of c. still inoduqustc coIioa'it of tho<br />
woblm. Thc Chicf qunrtcnmstor rcpliad that hc could<br />
suyply nothinc, :nd agsin roviotrcd his difficulties in obtoiniiq<br />
a pr0pr.r basis for the supply of thesc units. Thc<br />
situation WLS clurlficd to sono cxtcnt, but not coni>lztcly,<br />
by thb turninntion of hostilitios in Europo.<br />
c. aupplios uud cguipmont furnished to militbrg<br />
'md gaa-nilit Jry forccs of libmcctcd countries woru tronaf'crrsd<br />
in oocordunco vij th lond-loasc oocountlly procedures.<br />
In sp'tc of l~ck of lnfomtion as to strone;ths and types<br />
oi' units, militmy oncrstions worc not hindbrad throufrli<br />
look of su3pliaa :is sufficiont stooks wrc on hand to fiU bdsic mods. T ~ Lissuc of tho Unitcd States uniforn, howovor,<br />
to ather wilitary units, without boinc dyed or othorwiso<br />
altcrod, had c distinctly dcteriorating cffcct on tho<br />
morolo of thc: United States Soldier and lassaned his prido<br />
in tho vrunrin8 of his own uniforn. Such IsSuOS would not<br />
hovo boen nude hnd fncilitioa and tPm bocn aviilablo to<br />
nrko tho ncccflsory oltcrotions.<br />
- 68 -<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
100. Conclusions.<br />
a. Class I1 and IV supplies for the Air Forces<br />
would.have been better controlled from an Air Force stand-<br />
point, had issue been made through the air depot groups.<br />
It would have been impractical for the Air Force to have<br />
handled other classes, due to the wide dispereion and regularly<br />
scheduled issue.<br />
b. quartermaster sales store service to the Air<br />
Forces would have been improved had the Air Force had at its<br />
disposal mobile sales stores on the same basis as the armles<br />
had them.<br />
e. The lack of a sufficiently hitrh priority for<br />
the movement of' Civil Affairs su?plies from the Zone of<br />
Interior to the Xuropean Theater of <strong>Operations</strong> considerably<br />
reduced the flow of such supplies from the <strong>Quartermaster</strong><br />
Corps to Civil Affairs aEencies in the European Theater of<br />
<strong>Operations</strong>.<br />
d. The outstandina difficulty of' supplying Allied<br />
military units by the Qumtermaster Corps in the European<br />
Theater OP <strong>Operations</strong> was the lack of timely irf0matiOn on<br />
the dlanpower basis and the scales of issue for such groups Of<br />
personnel. The actual supply operations involvLnq these units<br />
were performed throueh Quartemster Corps channels and were<br />
SatiSfaotory to the extent that overall ,nilitary operations<br />
were not seriously pffected.<br />
e. The division of responsibility between the<br />
<strong>Quartermaster</strong> Corps and Civil Affairs for Civil Affairs<br />
supply was sonetlmas difficult to draw, and resulted at times<br />
in confusion and lack of officienoy.<br />
101. Recommendations.<br />
a. That in future operations the collection and<br />
dissemination of information and the formulation of broad<br />
plans for supply of Oth6F than Unitod States Amy Ground<br />
Forces be made tho responsibility of one single oentral staff<br />
wenoy<br />
b. That consideration and study be given to the<br />
feasibility of the Rir Forces drawing Class I1 &, D supplies<br />
from the Cmunications Zone In bulk,' and storing and issuing<br />
such supplies at Air Force depot groups,<br />
c. That consideration be given to the oontrol of mobile<br />
snlm stores by the fir lrorce for Air Force units, particularly<br />
those at sone distance from the armies.<br />
d. That in future operations, similrar,to those experlenced<br />
in the European Theater of <strong>Operations</strong>, the <strong>Quartermaster</strong><br />
Corps be charged with responsibility for the supply,<br />
includinR planning and estimating requirements, of all <strong>Quartermaster</strong><br />
items for all categories of personnel beinF supplied<br />
by the 0.9. <strong>Army</strong>.<br />
That the retail issue of auch supplies<br />
for the relief' of civilians end displaced persons be made the<br />
responsibility of Civil Affairs or similar agencies.<br />
- 69 -<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
R-E-5-T-R-I-C -T-E-D<br />
Bibliography<br />
Chapter 7<br />
1. Ltr, Hq United States Air Forces in Europe, subject:<br />
ttQuartemaster <strong>Supply</strong> <strong>Operations</strong> in the Air Forcestl,<br />
undated. *(4)<br />
2. <strong>Supply</strong> Plan to Govern <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong> Responsibility to <strong>US</strong> Maval<br />
Forces in Europe, Joint Lpgistioal Staff Coimnittee,<br />
European Theater of <strong>Operations</strong>, 6 Nov 43. *(5)<br />
3. Vechuical Manual Number 3", Headquartere, Theater<br />
Servioe Forces, European %eater, Office of the Theater<br />
Chief quartermaster, 15 Ssp 45.<br />
I+. "Continental Operating InstructionsTt, Office of the<br />
Chief Quartormaster, European Theater of <strong>Operations</strong>,<br />
19 Feb 45. *(6)<br />
5. quartermaster Operational Analysis Study ITumber 12,<br />
subject: Wivil Affairs <strong>Operations</strong>71,Office of the<br />
Theater Chief <strong>Quartermaster</strong>, Theater Service Forces,<br />
European Theater, Wovenbe? 1945. * (7)<br />
6, ft0,wrtermaster Operational Analyais study Number 8"<br />
subject: WMenpower in Relation to <strong>Supply</strong>rt, Office o$ the<br />
Chief <strong>Quartermaster</strong>, Theater SerViCQ Forces, European<br />
Fhnater.<br />
7. Administrative Memorandum Number 40, Supreme Headquarters,<br />
Allied Expeditionary Force,. 3 Dec 44.<br />
. -<br />
8. Lfr, WD, AG office, datcd 7 Jun 44,<br />
9, Ltr, Rq <strong>US</strong> Air Forces in Europe, subject, "Service <strong>Operations</strong><br />
of the OJ~ Corps", undated, *(si<br />
LO. Report on Graves Registration Services within the <strong>US</strong><br />
Air Forces in Europe, €Iq UWE, dated 25 Nov 45. '(9)<br />
*NTumber in parentheses.is Catalog Nwnbcr.uSed in<br />
Inventory of ?kiterial, QM Study No. logt (General<br />
<strong>Supply</strong>), f ilo R LOl/ll.<br />
- 70 -<br />
R-E -8-T-R-I-C -T-E -U
R-2-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-<br />
PART THREf!l<br />
_1__<br />
---<br />
olsss I E l s e<br />
-= CHAPTER 8<br />
BATIONS ___I<br />
SECTION 1 -<br />
TYPES OF WTIONS<br />
102. 0 erational RationsB1 Oporational rations wuxe<br />
issued un-dss whore the issue or use of a<br />
bulk ration was impractical. There wore three principzl<br />
typos of oporational rations :<br />
a* Field Ration "0" was a cooked balanced ration<br />
in cans. Each ration consisted of thrco cans of,prtparrd<br />
mer.ts and vcgctablos, and three ~ ansof crackers, sugar and<br />
solublo ocffee. As this ration was not porishablo, it was<br />
suitable for use as a unit OX individual reservo ration,<br />
b. Field Ration W1Consisto&of throe unito, each<br />
containing on0 meal, packod iia a rectangular oortainer. Tkis<br />
ration could be used to replace the C ration for special<br />
purposes,<br />
o, The 10-in-1 Ration was a composite ration.<br />
Subsistence for 10 men for one day or for five man for two<br />
days was included in tho packago. There were four separate<br />
inner pnCkEgQS. Each package contained ccmponents of fivo<br />
rations and oach sct of two djffercnt packages combinod to<br />
make fivo comnlete rations. The LO-in-1 ration provided a<br />
wido varioty of food in fivo diffcrcnt menus.<br />
d. Other rations included.the*5-in-lJ which ma<br />
similnr to tho 10-in-1, md tho 25-in-1, which conaistod<br />
principnlly'of fruit juics, soup, and othQr Similar ration<br />
supplomonts. Both rations wore mainly usud to supplmcnt<br />
tho hospital rntion.<br />
103. Bulk Ratioml Bulk rations were iasuod whonovor<br />
possiblo in tho %jrcoan Thoatcr of Opcjrntions, and w0r0 of<br />
tvm prbcipal typos :<br />
a. Field Ration lfAfp, which correspondcd in goneral<br />
to the ~QELCOFime garrison ration and was generally porish-<br />
ablo. Boing perishable, it ms not auitable as a unit reservo<br />
melon.<br />
b. Field Rrticn "Bll, which was tho same ns fiald<br />
rution A e2copt that nonpcri shnblo itm roplaccd tho pcrlshnblu<br />
€toms, This ration was suitable for unit reserve purposes$<br />
164. Supplemental Field Ration "DII. The D ration conrsisted<br />
of- g melting point choc-<br />
olata fortified with vitamin B-1. Originally, thls ration<br />
was intended as n complete reserve ration, but was used<br />
principolly in the Suropean 'Pheater as a supplement* to the<br />
operctionol rttions. Thore were occasions, bowever when the<br />
D ration was used and oonsumed 48 a reserve ration.2<br />
- 71 -<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
SZCTION 2<br />
105. Develoment .2 The developnient of tlie operational<br />
ration wasii=aTly on a lokistical basis, Gild was intended<br />
to povide sufficient food for a lkited iierioci.<br />
It VJRS 1ii~hl.y iri2ortant that the ration be:<br />
a, Zasy to ,"transpox%,<br />
b. SimiAe to issue,<br />
c. Coqact to carry.<br />
These 1oListical considerations were hazflrdous, for the<br />
character of the ration whs based on the size of the box<br />
it had to fit, ani not on the needs of the soldier.<br />
lQ6. p-?,C-->i;A-la>f.o~~.~ Tho nee& for a composite<br />
packed ra ion becane eviuent i;!hen B considerable portion of<br />
the Horth African Invasion Task Force vas suyplied fron the<br />
Uaited i;inkdm (See ALi5endix 9). Several miLlioii 14-in-1<br />
coilgosite rations wi?m procui-ed frai tile &ritish r,rry, but<br />
were never populcr witl; the Unite
R-E-9 -T-R-I-C -T-E-D<br />
at me sitting.& In the fall of 1944 however an ir~~iroved<br />
type C ration becue ov~iLable Set.c&nl excelient iter,,. of<br />
ffiatlt poducts mere substttuterd'for the stew type ~DQ&,S cf the<br />
oriqinal ration. !L variety of OrclCker6 rsplaced the original<br />
type C creckers. In nadition, uddltionol sclublb coffee and<br />
inprtwd confecticns were provided.:!<br />
3 09. Operational usc,<br />
Q. Tho 10-in-1, K and C rations wcro widely u8ed<br />
end woro aupplcrncnted whencvcr poseiblo by tba issue of<br />
fresh bread, mcnt end coffeo. Tho D ration, though-never<br />
popular, was at timcs uscd as a supplom~ntalration, as a<br />
substitute for coffee or cocoa, or as an ewr&6ncy rcserva.<br />
Tho 25-in-3 and 5-in-1 SUpplCUGntd rations wore uscd GXolusivoly<br />
for hospitals during the oarly stcgos of oporations<br />
on tho continent. Rosoarch and do-rolopmmt on all<br />
typos of operational rations was contjnuous. Hoat Wit8<br />
vmro prcvidod, spcclol bulletins on food preparRtlon and<br />
<strong>US</strong>G woro issued, P%dtho tJ"PYP0D bar Was AWdifiCd, The<br />
nutritional value nnii sccoptability of each tape ration<br />
was improved considorably. Thti followlnq ohart shows tht,<br />
changc in caloric oontent:Z<br />
Ration -194.3 x!&<br />
ories<br />
10-in-1 3408 4644.<br />
I I p 2756 2830<br />
"C" 2685 3709<br />
Average requirements pcr lnan per day: 4,000 cal-<br />
b. Comments by tho various Civision and Corps<br />
0,uartormastcre indicated their likes end dialikiis in type<br />
operational rations, as follows:<br />
Soventh Amrod Division.<br />
sOporational rations wore used during the<br />
cntire period (8August 1944 - 8 Reptombor<br />
1944) Pad consistcd Of C'S, K'8 and 10-in<br />
1's. Units et tintea would rofuao to acgoyt<br />
C rntioiis, a8 t op statoa tho mcn rcfuSod<br />
to cat thQll17.k<br />
Gth Infantry nivision.<br />
;1T$rpeS K and 10-in-lrations woro not in<br />
many instancos issuod es rO~.UQStQdand type<br />
C rations WClG substitutod tbcrcior. Thc<br />
typo C rntion is not oonaidorod sntisfao-<br />
tory for thG Infantry soldiorrf.7<br />
th Infantry Division.<br />
n tho fnst noving wP.riaro ncross Wranco,<br />
thc 10-in-1 ration wit3 DIUCT~ prootical tylc<br />
of ration duo to beinfl cornpact and mro<br />
opeily prepared in Q short tino. The I(<br />
ration ha6 been poforrcd by line aonpanics<br />
of Infantry whcn in oontact with the<br />
enemy and aspocLally during river croeflings<br />
or on D jump-off. Tho pe.akagoe woro<br />
oasily stuffod into n gcckot and this type<br />
- 73 -<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E -D
ation could bo oonsumod with little or no<br />
properation. The C ration has not bcen<br />
gonorally desirod by troops of this divi-<br />
sion and has been used only as a substituto<br />
for X ration when they wOre hord to<br />
obtain. Front line troops do hot liko tho<br />
C rabion due to its packaging and troops<br />
further in thc roar who can build a firc<br />
to hoot the C ration generally can be fed<br />
tho B ration.".a<br />
(4) %-*or o.rorationa1 rations oonsist-<br />
inE of C. D. IC and 10-in-1 vmro used oxclusiky<br />
&tii 13 July 194.4 whon tho B typo was<br />
brought to the oontinont, .horican troops<br />
did n3t thrivo on operational rations<br />
alone,. but on tho 10-in-1 ration no woight<br />
was lost. It yms dotominod that thc C<br />
ration wcs more praoticol for Armorcd clcmonts,<br />
and tho K for Infantryytt.9<br />
c. In addition to thu studios made in tho Zuropuan<br />
Theator of Oporations, a War Dopartmont Equipment Reviow<br />
Board whioh CbnVOnQd at Hoadqunrtors; !.my Ground Foroes,<br />
%shington, D. C., on 19 August 19!+/+, mode a ccnplcte study<br />
of all typos of rations. It recommondod that tho numbcr of<br />
typos be dooreasod, and that tho conditions undcr which cnoh<br />
was to be usoa definod mor0 olearly. It also rooonmondod<br />
that the C and R rations bo combined, that tho weight and<br />
volumo of packagod rations be roduood, end thnt accoptabil-<br />
ity be primarily charaotoristio of all rntians.5 Tho rocom-<br />
mcndations wero generally in accordance with ideas gathered<br />
from experience in the European Theater.<br />
SECTION 3<br />
110. pield Ration "B"2<br />
BTjLK RATIONS<br />
a. The first 2merioan troops arrived in Northern<br />
Ireland on 26 January 1942, and wera subeisted entirely on<br />
British rations. These rations were later modified into<br />
a British-Amcrican ration, and finally eliminated entirely.<br />
Plans for tho invasion of the continent called for the in-<br />
itial use of ogerational rations to be followod later by<br />
the B ration and finally by the A ration when practicable.<br />
The B ration was to equal the n ration in all respeots, with<br />
the excootion that non-pbrishablo componentB'wore to be sub-<br />
stituted for perishables. The B ration menu, which formed<br />
tho basis for procnrement in the United States, had thrae<br />
imnortant defeats :<br />
(1) Stow'type meat made up @. perccnt of the<br />
meat, poultzy and fish components.<br />
fZ) Milk products wore insufficient.<br />
(3j Thoro was froquent repotition of unpopular<br />
components of tho then current<br />
operational ration.<br />
b. Efforts were made to corrcct tho defects or<br />
to minimize their offeck, On-Dplus 32 the first B rations<br />
Brrivea on the continent. on- B 'plu 39 eMpments<br />
- 74 -<br />
R-E -6 -T-R-I-C-T-E-D
R-E-5-T-R-I-C -T-E-D<br />
of frosh moat and buttor bLgan to arrim and a partial<br />
convorsion to fiold ration A was nadG at that tinc.<br />
111. Fiold Ration A.<br />
a. Thc A ration was planncd to mu%thu smo<br />
standards of tl-e garrison ration issucd in tho Unitd<br />
Rtatos. Circular,Pumbor 13, Tr~adquartcr~, EurosLan Thontcr<br />
of Oporations, gave tho following characturistios:2<br />
(1) bcsh moats, dairv prducts, vogctabl&,<br />
fruits and othm porishablus to bd usd<br />
as much ae possihlo.<br />
(2) To contain approximately 4,000 caloriw.<br />
(3)<br />
oquol or cxcood thc. rcconmcndcd diotary<br />
allO~anO66.<br />
(10 To succcssfully maintain thc health and<br />
moralo of tho troops.<br />
b. In ordcr to insuro propcr 'sroparetion and consorvation,<br />
menus wcrc przparod and distributsd through Glass<br />
I supply points as a guide to mass sorrzomnts. Eohools wLrc<br />
ostablishod and inonu teams went into the fiild to instruct<br />
in proper proparation. A coadiment kit was iSSUQd t o pro-<br />
vido all messes with a basic stook of oofidimcnts, but it<br />
was not until latc in tho oporations that propcr ana conploto<br />
distribution was mde.2<br />
c. Ration issue oxporionco in tho Europoan Tlicatcr<br />
of <strong>Operations</strong> boginning with J~ly1944 indicatos that a high<br />
proportion of typo A or 9 rntion was,consumod. Thc following<br />
chart shows tho porccnta 81) of G,K, 10-in-1 and tiTe A or<br />
B ration that *ere issuod:Z PAppondix 1.2)<br />
-Date Typo A/B Typo C Typo I Type 10-in-1<br />
June 1944 14 15 71<br />
Soptembor 194L 58 18 10 1L,<br />
Doccmbor 194.4 87 03 05 05<br />
March 1945 88 04 05 03<br />
Juno 1945 94 01 03 02<br />
Boptcmbcr 1945 92 02 04 02<br />
Considorinq thqoondition of the highways and thc railroads,<br />
tho oftan inadoquato port facilitios, and tho difficulty in<br />
maintaining a balancod ra$ion, tho consistont isauo of a<br />
high poroontago of typo A or:B ration throughout thu war<br />
was a i;romcrndous undertaking, Somo of tho suocoas nay be<br />
attributod to tho V%&"od Coa-oodit Loading,r of rations<br />
at tho Pow Yorlc Fort of Embarkation.~o<br />
112. Ration Accosso Conveniencc.~ackots.2 Tho RAC<br />
kite (Appendix TO) as thg w~rocallod, xadu Eobaooo, oanUy<br />
and toilot artiolos availablo for issuo as Part of tho fidd<br />
ration. This gratia issue was to continuo Until Post EKohongos<br />
oould bo oponed. A composite pack of 200 balanoc-d<br />
- 75 -<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T -E-D
R-E-S-T-R-X -C-T-E-D<br />
rations Of tobacco, Candy and toilot articles was vory casy<br />
to hnndlo and issuc. Sqmntc packs of thrco typcs: 200<br />
tobaoco'rations, 100 oandg rations, and 800 tOilGt nrticlo<br />
rations, caused coziplicntions in supply. 'Ilx initial allow-<br />
EICG of om razor bladc pof man per wook was insufficient<br />
subscqucntl.~ chengod to three blades per man per week.<br />
113. Perishables.:! %be success of the A ration dependad<br />
largely~e~cureqbnt of perishable item. The<br />
3,unrtemaster Corps prOourr?d , received, stored. and issued<br />
fresh neats and dairy products at cold storage plants, and<br />
distributed fresh meats pnd dairy products in mobile reefer,<br />
vans front btiee depot cold stores to su?'-~l-~ points, Local<br />
proourenent of vegetables and fresh fruits wss aa8.e wherever<br />
poasible, and shipments of all types of :>erishnbles<br />
were mde from the Uiil.tm3. States. Transportation difficulties<br />
and ths lack of proper refrigeratton facilities for<br />
transport made it impoasible at times to issue perisheble<br />
items to front line troops. %en proper facilities wen?<br />
nv;vaj.lable, such issue was made.<br />
1Ih. Dehydrated Ipooas,2 !"he use of dehydrated foods to<br />
conserve shfppinfl space and to faoilitate distribution be-<br />
came alr,ost es-:eiitial. Dehydrated foods wcre issued with .<br />
both the field ration .A and the field ration B. In General,<br />
dehydrated foods vere nQt popular, and ness sergeants and<br />
coolcs wre not properly instructed in their use and proparation.<br />
Dehydrated pctatoes e.sd vegetsbles reconstituted<br />
feirly well, and t8he preparation of dehydrated egss improved<br />
considerably. Dried whole milk yowder was fairly wul'.<br />
accented, find 50 percent of the European Theater milk requireinents<br />
ware renuisitLonad in that form.<br />
1x5. Raticiis for othor than <strong>US</strong> Forces.2 AS the oporations<br />
progressed tho ~.uartermast,erCorps.became more and<br />
more'invclvod in feeding vrifioners of war, displaced psrsons,<br />
civilian labor and otlier nationals. Originally, in<br />
the interest of food conservation, the followinp: menus wcre<br />
devised:<br />
a. Allied Ilationals.<br />
(1) Civilian embloyees<br />
(2) Liberatad manpower<br />
(3 1 French Expeditionary Force<br />
(4) Italian Service units<br />
(5) RussZan ?rationals<br />
b. Enmy Frationale.<br />
{ 1) ''lorking prisoners of war<br />
(2 ] lJon-worldn$ prisoners of war<br />
(j) Hospitallzcd prisoners of war<br />
Each menu prescribed a d.lPferent, calorfc coritent. Thc sevoral<br />
uenus, howover, Were nGwr issue&, as tho nunbor and<br />
variety proved too difficult to handle, .A cnntinental allicd<br />
mwu replaced the five menus for Allied Nationals,<br />
while the other monus rQmainod in offoct.<br />
- 76 -<br />
R-E-s -T-R-I -c -T-E-D
116. Conclusions<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E -D<br />
SECTION 4<br />
a. Of tho opcrotlonal rations, the 10-in-1 ration<br />
VTQS tho most popular with tho soldior. It hztr n hipher caloric<br />
content thnn any of thc othLr typo opcrationnl rations<br />
and was used princinnlly as a modifiod R ration.<br />
b. Tho% ration, though containing fcwcr calories<br />
than the C ration, Wa8 mOrG acceptable to thc SolditiT. The<br />
K ration ia pacltngod to ffiCili%QtD ccirrylng, distribution<br />
and consumption.<br />
c. The C ration is bulky and awkward to oarry and<br />
normc.lly required hoating. ,Under oonditions it is<br />
possible to hoat a C ration, tha 10-in-1 ration om normally<br />
bo prepawd.<br />
d. Wile thc oporational rations wcro Lsscntial<br />
undor many circumstnnccs, ovory effort to issue thu A or B<br />
ration me. IIL7de.<br />
117, Recmcndations,<br />
8. !?hat studies and rosearch into dohydrated<br />
foods and oporational rations continue.<br />
b. That tho recommendations of.tfio %r Dcpartment<br />
?quipmont Review Ronrd , Fcadquartertr, lrmy Ground<br />
POPOCS,be gonerally accepted, an3 thet a suitablo 0701ational<br />
ration bo devcloped whioh will he nutritionally<br />
aocoptablo and contain a Suf'fioient variety in meals,<br />
whilo still combining the ni.2itary characteristics of n<br />
flat, mini"weip,ht and nfinimum volume packag6.<br />
BiblioRraphy<br />
Chaptor 8<br />
1. FM 100-10<br />
2. <strong>US</strong> Amuy Subsistonce Exporienco in Xuropaan Th69t8r<br />
dntpd 1 Novombar 1945. (Furnished for ffenoral Board use)<br />
3* Ltr,.Fq Sever&$ <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong>, 21 Apr 45, subj: "Operational<br />
Rations". . (1).<br />
4. AM Report No. 751, 23 Mar 45.<br />
5. War Department Report of Board of Of'ricersrCdhvened to<br />
Btudy theEquipment of the Pbet War <strong>Army</strong>, dtd 20 Jan 45.<br />
6. Summary of qM Activltles, 7th m r o d Div for poriod 8<br />
A X b4 - 8 flop 44. *(2) ,<br />
7. After 4ction Report of @I, 30th Inf Div dtd 4 Oct 44. *(3)<br />
8. Report of Opcrctions OT the 35th nJf Company during the<br />
poriod 7 Jul 44 to 1Feb 45. *(4)<br />
9, Opnwtion of XIX Corps - Normpdy Cmpaign (undated)<br />
10. nTT Operational aslalysls No, 5 , ddted 1Nov 45, OrPCQ)d,TSFEP.<br />
* Kumber in parentheses is Clatalog ?&."ex used in Inven-<br />
tory 0" Material, Stcciy No. log, (Class I <strong>Supply</strong>),<br />
rile ~~401/11<br />
- 77 -<br />
R-ES-T-R-1°C -T-E-D
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-n<br />
SECTION 1<br />
G O I ~ I O I ~ T SZONE O ~<br />
118, Oranization and Ws8ion.l The Chiof quartormaster,<br />
Zuropcan Theater of Operatione, vas responsible<br />
for the procuremant, storage and issuo of all goods to the<br />
Unitad Cltates Forces and, when so diroctod by the Commanding<br />
Conoral, Turopoan Theatcr of Opcrations, to acrsome1<br />
OthGr than Unit& 4tates militan. In thc ?&??for-<br />
mancc of this mission the following divisions of tho Office<br />
of %he Chiof qmrtcrmastor wore principally cooccrnod:<br />
a. Subsintonco Division.<br />
b. Frocurcmont Division.<br />
c, Storage and Distribution DivJsion.<br />
Tho rrocuremant and storam and Distribution Division8<br />
were concerned with all classcs of suivlios. Tho rosponsibilitics<br />
of thc Subsistence Division were confined to<br />
Class I Supplizs.<br />
119. Mctions.1<br />
a. The Subsietqnce Division was charped with the<br />
following primary funotions:<br />
(1) To secure by roquisltion all Cl4SS I<br />
SUppliOS frm the United qtatos, from<br />
the British, and fron othsr souroos<br />
through tho Trocuremcint Division.<br />
(2) To maintain balanoed stocks of Class I<br />
supplios in dopots in accordmob with<br />
proscribed levels, and to rocommcnd to<br />
tho Storago and Distribution nivi9ion<br />
tho distribution of Glass I sup?liCs to<br />
aooomplish this purpose,<br />
(3) To suprvise and assist in the efficient<br />
uso of Class I supplios, including pro-<br />
paration of monus and tho formulation of<br />
m098 policies.<br />
(fk)<br />
To aovolop spooificationn for items procurd<br />
in tho Unit& Kingdom.<br />
b. Tha Trocurcmcnt Division waa charEod with<br />
making all local purchases as rqucatod by thL Subsistemu<br />
Division, and with chzclcine; al.1 requisitions on tho United<br />
fitates to dotcmino whiah itoms wuo ~~OOWRblC from local<br />
eourcos.<br />
c. Tho Rtorapo and Distribution nivision was<br />
charRoa in qcncrnl with furnishing toclinical nuidanoo for<br />
thG opcration of tho dopote, ooordinating tho distfibution<br />
- 76 -<br />
R-E-$ 4-R-I -C-T-E-D
of the supplies to the depots, and formulating plans for<br />
the receipt, storage and issue of the supplies.<br />
120.. Rrocurment.<br />
a, Class I supplies were obtdined from the Zone<br />
of Interior by requisftion and presrranged schedules of<br />
shipments. These were nugzented by exploitation of local<br />
re8ources in Allied and neutral countries, as well as<br />
frac; cnptured supplios. The nnxinu procurement in the<br />
United Kingdm, from late 19$2 until D-Day, amounted to<br />
npproxiiwtely 30 pewent of requirenonts for the United<br />
Stetes Foroes. This proourelrent wns based principally<br />
on the ni?,l ration for consmption in England and mounted<br />
to 38 staple items and 24 perishable Items. Procurelcent<br />
in the United vingdom fcr Shipm6nt to the continent after<br />
the invask was based on 10 staple items and fiV6 perishnble<br />
item.4<br />
b. Procurmnt in France and Belgiwl WES limited<br />
prinoipally to fresh potatoes, VegetQbl6s and fruits.<br />
Food processing and mnufacturing servioes were also ob-<br />
tained in these countries for the production of items such<br />
as yef.st and Spaghettj pcm raw mteriels furnished by<br />
the United fitotes hrw. Other noutral or occupi d oountries<br />
furnished oertnln items cf food as follows: 3<br />
(1) Spain and Canary Islands - tomatoes,<br />
onions, banenes, dried fruits, and fresh<br />
citrus fruits.<br />
(2) Denmark - butter, eggs, and carcass pork,<br />
(3) Portugal - sardinos in brine, green<br />
coffee, cocoa beans, and dried figs.<br />
(4) Holland - potatoetl and onions,<br />
(51 Norway - frozen cod fillets.<br />
c. Lend-Lease waa employed in all the transactions<br />
in tho UnitEd Kingdom, France, Belgiucl, and Luxumbourg<br />
until the termination of Lend-Lesse, September 1945. The<br />
United Stetca Commerciol Corporation, operating from the<br />
Rtcte Department, dispatched special purchasing niseions<br />
to the neutral countries of Spain, P6rtxt$cil and'tho Canary<br />
Islands, cnd tho liberated countries of Eollgd, Denmark<br />
and PTorway, to buy subsistence ond Oth6r commodities with<br />
C ~ Qdirect purpose of keeping those supplios from lalling<br />
into enow hsnds, end at the same time to supplsmcnt the<br />
fTA" rations of the Unitsd States troops. Liai3on was maintained<br />
by the Procurement Division Offjce of the Chief<br />
Quertermastm, Rmop(~nn Theater, with the General Purchas-<br />
ing Agents of the United States Gommwcicl Corporatlon,<br />
in tho various countries.3<br />
d. Proourement of subsistence itoms from the<br />
United Kingdoffi wns effcoted on an allocation basis of all<br />
ave.ilfible supplies in the Unitcd Kingdom, whereas in Franc6<br />
cnd other liberetdd countries subsistence items were drawn<br />
froa civil economg . sqppliaswhich were declared surplus<br />
to oivilinn needs by the foodl ministries of the respective<br />
countries.3<br />
- 73 .<br />
R-E -S-T-R-I-C -T-E-D
121. Storage.<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I-C -T-E-D<br />
a. The storage of' perishnbles in the United<br />
Kingdom wes handled almost entirely by the British Minietry<br />
of Food and by commercial agedcies under its control. On<br />
the continent there-was an extreme shortage of cold storage<br />
facilities, particularly auring the early stages of<br />
the invaslcn. This was due chiefly to the destructkn of<br />
cold storage plants by enemy and Allied action, and tc<br />
the inability to quickly rehabilitate the plants. Construction<br />
and rehabilitatiGn was undertfiken as smn as<br />
practicable but, until satisfactory facilities were obtain-<br />
able, reefer vans hauled perishables direct from the ships<br />
to the supply points. The use of reefer vans, however, due<br />
to the long haul, was not satisfacto y for the proper care<br />
and maintenance of perishable items. 5<br />
b. As the operations progressed, more and great-<br />
er facilities fcr cold storage became available. With<br />
the liberation of Paris (S-0040) cold.stcrage capacity<br />
became adequate for the first time.2<br />
c. Since fresh fruits and vegetables obtained<br />
from local sources were not normally received until ready<br />
for issue, little or no storage was required. Fresh fruit<br />
and vegetables rrom other sources were stored in clcsed<br />
warehouses, when available and if made necessary by weatner<br />
conditions. When closed storage was not available,the 'Yem<br />
atyle stacks 14 feet by 20 feet, wlth tarpaulin covers,<br />
were used.4,5 These stacks were generally the shape of<br />
a storage tent and easily put together. In some instances<br />
two or more of these stacks were joined together for better<br />
storage or for heating when neoessary. After the invasion<br />
was well under way, 90 percent of all perishables, other<br />
than refrigerated perishables, were stored inside. The<br />
Vrem stacks were used for the renaining ten percentV5<br />
d. There wa6 a limited amount of spcilage aong<br />
nonperishable items which were packed prior to late 1943.<br />
hnoisture, in gome cases, detariorated the shipping carton<br />
and caused cans to rust. Citrus juices Bometimes developed<br />
pin holing from the inaide due to the aoticn of the oftrio<br />
acid on the metal. There was also some lcos due to the<br />
deterioration and loss cf paper labels from the cans. The<br />
majority of thbse difficulties were corrected by the devel-<br />
opment and use of a moisture proof carton. Also, a new<br />
laminated asphalt craft bag was used for coffee, flour,<br />
sugar, salt, and driofl vegetables. This type of bag practically<br />
eliminated loss from stcrage and moisture. An<br />
inside lacquered can for citrus juices cllminated loss from<br />
pin holing, and the label defect was eliminate6 by pai ting<br />
or stenciling the contents on the outside of the cans. 9<br />
e. Approximately ten porcent of' the A or B<br />
ration compononts such as coffoc, flour, sugar and dried<br />
VGgEtableB were stored inside. All ogeraticnal rations,<br />
and the reEainlng compononts of the bulk rations, were<br />
stored outside in staoks and covered with tarpaulins. 5<br />
122. Distributicn.<br />
a, The inltial Class I supplies for the lnvasicn<br />
of mope were brought in by ferry craft such as landing<br />
craft. tank. and nmphiblous DUG'Ivs. After a sufficient<br />
- 80 -<br />
R-E -S 4'-R-I-C-T-E-D
R-I2 -S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D<br />
number of trucks were ashoke they assisted the DUIPJ's in<br />
establishing the first operational dumps. Five mobile<br />
rbfrigcratiun companies, fully loaded with perishables<br />
arrived on the continent In the middle of July 1944 and<br />
wtre used frr direct delivery to the army supply pcints.<br />
Th6 first railroad train fcr Class I supplies was used on<br />
12 Awust 1944, and as operations progressed addlti nal<br />
railroad ~tcck was utilized as it became flvailablea8<br />
b. Class T supplies were distributed tc the<br />
several armies, based upon requirements contained in the<br />
daily telegram. The Chief Quartertwister desig"d the<br />
dspct or Ctepots responsible for the supply of each artqt.<br />
Tha daily telegrams were sent through the regulating stat!ons,<br />
after their establishment, to the depots concernec.<br />
The dopots procured the supplies and shipped thorn to the<br />
armies, throyh tho regulating station, by means of the<br />
daily train, These trains were BO loaded that they could<br />
be broken down into six to ten sections, each section<br />
cerrying a fully balanced number of rations to be diverted<br />
to the various army supply points. Thjs system was not<br />
always satisfactory as cars were loaded from several difrarent<br />
points and asseabled into 8 single train when load-<br />
ing was conplete. Cars sometimes ecame mixed anC caused<br />
tho receipt of unbalanced rations. k<br />
123. Control of Issue.<br />
a. Effort6 were conttnuously mde to maintain<br />
the ration issue within authorized allowances and $0 avoid<br />
waste whenever possible. <strong>Army</strong> <strong>Quartermaster</strong>s were required<br />
to include in the daily telegram the number of rations<br />
by type required, my augmentations uuthorizea, and the<br />
amount of any excess stocks on hand. Inasmuch as it was<br />
impracticable to make a head count during combat, the<br />
morning repert strength was shown in lieu of the head<br />
oount, and hrmy Pus-tormasters wePe required to jus ifg<br />
requests for requirements in excess of that figure.k The<br />
Chief C,mrternaster devised a ration return for Communications<br />
Zone troops which inaluded the s m requirements.<br />
~<br />
This form was rcvised from time to time in accordance with<br />
tlie situation, and was requlred of all units after cessa-<br />
Lion of hostllitlea. 2 ~ 7<br />
b. As a further precuation against the building<br />
up by armies of stocks In excess of maintenanoe and re-<br />
serve requirements, the Chloi ".srtermaster established<br />
credits in the supplying depots againot whioh the armies<br />
were authorized to draw. The credits were flexible and<br />
could be increased at the discretion of the depot oomnder<br />
upon request of the <strong>Army</strong> <strong>Quartermaster</strong>. This plan<br />
was effective and rtduced the amount of supplies the armies<br />
received against the doily telegram, while at the S ~ Q<br />
time It allovded the depot stocks to build up.6<br />
a. Operational rations were the only dveilable<br />
ratiomfrom D-Day until 2 July 1946 when the first issue<br />
of bread wfls made. During the first week in July fresh<br />
meat and butter were added and by tho middle of July local<br />
purohasine, added fresh potatoes Oarruta, turnips and<br />
cabbage. on 10 July (D plus 321 191+/+the first ~~PII<br />
ration<br />
was issued and by D ylus 90 most of tho troops were subststed<br />
on n rapidly improving "A" ration.* Diffioultios<br />
were encountered during the latter part of July in main-<br />
- 81 -
R-E-S -T-R-I -C-T-E -D<br />
taining a balanced nB" ration in each supply point and<br />
dump, The situation was relieved when the armies broke<br />
out of Normandy and by necessity were required to use the<br />
operational rations. Again, during the r3erman breakthrouqb<br />
in the winter of 1944-1945, supplies and dally trains were<br />
disrupted. The Third <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong> arm "A" rations to meet 9C<br />
peroent of its requirements at that time, but ths First<br />
and Ninth W Armies, due to the disruption of the daily<br />
train, were required to draw dweply into their reserve<br />
stooks. These two armies subsisted, during the early stages,<br />
exclusively on operational ratione. The large number of<br />
prisoners captured aftm the armies crossed the Rhine cawed<br />
another CritiCal shortage to exist. Operatlonnl rations were<br />
lssued for initial use since oooklng equip" was not<br />
available. After oookhg equipment was provided, the prisoaers<br />
were rea according to tne prescri ed prisoner of<br />
war menust This relieved the situation. B<br />
dh Tine adoption of "balanced commodity loading"<br />
ol ships et the New York port contributad more to feeding<br />
of balanced rations than any other single faotor. This<br />
eyetea of loading all components of the r*Artor IW ration,<br />
in the oorrect proportion, in e. single ship ermitted the<br />
entire load being assigned to any one depot,$<br />
e. Due to the large numbee of unreported or inproperly<br />
reported shortages or substitatlons ib 6ha rations<br />
which ocmrrred at supply points and depots, the Chief<br />
<strong>Quartermaster</strong> required a d'aily comprehensive report in<br />
order that he bo kept informed and could Cake such cor-<br />
reotive action as necessary.*<br />
124. Over Issue?.<br />
* a. Although the <strong>Quartermaster</strong> service made con-<br />
tlnuous effort t o keep ratlon issues within authorized<br />
allowances, there were several factors whioh contributed<br />
to over issue:2<br />
Division commanders wa-6 authrizod to<br />
augment the rations for thoir troops<br />
when in contact with the enemy.<br />
Doops often consumed four operational<br />
maals n day In lieu of three.<br />
several categories of porsonnel, such<br />
as prisoners of war, guides, interpreters,<br />
drivers and hungy oivilians were often<br />
fed by oombat troops. In many such<br />
oases no rsports of the numbem fed were<br />
made.<br />
FooQ waste normally inoreased whon organ-<br />
izations were on the move.<br />
b. The number of rations 1ssuc.d divided by the<br />
actual strength gives an index of over issue (Sac Appendix<br />
11). The index of over issue by month in tho EL&opean<br />
theater shows that the highest rate of over issue<br />
ooourrea during periods of maximum operetj onal activity: 2
R-E-S-T-R-I-C 4-E-D<br />
-rnaox Situat idn<br />
June 1944 1.02 The greatest portion of the<br />
troops were still in the United<br />
Kingdom, and therefore subject<br />
to control.<br />
September 1944 1.32 The transfer of c great den1 of<br />
Unlted Kingdom strength to the<br />
continent plus the great opern-<br />
fional activity of these months<br />
raise% the over issue index to<br />
its all time hi&.<br />
February 1445 1.04 The comparatlve stability of the<br />
fall and winter arc refleoted in<br />
rapid drop in overissues from<br />
its September peak.<br />
April 194.5 1.20 The intense Botivity of the drive<br />
into Germany is reflected by high<br />
over issues.<br />
SECTION 2<br />
FIELD FORCES<br />
L25. rnanization and Functions. The Arm Class T sections<br />
norially operated 8s port of the Supsly DiVi8iOn,<br />
Office of the .!amy Wartermaster. It was charged with the<br />
technical supervision and coordination of Class I actiybties<br />
within the army as directed by the <strong>Army</strong> Quartermastar. ,11<br />
In the performance of its mission, the Class 1 section was<br />
charged with the rollowing principal functiona:<br />
a. Determine Class I requirements, and coordinate<br />
tho proourmsnt, storage and distribution of Class I supplies<br />
based upon the availability of transportation, levels<br />
prescribed, and on the current milltery operational situa-<br />
tian .l2<br />
b. Recommend the distrlbution of Class I: supslies<br />
within the 6rmy 08 to type and percentage of eroh type, thfl<br />
source, the dally trsin shipments, and the resbrve stocks.<br />
c Reoomond the location of railheeds, truckheads<br />
and dumps.io<br />
d. 9uperviss bakery production and cold storage<br />
activit ie 8.12'<br />
e, E!aintcln accurate reoords on consumption and<br />
Class I supp1ies.10<br />
f, Receive and consolidate unft ily telegrams<br />
npd prepme and aubmlt the <strong>Army</strong> telegram. 1P<br />
1-26. <strong>Operations</strong>.<br />
a. Rations ware requested bV means or the daily<br />
telegram sndljere shlppsd to nrmy supply points by the<br />
dally train. The subordinate units normally submitted<br />
- 53 -<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I -C -%E -D
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D<br />
their telegram to the issuing supply point b8 nowe in<br />
ndVtInCe of drawin$.lOilb The supply point oonsolidnted<br />
requests and Bubmittbd the total requirements to the .&my<br />
Class I Section for tho preperotion of the army telsgran,.ll<br />
b. Armlks normolly opernted ne main dump and e<br />
iuinimum of one supply point per 00rpS.~3 mis was based<br />
on the lwinOipl0 that a base rnilheed should be Sbt up to<br />
handle 011 rations nnd to be responsible for providing<br />
bolnnced rrtions in the forwcrd supply points. The ~OCEtion<br />
of supply ooints was dictated by the tncttcnl ?&tun.tton<br />
,nd availnbility of‘ trunsportation fnc€lities.<br />
The primcry conaideration for the location of the roil-<br />
herd or supply pofnt wos the neceesity for hLrd atLnding,<br />
~t s6parPte entrance and exit, end a good roud net. The<br />
selection and 1oc:tion of the army railhead was no& by<br />
thc <strong>Army</strong> :ucrtermster. The selc=ctioi and recommendation<br />
of thc locntion of tho edvence supply points wss normolly<br />
loft to he Corps ?uartrrlrslstc7r nnd railhend officer con-<br />
ctrnad<br />
c, It w m found thst supply points could opcrr.te<br />
nearer to the front lln s than was gznerolly Eilieved<br />
possible or ndviscble.lz There %orenony times, howevcr,<br />
when the tCCtiCRl situetion progreseed so rnpidly or the<br />
transportation wn8 80 critiocil that the round-trip distance<br />
between combat troops and army slipply points equalled 8s<br />
muob RS 300 ailes. In such cnsus, odvunce aistributing<br />
points, stocked with onerational rations only, were estoblishod<br />
by Corps Quartermsters a8 ar a& 100 miles fopword<br />
of the closest nrmy supply point.15<br />
d, SupDly points we e normally oDfirated by -p.virtormaster<br />
Railhead Comwnies.fl Quarterma&ter Bakery<br />
companies supdied the- supply oints daily with the fresh<br />
breed md coffee requireixeents.f3t1&<br />
127. Issuss. Railhead oompanies were responsible for<br />
making c o m and proper losuea, and for mintenonce of<br />
accurate records pertaining therdto. Rations were issued<br />
on tally-out forms, and codes or tally-outs, together with<br />
corresponding ration rGturns, were submitted to the <strong>Army</strong><br />
nmrterlraster 6aoh day for record and comparison.l3 Rread<br />
was noreally Issued with bulk rations on the basis of IC5<br />
pounds pm 100 am, or as a aupplement to the operational<br />
ration oti tha bosis of 30 pounds per 100 mea. Fresh OOffbe<br />
w3s iss cd when ovoilable in lieu of canned or soluble<br />
c0ffee,~4 The normal issue wGS baS6d upon eight pounds<br />
pcr 100 ma. During cold wehther, end when there was a<br />
short8ga of toe nnd cocoa, the isauo was raisod to 12<br />
pound8 per 100 men.2 The regular oondiment issue was modo<br />
in bulk at ten-day intervole. Ths issua vas ofton deluyed,<br />
or missod entirely, duo to the rapid movemont of<br />
troops, the opening nnd closing of supply goints, and the<br />
ljmitcd tronsportntion rvoilnble to move the aupplies<br />
foz”nGrd*l8<br />
128. GrRanizatlon_,2 ~n attempt was made on the oon-<br />
- 84 *<br />
R-E-9-I-R-I-C-T-Z-D
R-E-$-T-R-I-c-T-E-D<br />
tinent to develop a catering servioe which would train<br />
oookke, bakers, mess sergeants and mess officere, pmtic-<br />
ularlg in the preparation of new types of foods. This<br />
plan did not progress very fa, though a need for such u<br />
servico existed. In lieu of a catering service, K bakers<br />
and cooks school and mess teems were csthbllshed. Each mess<br />
team, compoaed of one officer, one dieticisn and eight enlisted<br />
men (cocks, bakers and mess sergeants),went into the<br />
field and rendered service to mang units desiring their<br />
assistance in establishing messes. The mess teams were<br />
avaiLab16 to hrmies, corps, divislcns and section commundere<br />
on recuest, with priority t3 field forces. Frior<br />
to D-Day, and whiie troops were in the Dnited Kingdom, model<br />
messes were established by thc kugrtsrmristor Corps. Nuw<br />
units were encouraged to visit trkse model establishonts<br />
prior to opening mosses of their Own.<br />
129. Functions and <strong>Operations</strong> of atlkers wd Cooks<br />
Sohools &nd ?LESS Le=.<br />
a. The Bakars and Jooks School, which originally<br />
opened in Laland in Septlmber 1442, moved to Yranoe in<br />
April 1945 whero it was mada a %uartermaster responsibi-<br />
lity, and in September 1945 it rooved to a central location<br />
in the erican ZoIie in Germany. The schools trained a<br />
total of 6,163 stuaents in cooking and mess management,<br />
who were drawn from all types of organizations and units<br />
on the continent and In ingland.<br />
b. In October 1944 six mess taws were set up<br />
end trained, taking to the field after a 30-day course<br />
of instruction in OOOking and mess mnagemcnt. The number<br />
of teams wem doubled in JanuLry lgh5 and after VE-Day<br />
increased to 23 mess t ms. These teams had, in general,<br />
the following duties:l?<br />
To assist an orgenleation comandcr in<br />
supervision and operation of his mess.<br />
To instruct and work with the mc1ss personnel<br />
of an organization in their unit<br />
kitchcns.<br />
To cwsult with the mess officer on vha<br />
glanning, superivision and inspection of<br />
his ness.<br />
'Po advise all mesa pcrsonnol rcgarding<br />
the function of the several types of<br />
ratione and most effective ways of utilizing<br />
the typ IfAII and 'lBrt rations.<br />
To assist all mess personnel on yroblams<br />
of substitution and r;he necessity<br />
for adherence to the nonthiy menu.<br />
To instruct in the proper poparaclon<br />
of dehydrated foods.<br />
To acqcaint all mss peraorael with<br />
recommendcd procedure for the efficient<br />
care tlnd ojeraticn af standard field mQSS<br />
equip".<br />
130. DiBousSion. *<br />
a. The moss team operation in the Luropcan
R -E-S-T -R-I -e -T-E-D<br />
Theater was distinctly a success. In addition to their<br />
normal function of instruction, mess teams took hold of<br />
several major messing Jobs and carried them through to<br />
success. Sone exonples are:<br />
men supplying hot food to refnforceuonts<br />
enroute by train became a problez, the<br />
pilot models of the kitchen care were<br />
designea and built by the ceasing organi-<br />
zation, The troop train ffienu wes dcnonstrnted<br />
in actual use by G ness team<br />
which mde several troop train trips.<br />
Mess tsoms did much of the pioneer work<br />
in opening messas in the huge staging<br />
ore23 in late Dscenber 1944, Januaryand<br />
February 1945.<br />
Xess tenns were called upon to solve<br />
the almost inconceivable messing problems<br />
encountered in receiving German<br />
prisoners of war in temporary enclosures<br />
with no equipment whutsoever.<br />
After VE-Day eight teams were sent to<br />
Germany to work with occupational force<br />
organizatlons which hod heavy losees of<br />
experienced Peas personnel as a result<br />
of redeployment.<br />
- suoaessful operation could have been improved<br />
with more attontion devoted to straightening out<br />
supply point operation as a part of the mess team function.<br />
Ry the time they had worked a woak or ten days in en ares<br />
R mess team commander should be able to form a sound<br />
opinion as to the adouracy a4d completeness of the issues<br />
of its supply point. The moss team commander's mission<br />
could have been OXpmkd with benefit to inolude a bey<br />
with the personnel of the supDly point. in oacharea covered,<br />
amphesizing the importance of accurate issues and eapsc-<br />
ielly instructing in the3ter issue polioy.<br />
c. The establishment of a Catering Service along<br />
the lines of. the Pritish <strong>Army</strong> system (See A.pDendix 15 ),<br />
would certainly insure that n higher percentage of profossional<br />
alvilian cooks entering the army would be directed<br />
into messing work. Further, it would guarantee<br />
thnt training effort would bc expended only on personnel<br />
which would remnin in messing work. From the standpoint<br />
gf COm"d, its implications would be that instead of<br />
transfcrbing an unsatisfactory cook to guard duty, a<br />
comndinig officer would request n replacsmant from the<br />
Cntering Service pool and, upon his arrival, return the<br />
unsatisfactory cook to the pool for retraining and renssignnont,<br />
SECTION<br />
CONCL<strong>US</strong>IONS AND BECOIWNDA%IOWS<br />
131. Conolusions.<br />
a. The operoticg proaedure, procurecent and<br />
- 86 -<br />
R-E-9-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-P-D<br />
issue of Class I supplies by tho Comunlcetlons Zona,<br />
Xuropoan Theater, proved to be bnslcally sound end hi@y<br />
practical in principle and in opsmtion.<br />
b. Purchase of Silbsistancs Item in the<br />
Unittd Kingdon, on the continent and from Indigenous sour-<br />
CES relieved greater shipping facilities for other nssds<br />
and gsve troops foods they otherwise could not hme hnd.<br />
C. 'Yith the developat of the new typ packrglng<br />
sod conning, many ran-days of labor ware saved end<br />
loosca frol.i spoilage War6 reduced to B niniluum.<br />
d. lless teams proved to be a help in organizatlons<br />
fortunate enough to hove their services.<br />
132. Poco~-mcndations.<br />
n. Thnt packaging and conning rsthods be further<br />
devolopsd.<br />
b. That a Cctering Service be estcblished in<br />
the subststenae Brflnch of the Offica of tho p:unrtarmnstsr<br />
"anera1 and that it be developed along thc lines of tho<br />
rritish systom.<br />
- 87 "<br />
R-3-S-T-R-I-G-T-E-D
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D<br />
Bibliognaphy<br />
Chepter 9<br />
1. €,uartcrmaster Service Reference Datn Vol 11, Hecdquorters<br />
Services of <strong>Supply</strong>, European Theater of <strong>Operations</strong>,<br />
1 Jan 44.<br />
2. <strong>US</strong> Arny Wubsistence Exppriences in the European<br />
Thcatcr”, ‘Norld ’Nay TI, 1 Nov 45.<br />
3. Ltr fr Hq TEFET, OTCQ!, dated 13 Deo 45, subj: WorL.ants<br />
on quarternaster <strong>Supply</strong> Study, Chegter I1 - Opcrnting<br />
Prooedurs, Procureaent and Issue”. *(7)<br />
4. Technical Mahuol 43, Depot Operation Yanunl, Eq,<br />
ETO<strong>US</strong>A, O CW, Feb 45.<br />
5. Interview with Col J. Eh Kenderdine, @IC, Chief of<br />
Rtomge and Distribution Division, Office of Chiof<br />
<strong>Quartermaster</strong>, Unitad ?totes Forces, Eurupean Theeter,<br />
dated 3 NO 45. *(5)<br />
6. Advance section Conmunicctions Zone Opernttonal History<br />
of ?uartemaster (28 De0 43 to 28 Jun 45).<br />
7. nuartermsater Operation Analysis (Study #3 Level of<br />
Rupply), Hq Theater Service Forces, Iharopean Thiater,<br />
Office of the Theeter Chief <strong>Quartermaster</strong>.<br />
8. Annex **E@’ to European Theater of <strong>Operations</strong>, Standard<br />
Operating Procedure No. 7, undated.<br />
9. Quart~n”ater Operational Analysis, OCcl6 Study .P5,<br />
1 NOV 45.<br />
10. war Department Observers Report ,:‘930, 10 Ihy 45.<br />
11. fitanding Operating Procedure, Qartarmaster Section,<br />
Firtoenth <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong>, dated 1 Sep 44.<br />
12. war Department Cbsorvers Report f834, 15 Apr 45.<br />
13. war Departnunt Observers Report 9773, 9 Apr 45.<br />
14. War Department Observer6 Report ’058, 24 lbr 45.<br />
15 Report of‘ 560th QJ’ Sdlhead Company, 17 @ct45.<br />
16. V Arny Corps, After Actlon Report, 6 Jun 4L to 31 Dec 4k.<br />
*(23)<br />
17 * <strong>Quartermaster</strong> History within XIX Corps, 5 )fey 45.<br />
18. Seventh Arlpi <strong>Quartermaster</strong> Information for G-4 Periodic<br />
%port, for 7 Jan 45 and 7 Apr 45. *(6)<br />
19 Continenta1,OperatFng Instruotlons, European Theater<br />
of <strong>Operations</strong>, Office of tho Chief Quartermster,<br />
19 Feb 45.<br />
* Number in parentheses is Catalo Number used in Inventory<br />
or Material, Study NO. 109, $Class I supply), file<br />
R/401/11.<br />
- 88 -<br />
A-E-6 -T-R-I-C -T-E-D
SECTION 1<br />
HEFRIGEWMON UNITS<br />
L33. &artcrmastor Refrigeration Company (Bixod) T/O & E<br />
10-217,<br />
a. Organization and Mission, The company with an<br />
aggregate of 142 enlisted men and five officers operated and<br />
maintained Corps of Jhgineer refrigeration equipment and<br />
civilian refrigerated storage p1ants.l It was organized into<br />
three platoons: (1 headquarters platoon, a butchery pintoon<br />
and a cold storage platoon with attached personnel Prom the<br />
Veterinary Corps for mat inspection purposes.2 Under many<br />
cordi ions it w;i8 not necessary to activate the butchery pln-<br />
toon. P<br />
b. Use. The capacity of the company was determined<br />
by the particux situation, since the aveilable storage<br />
ftlcilities governed the amount that it could handle. When<br />
Engineer collapsible refrigeratton box s were used the comljany<br />
served as mmy as 120,000 troops.! Under coilditions<br />
dherein the company personnel acted in a supervieory capacity<br />
and employed civilians end pri onera of war, approximtely<br />
650,000 troops were oupgorted.3 This company wa~inot used<br />
in the Combat Zone, but it did meet all expectations in<br />
connection with the use of collaysible refrigeration boxes.3<br />
c. lidointenanoe.' The <strong>Quartermaster</strong> responsi bilitg<br />
in maintning refrigeration facilities was limited to the<br />
repair of the refrigeration units coolim the mobile vans.<br />
A11 oi' the reaainlng maintenance responsibilities were<br />
divided among the other servicea. The responsibilities of<br />
the Corps of Engiiaers, for example, inoluded:<br />
(1) Repnir to existing cold storage nnd ice<br />
facilities.<br />
(2) Operation and mnfntenance of all statio<br />
refrigeration plants.<br />
In the European Theater of <strong>Operations</strong> Engineer personiel<br />
were preoccupied with other activities which were basic in<br />
advancing the war effort, hence their responsibilities were<br />
aesumed by the using unit or other u,uartermc?ster agencies.<br />
134. Quarteraaster Refrigeration Company (Mobile) T/O<br />
& E 10-24.7,<br />
n, Orgnhixntion and Mission. The Quurtekmster<br />
1-frigeration Company (Uobile) was organized into three plntoons<br />
of three sections eaoh. Each section and platoon was<br />
capable of operating independently.5 The mission of the<br />
company was to transport fresh meats and other perishables<br />
from the advance depot or other point where fixed refrigeration<br />
was provided to the division or army supply points.<br />
When the turn around time between the loading point and the<br />
- 89 -<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I-C -T-E-D
R-E 43-T-X-I-C -T-E-D<br />
supply point was not longer than one day, one oompany was<br />
considered oapa le of providing perishables to ah army of<br />
nine divisione.9 To aocomplish this the oompany was equippd<br />
xith 30 trucks, 4 to 5-t0n, tractors and 30 scmi-trailers, 10tw,<br />
i: wncel, van-type, rbfrigeratfnR, on the bnsis of threa<br />
per secticn end tne per pletoon ~~adquart~rs.5<br />
b. 0 eration. The use of the Luartermaster Refrig-<br />
eration hJUpani’efle) fell into three categories:<br />
transportation of perishables, statio storage or a oonbination<br />
of the two. rrhile the use as both static storage and<br />
transportation of perishables was oonsidered the normal<br />
employment, there were not always sufficient refrigerated<br />
vans assigned to an army to permit this type of operations.<br />
As a result, it was often necessary to transpurt the perish-<br />
ables to a supply point and deposit the loads into any<br />
available static storage or on the grouad, In such cases<br />
the arrival of the refrigerated vans was tired for the late<br />
afternoon of the day prior to isaue.8 dhen no cold storage<br />
wa6 available at the supply point, the Fifteenth bS hrmy<br />
adopted the system of hauling perishabies by cargo vehicles<br />
from the fixed cold storage point to t e mobile rePrigera-<br />
tion unit located at the supply point. 8<br />
C. iide uac . The adequacy of this type company<br />
Bepended i n v a r a the distance the vans were required to<br />
move, rfhen fresh meat was dellvored to the area by Comnications<br />
Zone facilities, the mobile company was generally<br />
able to deliver the rations to the supply points. rghen the<br />
companies went beyond tho army area to obtain the perishables,<br />
it was frequently necessary to transfer supplies to ca go<br />
trucks in the army mea for delivery to supply points.?<br />
Additional vans oould have been utilized by each army.lo<br />
d. Civilian Refrigeration Equf went, Wherever<br />
possible, civilian eqapment was used to augment military<br />
faoilities. The type operating wit available and the type<br />
of personnel employed varied. In som lnstanoes operations<br />
were conducted entirely by civilian personnel. Where facilities<br />
were Bo located that a <strong>Quartermaster</strong> railhead or<br />
truckhead could advantageously use them, huartermastor peraonnel<br />
oparatej. then and employed prisoner of waz or civilian<br />
Labor, if available, for augmentation. On other ocoaaions<br />
personnel of tho i,uartermaster Refrlgeratfon Compang (Fixed)<br />
were utilized, either for the co%plete operation of a civic -<br />
lian installation or for the supervision of operations. Wintenan<br />
e and repair became the responsibility of the using<br />
unit.%<br />
e, Discussion. Refrigeration facilities on the con-<br />
tinent were not entirely satisractory. The lliobile refrig-<br />
eration companies did an admirable job, but tho use of the<br />
vane for static storage cannot be justified. The mohility<br />
of the oompany must be utilized to the fullest extont by<br />
hauling from static supply points to army supply points<br />
delaying only for the maintenanoe of Yam. The orgsniza-<br />
tion of the campany under Tables of Organization ahd Equipment<br />
10-217 is entirely satisfactory. Such is not the case,<br />
however, with the Refrigeration Company (Fixed), The bdtch-<br />
ery platoon was dropped from the oom any. This left 45<br />
mn in the company headquarters and men in a cold storage<br />
platoon for the operation of a oold Storage plant. Suoh a<br />
large plant failed ta materializa in northebn Lurope, but<br />
many small plants wore locetod and utliized. It was necess-
R-E -S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D<br />
ary to break the fixed company into three or Pour detachments.<br />
k more useful orgarxization in the Eiuropean Theater of OEerations<br />
woula heve been 8. company of four officers with a head-<br />
quarters of 15 to 20 men an8 three 32-man operating ~latoons.4<br />
SECTION 2<br />
BAKING AND COFFEE ROASTIPX<br />
135. uartermster Bakery Company, Mobile (Spacial) Ti0<br />
E io-ui'y.<br />
a, Organization and The oonpany hus an<br />
authorized strength of two officers and 82 enlisted mn and<br />
consists of a company headquarters and one operating platoon.<br />
The company headquarters supervised the operation and was<br />
responsible for all administritive duties pertaining to the<br />
company. Phe platoon, the basio oporating unit, was ooaposed<br />
of a platoon headquarters and three sections. Its function<br />
was to supply fresh bread and ooffda to troops in the Combat<br />
Zone. The ocWee roasting section, tbe fourth section of<br />
the oompany, consisted of six onlisted men with ooffoe roasting<br />
equiwnt. This section was improvised aa part of<br />
the Bakery Comgany in the European Theater of <strong>Operations</strong><br />
and the men taken from the headqUartErS seation.<br />
b. 0 erations The speclal wartermaster Bakery<br />
Company o p e r a t b i t i s h equipment, dl operating<br />
equipment was trailer mounted. Wlth tko four prim movers,<br />
four-ton cargo, to haul heavy equipment, and the eigh$<br />
truoks, 24-tcn, oargo, to motorize the remaining equipment<br />
and personnel, the company was completely mobile. ,hen in<br />
operation the cargo veh.icles haule ingredients and the<br />
finished product to supply points. f Having teohnioal equip-<br />
ment which required the one platoon to operate QB 8 unit,<br />
the oonpany lacked flexibility. It had to cea8e operations<br />
completely when required to move, but when an army had<br />
sufficient bakery oompanies to leap-frog one over the other,<br />
this was not an objectional oharacteristic.1° Zorward<br />
bakorias during the forward movement of an army augmented<br />
the rear area bakeries, while the bakeries in tho mar moved<br />
forward. This sytem required a min'rmun Of moving and reduced<br />
the hours af production lost,iZ Normally, one bakery<br />
compang WQS assigned to each supply point or two bakury<br />
campanise to uachrailhead company in support of a corys.12<br />
In one army, however, tho bakery oompanius were organized<br />
into a bakery battalion una furnished b eed-and corfeo to<br />
the supply points from a ocntral 1;oint.f3 ihis was th type<br />
of operation mvisaged by lrarLopartment publications, 14<br />
The coffee roasting and grinding equipment, trailer mounted,<br />
Udlikb the bakery equipmnt, was of Umarioan manufacture,<br />
When sufficient green ooFfeu. beans were availeblc fresh<br />
cOfYee was furnished to t a SWB number of troops to whom<br />
fresh bread was s~pyliad.~5<br />
Ca acit me capacity of the oonpany dependod<br />
on %hen w k *"each day it operatcd. The raoommended<br />
production we8 based on two eight-hour shifts each<br />
day, while the maxim production was based an three Light-<br />
hour shifts each Say. The produotion per day was as<br />
- 91 -<br />
A-3-S-T-R-I -C-T-E -D
R-E-S-T-R-I-C -T-E-D<br />
3mad C ompap 21,000 lbs. 30,000 lbs<br />
Coffoe Company 3,200 lbs. 4,800 lbs<br />
d. Kaintenanco. S_onre parts for three months maintciiancc<br />
were furnished with the British oquipmcnt. In sddftion,<br />
the companies wero bccked up with a tw6lve-months<br />
were outhcrikod to perform first and second echelon mainten-<br />
aace. Higher echelon maintenance repair was accomplished<br />
by the Central Sclvege De ot or by field service tecms from<br />
thr? Comunications. Zone.17<br />
e. Liscussion, A lpurtermster Bnkery Gmpany<br />
(T/O & E 10-1kmimericnn ovens and machinery, was originclly<br />
intendcd for use in the European Thenter of <strong>Operations</strong>;<br />
It was flexiblo but not mobile.18 It had twice the<br />
nuniber of personnel as the special ooxpany and used 16 ovens<br />
a8 corcpnrod with three ovens used by the special conpany.<br />
The production capacity of tho two companies, however, dua<br />
to the difference of equipmuat, was the 8ae. Upon arrival in<br />
the buropLan Thsater of Op6rations eaoh Hmerican oquipped<br />
company vms reorganized into two Bakery hmpanies (Mobile)<br />
Spacial. None of the herican equipsea companies were used<br />
wikh any of the Lirinies in the European Theeter of Opcrctions.’<br />
Ong was usod in the Delta Base Section to furnish broad for<br />
the redeployment center. The most valuable charaoteristic of<br />
the special cGunrtermaster Bakery Company is its self-sufficiency<br />
for transport. Possibly the most impressive fuatura of the<br />
bakary Companies’ record on the coutinent wa8 an almost total<br />
absence of major Froblens. The planning was evidently sound.<br />
The imuu rate of roasted and ground coffae, however, wns<br />
higher than planned. The normal lssus rate for two meals<br />
daily is eight pounds par 100 ration^.^ During colt weather<br />
it tvus necossnry to issue on the bcsis of 12 pounds per hundred<br />
rbtions. This. load could not bo cnrrieil by the coffos<br />
roasting equipnent , and oivilian roasting instullatioiis were<br />
necessary to aaEist in meeting the demand.<br />
SECTION 3<br />
CJNRLRTERMASTER RAILHEAD COMPANY (T/O dc E 10-197)<br />
136,Lisslon, The mlasion of the Quarteraaster Rflilhcad<br />
Coinoony wumovi.de personnel to operat railheads,<br />
truokheuds and navigation or beaohhea8s.4g Jt WELScharged<br />
by thc War Department with the gjcoipt, issue and evccuation<br />
or all quortermatcr suppliss. In the iuropean i’heater of<br />
<strong>Operations</strong>, however, this unit W E normally confined to the<br />
recoipt and distribution of Class 1 supplies.zO<br />
137. Or anizatioo ‘The company is organiaed into a comlmny<br />
heanqiA~~~~-;wo plRtOOnS, an aggregate .. b.*<br />
of 173 enlisted men and Sour The platoon was<br />
thb baeio operating unit and was nomnally divided into three<br />
- 92 -
sections for convenience in staggering working hows and for<br />
the purpo$$ of handling specific comodity classes of<br />
supplies. Copananded by a lieutenant, tLe platoon has 74<br />
enlisted men including one platoon sergeant, three seotion<br />
leadsrs, three checkers and one storekeeper.21<br />
138. Flexibilit , The organization of a railhead company<br />
into platoons and se5tions gave the unit sufficient flexibility<br />
tQestablish and Eaintain more than one distributing<br />
point. .*hen movement was necessary one platoon continued<br />
operation of the old supply point while the other platoon<br />
opened a new supply point. This allowed tlie issue of the<br />
reaaining supplies at the ola supply point while supplies WB~C<br />
received and issued at the new location. The ttleap-frogfl<br />
method of movement of <strong>Supply</strong> points was necessary in a fast<br />
moving situation. 23<br />
oui Sment. In addition to the normal organizational<br />
egui;i%t f++~ he rai sad company was authorized sufficient<br />
technical equipment to efficiently carry out its mission.<br />
The pump, gasoline, dispensing, and the gasoline drums were<br />
not used by the railhead company 88 the oombany did not<br />
normally handle Class 111 s~p~lies.~ Material handling<br />
equipment inoluded two hard trucks and two steel plates.<br />
The steel plates were to be used as ramps between box cars<br />
and warehouses. In the type of operateons encountered. in<br />
the buropean Theater of OparationB the steel plates<br />
not needed. Roller-type conveyors were a necessity.121&TeThe<br />
office aachines consisted of tw3 typewriters and two coffiputing<br />
machines, non-listing. It has been recommended that<br />
the company be aUthOriZ6d two comguting machines, listing.<br />
The listing typo machine is nee d in order to cheok the<br />
accuracy of reports maintained. %&<br />
140. Capacity. The railhead company, handling all<br />
olassea of &arternaster supply, had a rated capacity of<br />
70,000 men. The troop basis of the 12th <strong>Army</strong> oup was<br />
one coqsny per 50,000 men for Class I supplies.y$ Normal<br />
issues of a company were from 100,000 to 145,000 rations<br />
daily, and under exoeptionai circumstances over one-quarter<br />
of' a million rations a day were issued for short periods of<br />
the, In the amy area it was found that one railhead<br />
oompany handling Class I s pplies could support a f%yperl<br />
corps of thrae divisions.28<br />
141. Eb;;ity. The organic transportation of a Luarter-<br />
master Hai lee bom2any is illsufficient evon for administrative<br />
purposes, It was contemplated that addition 1<br />
transportation wolrld. be mde availablo as required. 26) The<br />
amount of transEortation necessary depended upon the type<br />
of operations involvsq. For tho internal administration of<br />
nt only a few additional trucks per platoon<br />
~~~e"%%dfst However, in a fast moving situation whore the<br />
supply point6 were located at great distances from the<br />
army depots, additional transportation to the extent of et<br />
least one Luarternaster Truck Company was normally made<br />
available to ha railhead company before it could operate<br />
si"ficicntly.~8 The lack of nobility is olearly indicated by<br />
the fallowing coments from unit 4.uartcrnasters:<br />
unite.. .,,Our ration trucks- took two days to mako- the trip<br />
- 93 -<br />
R-E-3-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
R-E -5-T-3-14-T-E -D<br />
to aim$ truckheads and return to Class 1 breakdown aroatt.28<br />
b. 4th &more8 Division: ,,Class I supply I.oints<br />
during the dash to the Rhine werc at times newly 150 miles<br />
behind our control point and approximately 200 dies behind<br />
our forward elementslf.29<br />
c. 83d Infantry Livision: ftnuring the drive to<br />
the hlbe, Division wartermaster trucks oofitinue@ to haul<br />
“Att rations from ”hen-Gladbach (P-0909) This involvcd<br />
a distance of 20 milos extending to 1 0 mllcs, as the ,<br />
division moved further into Germany”.%<br />
142. O&arations, The railheaa coqmy normally issuud<br />
rations to Lain$ unfts at tho suglly point. Oprations<br />
were generally efficient and the organlzation adequate.<br />
The platoon sergeant, or railheocl forem, su1;ervisad the<br />
receipt, unloadiiig, issm and loading of tiiu su&pliea. The<br />
chlof storokeeper in tlach rlatatn calculated the ,“roper<br />
breakdown end was charged with the aocuraoy cf all reports<br />
and inventories. Efficient checkers were essential as they<br />
formed the contact between the comijany and the drflwing units<br />
and were charged with making conplete and Lrober issues.<br />
The laborers were utilizsdmin the loadiw, unloading and<br />
wayehousing of supkllce. rhe tables of organizfltion and<br />
equipment, however, do not krovide sufficient laborers for<br />
all types of operations, and augmentation by cuartermaeter<br />
Service Companies or prisoner of war labor was often neccessary.<br />
It was at tises recomaended that the ratinga<br />
of various olasscs of personnel, particularly storekeepers<br />
and oheokere e made more commensurate with their reeponsi-<br />
bilities .l9, ’22:<br />
143. Liscussion. The function of the 6,uartermaster Railhead<br />
Company in the-Iuroyean Theator of operations we8 the<br />
rocoipt, storage and issue of Glass I supplies. It WRS wcll<br />
suited for this funotionexcapt for tha laok of vehicles,<br />
Thosv companies assigned to armios were ofton operating two<br />
or moro supply points. Transportation avuilablc to this<br />
company ima often insufficient for ir.ternal compenj adain-<br />
istrotion. It is highly dosirable that tho officers selected<br />
for warternaster Railhead Companies bt of superior ability.<br />
Tho propr breakdown of rations, tho intelligaat substitution<br />
of itoms, and a thorough broad-mindod knowlodRu of ourront<br />
menu instructions rcquiro an ospocially wall-qunlifiud<br />
offioer, The onlistud assistants in n roilhead coupmy must<br />
also be well trainud. In the Luropeun Theater of <strong>Operations</strong><br />
thoy become speciallets as StGrekeeper.9, aheckors or clcrks.<br />
144. COpCl<strong>US</strong>iDIlS.<br />
a. artermster Refrigeration Units. The tech-<br />
nical aquipmen?and personnel were sufficient to accoeplish<br />
the designated mission. The transportation and distribution<br />
of perishable item wes oarrled on with slight delays dependent<br />
mostly upon the tactical situation.<br />
- 94 -<br />
R-E-5-T-R-I 4-T-E-D
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T -E-D<br />
b. QuarFmst;r BekeFy Cka&panies. The equipment<br />
and personnel of t e kuar ermastsr erg-&@", Mobile<br />
(T/O I E 10-147 S) aid not entirely prove adequate to accomplish<br />
the deeignated mission.<br />
(1) The Quarteraaster Xallhecd Corqany (T/O<br />
and E of 10-597) in the European Theecter<br />
of Operation8 did not handle all classes of<br />
supbly, and it6 actual ca;racity for Class I<br />
supbly escoeaed ita rated cazaclty.<br />
(2) The prsonnei eniployed during oprations<br />
developed into specialists in many instan-<br />
OeS, and the responsibility and grado 0s<br />
personnel wag not always comonsurate.<br />
145. Reco"ondetionsI<br />
a. Quarternaates Refri~eratiodUnits. That an<br />
additional Quartermastdr Refrigeration Comyany, Mobile<br />
(T/O & E 10-2lt7) be provided per army to allow for necosamy<br />
statio storage and ppoper mobility.<br />
b, ,<strong>Quartermaster</strong> Bakery CompanieB.<br />
(1) That the bakery company be Organized into<br />
two platoons in order to provide greater<br />
flexibility, and that it be provided with<br />
the British type equipmnt utilized by the<br />
uartermster Bakery Oompang, Mobile,<br />
9Spacial).<br />
(2) That additional equipment be provided so<br />
that the rated cascity of each platoon<br />
will be raised to 20,000 pounds of bread<br />
operatine on two eight-hour shifts.<br />
(3) That one coffee grindirg and roasting section<br />
be authorized per plhtoon with sufficient<br />
mobile equipment tc furnish fresh ooffee<br />
for the number of trtOp4 to whom fresh<br />
bread is furnished.<br />
0. Roilhead Compaqy (T/O & E 10-1971<br />
(1) That the mission of the unit be limited to<br />
the raosipt, storage and Issue of Glass 1<br />
supplies with a rated oapacfty of handling<br />
75,000 to 100,000 rations.<br />
(2) That tho oompany be mde more mobile by the<br />
authorization of sufficient PehiOlQS t o motorize<br />
personnel and equipment.<br />
(3) That tho equipment used to handle Class 111<br />
supply be delsted from the Table OI Organization<br />
and Equipment, end that labor-saving<br />
and office machinery bs authoriacd,<br />
(4) That one railhead forenan per platoon bo Buth-<br />
- 95 -
R-E-3-1'-R-I-C -T-E-D<br />
orized to .supervise railhead opbrationo, and<br />
that tho grade the checkers and atmekeepers<br />
bo increased aorxensiwate with the responsibilities<br />
or their jobs,<br />
d, That pertinent dbatrines, techniques and Tables<br />
of Orghrdzition and Bquiprdnt be amended by apFroGrihte agencies<br />
(if the irar Department.
1. T/O & F: 10-217.<br />
R-E-S-T-B-I-C-T-E-D<br />
Bibliography<br />
Chapter 10<br />
2. I a temaster hervice Reference Data V01w.e 111 dtd 15 Dec 4:<br />
l?d<br />
3. Report, Office Chief Tlioater C,uarterr;lastor, subject: IV@artorraster<br />
Refrigoration Cbrcpany (Fixed) T/O & E lO-2l7I1.<br />
(Undat ea)<br />
4. <strong>US</strong> Subsitence Exprience in burcgenn Theater of Operatids,<br />
dtd 1 NOV 45.<br />
5. 12th <strong>Army</strong> Grsup Study quartcrnlaste? Rafrigeratlon Ccmpany<br />
(Mobile) T/O & E lO-ik7.<br />
6, Tw 10-615, t~arternflster Ihndbook, Hefrigeratitn Company<br />
(Mobile) T/O aC E 10-247.<br />
7. T/O & E 10-247 dtd 25 Fob &.<br />
8. <strong>Army</strong> Ground Ewces Regort Number 834. ‘(9)<br />
9, hfter Aation,pE;yrt, headquarters Fifteenth <strong>US</strong> hrmy, Btd<br />
31 Jul 45.<br />
19. Ltr, Third <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong> dtd 22 Sep 45, subject: tqIdeca cn Quartar<br />
master Or~anizstionlt.. “(11)<br />
11. T/O & E lO-l.47 S, <strong>Quartermaster</strong> Bakery Company, Mobile<br />
(Special), dtd 2 Oct 43.<br />
12. Amy Ground Forcos Xcgort Number 773 (First <strong>US</strong> ArmtF) dtd<br />
9 Kpr 45, “(12)<br />
13.<br />
Arny Ground Forms Report Number 933 (Ninth <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong>) dtd<br />
10 m y ~ 5 . “(13)<br />
14. FbI 10-10, paragraph 64, dtd 2 bkr 42. “(14)<br />
15. 12th <strong>Army</strong> Grouy,, ‘He3crt m the kuarterinastcr Uakary 5ompany,<br />
Mobile (Speoial) T/O &, E 10-147 3.<br />
16. Ltr, lst <strong>US</strong> Arm Group, 1 Mar 44,.1st Ilia. garagraph a, file<br />
AG 413 OPGD. ‘(15)<br />
17. Office crr Chief ~$~artermtzster, T~oknio~l tilanual Numbor 1,<br />
paragraph 21, dtd December 1944.<br />
18. 12th <strong>Army</strong> Group, Pioel &ter*hction Report, paragraph 11,<br />
Srrctiou In,paragraph il. (16)<br />
19. Pwugraph 1, TM 10-379, raaxtcrLastor Handbook, Rnilhcad<br />
Oomnyany, T/O & E: 10-197, dtd 4 N c ~439 ‘(17)<br />
20.<br />
i;;<br />
Puragraph 8, Sectitn 111, paragraph II, 12th xrmg GrLup,<br />
Final After Action Rqort, period 19 OOt 4j to 30 Apr 4&.<br />
0 &E 10-197, ~uartermstcir Railhead Company, dial 17 Feb 45<br />
21+<br />
22 I gral,h 54, FM 10-10, (partermstcr Service in Theater<br />
of <strong>Operations</strong>, dtd 1942.<br />
- 97 -<br />
R-E -S -T-R-T -C -‘P J3-n
23.<br />
24<br />
25.<br />
26,<br />
27<br />
28<br />
29.<br />
30 *<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D<br />
12th xrmy Group, Field Sarvice and OprLtlons Report,<br />
July 1945.<br />
Report oP 560th b,uartermasser Railhead Cwnpny, dtd<br />
17 Oot !+5. *(22)<br />
Paragraph 17, TM 10-379, lLuartermaster hndbcok, Raill1et;e.d<br />
Company, T/O & E 10497, dtd 4 Nov 63.<br />
Bistory, 79th Infancry Lividon, dtd 7 Jun 45.<br />
<strong>Operations</strong> of 4th Armored Division, dtd 12 Jua 45.<br />
<strong>Quartermaster</strong> History, 8yd Infantry Division, priod<br />
5 Apr to If; Oot 44,<br />
* Number in parentheses is Gatalog Number used in Inventory<br />
of Material, Q.4 Study No. 109, (Class I<br />
<strong>Supply</strong>), file R 401/ll.<br />
- 98 -<br />
R-E-S-T-R-T -C-T-E-D
148. Ifission cnd 0r~nnniar..tbion.1 Tho chiof qumtcr-<br />
mnetcr, Puropocn Thcctxr of Opcrctioiis, actod in n d.lc1<br />
cnpncity n.8 tho Chief qunrtomnstor, EUropoc.n T!iclntor 01<br />
Cporctions nnd r.3 n,u~.rtnrinc..stor, Communications Zono. If0<br />
w?.a ch?rgod with tho ovorcll roaponslbility lo? the proouromont,<br />
storr.go, distribution md issue of quutemc.stor<br />
supplios to all troops in the Europonn Thw.'cor of OpoTatiOnS.<br />
Tho rosponslbillty for Clnss.11 :ad nr suDnly we.s ploccd<br />
with tho <strong>Supply</strong>, Proourorfiort , :md Storcac cnd Distribution<br />
Divisions of tho Offico of the Chiof PLuauartonnnetcr. Th.e<br />
Procurotxnt an& Storsgo Nsd Distribution Mvislons wrc<br />
cojzcc"d vith c.11 cl::ssos of supply. ~ h o<strong>Supply</strong> Division<br />
W'B concernod only with Glass TI and IV ana Post &cohang:Et<br />
aupplies. It whs organized into the following fivd branches:<br />
n, Salos Storo Branch.<br />
b, Clothing cnd Equipment Rrcnoh.<br />
c, Regnlnr Supplies Brmch,<br />
a. Distribution Bmnoh.<br />
0. Yost FLchnngo Eranch,<br />
147, Functions.<br />
7.. Tlic <strong>Supply</strong> Division, as a control cnd oncrating<br />
c@ncy over Class I1 and TV md Post Exchmge sup$.ios, h.:d<br />
tho follovhg funotione:<br />
(1) lkde cstim.tos of roquirments.<br />
(2) Propnrcd roquisitions uiL1ior on tbc United<br />
3tP.tos or frorn'Brifisb SaurcuB.<br />
(3) Studiod and rocom"od roplnoemcnt<br />
foctors 03 Closs I1 ,md IT eupplios.<br />
(4) l4r.lntninoa [i bnladeed stook of Clnss<br />
I1 ma N suppli0dI<br />
(5) R0Co"Gndcd to tho Storqp ane Dlstribu-<br />
tion Division tho distribution of inconing<br />
Clnss IT cn3. IV supljllos.<br />
(6) Ryquisitionod salcs storu itms rrom tho<br />
- 93 ..
n-&+'y-i(-I- C-T-3j-D<br />
Unitcd States or by loccl procurmcnt.<br />
(7) Arrmged for tho publicr.tion of Thoatsr<br />
allownncos of Class I1 and IT sun llcs,<br />
principclly for zxpendcblo items. E .<br />
(8) Inmgurnted : systy of rationing for<br />
3clos Rtoro itons.<br />
d. Tho Procurement Division choc!tcd nl1 rcquisitions<br />
on tho United States to determine which item could<br />
bo procured locally, It orranged for t 3G local procuroiwnt<br />
of' supplics nnd followed requisitions to insuuro production<br />
r.nd dolivwy. It propnrcd cll~raports on atntns oT 8upplicr;s<br />
procured in tho ?Jni!od ISngdon, and dctorminod vhat itvcI.5<br />
of supply worc obtainnbla frcm 1oc~,1sources.<br />
c. The storr.go ::nd Distribution Division furnishod<br />
tcchniccl guiBrsca for the ogcratioii of depots,.<br />
coorclinc-.tod tbc distribution of su2nlics to thc dqots,<br />
l-lctcrmincd tho modo1 Btocks to be cnrriod, formul?.tad. plmS<br />
for thc rccofpt, storngc i:nd issue of siiI)pliOs, and catcblishod<br />
procedures for nll movanonts of suyplios pcrtc-ining<br />
to tcsk forcc oporationu.<br />
SXTION 2<br />
DYTERIUNATTION OF EQ,UIXEMiNTS<br />
143, Initic.1 ISSUC~ Troops nomlly crrivod in tho<br />
ltwogonn ?hootor of Oporctions complctaly cquipped with prcsoribod<br />
:?llc"os of clothing and oquipmcnt, wlth tho BXcoption<br />
of cortnin items of ore;-!niz?.tioncl oquipmont . !:%en<br />
now itoms ?.rrivcd on thi; continent rnd when units or roinlorcoments<br />
?.rrl.vvod without prescribod itor!.is of clothing nI?d<br />
oqulpfiant, it ms ncccssr.ry to stock items for initin1<br />
issuo. Tho initinl issue factor wns oalculotcc! from tho<br />
Rctu::l troo].l hnsis for tho firoponn Tlicatcr of OporotLonS<br />
cad ma cxprcssed in r,u
R-E-S-T-B-T-C-T-I!-D<br />
Thus il opt; mrckiccw, 7.vhich hpd on r.vcr::gc lcngth of lifo<br />
of ono yorr, or nn cnnu4 roplaoomcnt of 100 !mooizt vhcn<br />
dividcd by 12 montho givas ? foplpcomcjnt f7ctor of GI3<br />
porccnt por month. Tho basic formula for tho dovolopmont<br />
of tho roplnccmcnt foctor of ,-.n item wns r.s follows:<br />
?umtitios issucd for rcgl-oumont<br />
purposes durinR ono month - hlonthly pcrn,urntitios<br />
in tho hinaa of troops - cuntzgc lnotor<br />
c. The computation of tho formila prosantad ".-ip<br />
difficulfios. 8bico it wcs imposgiblo to obt::in m ?.coilr-<br />
?.to count of thc cxzct nwnbcr of an itun in tho b-adis of<br />
troopB, tho number wns dorivod by multialying thc initi::l<br />
issue fnctor by tho Europonn Thoctor of Oparations :lr-npcvror<br />
figures. These mnnpowor figums wore not ?ccur?.to but tlic<br />
mothod proved pcncr.-.lly sctisfcatory. In tho dotLrn:min?.tion<br />
of tho nmber o l rcplccomunt issues mc.dci, tha .i;otal monthly<br />
issuo or cn item hi:d to bo modifiod by catciu apglioublo<br />
fF..ctors, suoh cs initicl issuos *inado, issuos to r.gL.nci;Y<br />
othor thm Uiiitcd Rtctas Foims, and pur.ntitios raturnccl to<br />
atook through snlvngc chnnnols. atill othor fcctors hild to<br />
bc considorod in tho final derivation of tho ropl~ccomont<br />
factor, r.nd tho fnctors ,?s mcthemntionlly dorivod wro<br />
frequently nlterad, bascd on tho short supply of ?.n item<br />
whioh failod to mct requiromcuts of tht: troops in tho flcld<br />
and on the soceoncl. vnri?.tions which cnusod c. ch,m.jlAo in<br />
roquiromdnts for itcms euch ns woolon unCGrwoar :ad wintcir<br />
clothing.<br />
d. Roplnccmcnt fnctors wcro ncvor oonsidLred<br />
cmplotoly nccurnto p.nd. vrciro subJect to Coilstc.1it sti:dy end<br />
chr.ne;c. They did, howovcr, rcprcscnt thz marago cnticipntod<br />
roquirmnts over P. long puriod of tj.w c.nd scrmd<br />
thoir purpose in the detcl-aj.nation of ovGr.-Cl raipc rc;cjui.romonts,<br />
150. Tn.rifPs.lO A size tariff in n. ~chocluloor tr.blo<br />
shoving thoavor?gc a,umtity 02 fllzes of m item rcc!uirod to<br />
proporly lit P. givon numbor of men. ?ioim?.lly, %?.rifftr,bloa<br />
oovm only thr, pcnulnr sizo8, or thoso nizos whichwill fit<br />
tho myjority of individ.unls in tho nrmy. ,? supplcmLntnl<br />
size tariff is ?. siinilnr tnb3.o but is coqfinod *to thc odd<br />
nnd unpopular sizcls roqirirod for tflos~ ruon who omnot bo<br />
fittod by the norrw.1 B~ZGtariff, Europoai "ho.?tcr of<br />
Oporntions cxpcrienco indicntod that 93 F-rcsnt of thc tokT.1<br />
roquiromonts worc) mot by thc; noiw.1 tnriff tnbls. Both<br />
tsblos nro cordpntod and basod on records covciring lo.tlg<br />
poriods of tinc, cnd wcro uoad in dotorlainin@; o;ao rquiromcnts<br />
of clothing. Ccrtcin othw consiCcmtions, howw",<br />
EuOh ct.8 tho sup-13-y diffioultium inVOlVCd in on oxccsaivo<br />
numborpcf sizos .md tho possibility or f'cnsitility of coilbiniilg,<br />
substituting, ond rcaucing tho numbor of sikos,<br />
wero takon.intc nocount boforo tho siao rcqtilraacnts woro<br />
dotormincd.<br />
151. Stoolc L~velS.<br />
a. Tho "hr Dopnrtmont proSCribOd i'rs thc initic.1<br />
lovols of Class I1 and Tv supply in ljho Eurovonn Thc,-tcr<br />
85 any minimum lmrol and 75 d::T mximum lovol of-,sui~l~,&<br />
Tho 45-day dmiNuol love1 WtlS f,>Uldto bo iIi?,clBQLl?:~dU~to tho<br />
difft(hilt1es and the factors involved in the di8tribktiw
(1. Tho ''r.-.r Dcg?rtn?c t cstnblishcd thrw yh7s-s of<br />
SUrply POY. owraons thOP.%CTE:8<br />
(1) .%utom?.ttFcoupply phcso, which coutinuod<br />
uatil tnvontory oontrol ;?roco&vruswora<br />
ostr.blisho2.<br />
(2) Somi-nutom?tic su7nl.y pMeo, in nU.ch<br />
cortcin sup?lics worG cutowtioally furnishod<br />
bosd upon tho mrtoricl stntus<br />
rcports, whilc othor suppliea were furnished<br />
by thc ro6pomibJ.o ports of ewbnpkkction<br />
br.sad tpon thar;tcr roquiromonts.<br />
(3) The thjrd phr.66 pl?.coo thc overso~.o"amcnd<br />
on r. full requisitioning bnsls, and<br />
w.s ::uthorizdd only When lovole OP s?ipply<br />
j.n tho thazter had boon StZbiliZGd cmd<br />
control proceduros oatcblishud.<br />
b. ?nu rutowtic supply phxw bo in thG Euro-<br />
F'jm Ecrtcr of dLxxctlono .tn Jnnur,Zy lt)h2,Ecs unsctia-<br />
T-otory to both t)lG MLW York port Of hbrrkction Ckld to the<br />
chior q.mtcrmnstor. ~ u l luorrponsibility tor supply dit! not<br />
lig xvitr tho 2uronitm 'Phoitor of Opxtions Co"ndor; 110<br />
dii? lict h?vc CCnnplGtO hnowlodgo at all tims ns to the<br />
stotua of incoming, supplios; rmi tho spoolnl roquirmonto<br />
- 102 -<br />
R-E-3 -T-R-I-C-T-X -D
R-E-S-T-9-I-C-T-E-D<br />
dotorminod nnd directed by him, in addition to the nofor<br />
bringing SuPPlies to tho propor lcvcls, forccd<br />
syst m of roquisitldnlng rcgcrdlcss of uxistlng j.nstruo-<br />
ti0ns.Z Tho cutmatic <strong>Supply</strong> phcsa wcs diacontinuGa in<br />
OotobCr 1942 when the Chiof %mrtzmnstcr submittud. c qunrttcrly<br />
.rcqii.LsitiOn bas& on tho somi-automatic phcso, which<br />
oontinucd until P-Prfl 1945 when tho hroponn Thoc.tur of<br />
Ogerntions entered the lust phnso of supply.<br />
153, Rcnuisitlonin&: Puriodsaa Tho Chief Quortomasfmcxporimded<br />
with monthly, aur-rtcrly , and semi-annual rqulsitions,<br />
The nionthly system or rwuisitioning rcauirod<br />
that n aomplctc reviow of the atoclc 1wel.a bc ma0 2.5 icr.st<br />
once ovcry thirty dciys, nnd Insured r, Tositivo nsthod for<br />
dGtooting orrorc tmd stock dcficicncicjs. It clso :lj.minc,ted<br />
the necessity for a lcrge numbcr of intoritn roouisitions.<br />
T ~ Camrtorly requisitlonlna proccduro , utilizinK ou.td.?tcd<br />
inventories, forc-d thL ?uartcsmrstcr to suljxit numbroue<br />
LntiorW rcquisitions to COTrCot doficioacies. Howcvor, the<br />
stntic oonditlons that Gxlstcd prior to Ihfoh 1944 showcd<br />
n quartarlg rovicw of itcms w.s sntisfnctmy.2 A rcquisition<br />
Par n poriod longcr thnn a ouartcr of n :'car could<br />
bo utilizcd only for supplios consued nt Q specific rate<br />
roRnrdloss of tho situation nnd wm thorcfore not Iccsibltt<br />
for the grcatcr portion of ~,ucrtc.rsk?.stcr Suplios nn9. equipmant.<br />
Tho pl'inoipal aclvmtagi; gainod frou thc. @.uarierly<br />
and scni-annual period mya,4 that it furnished the nauartor-<br />
mcstor Canornl with a projocted foroonst of roquircmnts that<br />
wm incorporr,tad into tho loiip, rmge procurmont ?lc\nning<br />
program. The montiily period of requisitioning was found to<br />
be tho nost sntisfnotory an6 feesibla when sunplics wore consued<br />
at an unovon rate nncl tho stoclc position was not sccure?<br />
- so3 -
R-E-S-T-R-I -C-T-E-D<br />
porta of entry for tho smpplios, xid tho mp.smcmJnt<br />
long tons to bo dollvuroa to orloh port, woro oom;?utcd End<br />
notGd on ocoh rcquisition.<br />
SECTION 4<br />
CONTROL -i!TD DISTRIBUTION<br />
155. Dlstrlbutlm Dirooti~ca.~<br />
a. Distribution dirootivoci wcro prcpcred in thc<br />
OffLco of tho Chiof qu?.rtommjtor, directing si-dzmcnt of<br />
supplies cs indiontcd, cnii wcro bosod On stock lcvcls in the<br />
vnrioua dopots and on tho roquirmonts sf the fiald forces<br />
ns indlcatod in dnily toleerma, roquisitions, or in cjstimntes<br />
of tho nituxtion. Tho diroctivcs wcro forw:.xdcd<br />
directly to thc sbipplng depot8 through 'thc r.i>yopric?to<br />
sootion"l,u~.r;rtcmr,stora, Copics wro fumishod to thd cor-eignoee,<br />
nnd to thu c.pppmgribtc seotion ~,ur.rtGm.st~~s.<br />
b. Tho iSsuiw3 dapot, b?so dopot cmpmy, or 0th-r<br />
fi,u?rtcrm?etor i dt 0onoornc;d took thc nnccssnry acticr. to<br />
prcpnre cnd. shi!, tho supplius 2s ccllcd for, m B cxtrcctod<br />
unnw.llnblo itcms to tho Office of the Thcxtur Chiuf Wzrtormator<br />
for dotormiuntion of nvailcbillty fmmot:lor s3uro~s.<br />
Distribution Alroctivos wero roturnod d?.Sl?r by the issuing<br />
depots to tho Chiof ?unqtcrmstor giving n ompkte roport<br />
ne to tho nction tnkon fiurinR tho procodininr. 24 hours. rubsoquent<br />
shipments wro roportua on other ooploe of tho<br />
dlroctivoa furnlshcd for thct pwjmso.<br />
156. Controlled ItmmsQ Itcma mre 6.csign:natod ns controlled<br />
dthar hoc-uso tTq wor& in short rmn~ly,suit.ible<br />
only for rastrlotod uso, non-st"Ird, or in cxporhicntnl<br />
stagos OP aovolopwnt. <strong>Supply</strong> of oontrollcd itcas vms<br />
dologcted to bnsc motion nunrtom?stora ir; 'Gho forn of<br />
orodits, basod on csth-tos of' oontrollod iton roqui.rmcnts.<br />
subittad by tho scction ~unrtum.atcr9.<br />
. 104 -<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-F-E-D
159. Rcoocrlcnd:.ti~~ns,<br />
R-24-T-R-I-C-T-E-D<br />
?,.Th?t is lutwo oporntions, t:io cutmtic .<br />
su?;ply ?hr.so qf supply opcrr,tions, if cnd :vhen utiliEcd,<br />
bo nodiiiod to Rivo the Thc.?tcr Co=.slr!ndcr p,m.rti?.l ocntrol<br />
?.nil cmploto informtion .?.s to tho str.tus of inilmdng<br />
supplics. .In ovorse?6 thwtcr nust bo supplicd by ncns of<br />
?raquuisition; cmplotc -.ntcm..tic supply shsuld not bo uOi1imd.<br />
b. m.?.t during opcrctinns -. nonthly roquisition-<br />
ing pcrlod bo used, but nftcr ccssctim of hositilitios c<br />
gucrtcrly ronuisltioning poriod bo uuod.<br />
c. Th-t ?, cantrnl cponcy bo dosign.?tc;d to conpllo<br />
~.rai!mr.:ntcin r.ccur-.to .-ad curront mniowor figuros in r.<br />
Thcr,tor of Opcr~.tionsin ordor to nolo cfficiunt1.y dotamlno<br />
rcguircricnt a .<br />
1.<br />
2.<br />
3.<br />
4.<br />
5.<br />
6.<br />
7.<br />
8.<br />
9.<br />
LO.<br />
- 105 -<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I -C -P-I-D
-CBAPTER 12<br />
CLAM I1 ANC fV OPERATIONS. FIELD FORCES<br />
SECTION 1<br />
GUARTERNIASTER, ARMY GROUT<br />
160,Misslon. The mission of the &my Group was prlnarily<br />
t a m The <strong>Quartermaster</strong> was mainly ooncernsd<br />
with the overall planning and establl.shment of gclloies relating<br />
to <strong>Quartermaster</strong> supply and with the neoeasory super-<br />
vision to insure t at the plane and policies were followed<br />
and carried There was nc Class I1 and IV section<br />
as such in either army graup. The <strong>Supply</strong> Division, Quarter-<br />
master Seqtion, in the 12th <strong>Army</strong> Grou , and the Quuartermas-<br />
ter Sub-section, G-4. Section, in the 8th <strong>Army</strong> Group, performed<br />
suoh Class I1 and IV functions as were ne~esssry.~,3<br />
161. Tunctions.3 The <strong>Army</strong> Group <strong>Quartermaster</strong> kept hlmself<br />
lnformea at all times on the status of Class XI and IV<br />
supply. Pis principal functions wore:<br />
a. To maintain olose contact with the <strong>Army</strong> Quar-<br />
termasters and with the Quwtermastars of Comunlchtions<br />
Zone and Advance Seotion, Communications Zone.<br />
b. To prescribe or make reoommondotiona for thc<br />
levels of supply to be maintained by the verious armies.<br />
c. To insurs the proper maintenance of these pre-<br />
soribed levels.<br />
d. To make recommendations on the establishment<br />
of priorities for issue of critical items and on the allaoation<br />
of tonnage to the various armies.<br />
e, To allocate c'yartermaster units to the <strong>Army</strong><br />
<strong>Quartermaster</strong> as required in the performance of his supply<br />
mlssione.<br />
f. To plan and estimate Quartarmests~ Glass I1<br />
and 3 7 operational requirements.<br />
g. To supervise the distribution of <strong>Quartermaster</strong><br />
suppliss,<br />
The <strong>Quartermaster</strong> of the 12th <strong>Army</strong> Group exeroised control<br />
over a wider scope of activities and responsibilities than<br />
did the <strong>Quartermaster</strong> of the 6th <strong>Army</strong> Group, due mainly to<br />
the difference between their organizations and to the wider<br />
scope of the 12th <strong>Army</strong> Group itself. Their principal miadone<br />
and functions were, however, relatively tha same. In<br />
Class I1 end IV supply they were not eperational, but acted<br />
in a OQOrdinating and .supervisory capacity only.<br />
SECTION 2<br />
C<strong>US</strong>S If AND TV SECTION, QUARTERwL4STER SUPPLY, ARMY
B-E-S -T-R-I-C-T-E -D<br />
162. Mission ad. Ornanization.4 The <strong>Quartermaster</strong><br />
Class X I cnd IV Sootion operated as B part of the APNY<br />
Q.uuorter5aster <strong>Supply</strong> Division under the direct suparvision<br />
of the Arffiy Quartermaatcr. It was charged with the overall<br />
supply of ClriSs I1 and IV itcans to all troops under Amy<br />
control. It had no Trcscribed tF.blG of orgclnization but<br />
nornnlly consisted of two officers and eight enlisted r,en.<br />
In the performnce of its supply functions, the section was<br />
cherged with the following responsibilities:<br />
a. Preparation of‘ 011Clcss 11 rJnd IV plans, repons<br />
end corresgonhmca,<br />
b. Maintenmce of authorized stook levels.<br />
c. Preparation of estimtes for Closs If and IV<br />
requircrentv.<br />
d. Requisitioning of ars y requireffi6nts.<br />
e. Qesponsible for the efficient operation of<br />
t6c mry Class I1 and IV Depots.<br />
f. Control snd nllocation of itens in oritioal<br />
short supply.<br />
g. Liaison with the Cormunioctions Ione, Advanoe<br />
’;cotion, Communications Zono, Ar~vGroup, and subordinate<br />
units of tho army on all Class I1 and IVmttcrs.<br />
h. Control of Qunrtermstcr sales store operntions.<br />
163, Methods of Operation.<br />
o. In generul., it was the reEp0ndbility of the<br />
Cormonding General, Comaitmicotions Zone, to push supplies<br />
forward to the army by whntuvcr means of transportation vms<br />
c,vailnbfe, based upon requirements DB estimated Dr raquisitiorGd<br />
by the armies. Suppliea were stooked in srw depots,<br />
maintained et proscribed levels and issued to using units<br />
upan requisition. The Cless IT and IV Section wis responsible<br />
Por mointsining P currant Class I1 and IV plnn to<br />
ineot chrnging sltustions and for eoourately ostiL!fiting roquirsmuts<br />
to fill the needs of using units.<br />
b. During the initial stagw of the continentnl<br />
operotion, all supplies were brought to the benches under<br />
cofitrol of the pirat <strong>US</strong> Amy, Class I1 and IV supplios<br />
were ahipned to the continant in beaoh mlntennnce Ond<br />
bench follow-up sets, the composition snd planning of which<br />
had been coordinotad by the Chid Q,uuartsrsastbr, Eur0pW.n<br />
Theater of Oocrations, ond the ‘prtermcster, Firet <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong>.<br />
mhc suapliss were controlled Pnd issued by the Writernester,<br />
First trr~Amy, until tho latter pert of July 19b4<br />
whcn the Advance 9ectlon, Com,unicrtions Zone, arrived<br />
tinct assumed control,-l T ~ EThird TIS Arriy prepared pre-scheduled<br />
requisitions for supplies to be shipped to the continent,<br />
broken down by days in t2CCOrdQnCe with t O m X E<br />
allocat~ons.5 In Southern bonae, the Seventh <strong>US</strong> Arrq mintnined<br />
control of beach supply operations until D plus 24,<br />
when the Continentea Base Section of ComrwnioatJ.oas Zona<br />
assumed control.6<br />
164. Feauisitionina Prooadure. 7-<br />
~ i . During bho early stnges of the continontnl
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D<br />
campaign, the ardGS JWq,UeSted ClQSS I1 and IV Supplies by<br />
requisition. In September 19b4 the policy was chaoged,<br />
Requlraments were included on the dally telegram, with no<br />
formal requisition required. Some confusion resulted due<br />
to the arrival of supplies in the army area without edvsnco<br />
notice and in quantities which could not be checked against<br />
the dally requests. Also some shipments were duplloated<br />
due to failure of units to remove items from &€ly telegrcns<br />
after the intiRl request. 7<br />
b. In December 1944, due to the unsatisfaotory<br />
results obtained, Class I1 and IV supplies were deieted from<br />
the daily telegram. Requlsitions were submitted instead to<br />
the <strong>Quartermaster</strong>, Advance Section, Communications Zorlo, for<br />
roquireme nt s coverinE a t en-day period.<br />
o, Early in 19C5 other changes were instltuted.<br />
The nalntenance of the backlog record of items not available<br />
was discontinued. Requisitions were submitted every 20 day8<br />
ror requirements computed on a jo-aay basis. This assured<br />
the .?rmy <strong>Quartermaster</strong> of et least a 10-day etook level Rt<br />
all times. To sFn,plify and coordinate supply, a conference<br />
was kald eaoh requisitioning period. Those attending inoluaeil<br />
the 4rmy Class If and IV officer, supply offioers of<br />
Csnmunications Zone depots and representatives of the Chief<br />
Quartermster, European Theater ot <strong>Operations</strong>.<br />
165. Stock Levels and Allocations,<br />
a. The 12th ArmxvGroup authorized a 30-day level<br />
of 01 8s I1 and IV suppliss for tho armies under ita control.8<br />
The 6th Array Group authorized a 15-day level.9<br />
Those levels were never constant due to the short supply<br />
of m y items and to the necessity for increasing or deoroasing<br />
the mount of stock on hand as the tactioal situation<br />
progressed from statio to mobile and baok to statio.<br />
b. Class I1 and IV supplies received a low pri-<br />
ority on shippinp and Zronsportetion. This caused many items<br />
to fell short of requiredlents, and the lack of supply dtaoipline<br />
ariong all troops resulted in further shortages.<br />
The <strong>Army</strong> Groupe, therefore, instituted the orocedure of’<br />
allocating criticfll and controlled Items to the armies, based<br />
on the missions and needs of en0h.l The srn5es in turn<br />
aoptrblled issues to the u s i ~troops,<br />
c. When transportation was short a system of control<br />
by ~llocattngtonncge was introduced. This restriction<br />
requirsd the .2p4 :uarternaster to submit his requirements<br />
by tonnage, listinq the ftems bv class requJ.red, Due to<br />
the low priority gtten to Claas’II and IV rqply and its<br />
resultant low toonage allocation, n further shortage of’ this<br />
class of supply developed.<br />
8. In Cictober 19L4 the Seventh <strong>US</strong> Pxmy foresaw<br />
the need for winter clothing and raised tho priority of Class<br />
I1 and TV supply to e level equal to that of Class I and 111.11<br />
In December 1944 the heavy combat losses s1.istained by the<br />
Uni$ed States forcea, w3th the resultoh% urgent need to reequip<br />
the units, caused a first priority to be given to<br />
Class I1 and IV supp y. The neaessary shipmsnts were acoomplished<br />
in ten days. 3
SECTION 3<br />
WXRATIOM OF AFW C<strong>US</strong>S I1 AND ZV DE-3<br />
166. Mission. The &my Class I1 and IV depot, operated<br />
by the <strong>Quartermaster</strong> depot oonipany, supply, under the direc-<br />
tion and teohnical supervision of the army Class I1 and IV<br />
Zfioer,L2 wns ohsrged with the responsibility of carrying<br />
model stocks of supplies for a oertain nmber of troops for<br />
a eiven period of tine; to supply, Either directly or through<br />
distributing points, all troops assigned to tke depot for<br />
supply; and to receive, store and iesue additional BUppliW<br />
over and above model stock levels in order to fully utilize<br />
all storage foclllties.l3 The normal delivery of Class I1<br />
and IV supplies to the using units was elads at the <strong>Army</strong><br />
Class II and IV depot. Under unusual cjrcumstances, delivery<br />
was ma e to units if transportation faoilities were<br />
a~nllable.~4 During one phase of th6 Third <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong>‘s operations,<br />
sub-depots were cstsblished for the pmpose of receiving,<br />
consolidating and forwarding to the main depot<br />
unit requisitions for supplies. The supplieo were trucked<br />
to the sub-dopots and issucd to the units at those points.<br />
167. Location of the Depot.<br />
a. The looation of Class II and IV depots p e<br />
oented Q problem throughout the continental cmpaign. 5-<br />
Factors considered in selecting a proper sitc included:l3<br />
(1) Type of terrain, drainage and accassi-<br />
bility.<br />
(2) Sufficient amount of open find closed<br />
storage,<br />
(3) TransportRtion f’acilities, rail Rnd road.<br />
(4) Security (dispersion and camouflage).<br />
(5) Layout plans, to include aisles ond roudways.<br />
b. Even should a Rite be found to meet a ll theae<br />
conditions, it was still unsatisfactory IS tt was not withln<br />
easy reach of the using units. The denot oompmy is not<br />
mobile without the attmhnent of addit?onal trucks, and tho<br />
low priority given to Class JI and IV eupplles Eade the move-<br />
ment of the depot difficult under the best of ciroumstances.<br />
During August and 98pteRber 19k.4, the round-trip distance<br />
between the combat troogs and the %raydepots amounted to FIS<br />
mucb as 360 uiles, and even then 50 perocnt of tbe unit trucks<br />
dispatc d to the depots were wasted beoause of lnodeciuate<br />
stockB,p3 In April 19C5, many arm depots were completely<br />
out of reach of the units that hed crossed the Bine. The<br />
units were utilizing their own avalluble transportation for<br />
Class I, IT1 and B supplies and round trips to the depots<br />
were as much as 500 miles.lb Bridge faoilities were also<br />
lnedequste at this time. On 31 March 1945 the <strong>Quartermaster</strong>,<br />
Beventh <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong>, decided to move the army depot, starting<br />
with the immediate novement by truck of certain critical<br />
items. Transportation shortago, however, necessitated the<br />
use of slower rcil facilltles and the move was not completed<br />
until May, by which the the troops had mcved so far abeag<br />
thnt even at Its new location the depot was out of reach.<br />
- log -<br />
R-E-5-T-R-I- C-T-E -D
168. Depot Procedure.<br />
R-E -S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D<br />
a. A strict systei? of stock control within the<br />
aopot was essential in order to insure that Etocks were kept<br />
r;t the propr levels to met the unit requirenents.17<br />
sunplies received w~rc?ronptly tallied in, inoluding the<br />
co:gl,etc description and quantity of QrCh iten receivctd.<br />
~lisywere storod and ssgregoted by class. Particuloi. ntten-<br />
tion wos given t o critical itom to arevent cny loss through<br />
negligence cy inprows storcge.13 S!>ot-ohsck team wira used<br />
in soix c:?ses to insure ci'rb nnd ncotness In tallying cutgoing<br />
end inco.ning suppligs, and to rectify errors made in<br />
notm~cloturonnd figures. 'f' .4 syste.1: of records, which reflcjcted<br />
mounts on hmd, mounts due $n,nnd mounts ue out,<br />
were ktpt ct nost deqots and included the fo1lowing:lq<br />
Stock record cords.<br />
Eaok-order cuds for sneciol iterrs only.<br />
Faxima lad minimn levels to be naintained.<br />
Daily renort of chAnge on master chart<br />
for forwarding to the headquarters supply<br />
ssction.<br />
Credit register of contrclled item which<br />
had been released to the units.<br />
Reports of shortages subaitted to headquarters<br />
supply section.<br />
Stock recard adjustment chart.<br />
b, Stock record cards were normally mnintained<br />
in c mnner as explsinrd by Q Fifteenth Amur Depot Commanaer:le<br />
"Stock record oards are filed by class nlphsbeti-<br />
cally within each clajs. All crndlt vouchers are ooneolldated<br />
on D daily mster voucher, which is a printed for&<br />
listj~iqall items in the snmc order as they pre filed in<br />
tho stock record cabintts. The business dcy runs from 0700<br />
to 0700, Wunntitlea urs posted to the master voucher 8s<br />
raquis'itiona 8rc3 fillcd. At the end of the business dag<br />
totals ere txtended for eech iten and only the total is<br />
postGd to tk stock rscord oord. This oDeratior. reduces<br />
the nur;ber of 7crsonnal posting stock records, as the cards<br />
ark posted only OnOe B day and the OOSthg to tho cards is<br />
dc4a in a consocutlve manner. Stcck record cards never<br />
fall behind issues by mre than twenty-four (24) hours.<br />
The mmtcr vouchar is Given the voucher number of the last<br />
credit voucher posted to it for reference purpose. This<br />
sa.m fora is used to pr6pi.m the ten (10)day stock status<br />
rcyorts and physic01 inventory reportsi1.<br />
0. Physical inventories varied within each army,<br />
but at laast one inventory per nonth was Mndatory, The<br />
Qxwlx"ster of the Ninth ?E<strong>Army</strong> prescribed that a permnent<br />
inventory Section be established acpot aotivitios<br />
roquired and thnt each tteu be physically Inventoried every<br />
two wesks.13<br />
169. Processing of Requisitions.<br />
a. Each army required tlmt raquisitions be pro-<br />
?brly propcred and oertifie?, and consolidated by the high-<br />
- 110 -<br />
B-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
R-E-S -T-R-I-C-T-Z-D<br />
er headquarters of the rec,uisitioning unit. Requisitions<br />
were edited at the aepot for the purpose of asoertaining<br />
their correotness and that the items requested were authorize&.<br />
The quantities of items were not questioned w-less<br />
they appeared excessive, but they were reduced as depot<br />
stocks required. The procedure fop submitting requisitions<br />
and drawing supplies varied among the armies, No depot<br />
schedules were established during the early mosths of operations<br />
in the European Theater of <strong>Operations</strong> with the result<br />
that when a stalemate was reached the depots were flooded<br />
with requisitions.l6 In January 1945 the Third TTB <strong>Army</strong><br />
established 8 drawing schedule for its units, and other<br />
armies adopted similar neaswes.5 Tho Ninth U3 <strong>Army</strong> required<br />
thet requisitions be submitted 211 hours in advsnce<br />
of drawing.19 Requisitions for controlled items were submitted<br />
to the <strong>Army</strong> <strong>Quartermaster</strong> for approval, and requewts<br />
for equipment in excess of authorized allowance and for<br />
Class IV supplies were submitted through oommand channeln.<br />
In the First <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong> all requisitions of divisions required<br />
the approval of the <strong>Army</strong> cuartermester, whereas smaller<br />
units were allowed to draw direct. Normally, however, depots<br />
were authorized to approve and process all rcquisitions<br />
for equipment within authorized allowanoes. All otliar<br />
requisitions required tho Dpproval of the Arm 9,uartermaster<br />
or his representativee.<br />
b. The variations in depot prooedures among the<br />
armies often proved a handicap to the combat units. The<br />
neoesstty for obtaininp the approval of the <strong>Army</strong> <strong>Quartermaster</strong>,<br />
who was normally located at some distahce from the<br />
depot caused n considerable delay. The <strong>Quartermaster</strong> of<br />
the 35th Infantry Division stated:2* Yfn one <strong>Army</strong>, supplies<br />
could be drawn daily, or as needed; in another, one<br />
day each week was designated, In one arw the requisition<br />
was submitted to the issuing depot and honored at that<br />
point, while in another army it was.necessary to submit<br />
the requisition to the <strong>Army</strong> <strong>Quartermaster</strong> for approval 48<br />
hours prior to drawing time. This plan caused a delay in<br />
replaoemant --It.<br />
170. Conclusions.<br />
STCTION lt<br />
CONGL<strong>US</strong>IONt3 AND FSCOMNBXDATIONS<br />
a. That throughout operations in the European<br />
Theater of <strong>Operations</strong> the taatl.ca1 situation normally dlo-<br />
tatad a low priority for Class I1 and IV supply. This<br />
priority, combined with the shortage of transportation,<br />
was normally too low to permit efficlezt operation and to<br />
insure ad6,qUato supply to the units when required. On those<br />
oooasione when the taotical situation permitted or required<br />
B higher Class XI and IV priority, the efficiency and speed<br />
of supnly increased in propartion,<br />
b. That different methods, procedures and sohedulas<br />
rogarding requisitiuning and drawing of supplies<br />
adopted by tho various srmies caused additiohal delay and<br />
oonf'usion among the combat troops.<br />
0. That the inclusson by axmy of Class TI and IV<br />
. 111 -<br />
9-E-S-T-R-I-C -T-E-D
R-E-S-T-R-1 -c -T-E+D<br />
supplies on the daily telegraIn wae unsatisfactory, aRd<br />
that the 20-day requisitioning period system, as finally<br />
developed, proved effective.<br />
d. That depot procedure, including recorcls and<br />
stock control measures, WBS as efficient as could be expected<br />
under the existing olroumstanoes.<br />
171. Reoommendations.<br />
a. That appropriate agencies of the !Per Department<br />
give further study to the fsasibllity of prescribing<br />
a standard procedure of army depot operatlona in regard to<br />
methods, policies end ,scheduling of units. That the procedure<br />
be so devised as to keep transportntlon, Qersonnel,<br />
movement, delay, and confusion to a minimum, and that it<br />
be published as a guide to mniy Cuartermstors.<br />
b. That the mathod prescribed by the War Deportment<br />
of calling forward Class I1 and IV supplies by the<br />
armies by means of requisition be further developed to indude<br />
the 20-day requisitioning period as outlined herain.<br />
- 112 -<br />
R-LWl'-R-I-C-T-B-D
R-X-5-T-R-I- C-T-E-D<br />
Bibliography<br />
Chaoter 12<br />
1. 12th hay Group <strong>Quartermaster</strong> "Final After Action Report".<br />
2. 6th krw Group G-4, trOffice Menorandm No. 13, -Standing<br />
Operating Procedure", dated 1 brch 1945.<br />
3. First DS Arw Group huartermaster, "Standing Operating<br />
?rocedurel~, 6 June lY45.<br />
4. Seventh <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong> kuartermastor section Wperations".<br />
5.<br />
Third <strong>US</strong> &my, tLBi?ter Action Report1'.<br />
6. Severith <strong>US</strong> himy Qmrtermustzr ftRocord of Events".<br />
7. 12th <strong>Army</strong> Group b&artermaxter "Memorandum for Recorcl",<br />
dated lY September 1944.<br />
8. Chcnge 2, 24 IWVeLnbCr 1944 to Eioadquartera 12th <strong>Army</strong> Group<br />
rlBtailding Operatine l'rooedurei', 18 October 1944.<br />
9. Headquarters 6th wmy Group, "hdministrntive Instructions<br />
x'o 519, dated 20 Kovember 1944.<br />
10. Letter, Seventh <strong>Army</strong> ,u&rteraastor to Bsech Group <strong>Quartermaster</strong>,<br />
subject: "Report of Inspeotio!Ilr, 26 nugust 1914.<br />
11. Seventh I3 amy 0,uartermaater YPoimqe Bid for reriod<br />
8-15 October 191+411.<br />
12. Piftuenth <strong>US</strong> wmy Quarternaster Wlass II and IV After<br />
Action Report", 31 July 1945.<br />
13<br />
Xinth <strong>US</strong> ~cqyuLi.artermster tistandard Operation procedures<br />
KO. 7, Glass I1 and IV Suppiyft, 7 December 1944.<br />
First <strong>US</strong> umy %tanding Operating Procedure for the<br />
Quirtermas ter Depot w.<br />
15- 30th Infantry DiviRion ''Kfter hetioil Report".<br />
16. XZX Corps, I1,9ter Hction Reportfr.<br />
3.7. %ai- Uepai-trrinl; Obsarvers tmwy Ground Forces Report No,<br />
323, W-4 Yopic List", 9 January 1945.<br />
18. War Degartnent Cbeervors Arnty Ground Forcos Report No.<br />
923, *vQuUnrteruastzr Depot Company, <strong>Supply</strong>", 10 May 1945.<br />
19. Ninth <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong>, "Administrative lnstruotions No. 2",<br />
4 January 1945.<br />
20. 35th Infantry Civision, flute2 kction Reportit.
172. Mission. The <strong>Quartermaster</strong> depot oompany, 'supply,<br />
is the amnative and teohnlcal udt for operating a<br />
<strong>Quartermaster</strong> supply depot other than motor transport and<br />
remount. It handles any partioular class of kuarter-<br />
meter supply 68 required ty the oiroumstanoes. Is aperate8<br />
as a unit in either the Cmunicaticns Zone or in the<br />
combat zone. It is designed to operate as an indapondent<br />
unit in oharge of H 3mtlll branoh dmot OP uncle: the control<br />
of a headquarters tind headquarters hcm_naby, -uLuortermaster<br />
base depot, fcr sub-depot operations at a .mjor huartermasmr<br />
brhnch depct. It can operate as separate plat0 ns,<br />
eaoh ElatOCn operating n soptlrhte kwt'tcmaster depot. P<br />
173 a Organization.<br />
a. The company is composed of E: company head-<br />
quarters which perPcrm the noma1 administrative, aess,<br />
and supply funotions for the company, and three operating<br />
platoons. Each of the three platoons is orgenized into<br />
two Sections: a depot headquarters section, coralsting of'<br />
one offioer and 17 erJ1sted mea; and a storage section,<br />
consisting of one officer and 33 enlisted men. The dopot<br />
hoodquarters scotion furnishes the personnel required to<br />
handle the clerioai work of the depot and mailitain the<br />
depot utilities. ,he Storage seotion f~imish6speraonnel<br />
for the receipt, storage, warehousing and issue of supplies.<br />
Normally, the oolrpany is orgunized alont oonmoditp lines,<br />
with eaoh platoon essigned to e partioular olaos or grouping<br />
of eupp~ies.2<br />
b. The tsblo of orgwization and equipment<br />
out;horized orly tko niniu.m 6mo.ut of personnel, trarsportation,<br />
and major i'cox3 of QgUigmc!lt, Thb o;cjOr itEll!S Of<br />
office equipsent, including 7cnyting and duplicating<br />
mchines, tyFWriCEr3, En? a 3CU yiind cepacity platform<br />
scale, are nor,r=:ljr nv!:'icienk for dapot opere.tions, lke<br />
company is no: r~;M.;e: c1.Q rid58 3ot have sufficient labor<br />
0rganios.llg tc hanc.ir ~1.1thc de3ot sup lies. With its<br />
normal caga-ity 'io sii?;,ly en2 mairitain f;10,000 moa under combet<br />
cocdS:iona, t!.b atfschment of one t uck oompany and two<br />
service companies is ncrmal1.v rc;uired. T<br />
SECTION 2<br />
EMPLOYMENT IN THE EUROPEAN Q W R OF OPERA5?IONs<br />
174.Communications Zone.<br />
a, The advanae planning for the troop basis Of<br />
depot supply companies in %uartermssteroperations on the<br />
The need<br />
continent raised several divergencies of opinion.<br />
- 111, -
R-E-S-T-R-I 4-T-E-D<br />
for dispersion and the looations of the troops had to be<br />
Considered a5 well 88 the rtted capacity of the company.<br />
The actual requirments Were estimated higher than the the-<br />
oretical r&te Tor the si26 O f the forces involved end it<br />
was decided that 37 companies would be recuired t; reoeive<br />
atore, and issue BartermaBter supplies for all general ani<br />
guartarmster branch depots.<br />
b. The company was normally utilized either by<br />
assignment to u headqrlurters and headquarters ccmpeny, Luartermster<br />
base depot, for sub-depot operations at a major<br />
~uextermaster branch depot, or by placing the compmy in<br />
ohfirge of an independent Uuartermastor depot, Cortrul m s<br />
exercised by the Wartermaster, Communications Zone, either<br />
direct, or through the advance, intermediate, or base sections<br />
to which the companies were cssigncd. In operating Communionticns<br />
Zone depots tho compunies ha dled Class 1, I1 and IO<br />
eupplius for as many cs ~OO,OOOmen.E<br />
175. Combat Zone.<br />
a. Bn allocation of depot supplg ooixpenies to the<br />
several amies, based on the rcted capacity of the om@ny,<br />
would huvo given each army nn average of fivo companies. Instead,<br />
6CCh army wa8 assigned two compcnles. That number<br />
proved sufficient.<br />
b. Employment of the comyaies varied to some extent<br />
within the ardes, although in generel the methods of<br />
employment missions, and functions were the some throughout.<br />
The company was the bnse fur supply operetiom of the r.rrj<br />
kuartcrmestc!r Service. It was used for the operation of the<br />
oimy Class 11 and IV depots, and in some ca8es for the cperction<br />
of Class 1 depots or dump$. Normclly, the aompany<br />
operated as a unit, but there were ocoasions when it was<br />
ntrcessnry to util.Lze individual platoons es separate operating<br />
units. hlthough Lhe dopat supply conpay was lloFmelly<br />
nssigncd to a &uai-tcrmustsr croup under army cofitrcl, th8<br />
standing oporstrng procedures of the various crmies placed<br />
the responsibility lor the efficient oparation of Glass I1<br />
an8 TV depots on the &my Qunrtttrmcster Class I1 and IB<br />
offioer. The kutk,-t.tclrra?ster goup cr bhttalion to which tbe<br />
COI, cony WLS ossigrwd creroised ndm'nistrative control cnly.<br />
<strong>Army</strong> rutaineci opori,tional control. 3 The company, operating<br />
as e unit and handling only Lllcss 11 and Iv supplies, supplied<br />
betweon 1.50,W0and 200,000 men. The kuartermaater<br />
of the 12th lsmy Group rclcommendad that tho Capacity of tho<br />
oompany for 0loc.s II and IV sup-dy be standerdized at<br />
150,000 troGps.b<br />
c. Th,: Firat CS m y normally operated one<br />
Cluss 11 and 1~depot., utilizing o m depof, snpply CGmpUy<br />
with ono or two sorvlco compnnics for labor. The second<br />
dopot company opcrr ted Cluss I &I ots with two to four<br />
scrvioo oompunida cttuohed for labor.? mira <strong>US</strong> &my<br />
employed ir;s two ccmFonios for 31cLss11 and IV supply, each<br />
operating n depot with one or two sorvlce companies attached.<br />
During cns phose of tho operetions, however, the two oompanics<br />
combincd to operate one d rct, but established subdepots<br />
Et Cl~ssI suppiy points.[. The Seventh <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong><br />
opsrcted only one Ulass I1 and. IV depot, with one service<br />
company attnched.9 The Ninth <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong> operated one Cless<br />
11 mind IT depot, utilizing one ooffipny rrfth .me or t7m<br />
service companies attucheci. When a second dopot oompany<br />
- 115 -
R-E-S-T-3-14 -T-E-D<br />
was assigned, it w ~ semployed in operating n Class I atorngc<br />
supply point, normally with three service cilmpanies ottnched.1°<br />
The Nfteenth <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong> employed OCE coqcny in the nporction<br />
of twc Class I1 and IV ciepots,. with one servico ocmpnny ottachtld<br />
to onch depot for lnbvr.<br />
d. The toble of crgcinizetion pr;vidcs for the<br />
attachment of one truck conipmiy to th6 uopot supply cnmp::ny<br />
for operht1uns;but due to the low priority givon to Clnss I1<br />
end IV supplies, the ormies were inclinsd ta allccstc all<br />
cvailcble transpcrtution fcr tho mctvcment of troop cnd<br />
other more vital chases of supply. Nbrmally, truck companics<br />
were nct attached to depots, and difficulty waa experieiiced<br />
by EL lack of transpoPtation when it became necessary to move<br />
the depct. The b,uartermaster, Third <strong>US</strong> amy, statea: f t O ~<br />
Class I1 situaticn would have been solved during the drive<br />
across France and into Germany if the depot su2ply coaywnies<br />
had been provided with trucks as a part of their regular<br />
equipment, The inclusion c;f l+8 trucks in each nf the<br />
above units will ffect a great improven!ent in Guarter-<br />
master supply."<br />
176 Me uac of Personnel and E ui ent. The organization<br />
AFC&* c~mpaiiiwas ade~hat~Cti enable it -<br />
to perform its mission.. DUQ to large scale supply<br />
operations in Comxmications Zone, the activities of the<br />
company when employed in the Communioaticns Zcnc were frequently<br />
limited. In the ac.mbat zone its functlcjns were<br />
diversified and many, The internal organization of the .<br />
oompany was freqliently changed to meet existing cunditions,<br />
but the most frequent and lasting ohange ms the assign-<br />
ment of paokers as checkers, due to the heavy demand in<br />
that line of work. A transportation section waa OlSO<br />
organized in a Fifteenth kr depot t G mintain all records<br />
on mail and truck shipments% l'hroughout the European<br />
Theater of <strong>Operations</strong> it was found that depot personnel arrived<br />
on the coritinent with insufficient trainin$ and there<br />
was llttle time for training after arrival, Outstanding<br />
deefioienoies inoluded lack of trained personnel to handle<br />
the txansporbation problems and the problem of handling<br />
peraonal affeots and baggee.13 The company had no organic<br />
materials handlick equipment, but the Comflunications Zone<br />
maintained a sufi'ioient stock in a certral bass depot from<br />
which the armies ilrew their requiremeots.lb<br />
SECTION 2.<br />
COWCL<strong>US</strong>IONS AND RfXCD!&EIQATIONS<br />
177. COnCl<strong>US</strong>iOnB.<br />
a. That the organization of the depot oompany,<br />
supply, 'is adequate end flexible.<br />
b, That the company was normally employed in<br />
the Buropaan Theater or <strong>Operations</strong> tc handle Class I and<br />
Class I1 and IV supplies.<br />
c. That the cmpany has insufficient transportation<br />
crganicaUy for normal routine recuiremnts in conneo-<br />
- 116 -<br />
R-E-8-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
tion with depot operationa.<br />
178. Reoommendatlona,<br />
R-E-8-T-R-I-C -3-E-D-<br />
a. That the <strong>Quartermaster</strong> Bepot Company, mgp>y,<br />
be rodeeignated w."noster depot supply cuapany.<br />
b. That the rated capacity for handling Class I1<br />
an& IV supplies be placed at l50,OOO troops.<br />
c. That aciditional transportation be assigned<br />
the company orgaLicaL2.y to eneble it to do normal dally<br />
routine haullng in connection with depot operations.<br />
a, That pertinent dootrines, techniques and Tables<br />
of Organization and Erruipment be amende6 by appiropriatr<br />
agencles'of the War Department.<br />
- A17 -<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
R-E-S-2-R-I-C-T-E-D<br />
Bibliography<br />
Ch&pter 13<br />
1. lield l&inual 10-10, <strong>Quartermaster</strong> Service in Theater of<br />
Oparatioss, 2 Xar 42.<br />
2. Technical hCanutl1 10-230, Depot Company, <strong>Supply</strong>, 24 July 43.<br />
3. Table of Orgerdzation and Equipment 10-227, 6 Sap 43. *(5)<br />
4.<br />
5.<br />
Comnioatione Zone kuartermaster Report on 'lQuarterm3ster<br />
Depot Sompany, Supj?lg".<br />
Fifteenth <strong>US</strong> unw <strong>Quartermaster</strong> Wlass I1 and IV -4ftor<br />
Action Report", 31 July 1945.<br />
6. 12th army Group 4$mrtermaster 93"nul After Action Rcportll.<br />
7. First <strong>Army</strong> ,ieekly &uartermoster Operntiona Report to 12th<br />
<strong>Army</strong> Group.<br />
6. Third <strong>Army</strong> Wpieklg &uarterm.stfx! Operatione Report to 12th<br />
<strong>Army</strong> Group. (8)<br />
9. War Department Observers Eoard Report 1 No. 834, 14 April<br />
1945.<br />
10. Ninth <strong>US</strong> Ariry kuartcrnaster <strong>Operations</strong> ReEcirt to 12th<br />
Aru;y Oroul,, (undated). *(9)<br />
11. Letter, Third <strong>US</strong> &PI Quartermster to the Theatsr <strong>Quartermaster</strong>,<br />
22 Sspt 1945, subject:%ome Ideas on <strong>Quartermaster</strong><br />
orgsnizctione." *(IO)<br />
12. War Dejwtizbnt Observers Arrry Ground Forces Report No.<br />
923, "Qunrtornaater Dept Cci?pl;ny, Surply", 10 ~ @y1945)s(6)<br />
13 M~coto PlYccenth <strong>US</strong> krroy Class II RC IV Officers, dated<br />
15 August 19L5, subject: VuIzmnts on Training of DcGot<br />
SuisLly Company.lf *(7)<br />
14 - Letter, Ikadquartors Corurunichtions Zone, 16 March 1945,<br />
subject:,tAllocntions end Requisition Procedure for<br />
Materials Hcndling Equipent .<br />
* Ktmblber in parentheses Ls Cotclog limber wed in<br />
Inventory of Material, Study No. 103, (Class I1<br />
& ly supply), file R 4o$E.<br />
- 118 -<br />
R-E-8-T-R-I-0-T-E-D
R-E-S-T-8-I-C -T-E-D<br />
CHAPTER 14<br />
BEACH MAIFTENANCE SEFS AND BEACH FOLLOW-UP SETS<br />
SECTION 1<br />
CHARACTJ5?ISTT.CS AND <strong>US</strong>E<br />
179. Bas1s.l In February 194k the Chief ~uartermest6r,<br />
Eurogeon TTZXer of <strong>Operations</strong>, in planning for D-D~Y,<br />
made arrangements with the <strong>Quartermaster</strong>, First iJnited<br />
States <strong>Army</strong>, for the shipment to the continent of Class<br />
I1 and IV supplies In sets which were to be amphibiously<br />
paoked. The plan called for the shipment of the initial<br />
supplies in sets that were to be skid-loaded, while the<br />
follow-up supplies would be shipped in composite sets.<br />
The inaintenmce during the early stages of tEo operation<br />
was to consist of <strong>Quartermaster</strong> items essential to combet<br />
and were to be gradually increassd in variety and quan-<br />
tity as the operation progressed and the requirenents for<br />
additional items arose. The plan was approved end placed<br />
into operation.<br />
180. Rescription and Composition.1<br />
e. Skid-loading may be defined as a method of<br />
loading in which the supplies are cratsd and mountad on<br />
skids or runners, similar to thQse of e. sled, which enables<br />
the load to be dragged or pulled over sandy terrain<br />
with conrporative eese. The skids keep the supplies off<br />
the ground, thereby ellmlnntin~ the possibility of dwge<br />
from ground water.<br />
b. Beaoh maintenance sets were composed of<br />
selected quantities of sPsentiel Class II and IV supplies<br />
loaded on akids, each set normally containing 23 skids,<br />
These supplies were sesembled, loaded and shipped as a<br />
cmposlta unit. Each set contalnad 75,000 man-days of<br />
supply which we8 sogregstod, insofar a8 possible, like<br />
oommodltles by skids. The londs were inaintalned on the<br />
skids by tle utilization of open cratss built onto the<br />
sklds. The supplies were safeguarded aqainst the elements<br />
by tarpaulins over tho crates for additional protection.<br />
?he beach mintenanoe set was therefore n composlte grouping<br />
or essential supplies, loaded for fast movement and<br />
segregated by commodities to fficilitote issue or Storage.<br />
c. Foll.ow-up maintenance sets were similar to<br />
ths beach maintenance sets, but were composed of a muoh<br />
wlder selection of items. They were not skid-loaded, but<br />
eaoh set contalned 450,000 man-days of supply.<br />
181. Preparetion of Sets,<br />
8, Approximately 61 beaoh maintenance sets were<br />
assembled et five different depots in the United Kingdom<br />
for delivery to the continent. The follow-up maintenance<br />
sets were also asseinbled in the sbme depots. Supplies<br />
were packed and shipped in oase lots if the difference<br />
between the case lots and the amounts require&were less<br />
than 10 percent either way.<br />
- 119 -<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
R-E-5-T-R-I-C-T -E-D<br />
b. A typical skid contained the following items:<br />
W.Pkgs. WEIGHT (lbs)<br />
Trousers,wool,OD 420 7 850<br />
Undorshirts,wool 400 4 325<br />
Wspenders,bslt 140 2 160<br />
Bag,canva$,field 50 1 103<br />
Batter ies ,hand,<br />
electric 180 2 3 50<br />
Candles 450 1 75<br />
special and _parfichutist clothing was included in every<br />
fifth set. Pturses clothing was pecked on every 20th set,<br />
and blank forms were on a single skid included in every<br />
fifth set.<br />
e. Skids were preFared for ond constructed under<br />
the following specifications:<br />
Average net wai.&t of skids 1,838.0 pounds<br />
Cubags per skid<br />
146.1 cubic feet<br />
Wet weight per set 31,943.0 poun&<br />
ship tons per set 84.0 ship tons<br />
These skids were top-hcevy cnd were difficult to handle;<br />
they should be designed so as to give o more balanced lo%d.2<br />
d. Several problems were encountered in the assembling<br />
and shipping of them sets, ana in view of the ahor-<br />
toga of time, immediate steps had to be taken to insure<br />
that the deadlines were met. The major problems inoluded:<br />
The design, construction, loading Cnd<br />
marking of the skids and crates; snd<br />
assembly of the required sets.<br />
Sagregstion of skids by set in the dspots.<br />
Inspection of all ohases of the program.<br />
Short supply of certain items.<br />
Late arrival in the Unitsd Kingdom of<br />
a few key itens from the United States.<br />
Establishment of Driorities between the<br />
skid loading program end the normal requirements<br />
of supplies for other purposes.<br />
Last minute rsquests from the Quartor-<br />
master, Plrst <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong>, for the inclusion<br />
of naw or additional itoms in the sfits,<br />
Throe depots were deslgnctsd to complete the construotiun<br />
of all skid crates and tc deliver them to the loading<br />
depots. qualified officcrs from the office of the Chid<br />
<strong>Quartermaster</strong> were dispatched to the depots to aid, sup-<br />
ervise an& coordinate the manufacturing, landing and assenbling<br />
of the sets in the order of their out-loading sched-<br />
ule. Oritiaal item were trucked fro& ports to depots<br />
and from depot to depot to complete the sets in the order<br />
of thoir calling up for shipment. Coordination WEB cffeotea<br />
bstwesn divi ~On8 the Office of th6 Chief Qyartermaster<br />
to establfsh pr or ties among the supplies.<br />
- 120 -<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I-C -T-E-D
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D<br />
SECTION 2<br />
OPEPATJON<br />
182. Amphibious Packin . In addition to and simultaneouely<br />
with the constru%lon of skid loads, preparations<br />
were made for the amphibious pocking of Classes I, 11 and<br />
Lv euppli6s for the period D plus 1b thmugh D plua 60.<br />
Inspection of the facilities for off-loading and the storage<br />
conditions on the continent immediately subsequent<br />
to D-Day reeulted in the dealsion to amphibiously pack fll1<br />
nuartermster supplies for t h e w through D plus 60,<br />
placing a heavy additional burden on the <strong>Quartermaster</strong> personnel<br />
and iacilities. Peaking and crating eohools had,<br />
however, already been established, pnckiw and crating<br />
supplies ware svailable, and 8 method of repsiri&q damaged<br />
or unserviceable containers agreed upon and plflced in<br />
effect. The containers were so constructed that they would<br />
be able to withstand over-the-beooh-handling, momentary<br />
Immersion, and at least 90 days of expoaed open storage<br />
without breakage or damage to the contents.<br />
183. Phasing of Maintenance Sets. The planned phasing<br />
of the sets a8 desired by the <strong>Quartermaster</strong>, First <strong>US</strong><br />
<strong>Army</strong>, and the shipments e.s actually made coincided very<br />
closely. Extremely rough weather in the early stages<br />
of the operation resulted fn a delay in the shipping of<br />
some of the seta as originally scheduled. Subsequent<br />
shipments, however, rectlfiea this lag and the sets were<br />
completely shipped by tha end of eaob period as plamed<br />
for particular type of sets. The planned shipping sched-<br />
ule for the beach maintenance ae s and the follow-up<br />
maintenance sets was as follows..P<br />
Beach Eainteance Sets.<br />
E% No. of Sets I& No. of Sets<br />
D plus 4<br />
0 plus 5<br />
D plus b<br />
D plus 7<br />
D plus 8<br />
D plus 9<br />
2<br />
3<br />
5<br />
5<br />
6<br />
D plus 10<br />
D plus 11<br />
D plus 12<br />
D plus 13<br />
D plus 14<br />
6<br />
! 7<br />
8<br />
Follow-up Maintenanoe Seta.<br />
Ex Na. of Sets m yo. of Sets<br />
n plus 15<br />
D plus 16<br />
D plua 17<br />
D QlU9 18<br />
D plus 19<br />
D plus 20<br />
1<br />
2<br />
2<br />
2<br />
2<br />
2<br />
n plus 21<br />
D plus 22<br />
D plus 23<br />
through D<br />
plus 4.1<br />
2<br />
0<br />
1 each day<br />
184. Qesults,<br />
a. The utilization of the maintenance sets for<br />
shipping supplies across the beaohes was a oomplete succesa.<br />
The contents were carefully selected by the <strong>Quartermaster</strong>,<br />
First <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong>, and the Chief Quartermester. The sets were<br />
brought to the beaohes under the control of the Firat <strong>US</strong><br />
Arny lramedlately following the assaults. Issues wzre made<br />
- 121 -
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D<br />
to the troops without fo$vial requisition or depot procedures,<br />
Remining atooks eventually collected and proces6ed<br />
into depots where they were augmented by the bulk shipments<br />
that followed.3<br />
b. In a report on the operation, the Commanding<br />
General, First TJS <strong>Army</strong>, stated:&<br />
"It has been previously stated, for the first<br />
ten days the 9,uarteraaster Class I1 & IV sup- I<br />
plies which arrived on the continent were in<br />
the form of Beeoh Maintenance Bets. The possession<br />
of these sets WRB quite adequate to<br />
this end. No requisitions for any item contained<br />
in these sets were turned away; on the<br />
other hand, 00 lsr e surpluses accumulated<br />
at any time, The ftems which they oontsined<br />
were esRential rother than ornaments1 and the<br />
factors were accurate. Considering the conservdtion<br />
of aupnlies and tonnage which was<br />
ePfeotaa by the use of these ssts, it is<br />
considered that the& design was one of the<br />
fhighllxhtsf of the entire operation".<br />
c. The difficulties encountered through the declsion<br />
to amphibiously pack all supplies for the period<br />
through plus 90 were overcame by htilizing the faoilitiea<br />
of all aepots in the C'nlted Kingdom on this work. Supplies<br />
were aistributed among de-pots as required. Personnel of<br />
depots not familiar with mphibioue packing were given<br />
speoiel instruotions in wp.torproofing supplles. Close<br />
liaison was maintainea throughout. The mission we5 acoomplishad,<br />
with only s am11 amount of tonnage shipped to<br />
tho oontinect without being amDhibioiisly paoked.<br />
SECTION 3<br />
COPTCUJSIONS AM) RECOMfENDATIONS<br />
185, Conclusions .<br />
a, That the use of beach maintennnae sets nn4<br />
follow-uD maintenance sets in the aly stages of lending<br />
operations on the continent and the amnhibious paolting of<br />
all sunplies proved of definite value.<br />
b. That no aaprecioble qunntities of supplies<br />
hed to be shipped over to mqplement the sets.<br />
186, Feoammendntions,<br />
a. That beach mainteaohco and besoh folloW-up<br />
sets be utilize& in tho early stages 2f Suture amphibious<br />
operqtions.
R-E-S-T-2-I-C-T-E-D<br />
Bibliography<br />
Chapter 12c<br />
1. Topic No. 37, Headquarters, Theater Service Forcea,<br />
European Theater, Office of the Chief ?uartermaster,<br />
subjeot: "<strong>Supply</strong> Planning for Continental Operntionsn.<br />
(Inrormal Study for General Board Use.) *(20)<br />
2, Fq TsFET, OTCQf, Ltr, subject: tfCommentsof Q!4 8Upply<br />
studyvt, dsted 13 December 1945. *(27)<br />
3. 12th <strong>Army</strong> Group Quartermeeter "Final After Actiou<br />
neport", *( 21)<br />
4. ?eport on <strong>Operations</strong>, First <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong>, Annex 12-14,<br />
Section 111, l,The <strong>Operations</strong>",<br />
*Nunher in pcreptheses is Catalog Number used in<br />
Inventory Of Matbl'ial, 91 Study NG. 109, (UlaSS<br />
I1 & N <strong>Supply</strong>), file R &OI./ll.<br />
- 123 -<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
187. Allmances. The iqltial allowances of individual<br />
and OrganiZational alothlng and equipent, as presoribed by<br />
the War Department, are contained In appopkate tables of<br />
organization and equipment, tables of basic allowanaes, and<br />
table of equipment number 21.l The Canananding General, aro<br />
ean Theater or OperatLons, authorized and published from<br />
tine to time speoial aliowances, in addition to those presorib-<br />
ed by the Uar Departmept, for troops in the European Theater<br />
of <strong>Operations</strong>. Requests for additional Items, or for items<br />
in excees of authorized allowanoes, were eubmitted through<br />
oommand oharmeLs to the Colrmaa&inLGeneral, Communications<br />
zone, for approval prior to issue.2<br />
quacy of Allowanoes, The allowances a6 pesorib-<br />
Department and as modiried in the i3uropean Theater<br />
of 0 erations were generally adequate, .There was a need<br />
for specfa1 it- required by speoial types of personnel suoh<br />
as armored, airborne, and tank destroyer, and in addition, a<br />
definite need for winter clothing. mny items of olothing and<br />
equipment were in critical‘short supply at various thes due<br />
to low priority. enemy aotion or to Laok of supply disaipline,<br />
Some item were ooneietently in short supply, whioh indloated<br />
either that the initial tqllowanoe wa8 too low or that produo-<br />
tion or rei?eh facilities were inadequete. The most outstan&<br />
ing oi these items were:3<br />
Outfits, aookiq, one burner<br />
Outfits, oookim& two burner<br />
Outfits, aooking, 20-man<br />
Field “34<br />
Heater, water, immersion tyye<br />
lkieess equipment, all tirpes<br />
Tentage<br />
Certaic items of combat aZothinG<br />
“anter QlOthiq<br />
Medessinc: equigment was often in short supply beaause bring<br />
oambat operatione ults Were frequently split up into smaller<br />
detaohments OP oombat groups. Organimtional allowances were<br />
not adequate to permit the iesuanoe of this tne of equipment<br />
to them detachments, Thia wa8 esgeoially notable among Mllitary<br />
Polioe an8 similar unite whioh operated in small groups.4<br />
Speoial and non-tariff sizes of olothing ~nbfootwear were ot’ten<br />
dirrlault to cbtain in army areaa, althou there were eufi&-<br />
oient stoaks oa the oontlnent. Units were u l t ~ t d author- l ~ ~<br />
ized t o draw sgeoial and non-tarfif size olothisg ahd footwear<br />
for storage in unit supply for issue as required.<br />
- 124 -<br />
A-E-8-T-R-I4 -T-E-D
R-E-S-T-3-I-C-T-E-D<br />
189. Classes of Clothing and Equipment.5 Clothi- and<br />
equipment W88 classified in the European Theater of <strong>Operations</strong><br />
in tie order of serviceability into four categories as fallws:<br />
a. Class A olothink and ec,uipment included all Iiew<br />
items and thos- were sliEhtly used but not substantially<br />
aistinguishable frm new.<br />
b. Class B Included that which, althoueh not new or<br />
Glass A, still-ed combat serviceabiiity.<br />
0. Class C incluaed tb.& which could be made combat<br />
servioeable by-ation and repair.<br />
d. Class X included that which was usable but did<br />
not kVe combamceability for extended field use, Clcthin&<br />
aud equipment was segregated and issued by classes in<br />
order t o Obtain the maximum use of supplies on hand.<br />
190. Maintenanoe.3<br />
a. It was the responsibility of each soldier to<br />
maintain, bg normal care, the clothin& antl ekuipment issued to<br />
him. Susply discipline extended through all echelons and<br />
proper oare and miatenanoe was a command responsibility.<br />
QUartenn"aQr laundry and repair units while not always easily<br />
accessible to ombat troops, were avaiiable and provided<br />
aleaningj and repair service.<br />
b. Three salvage repair oompanies were normally<br />
provided for eaoh army. They proved adequate for the repair<br />
of shoes, although they did not meet expectations in the repair<br />
of other types of <strong>Quartermaster</strong> ecpiptlent, Shoes were<br />
tagged with the individual's name, rank, serial number and<br />
organization to insure return to the original mer. Repair<br />
of tentage and webbinE was abeguate, but laok of spare parts<br />
and proper facilities seriously hlndered the proper mintenanoe<br />
of items suoh as Inmereion type heaters, tYpwriters,<br />
mea8 equipment, and on6 and two burner StOVeS.<br />
191. Substitution and Elimination.<br />
a. In order to increase production and ausply of<br />
Quuflrtemstar item which proved more satlsfaatory ana essential<br />
than the othcrs, a study was madu to eliminate as many<br />
of tho lees satisfactory and non-cssantial items as gosslble.<br />
Items considered for elinination wera those whioh, although<br />
eliminated, would produce the least detriment to the success<br />
of future opera ions. They were divided into the following<br />
two categories: t<br />
(1) !Phose itens wliioh would be non-essential<br />
from a tochnical viewpoint.<br />
(2) oarmanly used items which recorda revealed<br />
to be in slight or decreased demandr<br />
b. The matter of eliminating non-essential items<br />
was of extreme importance to the owbat foross, It was appareat<br />
to Suprome Headquarters, European Theatsr of <strong>Operations</strong>,<br />
that oqntinued production and supply from the United States<br />
of all items being used in the European Theater was bpractioablo,<br />
and that in order to provide suffioient quantities of<br />
__ . .<br />
- 125 -<br />
R-IF-9-I-R-1-0-T-E-D
R-E-8-T-R-I-C -T-E-D<br />
the moat needed itdms the eliminatiou of non-essential itas<br />
waa necessary. The British Arm, for example, adopted tho basic<br />
fundamental prlnci3ltrs of qimplicity and uniformity at<br />
the beginning of thtr war. Consccuontly the British uniform<br />
for all components of tho mmy, which consistd basioally of<br />
only 11 itoms, remained unohanged throughout five and onchali<br />
yeors of combat.<br />
C. As a result of a study diructed by Supreme Huadquarters,<br />
Eurogean Theater of Operatione, thu 6th and 12th<br />
<strong>Army</strong> Groups mado tht; followinL recommbndations:<br />
-Item 6th <strong>Arms</strong> Groug _I_ 12th <strong>Army</strong> Groq<br />
Clothing, Bakera & Cooks Elhlnato Zliainato<br />
Casa, Canvas Dispatch Eliminate Eliminate<br />
Chinawaro Procurable locally No oolnment<br />
Enamulwarer Procurablo looally No c mnt<br />
Stove, cookini 2 burner Eliminate Retain<br />
Dubbing, 4 oz c@n Is~ue2 oa can only Issuc 2 oz<br />
oan only<br />
Tent, Pyramidal Subatituto, Tent Retain<br />
squad<br />
Tent, Wall, mall Substitute, Tent Retaip<br />
squad<br />
Tent, Kitohen, Flyproof Substitute, Tent Retain<br />
Squad<br />
d. Surve;s were conducted throqhout the field<br />
forces to furthor determine bossiblc sources of blinlnation<br />
or substitution. The survey6 indicated the following:<br />
(1) Poncho was desirable a8 6n issw item.7<br />
(2) Lekgings were uneatisfflctorj. and disliked.<br />
(3) Overcoat was often<br />
(4) Combat boot with tk revarst! leathar aoaked<br />
up water and was 00113.7<br />
(5) Rainaoats were unaatiafeotory duo to lack<br />
of uniformity in sizes and maturiale.9<br />
(6) The cushion sola sock was in ereat denam3<br />
since it was warm and conlfortablc and the<br />
new type did not shrink vfhhun vrciehed.7<br />
(7) Leather palmed glove did not last. Thc<br />
glove shell, leethor with insert was fer<br />
more satisfactory and recommbnded as a mb--<br />
StitUtQ-7<br />
(8) Pile jackat waa popular,<br />
outer garments were not<br />
resistant and water repellent.<br />
- 126 -<br />
R-E-8-T-R-14-T-E-D
R-E -5-T-€3-I-C-T-E-D<br />
e. A board of officers convened at Headquarters<br />
<strong>Army</strong> Ground Forces, ',cshington, D.C., in August 1941, t o Stiicly<br />
the equipmnt of the post war army. T is board considered<br />
the fumy rsquirements in all theatera.50 Its Tindings were<br />
benerhlljr similar t o those in th8 European Theater. The<br />
bosrd reconiiended that outer clothing he developed which<br />
would provide an adequate uniforn; for dres8, combat and rat-<br />
igce, This uniform wt1s to conslst of a meximum of general<br />
purpose farulents for issue to the greatest number af troops<br />
possible. The board racomended further that researoh con-<br />
tinue to iil.prove the type, quality snd characteristics of<br />
clothing anu equipment,<br />
,mCTION 2<br />
WINTER CLOTHING~~<br />
192.Problem Involved. During the three yeor period in<br />
Europzan Theater of <strong>Operations</strong> efforts were cansjstently made<br />
to dovelop a winter combat uniforrr, suitable for 6ll troops under<br />
the clFmaLio conditions prevailing. Different types of uniforms,<br />
incluaing 70 different basic items, vvere issued. The<br />
suggly and aistribution problem was almost insurmountable.<br />
dul,b3.y W ~ Ynot adequfite, and conbat troops were not aaequately<br />
clothed for winter. The Jarmanding kneral, European Theater<br />
of <strong>Operations</strong>, therefore called a conference on 29 Jsnuary 1945,<br />
for the purpose of eliminating unsatisfactory items and de-<br />
tarminine, upon a single winter combat uniforo. suitable for ell<br />
oomponents. Representatives of the Jhief kuarterirmter, the<br />
12th <strong>Army</strong> Group, the 6th amy Group, the ;uarterniaster Air<br />
oerviae Gomano, the War Produotion Board, end other trgenoies<br />
were preser.t at both Lhe initial conference and at the final<br />
conference Iield in March 1945. The vErious items of uniforru<br />
were discussed snd studied in detail, and ths final recomen-<br />
dations adopted by the conferenoe are a3 followe:<br />
a. Jaokets. Of the six different tyies of jackets<br />
issued durin;s c hater of 19b!+-l+5, only two vwre reclomenbed<br />
to be retained:<br />
(1) Jacket, field wool - 1 per individual.<br />
(2) Jacket, combst winter, with hood - 1 per<br />
individual.<br />
It was reccn.n*ended that the combat jaoket be modified to include<br />
breast pockets, and that the outer fabric be Kade of'<br />
tough, wind resistant an8 water repellent material.<br />
b. Yrousers. Of the seven types OT trousers issued,<br />
only two were reco;LLen8ed to be retained:<br />
(1) Trousers, vool 18 oz - 2 par individual.<br />
(2) Trousers, oonbat winter - 1 per individual.<br />
It whs rocom;endea that the combat trouser be made tougher,<br />
more kin6 resistnnt an6 water repellent, and thht it be ~r,od.ified<br />
to include oargo pookets.<br />
c. Underwear and Shirts- That woolen underwear<br />
Elsd flannel sdrts were considered generally satisfactory.<br />
It wan recouienaed, however, that all $bee garments be<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
R-'T-9-T-R-I -C -T-X-D<br />
treated for shrinkage rssistanoe and that the wool content OT<br />
the underwear be increased to a ininimm of 50 yercent. In<br />
order to reduoe the problem of Suuply it was also i-ecm"mnded<br />
Cat underwear be sized only as small, medium and laree.<br />
d. Boad ear. That the cap, field, cotton, with<br />
visor, be i'eta& all others be eliminated.<br />
e. Gloves. That the alove, wool, leather palm,<br />
%meunsatisfacFyTor use in the European Theater of OperatLons,<br />
md that the mitten, trigcer finpar with insert, was<br />
suitable far o~lya smll percentage of troops. It was therefore<br />
recomended to eliminate all but t'ne rollowing three items:<br />
owing:<br />
(1) Glove, shell, leather - 1 per individual<br />
(2) Glove, insert, wool - 2 per individual<br />
(3) Glove, leather, henvy - 2 per truck driver<br />
or individual performini;<br />
'manual labor.<br />
f. Footwear. Tht Footwear be limited to the foll-<br />
(1) Roots, service combat<br />
(ivoaified)<br />
- 1 per individual<br />
(2) Shoapaos or overshoes - 1 per individual<br />
( 3) soclrs, wool, C~~.S~~.Oll - 3 per individual<br />
sole.<br />
(4)<br />
Socks, wool, heavy or - 3 per individual<br />
Y~001,Ski.<br />
x, Overcoats aild-Raincoats. That a soldier in COR-<br />
bat, clothad arrecucKiende3, woi.ilC! nit require an overcoat,<br />
but would require Iro'cectinn from rain. Troops on furlougi,<br />
and those eiiEaged on sentry duty or in sedentary activities,<br />
rrould require adklitioual warmth. It was therefore recomendod<br />
that, such issues be iwstricted to one nylon poncho an2 one<br />
trcnohcoat per indiriidual.<br />
h; Bwoater.. It was unanirnously agraad to retain<br />
the sweatcr, hi& neck, and to issuo !t on the basj.3 of 0110<br />
per individual.<br />
i, Miscellaneous, That raiucel.laneous itom 3uch a8<br />
trousur suspcnaors aiid-EZTlers be eliminated but that tho<br />
sleepinR bag and two v?ool blankets per individual he Tetaincd.<br />
193. Rasults. Tho adoption of. elm rucoinuended wintor uaiform<br />
would provide a sultable uniform for troops in the<br />
Rurqean and. otbcr theaters with aiiilller elimtiD conditions,<br />
It would sirqlio su'gply and distribution, eliminate 21 itenis<br />
currently issued, reduce tho nuber of roquired sizes by 59,<br />
and re:ucz. thc nuuber of basic fabrics fra! ton to four. By<br />
tho a8ditfon of a nacktio and a wool garrison cap, it could be<br />
converted to a non-combat uniform which would measure up to a<br />
high standard 02 military uppearanco. For spocinl opcratlons<br />
01- tinusual conditions thc unlform mi@ roquiro additions, but<br />
no ohangos, For ejrmple, snow caniouflago could bo quickly proridod<br />
13jr tbc addition of trousers, parkas and mittens, over whit6.<br />
- 128 -<br />
R-E-5-T-EL-I-C-T-Z-D
194. Conclusions.<br />
R-E-94-R-I-C -T-E-D<br />
SECTION 3<br />
COXCL<strong>US</strong>IONS AND REcOMbW3ATIONS<br />
a. That the clothing and equipment, and allowances<br />
were generally satisfactory, but there were too<br />
many items to insure proper supply and distribution.<br />
b. That there is 8 definite need for a basic<br />
uniform and for continued research and development to<br />
develop better and more adaptable clothing and equipment.<br />
195. Recommendations.<br />
a, That aUaSi0 combat, dress and fatigue uniform<br />
be adopted for all components of the <strong>Army</strong>. The combat<br />
uniform to consist of the followine:<br />
Steel helmet, liner and cap, field,<br />
cotton.<br />
Combat aliirt and trousers (one light<br />
wool oombinafioa and a heavier wool<br />
fabric for cold weather. Same standard<br />
color for both).<br />
Combat boot s.<br />
Underwear and socks of a high wool content<br />
for winter; ootton for summer.<br />
Muffler and highneck Sweater..<br />
Overcoat of the trench coat type.<br />
b. That research and develop” continue towardtr<br />
the development of better and more adaptable clothing and<br />
equipment,<br />
c. That the recummendations mBe by the Board<br />
of Officers convened at Heedquarters <strong>Army</strong> Ground Forces,<br />
Vashington, D.C., in August 1944, to study the eQuipment<br />
of the post war army be genarally aoaeptad.<br />
- 129 -<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D<br />
Biblioeraphy<br />
Chaptcr 15<br />
1. AR 615-40, Sec I, Far la and b, Par 2.<br />
2. Qh; Technical CLr Ltr, No. 19, 16 March 1.945. *(22.)<br />
3. 12th <strong>Army</strong> Group SOP. *(23)<br />
4. Kq TMET, OTCQ;, Ltr, subject: Qomcnts on qt: <strong>Supply</strong><br />
stuay~~,<br />
aatLa 13 D ~ C45.<br />
5.<br />
Hq Com 2, dT0, TLchnical Kaiiual Uo. 2, Dec-%bor 1944.<br />
6. SSgdP Cmittce vn Dolotion of lJon-$ssontial Itons.*j24)<br />
7. AGGPReport PTO. 786, 7 ~pr45.<br />
8. ,fD Observcrs Riport No. 677, 23 Feb L+5. *(25)<br />
9. AGF Ruport Eo. 4E7, 2 Jan 45. *(2G)<br />
10. Scvath <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong> Quarttrnmstw Vonnage Bid for Puriod<br />
8-15 Oct 4.b".<br />
11. Lkjnorandum, subject : ".linter Uniformif, to the Quartermastdr<br />
General t-b.ou&,hthe Sur&eon, 5uroyoan Thuatcr of<br />
Opuratione, from thc; Chief Quartormastar, Iiwadquarters,<br />
Communioations Zone, dat;ed 9 Kay 19b.5.<br />
*Number in psrentheses is Catalog Number used in Inventory<br />
of Malntorinl, GI SWdy No. 109, (Closs I1 &, IV<br />
supply), file R 401/11.<br />
- 130 -<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
3-E-S-T-B-14-T -E-D<br />
WARTERNASTER SALES 0,PERATTONS<br />
SGTION 1<br />
QUA~FRWSTER SALES COXPANY, T/O k E 10-152<br />
196. Xission Prescribed and Actual. The Qusrtermster<br />
seles company was designed to make available for sele to<br />
officers only, certain-items of clothing and unlform<br />
aocesories and to sell certain merchandise such a post<br />
exchange items to both enlisted men and Actually,<br />
it sola items of clothing and equipmeat to offioers,<br />
nurses, officers cf the Vomen's <strong>Army</strong> Corps, civilians of<br />
officer status, end authorized Allied officers. The distribution<br />
and sale of p st exchange item were handled<br />
thrcugh other ohnnnels.q Tho company operated both in<br />
the combat zone and in the Conmunications Xoncs, establishiug<br />
I: static store as ti base find dispatching mobile<br />
stores to othw nreas.3<br />
107. Orgtmiaatm.<br />
a. The company is composed of R comFany headqmrters<br />
and three operating platoons. EEoh platoon in<br />
turn is organized into four operating sections. Tech<br />
seotion is capable of 'ndependont action and has a Cap.olty<br />
of 10,000 troops.i Its nobility Is restrioted to<br />
the cne truck And trailer author1 ed for thc tronsyortation<br />
OI both nersonnel and sto0k.t The company is flexible,<br />
but tho momt of stmk thet cun La carriad is<br />
limited and short of normal requirements.5<br />
b. The ccxpnny headquortors narformed the usual<br />
administrat,ive and housekeepinq functions for the company<br />
as E Wholc, sunerviaod the sales activities end handled<br />
the oroperty and noney accounts of the operating platoons<br />
snd sections.3<br />
198. Experience in the hbropean Theater 3f <strong>Operations</strong>.<br />
o, Troop Easis. The troop basis for the mssignmnt<br />
cP tke salgs company durinR <strong>Operations</strong> was two plntoons<br />
Der army. During the initial phases of operation<br />
on the continent sales companies ware not avciloble in<br />
sufficient number for such an allocation, end front line<br />
unitn inveyiobly reportod that no sales friOilitlb6 were<br />
zvellable. Even le,ter, when sufficient numbcrs were<br />
iivalleblo, it was found thnt the allocation was inad quste<br />
ard that et least one company per army was required. 3<br />
b. 0 erntion, In the oombat zone the rssponsibility<br />
for t h b n t operotion of the Sales unlt rested<br />
with the <strong>Army</strong> Class I1 and TV officer. Administretive control<br />
WEB exercised by the bzttsllon or group to which the<br />
unit was assigned. The general method Cf amploymcnt In<br />
eaelI army, with the two platoons assign6d, was to establish<br />
a static store operated by one plitoon, ana GO dlspntoh<br />
a mobile store, operated by the remaining pletoon,<br />
to the outlyinq units. This mobile unit, by utillaing the<br />
transportation of both pletoons and therefore carrying a<br />
- 131 -<br />
B-E-5-T-R- I-0-T-E-R
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D<br />
larger stock than would otherwise have been poasible, visited<br />
division, corps and army ereas. The platoon operating<br />
the static store was ordinarily Installed in or near the<br />
arq depot area, making sa 8s and Drocuring and storing<br />
stock for the mobile unit.' The oporation within the<br />
Communications Sone Was shiler, with the exception that<br />
the majority of storos were more or less static, and that<br />
in more permanont installations,, permanent or smi-permnent<br />
stores were established, The CormKlnding gensrels<br />
of secticns were authorized to establish and close snles<br />
stores as- required upon approve1 of the Chief Q,uwtermnster.7<br />
SECTION 2<br />
SALES STORE OPEIULTIOlJS<br />
199. Operating Units End Parsonnel. The c)uartermoster<br />
seles company sns the nucleus for the OperfitiOn of sales<br />
stores on the continent. Civilians were generally hired<br />
6s clerks to assist in the operntion of the large statio<br />
installations. Occsslonally, provisional sales units ware<br />
orgenized within comhet units to augnent the c$artermeater<br />
sales Store facilities. The 1st Infentry Division dcvaloped<br />
an organization which mdu purchases from the army<br />
seles store on a OOhSOl~dtIted diviaion order, and then<br />
broke down tbc items to unit supply officrjrs for r snle<br />
to the officers of their respective organizations. B<br />
200. Sales ?rocedurvs and Accounti ,9 Sales procedure,<br />
accountability,. and the appointment of2alc.8 off lcers are<br />
covered in appropriato '&r Dcpertmsnt regulations. The<br />
procedures in the European Theater of Operetions generally<br />
followed these re@letions, and were mrther covered by<br />
regulptions pu lisbad in circulcrs of the ruropean Theater<br />
of oDerations.4 Sales offioers were anpointed, bondcd,<br />
and made financially nccountable. The accounts were subject<br />
to monthly cudit by the Sales Audit Division. Normal<br />
prooedures were followed in sales inventories, daposits<br />
of funds, end adjustment of accounts.<br />
201. Procurement of Stocks.7 Pequisitions for sales<br />
Storm itoms -#ere subdnitted to the Chief ?,uartsl.a&stor by<br />
each section Qunrtermastor not leter thnn the 20th of each<br />
month for the followin& month's requirements. The Quertermastor<br />
of the Advance Saction included the requirements<br />
of the armies in his requisitions. Based on thc above<br />
requisitions, credits were astublished at the assignEd<br />
depots in the form of credit letters issued to Section Quuertermsters<br />
by the Chief Quartermster. At the end of tho<br />
perlod unused credits were nutomatically cancelled.<br />
202. Rationin .? Rationing gf sales store itens wos<br />
set up aa-a meas$e to secure more equitnble distribution<br />
of items in short supply. Ration curds were issued to<br />
thuss eligible to make purchases. If, in thc judgment of<br />
the Chief Pwrteraaster, the supply situation required,<br />
he could increaae or decrecse the ration; make special<br />
distribution of rationed items without reference to the<br />
rp-tion card; suspend rationing on any prticiilar item or<br />
Items; and clnssifg sales, varying th6 ration by type OS<br />
purchases to secure D more equitable distribution of the<br />
avail~able supply to all personnel authorized to purchese.<br />
- 132 -
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D<br />
Beoause of limited transporteticn hcilitics on tho continent,<br />
it WLLS extremely dlffL0ul.t to maintain balanaed<br />
stooks in ull 7,uunrtermaster sales facilities. hies<br />
Officers Could reduce the established rations oonsietent<br />
with existing stooks to aohievs an equitable distribution<br />
of supplies.<br />
203. Prices.10 Thc gelling price or all item was at<br />
oost plus- lxroent overhead. The price list of all<br />
wles items was published by the Office of the Chief quusrtermster<br />
frm t he to time, and all mioes listed inoludsd<br />
the OVQrheQd.<br />
204. dditional Servioes Rendered. 8916s stores 7uer6<br />
normqlly tot set up to.rendar additional servioes such as<br />
t61loring and shoe repair. Tailoring eervioe was smetimes<br />
given in lnrge or statio installstions where oivillan labor<br />
and fecilitia aermitte8. Shoe repeir servioa was also<br />
given in some case6 by errangement with a nearby Salvage<br />
repDir unit. Shoes were eooepted at the sales store, t ake<br />
to the repair unit, md generally returned within a wsek.<br />
PriCee cbarged were governed by appropriate War Dopartnent<br />
Circularsa<br />
205, conciusions.<br />
SECTION 3<br />
CONCL<strong>US</strong>XCNS AND RECOB~aATfON3<br />
a. That the sales company is a flexible and<br />
oPiloient unit, but laoks the neoeesary transportation<br />
to aarry the required amount of stook.<br />
b. mhtlt its mission in the Zuropean Theater of<br />
<strong>Operations</strong> was to operate as an offioePs a:.les store for<br />
the eale of olothing and non-issuc equipment,<br />
c. That the ellooation of two platoons per arniy<br />
was Lnadequete.<br />
206. Reoonmendations.<br />
a. That the sales company be made more mobile<br />
by ths organic assignment of additional t~anspcrtatian.<br />
b. That provisions be made for tailoring and for<br />
shoe remir servtce within the company.<br />
c. Thst pertinent doatrlnes, teohniques and<br />
Tebles of Ormnieation end Fpuipnent b6 amended by appropriete<br />
agencies of the'%r 'Oeportment .<br />
- 133 -<br />
R-E-S-T -R-14-T-B-D
11 PE! 10-5, QM Oaerotiona, 29 April 1943.<br />
2. 12th <strong>Army</strong> Group Study, tt<strong>Quartermaster</strong> sales Compmyii. *(12)<br />
3. Field Manuel 10-10 , Zuortsrmaster Service in Theater of<br />
Operntions, 2 March 1945.<br />
4. T/O & F: 10-157, 28 May 1943. *(13)<br />
5.<br />
aifteenth <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong> <strong>Quartermaster</strong> t'Class 11 and TV AftQr<br />
Action Report!', 31 July 1945.<br />
6. L2th <strong>Army</strong> Group <strong>Quartermaster</strong> t'Fina1 After pction Report".<br />
(14)<br />
7. qi Technical Cir Ztr, Wo. 14, Hq Con ?one, ETO, O CW,<br />
24 March 1945. *(11)<br />
8. 1st Infantry nivision, "After Action Report". *(15)<br />
9. Hq ETQIJSA Cir No. 16, 23 April 1915. *(16)<br />
10. Office of the Flscal Ufrector, Ssles Audit Branch, ETO,<br />
Ltr to all sales officers, BTO<strong>US</strong>A, subjcot: ~Inllortermaster<br />
Salas store hcoounts", 1 July 1944. *(17)<br />
11. Ninth <strong>US</strong> euy flQuaPtormastor Salt6 store <strong>Operations</strong>t?. *(18)<br />
* Number in perentheses La Catelog Wumbcr uprd in<br />
Inventory of Material, QJl Study No. 109, (Glass I1<br />
& IV <strong>Supply</strong>), file R LOl/ll.<br />
- 134 -<br />
R-E-S -T-R -I-C -T-E-D
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D<br />
-<br />
-PART FIX3<br />
,uZASS I11 bXTX?LY<br />
SECTION 1<br />
INTROWOTI:ON<br />
B. The Victul'i(ius strategy und tfictics of<br />
.;~rldi r u I1 were Ltiacd cn, Lnd ciependent upon, obr<br />
bbllity to subply Our mechanized forces GI. larid, sea<br />
and tdr xith petrolem, oil f.ad LubrioGrits.<br />
b. To provide the fuel rjctceesary to opereto<br />
the vWt clzcurculcticn uf mecheniaecj transport, the oil<br />
ir,austrg iu the Clnited Statas of imerica had to cxpand<br />
ln size, kn~dedge and tecrvlique at an equal pace with<br />
the mchmizction uo that a constant an0 deimidable supkly<br />
of this ell ikportant product wauld ulways be .wailable<br />
iii the quality mil quantities desired. It w w the e;jpliuatio:r<br />
in tirue of war of the experience an6 n.:etbods davelopd<br />
ia t h e ai peace by the oil induetry in the G.~IIU-<br />
Pxtwe cmi xian3portation or ptrolauo: products that<br />
nEl.5 €i<br />
Great factor in r!.alcint it possible for lis to cruah<br />
our eneales puickly ana with n prepnderaooe of uechauized<br />
Ii?.@lt.<br />
c. An Arn;y-%rvy Yetroleurn Board v!aq creesed<br />
by the Joiii't J-hiefs af Ztalf in ;laahlr&tou to asaen:bla<br />
3itish hird mierican reguifaiKents In every theater of<br />
olerations and to nrrnn(,s for the fL;l?illnlen$ end aisptch<br />
of these requirsnsnts. The +.rmy-Knvy Petroletn<br />
Bo6l.d Ma 88 ito representativa an Ar@a FeZroleun; Offioer<br />
, a1;;pointed by the Tteetgr Joei..under conoerned, In<br />
emi; theator cf oporatiu.~.3<br />
d. The following study is r3 review of the<br />
mthoilr of distribution of petroleurr., uil did lubricants<br />
to Iinitod BCete.9 Field ~OXCES in the Ewopeen<br />
Theater of Oprations.<br />
208. Dcfinitione.<br />
a. jlh't;e -- a lory: term requirement report,<br />
8hmlnL astinetea cdutixltities roquirvd to neet supply<br />
aemtCia over t 6,lven puriod of tim.<br />
b. Bulk -- Eny quantity ul product in a<br />
ahgale container rhich would be too hehvy to banilie<br />
by parsonnal withcut the aid of mechanical devices,<br />
ncmma:lp any conntainer bavily mre tban 55 United States<br />
gullons quantity,
c. Packaged -- any quantity of product in a<br />
siil@;lecontainer which may be handled by parSOMel without<br />
the use of meohanical devices, normally use6 in reforunce<br />
to five gallon cans.<br />
d. POL -- the British abbroviatlon for Petrol,<br />
Oil tind Lubricants.<br />
e, class I11 Products -- all petroleum and<br />
solid fuel protluots, othcr than those which carry an<br />
air forao specification.<br />
f. Class 111 (A) Products -- all Petroleum<br />
products whioh met air force apecifications, excluding<br />
speoialty item for which the air forces is solely<br />
rLsponsible. Itms consist mainly of aviation fuels<br />
and lubricants.<br />
g. Jorri-can -- A german type five-gallon<br />
gtlsolint! can with clamp type cover with pouring Spout<br />
mug onto can.<br />
h. heri-can -- a five-gallon gasoline can<br />
with screw-on cover and Which requires a nozzle, tube,<br />
flexible, steel, to pour oontents from can into gasu-<br />
line sanks.<br />
i, Dacmtlng -- the process of dispensing<br />
gasolino from bulk to packages.<br />
j. filled products -- petroleum proaucts other<br />
thw gasoline, such as oils, greases, and other lubricants,l<br />
SECTION 2<br />
mcHANIcs OF SUPPLY<br />
209. Levels of S U I . Stock lovels were prescribed<br />
for asmy servicR areas and for advance, internediate<br />
and base seotions of the Commnications Zone, based<br />
upon plannea oporatlons and the time required for replenishmnt.<br />
Levels varied from time to time as the<br />
operfition progressed. Xrmy Guartormsters, however,<br />
attempted to insure et all tines that suffioient levels<br />
were on hand in army areas, or immediately in rear in<br />
the Advwe Seotion to mot planned or UeXpected requirements.<br />
Operational supplies ae carried by the<br />
individual units were limited by the number of ontainare<br />
and the mount of transportation available, e<br />
210, Requisition,<br />
a. The original plan for the invasion of the<br />
coiitinent caLled for the issue of Class I11 supplies to ugts<br />
on requisition. This plan was found to be impractioablo.<br />
- 136 -<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
R-IS-.$-T-R-I-C-T-E-D<br />
It vias dotormimd, however, thst the return of em$y c<br />
fcr rofi1lii:g was essential. Tho can-for-calx rsouisit<br />
,;mmcaure wns thorefme iilstituted to cL-::serve the !;UTI<br />
f July i,limx the ddvailco Sectisr,<br />
Cnwiur!ioctims ZOlib assmod c.int;*ol.<br />
b. Effective 15 kuE;ust 19l+t+,resupply ;rf all i:asolino<br />
:iroducts ts thc arrdes w s placed cn ir daily tclegrtln<br />
begis.? Tnlcermns were SCiit to the P:ogt?luting station with<br />
iiifarnation conies ts the advance Seetian Had to tho chief<br />
Qua?2terLlastCr.~,2 The R.rr.dm at timos oxporiunccd diffl-<br />
culty in sbtainiil& the qualtitics nrid types irf graducts<br />
which vore callcd for in tho deily telepraris. It CES fncnt, xany truins wore broken mcl ShipWJitS oftcn<br />
urrivcd pieconocll in the arny areas. Ir.atieaunte docuriuntatiirn<br />
also added. to the ao~~fusioi?, and it vms oftos inpassible<br />
for tho Amy <strong>Quartermaster</strong> to rocc!i.cilc his receipts<br />
with his daily to1cgrai.i roquire:m,“nts.R 1,luch af this diffioulty<br />
was i)vcrcar.m by roquisiti:ci;ig basrsd upcn noxirur.1<br />
arid niriinuri quantities requirocl to mko up a cLmploto<br />
train of Clew 111, thus olifi1lcutii~ brokon train lots<br />
wliich were hard ti: cciitrcl.<br />
211. ’,ioquirenmts.<br />
8.. The Advance Sectim v7as su;iglied by dosicwtxl<br />
,;ir:terriediato and trsso aoCti.cn aepots i.n.thc farward noas.<br />
Tho 3hiGf Qusrtcrm6ster dcsicnutod ports for tho supply of<br />
ii-.tcriiodiute and ~ L S Gdcyts.10 fjoctim Quclrter:t?stcrs<br />
oetinntod ::.ad. subrdtted thoir rcquirenonts Lo the Chicf<br />
Cpxrtcrixstcr i;n L: 30-dag basis vary 10 doys.11 Each<br />
estiLz;tc gavc thr: final revised mtimte for the ocxt BUCcocdiric<br />
10-duy p risd, a rcvised ostinK\to far the follxricy.<br />
1C-dsy :>eriaid, a d c first estiru.te for thc lcat 10 days i)f<br />
tho 30-duy period. 16 These cstirxtes o!mblad tha Chief<br />
Quartorrustor t.? subiit requirad crstimtos to h1,yhcr hcadquarters<br />
md provided a basis for na.‘:i!ig awLltblc sufficient<br />
sup>lics to neat uiiy rcquircmnts.<br />
b. The Erigixer Potrolouii, Oil arid Lubricsnt<br />
Ermch of tho Southern Lirn of Cs?municnticnS handled the<br />
wocureuGl?t, storcge, distributixi and is.~ucs;rf pctrulbun<br />
groducts i;! Suuthorn Fruncc throuch February 1945.13<br />
liftor tho arulprmtian of Gcuthsrii Liilc af Gtouad.catirw3<br />
with the Co:kiuiiicb tioiio GoliC, those fulctid:?s were takoil<br />
mer by tho Ca”:icatioiia Zoi!c rmd the smo divisim botwmi<br />
Ei?~inccr mid Quortorricstor rcspoiisibilit existed as<br />
iii tho 1Turthcr:i p&rt al” tho Buropeun Thonter,2g<br />
c. Importstim of Fuel during tho initial staeos<br />
af the nporatiiiii could Lot be plawud rioru thall ~i few days<br />
in cdvorica, &ftcr n f irn f oothola waf! o8tabliahod, hawcver,<br />
t,.nlrara crrivod on n rogular lO-d,,y schedulo. Lata:, the<br />
Britiob ;kr Offico and Sugroi3e IImdpuartors blliad axgodi-<br />
tiant;ry Forces colLborated i)JI tho procoduro for abtoiJ:ii2$<br />
all >c;tr,:;leuli .?raducts. All co.iaon .X:tl’sloUli produots<br />
wx*e 81etcil una cc.ntrallcd (;E the coatiwat by Sugronc<br />
ticzdnuurtors, j’.lliod Tx],oaitim ry Farci:6, i?lltho bzsi:;<br />
- 137 -<br />
R-E-S-T-R-J-C-T-E-D
of 8 rmithly Slat0 ca~~s~~lidutod by th-t hcndguartcrg.<br />
3ulk getralcun ~IRScol.lcd fi)rrar&by ric8i.s of 10-dsy dcrmds<br />
by Sup-m Iicpdquartors, hlliod 2xGzd:timi;ry Pqrc.zs,<br />
whilo the pockarcd pri.dUOtS wrc calloS fnr,raM by tho<br />
Garlnunicatizns Zir:io; The 10-day su!?ply *wri<br />
t1irsuC;hout the oporatioi; as tho port situ!rti<br />
in a position tJ perriit a 30-d~~ slntc tir be<br />
orfaot.5<br />
d. Prim- to D-Day tho Chiof Quorternaatcr hn8<br />
aCcUr-;lUlet0b 0 hrge stack Jf psckLp,cd Pu.01~md J.ii3ric~r.bs<br />
sufficient t? 1;10ut cmtirer.ts1 requlroi,ie:ito for u thrcoraor!th<br />
perid. Those stocks vore hsld ii: t2o Unitcd 1Cir:g-<br />
Cisi?, mid ware caLlGd fcrward by tho Chiof Quuorterrmstcr 9s<br />
roguirod. Aftor D-Dug pockuCcd products VICIO shippod<br />
direct frcmthe Uriitod States as called fsr by thc Chief<br />
Qunrtorriastor ail noi1th3.y roquisitirpns. 5<br />
0. Tho Slatirig proccduro of Suprmo Huadquortcrs<br />
Allied Expodititx!&ry Porcos funishcd potr,lcun prsduct<br />
requireimits far ono :iw.th bid inticipatod roquimnwts for<br />
the lsllowiq three successive U3,iithS. Tho bulk quantities<br />
shom on thc slate for tho IIGC~~I wora usca us 3<br />
tho 10-day dcmxls to procure niid ship t,;.ikcor CB<br />
The .?acl;ngod oatha tos, h-wcvcp, wrc used ~nly<br />
hnd the Chief Quartern6stcr reqiiisit io:xod o mct onomit s<br />
lrsm the Now YJrk Port cf Ccihsrl:ntiili, thrswh tho Arm<br />
Pctrnlcun Office, or frciii Zho British-lYcr Officc throunh<br />
the Coiieral Purchcsix figcnt.5<br />
212. z4110cations.<br />
n. Brori D-Day until Octaber 194.!1, nll t;iR:?qc<br />
rwvomocts wro oi~.:trhllorl by thc Birst cind Third <strong>US</strong> ~2l'r.l~~<br />
alnco the conplctc inf;!rri~ition a!.i thc roquirznw!ts aiid<br />
avoilob lity of trs:i~port:~tiin110s 01: hmb mly ik thohoacli3,<br />
rrnd storage arcas, ond thc ostiimtad btink car, tank truck,<br />
r!nd bnrge lift ovailublc fiBrthe nilvcnoiltr, QuriiiF: the next<br />
culoilclar nai:th. Tho Chief Quartorrunster ir. turr. fiiriiished<br />
the 0-4 with n breakdom of tol:uogo shah5ng thc 0pprO::i-<br />
mto amount noodca for daily -mixtoii~.nc.ea d the tirbxmt<br />
Ileodcd far build-up of reserves. Thc Chiof C&Iurter;mstcr<br />
0100 includod o prsposod grogrnn of Ou,pplylr,p tho Uuil:g
agencies, giving the method of transportation to be use<br />
an8 the oatimted emergency tonnage requiring air lift.e2<br />
c. Based 011 thcso estiriates, the 0-4, in conjmction<br />
with the Ch.i€f of Transportation and the Chiefs<br />
of Rcrvioos , propared and submitted to Comunicatiorx<br />
Zono Seotions ard Chlcfs of Scrviccs tho approved WVQ!T%Lt<br />
sch~c?ul~ for all classes duriw the next cnlender aonth,<br />
Thl8 sygtom proved vcry sttisPuotory.~2<br />
213. Distribution.<br />
n. csrsolino supply we8 basod upon the thcory tlrt<br />
lnrgo~volumcsor msoliuc should bo introd.uc6d at dotip-water<br />
?or:Us, tronsported tliroup,h str~~togicallg looatsd pipolinos<br />
to front Uno arcas, and distrfhutcd in tank cars, tank<br />
truczs,. an*. containers to the usinR egoncios. 5<br />
b. Initially, nL1 avoilablo bulk storage in EnglunA<br />
m s plaoo5. undor control of tho British Futroleum<br />
Bocrd. A11 stocks wrc hi16 by thc Rritish Petroleum Romd<br />
anr: iasuod to t!;o United ::tatus on ruvorso lond-lease. The<br />
avnilablo tanlcor flcot of Groat Rrltoin end tho Unitcd<br />
Rtotos ms usod o build-lip dusirod stock lcvols preparatory<br />
to thc invasion,! ma inj.tia1 assault forco carried fivr:<br />
gallon conteinors came ovor tho bmohes, and on 23<br />
Junc 194.1,,thi; first tonkar nrd.vod at a Ilommdy gort. .Yt<br />
tiinos it was also noccssary to fly paclcoged fucl dircot to<br />
tho continonb from tho Unitcd E'ingdom,<br />
o. Bctnil distribution or dkliver7 of pasolino<br />
WRS mdo cithcr from bulk storopo with the iropcr dispoiising<br />
oqulpmcnt, or from dram, fiw or 55-za13on. RUB storage<br />
was satisfactory on:'.y when Chr! location of ths using unit<br />
was rolntively static and easily nocessiblc to tho bulk<br />
storaRo site. ",'hilo bulk storage distribution invoivod<br />
lass handlilu: and was morc eoonomicel, it was oxtromly<br />
limited in flcxibility and was usGd primarily for Comani-<br />
ontions Yono or rctir aroa troons. Rotail distribution in<br />
55-~nllondrum vias never satisiflotcry dub to itfl wi@t<br />
and :iulk, ana nlmyrr broueht corqlntnts from the using units<br />
bocauso of thc difficulty in handlinp. 1X"rous cascs of<br />
hornia lcrc rttributoi to tho usc of the 55-qallon drums,<br />
nnd thcir usc was conacqricntly hcld t o. rinimum cxctipt in<br />
tha :7outhorn Tdnc of Gowlunicntiono. z5<br />
d. Rotail. distribution by mans of fivc callon<br />
gnsolinc containors vms tlloroforc ahost mndatory, porticu-<br />
larly in tho rorwnrcl co:tbnt arcas: Tho fivc gallon oontain-<br />
ors RSC rolativoly light ill i:cielit, sm1.l in bulk, 8118 canpurP.tivcly<br />
c?nsy'to handlo. Gnch vi.hiclc, cjrcogt tr.nlcs and<br />
tank dcstrovors, ms oquipycd with spcicrl rac!;s to carry<br />
oufficicnt msalino in fivo-~allcn containers to last Sor given<br />
pcri0d.s of ti;:o, Bud distribution was madc by cxohiinging tho<br />
empty cxis of o. unit for full cans. In addition, divinioii<br />
Q,uc,rtoi-ma.stGrs wlro autl..oriaod cdditional cans for tho oporation<br />
of distributing points. In ordci to s?cod rind. facilitntc<br />
ciistribution to thc using units, it Wn13 originally ploencd<br />
that rll aacknKin5 and dccnnt.inq from bulk to fivc-gallon oontc.incrs<br />
bo Oonc by t3o Cmxmication.s Zone, Nld thct 0.11<br />
Bnlivcrics o tinny supply points bo mdo in five-gcllon<br />
contnincrs.3 Tho speod of thc farvrnrd movomont OS tho<br />
- 139 -<br />
R-T-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
=:des, the time required for nev pipeline csnstructicn,<br />
%he size af tho can population, thc oandition of railroads<br />
and rail equipmnt, on6 tho docontin;- T cilities all<br />
had an offcct an decanting operations, and it was often<br />
necossar tc dallvor psolirro to khc army supyly paints<br />
In bulk.% In such cases decanting was dono by the ur~~les.<br />
e. In viovi of the fact that retail distribution<br />
by five-gallon containors was the only netbad suitable for<br />
csabat and othor units, a can gopulntian sufficient to<br />
met tho nccds of such distribution vfas cssoaticl. Such<br />
factors JS tho nuraber of troops, tho nubor of vehicles involvad,<br />
typo of pLinned opcrettlons - pertlculurly t!;osa<br />
calling for tho oaplsynimt of largo srriorod Tarccs, and %hi<br />
rapid fomard iisrencnt of tho arilios, all hnd to bc csnsid-<br />
ercd in deternining thc size af tho can 2opuldtIon. In a<br />
fast novinr situation such as thc drive &cross Pranco it<br />
was essential that full cans ba alwoys availablo when<br />
nocdod, and additiand oms for naiiitennnco wcro afton roquired<br />
by the coabnt units. il sufficient stock ha2 to bo<br />
on hand ta elinln.,tc &lay caused by waiLlnF, Tor cans to<br />
bo rGfillod 5r for bulk gasnlirio to bo dcczntod. ‘!ithwt<br />
such a stock af oms on h;nd to supi?ort thc cmbat units,<br />
thc drivc acrms Bruncc ciuld nilvor haw bcan rmdo. In<br />
such a drivo, tho oasc ana rapidity of ecsclino dlstrl-<br />
bution to tho using units nnd ‘to tho individual vohicles,<br />
io of priiic csnsidcratlon. It ws ilrifinally ost-<br />
imted thRt seven xJ.lllon cans w“. sup?nrt the ooil?at<br />
forces throuphout tho operations in thc %uro>cen UeaCcr.<br />
This included not only thu iiimliatc? rcqiiircaonts cf thc<br />
grnics, ‘Jut also tho rcquiromnts or thk) Ssmunicotions<br />
Zono troJps cnEclgcd in haulinC: to tho aimiils. Bofor~<br />
hostilitics ccasod, thirty-Tivc nillisn cms wre iaportcd<br />
to thc aontincnt, and to this was ddGd an indr;t?r-<br />
ninablc nuiibor of copiured Gcriloa cons. In s3itc of this<br />
largo nwibor, vhilc thoro was novcr a roal s.hortn{:c except<br />
in isolatod instances, them was ncvor un ovor abundant<br />
su.pply, and it Y ~ Sstill nocossary tn ricidly oiiforca<br />
can di iplinc in order to naintain o sufflclcnt stcic!c ‘an<br />
hand. $8<br />
214. Pipulines.<br />
a. i, linltcd mount r;f fuel was pwlped frcri the<br />
Uiiitod 13ngdsr.i by undervrntcr pipelipcs . This opcrstion was<br />
holm as Pluto (pigclino wder tho ocaan). Thoro wcro two<br />
systorm: Banbl, whloh was a four lino systo:i that Irovad<br />
of llttlo iuportanco duo to the enell qkmnttty c1olivi;rad<br />
nnd tho cxpcnslvc Dpcraticnal trouble t?X:>C”xa; and hbo; a<br />
15 Uno systcu DCPCWS the narrov nock of thj ZKqliuh Channol<br />
which avemgcd, up to the cnd ~f hostilities, 27,000 barrcls<br />
n day, The operational ccat of this systoa in mnpowor was<br />
also cxcossive, and elttiough the systcn Va‘a D SucceES it<br />
was oonsidorod th;t tho transilissim by bulk tanker delivery<br />
wns for narc satisfaotory as lone na oir an2 naval sugciria-ity<br />
axistod.<br />
b. Tho ?ipclinc system was thc backbone of tho<br />
aistribution systen an tho contlncnt. It pomittcd tho<br />
tronsrzissim of gasoliuc bvcr torrain ti)c rwgcd for othcr<br />
nenna sf transportstion, avoldod rood ctmgcstion wkcro road<br />
capocity was lidtad and trarri,c heavy, ond corricd 50~solina<br />
ovor vnryirq distnncoa whoro onony action mdu ;>tbor<br />
mens of trnnsportotisn impracticable.<br />
- l/+O -
c. The annr Systun !vas installed an tho continent<br />
bopinning D plus 3 tu provido E bulk clistributicn systcn<br />
durim tho initial poriod preceding tho capture of Chcrbiicrg<br />
(0-1020). Facilities ~orcmstructcd ut Port en Uaasin<br />
(T-70fk:) for unlahding soverol small tankcrs. Two six-inah<br />
lines were providod for 1HT-80 gusolino and ane six-inch line<br />
for aviation gasolino. Thoso pipolinos wore oxtondod to<br />
dispensing points a t Etroham (T-7060), Caroritan (T-3000)<br />
and La Forge (1-40GO).<br />
d. Thu IIaior Syston (A.?pandix 15) miginatcd in<br />
the Port of Chorbourg (0-1020) , with two six-inch IZT-80<br />
psolino lines and ant six-inch aviation gasoline linc oxtonding<br />
south through St. La (T-I+060) to Chslms-aurdI::monc<br />
(Y-7050) . Frcr.i Chalons-su--lIarne, tr:n six-inch IIT-CO gasoline<br />
lines axtendad to ThfanvilLo (U-8080),Fiancc, and irm<br />
Thiclnvillc, ml? six-inch lino vias carriucl ccrms tho Ithinc<br />
River inti; Germny, 8 total distzncc of t*ppro;rirwtoly 600<br />
milos fron Chcrb;,ur&.<br />
c.. The Narthern Systcn (Appendix15 ) startcd frm<br />
tlis Port of Antwerp (U-7090), l?dciu;%. Ona eix-inch and<br />
t-ro fourrinch MT-eO gasolina lines and tvc four-inch<br />
ovitition gasolino lines war@ constructod to Ihastricht ~<br />
(IC-5552), Hollmd. Tho three NT-00 gasolino lincs were<br />
ccntiiiucd northooutward Trr.:.: i:c.astricht und acr3ss tho<br />
Rhino RivGr to llescl (h-Z2l,.l],Gar~mny. Tho linear distanco<br />
from fsitrrer? to :.:cso~ 5s lea nilcs.15<br />
Tho St~JUthOrn SyStGrl arigintstod at lItw3cillCS<br />
(T-'l+010), Frcincc;, kind was built ta sup9mt tho 6t:i Array<br />
Group. Prom Karsoillos, one six-inch and i!no fcrur-inch lirio<br />
was built narthard to La Porco (P-4080)ncur SfiarburE,<br />
Oorr:ony. Iror:iLa FmcQ throe fsur-inch lines irere continuod<br />
ticrass tho Rhinu at Frmknthal (Ii-l+505), Gcrany.<br />
Tho linear diatoncc was 620 nilos. Tho systm consistcd<br />
of 1,507 milos nf pipclinc, und tronsnittod 569,000,000<br />
pallms of motor i;nd. sviotion gasiilinc Up to 15 Soptenbcr<br />
i94.5 15<br />
p. In additian t o thwc no.jor PipClinG SyStCI&s,<br />
thoro wcre nuiorous smull pipclinc GpOratiaS on Chc corttincnt,<br />
such os tho Rhino Rivor pipclinc crossing, Kehlon<br />
fL-Oht(2) to Konigswintor (F-6232). IIorr~,gasi!lino was roceivod<br />
by rail tank cars at lbhlon and pmped across tho<br />
rlvor to o truck filling insto1lotion"iin tho autobahn<br />
northueet of Konicswintor. This rclievcd tho Rcmgon<br />
(1-4432) ontoon bridgos of o oansidcrablo sncunt of truck<br />
traPric.d Thcrd -.&?re 3,600 xlllos i.rf pipollns laid ts thc<br />
asst side of tho Rhihe Rivor up to cessation of hostilitics,<br />
with a total capacity of l50,OOO barrels per day.15<br />
h. Tank ctus wora usod ti, heul bulk easolinc<br />
frmi soaport m6 pipolino tarninals to 3amunications Zone<br />
ant! army' &canti= points, m for trnnsiar to tank t.rucko.21<br />
Tank truoks hauled gasoline from bulk storoga tanks, aipoline<br />
terrdnals, ana r.Jil tank cLm ta Comiunications Zone<br />
or amy{ decanting points ilr fillin(F stations. Approxluatoly<br />
3,000 rail tank cars and 1,055 tan!< truoks with a asaacity<br />
of 2,000 or 750 gallons each wero us0d.~7<br />
215. hocounting.
-<br />
142 .
Suyxne Ticodguortcrs, .Uliod 2xmX.tionorg Porccs , ms<br />
chnrsod with ccardinatin6. ond chtmllin thc supply :>f<br />
pctrilloun prsducta to tho Bllicd Psrcos.fE Tho hrcn Pct-<br />
rolauri Offioa was char@ with etcff r~3ponsibflit~ for the<br />
ossrdinoticm of 31; mttors gcrtoiniq ta zdepustc su2.ply<br />
far cll ~~urposca.l7It is thw oSv1~7u3th-t there was axi<br />
swrl~pi>inenn8. duplicutim of fcactions and rcqmnsibiliticrs.<br />
SECTIOU 3<br />
217. iiroy-Novg ~otr.nleuLi acarP. 17 The krv-l~~vy Potrg-<br />
1eU.i Bourd was thc fieoncy of the J;rlnt Chicfs of E:tuff uni.<br />
was ohorgod with thG follming functisns rchting ta petri:loui<br />
.>nA pCtr%JlCun products:<br />
E.. Ihintnin doso comxlinntion md liciaor, botimn<br />
thG Vur and Hnvy Dopnrtnents cnb vrizh tho Patrc'luun<br />
fdrd.nis2rntisn for ?far.<br />
b. Prepare md Llcintilin full inforrution una<br />
stotus of petrolom and potrslouri products rmttors vith<br />
whioh tho Var ,md ITnvy Dcportncnts vmre cmcorned.<br />
c. Inourc ci~nrdinotlon, br,sed on ovcrcill Isgistical<br />
plrclns, CJf prmuroriont, wcraous shigmnt, snd storngc<br />
fin hrny snt! Invy.<br />
rl. Efloct collcbcrotiun pc~trolourinattcrs<br />
witli othor Unitod llntlcm sa diroctud by tho Joint Chicfn<br />
of 3tcl-f.<br />
c. 3orcoii and ct-nsolic7Qtc Arny and Navy rcguircrionts<br />
and cocmlincto with tha Yt:.troloum AddninistiJtor for<br />
Uar tho cqmcity of inCuvtry to prmidc the roqairorionts.<br />
218, kruo Pctr;;lcun Officc. Tiie Area PoBroloun Offico<br />
vrns En agoncy nf the i.rny-Biivg aoarci with Euprcne Hcndquarters,<br />
Nliod EX3oditiiJnllr!l Parco, Cort:,fn rccclrds GI<br />
roquLrorlonta and stocks were iwiiitainod rc:wrts propnrod<br />
for thc ArEIy-ITQVy ?otrslcm Board. Technioul<br />
.i.ni"ormtion af pctrolcuu/prmluota was disse:iinc%ab<br />
thrmqh ohnnnclo. Tho Arzo Petrolouu Offioo wna divided<br />
int,.r u Tochnioal Branch, a Planning and Rcquircnents<br />
Branch, and a Stock und Bhippi~Rronch. It6 principal<br />
funations woro :<br />
u. Stuff rcsponsiblity for caorbinatim uf i:ll<br />
rslttors ,wrtoininc to udequato suj>ply for cll p~rposcs,<br />
b. Roprcsciit tho 1say-l:kvy Potrslourr Rorrd with<br />
upgroprioto British ngonoics. Act .m len6.-lcoee and reverse<br />
lond-lonoe os rcquircd.<br />
c, Rcgrescnt the armd forcos os rOqUirQd in<br />
&linistdng. nlliod potri:.lcuti na"YCora with coubinod<br />
bi:.irds (?rcamittoes in Lcndm.<br />
a. Combinate requeste by the Unitea Stotcs
g. Supcrvisc productlcn of gnsolinc and Water<br />
cans at tho assanbly plant in tho Vnitcd 1;ingd:w.<br />
h. Reproacnt tho Ghicf (luurtcjmaster Lind min-<br />
tala liaism Tiith other solcvicos on Class I11 suppig mttorp.<br />
221. Basc Bu0ticrlIS.l Base SQCtiiXI Quertc?rimstcrs w‘ICi’c<br />
rcsgcnsiblc fbr thc subd~~ion of raquiromnts far tho op-<br />
er2ti.m jf a11 grcund vc+hiclos, installati;~ns, 2nd rsr rdscol1snoi:ug<br />
us08 within tho cnumnd. Thcy consslidstad<br />
doyt ra;?c.rts and dcsignatad the suiiply pointg fm sorvicing<br />
tr,:sps vithin thoir raspcctive areas.<br />
222. Advance; Sectism. 21 The :~dvsnooSocticn Quartcr-<br />
mstorg, in oeaopc.i7ati(.n snd csnjunctii,n :iith tha G-l, and<br />
Tmnspiirttitifhulk at.:rego<br />
facilitlos. Burqdics wcre un1;)ndcd frm vmscls,<br />
traUapi;rtod hg ?ipclincs, iind stncd in bulk by tho En-<br />
Fineor mrvico. Cuntc.dg passed ti. tha Qunrtcrnastcr whcn<br />
tho gesalins supply oimpany gaoksgod tho product or crthcrwisa<br />
asaulxd cmtral. Tho Ui::.itary Pipdllno sorvicc vraa<br />
rus’\imsiSlc for thc c. netructinn .f hulk potroloun hond-<br />
line anc? 8t:rage. fhcilitics undc-r the tCChniCQl suporvisiijn<br />
of tho Chiuf: Engin::or, Simunicstii~nsZ: no.<br />
22C. ih ntinciital Lavanoc Bcoti5ii. Aftcr 1 Ilsrch 1945,<br />
tho Cmtinont,l Advance Bocti-i?: was an ogcrs.xtine agcncjr<br />
i.f thc Ca”niaatic;ns Zum, Suriipcan Thoatsr ;i Oacrati:lns,<br />
and 7‘108 cmtiguous ti\ tho owbat zmo. Its dssi;.n in<br />
im.mdiatc sup,wrt end naihtcnancc .cf tho 6th hnry Grilup,<br />
WQS to MCOIVO, stwc and mvo Icmara mtcrial snd supp-<br />
lies as rcquirod.22 Its functions were sinilar tu thosc<br />
of the’hdvanoo Ocoticn, Oa”nicatims 2, .ne. Prinr til<br />
that tiw, tho Cmtinontdl ;;dvmco Sectifin porfnrned tho<br />
Sac Su;rglg role fer tho Bituthf?l’ll LinD of CoiX.IlUliCQticm8.<br />
During part rif tbis porisd tho Petroleum, Oil, End Lubricants<br />
socti::n vma n sc.gerato soct1.m csmplotuly divnrccd<br />
frail tho Quartomstor Ciirps. It controlled sufficiont<br />
gasJlinc supply mapanios, sorvico csnpanies, and Ewinecr<br />
Pipolinc conpanics to pcrforu its i.lisrriim,<br />
- 145 -<br />
8-E-R-T-R-I -C -T-E-D
The <strong>Quartermaster</strong> asswd cmtrol when the Contiiientcl .*dvmoe<br />
Sectim moved forvard rind the Specj.al Petrf;leum Section<br />
remained behind vith Delta Base Section. lfovever, the<br />
Quartemaster was relieved of this function in January 194.5,<br />
but assued cdntrol again in Llmrch 1945.vhen the Continental<br />
Advance Section becorae an agency of the Corti“ioatiqms<br />
Zone. 23<br />
225,Southern Line sf Comunicatims. The aisoim of<br />
the Petr7deun Branch, Engineer Sectlon, Southern Line of<br />
Cumuniaations, was to slate the procurenent of Engineer<br />
pipeline supplies for maintenanoe und c,nstructiJn 01 Pipeline<br />
systems and terminal bulk installatinne , operote the<br />
pipeline and buik storage iaoilities and deternine require-<br />
ments. The Petroleum Eranah wfis charged with the procurement,<br />
storbge, distribution. and issue of petrc :iroduots,<br />
oonttiiners, laboratory su’Tplies and equipeat. Bm<br />
226. Field Forqes. The respansibilitiea and functi~ns<br />
of the various ochelans throuchaut the field forces ?rere in<br />
penerul the same for Class IiI 3u ,ply as fur the sup:ilg of<br />
other classes, The my grsu3 supervised distribution 9,nd<br />
insured maintenance and proper stock 1ewl.s. It soreened<br />
estimates and mde allocations 8s necessary and mintfiined<br />
current study of logistical factars ond rates of cainsunption?&<br />
The cmies estimRteC raquiremnts and effectod,<br />
through noma1 channels by the maintenance of stock levels,<br />
the supply of :ietrolew, oil, an6 lubricants tci all troops<br />
within the arny area.25<br />
227. Cijnclusicns,<br />
n. That the supply of petroleun, oil tmd lubrioants<br />
in the European Theater of <strong>Operations</strong> *.1u8 generally<br />
adequate ana satisfactary, - except during September<br />
and October 194$ wken stock level6 were ’ dangerously<br />
ELOW.<br />
b. That without n large flve-gsllan can populatlim<br />
cn hand sufficient to meet tho requircmonte , prrticularlg<br />
of fast moving ccnbat units an& c.!omunicatl;ms Zone trsogs<br />
cmagcd in haullne troops uqd supplies in sup,i>rt af tho<br />
armies, distributiou uf gasoltwJ probkb’ly would how failea,<br />
viith a sorloua rosultant dotrimntB1 offoct on tho combat<br />
opurations .<br />
c. That aiatribution by f ive-gallow containers<br />
was found to ba the only suitable method or distribution<br />
In the European Theator, anC that in futuro oporatlons<br />
aaroful stuciy must be given ts the win populotinn rcquircd<br />
to austain and su:coart the units ongeged.<br />
a. That accounting procedure thrroughaut tho<br />
echelans was not stendaraizsd or rolnted.<br />
e. Pluto (pipcline urldor tho ixosn) was maorately<br />
aucoossful. Bulk tanker dolivary iJVCr a lurge body<br />
’3-I-R-T-R-1 -C-?--$-D
~f mter is much mare ecmcnical Vuhm eir and naval suixri.;1:i;;y<br />
ar1sts.<br />
f. Pipclinos an tho continent were ver:' succcssfill<br />
,-nd ahsclutolg necessary for ths su?gnrt iP inur large<br />
fialii forces,<br />
228, E\oc.,:lrwndetions.<br />
e. Thet aoodmtinp, nrscedwnsbs stonderdizod.<br />
5. Thtjt pigcliiio cunvtructicn end 3pcrpD tim 30<br />
mado ano subject af Iouro and canstat rcscarch.<br />
c. Thot tho nunbcr ;)f agemius charpd %lthClass<br />
11: oporatlonz bo hmld to a miair.isw ti; av[.id cmfusim and<br />
Buplicetim.<br />
(1. Tht in futuc ngorsticnu omcful study be<br />
given t3 thc sizo of the con poptilot9;m requlrod ta sustain<br />
end support tho units c.xeycd, snd thi:t neor?saary ect.i;:n<br />
Le tahn tc insure a aufficfent stack cef nontai. cry .In hand<br />
thr.m&out' all cnholons.
1. ETO-SOP #3E, Cxitinental <strong>Supply</strong> Prc:cedurc for Pctrslom<br />
Products and Related Ehndlinl: Equipmmt dated 19 ,L,uEust<br />
1944 and 12 Jiino 19/+5.*(9)<br />
2. ETO-SOP i’7, Sur, 1 Praoeduro an the Contirient aatod 2<br />
February 1945 .a$6T<br />
3, Ifemorandun; Quartornastcr Scctim to G-I+ Section, 12th<br />
Amy Grsup, dated 6 Bcbrumy 19b5.*(37)<br />
L. Advance Sectii;.i, C.rmw-icttions Lono Opw. tianal I!istcry<br />
1943-45, imdatcd.*(22)<br />
5. History of lrrsa Pctroloum Office, undatod.*(l6)<br />
6. Rcplirt “Fiold Gervico L,:f‘l stlo@’, 12th Amy Grnup, G-4<br />
Sccticn, undatoa.<br />
7. First <strong>US</strong> brny Rcpnrt on Dpordtims, hnnox En. 14.*(43)<br />
8. 12th Amy Group Final After Actl,n Rcp rt.*(32)<br />
9. F.uartcrmauter SOP, 12th Arny Grmp. “(32)<br />
10. Hq Cam 2, ETO, OC@l Circular Lcttcr y97, Praccduro for<br />
distribution cd O,uartont.stcr Supplies t., p,r,iios, hdvanoc<br />
Soctions and 3acti,m8, dated 5 Dcccribcr 19kL<br />
11. Hq CLu Z, ZTO, OCPTI Circulhr Lottur ,:14, PruOGd.Ure fi,r<br />
Distributim OP Quertcrnastcr Su?Tlics on tho Cnntinont ,<br />
datod 9 Fobruurg 1945.*(11)<br />
12. Eq ETO<strong>US</strong>A, filo AG 400/1 OSD, Subjcct: Proocdurc for<br />
Planning, Rcooption and I:nvenont of Supplies, Equiy”<br />
and Bersmnal, datod 10 January 1945,<br />
15<br />
Histnry nf Southern Line of Caxmunicatimn, undatcd.<br />
Hq 6th Amy Group Adminietrativo Instructions UP, 5 ,<br />
dated 20 Bwc3bbcr 1944.<br />
Enginoor Section, ETO<strong>US</strong>A - History i,f POL Facilities,<br />
unaatcd.* (15)<br />
16. Bq Can Z, El%. OCQf Circultir Lottor NL. 52, Pmcodura<br />
for <strong>Supply</strong> of Tuartormastor Itoms im tho Gmtincnt,<br />
datwd 16 Septonbcr 194.11.<br />
17. Joint Chiofs irf 3taff , fsr;ly-IJavy Potrolowr Board Chartor<br />
dated 13 Octsbor 1943.<br />
18. SFLTF Administrebiw bk” No. 25, IIsintcnanoa 3f the<br />
Allied Expcdi-ticnarg Forccs in Petrolour3 Prsdu ts -<br />
!kwtcrn Europoan Theater, dated 21 July 194k.*?l)<br />
19* Hq ETO, QCW Circular Lottcr t32, Rcspmsibilities of<br />
Quartorsster Sorvicc, 3PO<strong>US</strong>A, for Pucl, Lubriosntfi an8<br />
Handling Equipnwnt, dated 22 July 1944.
20. Hq ZTO<strong>US</strong>A, SOP $47, liil.itary Pipdino Service, 22 Scptombor<br />
L944.*(10]<br />
21. Cq Advance bectian, CUmuniCatinhS Z'me, SOP for Pctrol,<br />
Oils ma Lubricants (POL)<strong>Supply</strong>, datcd 19 April 19C4,<br />
22. Orcsnizafion of G,mtinontal Advance Socti m, Comunicatixis<br />
Zone, ETO, aated 1 Fcbruary 1945.<br />
2.3. Oqenizatiia, Bunctions and Opsr~tion of C&tincntal kdvanac<br />
Bt,ction, Con Z, ETO, dated 1 Fubruury 1945.<br />
24. Limo rrrm C-4, 6th Aruy Gr ,up to)AGF Qwrtmmastor Obsower,<br />
27 M:Rrch 1945,<br />
25. 110 6th Arng Fhup, G-L+ Seotiun Orfioe ?IOU Ea. 13, 1<br />
iIarch 1945.*(30)<br />
26. Quartcrnustcr SOP'S tX the firnlcs.*(42)<br />
27. IIist2,rionl Data fr.n P & Y Diviniirn, OGCH Piloo.*(15)<br />
20. C3,rmonts, Lcttcr, Thaatcr Chiof Quartomaster, 13 DQCCIIbor<br />
194.5, to Thw G m " l Bl,ard.* (56)<br />
29, 12th hrny Grcvp - C-lr Pcriudic Ropsrto.
LOC-1STIC.U FACTOW<br />
229. Definition. Logistics is the art of plannin and<br />
carrying o m i t n r y movement , evacuction and supp1y.f Tagiatical<br />
factors, as discussed in this chapter, are t!,ose factors<br />
dealing with the most important phase of sup_nly -- the<br />
comautation of requirements.<br />
230. Types of ZoRistical Factors.<br />
'a. There are three methods of expressing petro-<br />
leum, oil, and lubricant logistical factors for coqmtation<br />
of large soale renuirements:<br />
(1) Pounds per man per day.<br />
(2) Gallons per .mn per day.<br />
(3) mpresslon of reouirements of HT-80 gasoline<br />
by either of t%se first two methods,<br />
and recluirements of allied products as<br />
percentages of ?!T-80,<br />
b. There is easentiallg no differenoe in either<br />
of the three metbods of expressing petrolem, oil and lubricant<br />
logistical faotora. The use of "Pounds per LW per<br />
day"*is desirable whon requirements are to be stated in<br />
tons, and ",qallons per luau per day:' (greases excepted) is<br />
desirable when requirements are to be expressed in total<br />
gallons or barrels.<br />
231. Eethods of Determinatim. There are.two gener-<br />
ally accepted methods of detsmining petroI.eun, oil and<br />
lubricant logistical factors:<br />
a. The vehicular raethod , in which the average<br />
daily reauirenents of any unit or nimber or units can be<br />
determined by computing from experience the average numScr<br />
of niles to be traveled daily by all ~6hhleSinvolvod,<br />
nultipljjing the average nunbar of miles to be travclcd by<br />
the total number of each type vehicle involved, and crithar<br />
multiplying tho result VJ the avornge oonmnn?tlon rate (increased<br />
by safety faotora) in Gallons pormllo for each<br />
type vehicle (taken from Ff 9-2600) , or dividing thb result<br />
by the averace consum2tqon .rate in :lilca por .pallon for<br />
each typo mhicle involvcd. Norr~~lly, the total requirements<br />
of msoline for potmr oqulo"t, coolcinq, hoatinc,<br />
lightina: and other miscellaneous needs arG figurcd nt twenty<br />
porcont of the gasoline reouiromcnts for the vehicles. The<br />
total figure can be dlvid6.d 5y the irlachine records unit<br />
etrenRth or by tho ration strmqth to ohtdn the rcauironats<br />
in eallons mr 3811pr day. O i l and lubricants aro rlso<br />
normally dotomined as percentaces of t_otalfuLl rquirementa.<br />
rcrccntagea usually used are: .,nqinc oil - 34'. of<br />
total fuel rcouirmcnts; gaar oil - J$ of'total ruol requirements:<br />
and grease - 1.5$ of total fuel roauirmonts.<br />
Appcndicas l6& 17 list thc roquirmonts for largo forcet?as<br />
computed by tho Office of tho Chief ?uartcrmastor, 3uropean<br />
Theater of Oiorations. This ncthod is flcxiblo and Is<br />
- 150 - '<br />
R E S T R I C T E D
R-E-S-T-R-I -C -T-E-D<br />
applicablc to both mall units ana field foroea. Ono can<br />
ooiuputa the 8mo.unt of gasoline needoa to mow unit vohioies<br />
On0 mile, and tlluR Porecast ronuiramont8 from day to day by<br />
multiplying the tlqallona roquircd pcr d.lo" for tho unit<br />
by tho anticipated number of nibs to bo travclad. Corps<br />
und largcr organizations find this method cumbcrsom baccutsc<br />
of thc constant challgo in thc units assigned or attachod,<br />
which affcctd thc numbor and typcjs ol vehicles, and because<br />
tho avcracc daily,movonront.of units will vary from day to<br />
day. This mothod, howcvor, js mandatary when no cxpcjsianoct<br />
oonsrmption factors arc availabl0.2,3<br />
b. Thc oxpcricncc consumption mto mthod involvcs<br />
thc actcrr.aination of rates basod on thc total gallons or<br />
pounds of pctrolcum, oil and lubricants consmud during UXtcndcd<br />
oocrations of largo mssos of troops, diviaod by tho<br />
total moohino records unit strcngth or tho ration strength<br />
of all troops who ocnsunod those products. Thus, tho roquircmonts<br />
gor man ?cr day aro dctcrriincd from actual cxp~rionoc.<br />
"ken past cxpcrionco data Is not availablc , C11~vchicular<br />
mcthod should bo usod un%ilthc oprations have procrcsscd<br />
sufficiently for cxporienco consum:ltion ratl;s to bo<br />
OONpilOd. nation strcngth data is ~ asil~ obtaincd and is<br />
mom noourato for lar@ P~QRSOS of troops than nachinL rucords<br />
strong@ data.<br />
232. rlapninp Factors dcvplop.td by tha Area Pctroleum<br />
M.<br />
a. Prior to D-Day, rmuirc,ments wwa kesed upon<br />
coabat anci non-oombat.logistica1 factors. Thas~factors reprcsontcd<br />
consumption, oxolusivc of rsouiromclnt3 usod in<br />
building up a rcsemo stoclc pile. Thc faotors woro:<br />
Froduot U S Nan- combat Combat<br />
?IT-80 Cal/man/day 0.4 l.bG<br />
nmoi GRl/man/day 0.04. 0.27<br />
Koroacno wf/man/day 0.005 0.005<br />
TLlgino oils $ Of (bE-80r)ieSQl) 2. 3.<br />
Fear Oils $ of (MT-80 Diosol) 0.5 1.<br />
crcasos $ of ("80 T)loscl) 1. 1.5<br />
Casol-ino {for of (IilT-~oM.osol) - 0.08<br />
cooking)<br />
The oonbat rcquirements wore 214. net tons of POL pcr day for<br />
uaoh divisional slico of k0,000 poops, Tho non-combat roquiromonta<br />
amounted to 50.6 nct bons for tho sama numbor of<br />
troops,<br />
b, Tust 'prior to D-Dcy, conparison vias modo with<br />
factors dovoloncld and usad by Allied Poroen Wadquclrtcrs in<br />
Italy. Rcauirencnts in Jtoly rcvcalcd n oonswption ram of<br />
150 liquid 'tons VT-SO; 9.s dicscl mcl; 2.7$ korosono; and<br />
2.9'4 cngino oils, 'Roar lubricants and groasus. Based upon<br />
tkc abovcs figures, it wag agrcjd to plan rccuiremcnts for<br />
thG instiax opcrations in thc Europcan Theater of Oporations<br />
on n daily con9un tion rato of 153 not tons for caoh divisional<br />
slice of &0,008 troom, of a ioh 79.0@ was 18-80 gosolino;<br />
- 151 -<br />
3-E- S-T-9-I-C-T-E-D
H-E-5-T-R-I-C-T-E-D<br />
0, In Octobcr 1944, hmovtr, thG factors wore rovised<br />
bosod upon actual oxpc-rionco in tho ?hropoaa Thuiltor<br />
of Optrstions and upon tho devclopmcnt of accurcto records.<br />
Pin00 OOnsumPtlOn had hen pector thm onticipatod, th dai-<br />
ly roauircmcnts wGrc raisud to 217 nct tons while --- thr. --- nnn- --_-<br />
ohnbfit ConsUWtiOn rat0 incrcasod 66 nct ions, a ~ .basGd<br />
upon 0 aivisiCne.l slico of 40,000 troops. Tho nc.w rbquiro-<br />
IUOUtS wcro broken down 0.8 follows:<br />
TIT-80 1.700 <strong>US</strong> gcil/m/day<br />
Unloaded fuol 0.002 I1<br />
Koroscnc 0.003 If<br />
%os01 fu0l 0.170 It<br />
Rngino O i l 0.0561 I’ (3$ of fuc.1)<br />
Gonr O i l O.O?.e? (1% Of fuol)<br />
[*;Poaec 0.0250 Sbls/man/day (16‘3of fucl)<br />
d. In Januery 1945 consm>tion rooords from D-Day<br />
to inoludc 31 noooirbor 19b4 wGro avnilsble and at that tine<br />
it w s dotcwnod thst ruquiromnts mro 192 net tons, based<br />
upon tho BNRO €tivisional slicp.<br />
233. Actunl Planning: Factors Usd by Field Foroes.<br />
a. In plosnfng a daily consu$ilon figure for .<br />
pOtrCl~um products, thoro woro two basic thoorlee, First,<br />
thnt tho fl~uurashoul3 06 oxprcs-ad as a total Euantity<br />
bascd upon tho nmbcr of oiorationsl milas por dey for all<br />
YGhiclos invoLvod, end SSCOnd that tho fipyP.3 should bo exprossod<br />
i-.s n hctor in ounds par nien par dayr! for all<br />
troons involvod. It m ~ b o to 6 <strong>US</strong>G P factor of 15.4.788<br />
pounds por mn por dey, as computoa bo tho Chi~fQmrtcrmastor.<br />
This fi uro was ksad on 50 operational milos gcr<br />
vchiolcr pcr day YLppcndix 17). Tho First <strong>US</strong> rigrood<br />
with tho daily opcrationcllmilongo, but aonafdcrod the actual<br />
vehicular oonsunption figurc to be grcctor thcn thet which<br />
wm uaad in tho CMbf n,mrtLrmostcr’s calculctions, and<br />
bcliovcd thnt a Ifborn1 safoty factor should also bo in-<br />
~ludod. Tho ’First UR <strong>Army</strong> thoraforc cn1cul:tcd tho factcx<br />
to bc approximtolg 24 pounds pcr mcn pur 9w. 54 of thc<br />
12th ,!amy nroup oonpurrGd in thcr First UY -vta FGOO~ORdntions,<br />
nnd tho 24 pounds por r3nn pcr day ff&tOr was adoptcd<br />
nnd usca TOT approxhatoly two months nftcr D-Day. 5<br />
b,. b3tcr oporctiona ComCnoud in tho EUrOpom “hmtor<br />
of Oporr.tlons, studios wLro m.do on consmpticn rates to<br />
Eovclog plnnnfng fnctors based upon oxporlonoc, It ms soon<br />
rocognlaod thpt tho faotor prcviowly ncocptcd in tho oonputnCion<br />
of tho’day of mpply for potroloum, oil nnB lubriognt<br />
pr&uo*,s I nwcly, 24 pounds par nan pcr Cay, ms 01:coasivo,<br />
an?. this figure wcs disoilrdtd in favor of tho fagtor<br />
15.47, fis origina].lg P ~ O ~ O Sby C ~ tho ahid “11tWtCl’IXiStQr.<br />
or L4s tho rapid advc.ncc, ?.cross tho Continent pro-<br />
- 152 -<br />
+$-s-T-R-I-G-T-E-D
B-E-S-T-F+I-C-T-'E-D<br />
gressod, additional experience facSual data was.accmulatcd<br />
and compilod by tho Fotroloun and Fuola Section, Office of<br />
the Chief'?mrtcmester, as of 31 Dcoeffihsr 194b.9 These<br />
factors vwo basGd unon tho conswption of petrolom, oil<br />
nnd lubricents frmi '6 JUaC 1944 to 31 Dcombcr 1944 by r.11<br />
Unitod P.tp.tc8 Forces,.nnd as I? result ft emward rovision<br />
of proviaus OstimFltos, particliLnrly In th6 casc of allied<br />
products, IWclS LEldG.<br />
d, !bo Conmanding CGncra1, 123 .Amy c;rou.p, lr.tLr<br />
eubnitted to tho Co"nding Crofrcrnl, &ropean Thcnter 02 .<br />
Oporntions, United Rtntos b.rr~,a roport on thc potrolcw,<br />
oil nnd 1 brlcGnt consmption from 1.4up,wt 1944. to 28 Elibrunry<br />
1945.tf ' mcso figuros wcrc -nnnlpzed ma ncw factorE<br />
WC~Orscommendct! fcjr ostimtlnfl t!m ro;ulre2onts for fiold<br />
f.orces. Rocormondod fnctors pcr mn per dsy wre:<br />
-1ton Gcllons Founds<br />
IT-80 1.0153 8.2526<br />
Dicsol O i l ,0353 42773<br />
Xagino Oils ,0234 ,2032<br />
Qcar Oil .0028 .0025<br />
Grcascs .0012 ,0123<br />
Keroseno ,0051 ,0436<br />
Thoee above figures WGrE bQSGd on ration strcngth and illcluded<br />
a 20$ inorease for additional rnisoellanoous units.<br />
Pnragraphe 6 & 7 of th 8 reGort or0 quotcd J.n oxplamtion Qf<br />
thOEQ revised factors. 3<br />
"6. A nurvoy of tho strength figuroe of tlw mjor<br />
comw-3da indicates that thcro is normally n lnrge<br />
perce.it.i@e of troops in ench sroo who am serviced<br />
by n g1rr.m omand but whosc numcr!.cnl strunfitfitas<br />
ztro not lncluclod in tho ::.ssignncd i:nd nttachcd<br />
strength figurcj 02 thc br,sic com?.cd. TkIa aocountod<br />
for additional stronTth (4ir Form, Communications<br />
Zona troops, Allied trooy, oto.)<br />
vnrios bctwon 20 nnr! 35 pcircont of thc bnsio<br />
strength figllroe of th3 oonrmr?nd and pono'rnlly<br />
oorrosgonds to the ratloc. strength. ,Bquricnoo<br />
has provcn thnt tho factors, a8 ofltablishod in<br />
tho 1.w.rtcmasta ~orviocBof wouco natn, onlling<br />
for 15.47 pounds ?or mn p~?:dey md acnputad<br />
on the notup.1 c.ssigned cnd nttcohsc? strcmgth, .<br />
d3finitoly rosults in a surplus of ell POL itwas,<br />
with thG cxcop-tion of koroson.0. .Thus, it-ia appnrcnt<br />
tktt the factor is oxoessivo, I'lhGro&s, the<br />
strongttii figuro is insuffizicnt. Thc two conponsating<br />
wrors, howovcr havc hc.d the nct rcsult<br />
of ostabllshing qwiltities in toma of doys of'<br />
eupply on a mom or less workehlc hsie.<br />
''7. TO cstPLhl18h thG <strong>Supply</strong> Of POL ItOI<strong>US</strong> on<br />
mor0 oxact basis and to provide unifcrdty<br />
thmughout thG thontcr it is nrOpOSGd:<br />
"a. Thnt now factors IJG cstcbllshd, bascd<br />
- 153 -<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E -D
H-B-S-I'-H-L -G-18-E-JJ<br />
upon actual cxporicncr. which will call for tho<br />
propor proportion of all FOL itoms.<br />
"b. That tho basis for applying such fac-<br />
tors bc on tho ration strongth ratahathan on thc<br />
aotual asaipnod and attached strungth of tiic command.<br />
%, That tho ncw factors bo bascd on a high<br />
avcraqc ueo of caoh product rathcr than thc oxact<br />
avcrauga. On this basis, amios will bG adcqutc-<br />
ly providcd for ovGr a pcriod of tirnc eltbough<br />
i;hGrc may bo short poriods of oxtondcd action or<br />
unusual activity in which tho actual consumption<br />
will bc grcatcr than tho cornputcd day of sw?ply.<br />
In planning for pcriods of abnormal activity,<br />
allowances will naturally bo ma& for additional<br />
quantitios.I7<br />
234. Factors Finally Dovolopod.<br />
a. Tho f$tnti8tiCS Scotion, Office of the Aasistant<br />
Chicf of qtaff, G-4, Suprano Xiadquartms, +lid 3pcditionary<br />
Forccs, compilcd,a ropcrt on conoumption fig- .<br />
urce from 24. Fcbmry to 23 Itarch 1945 for tho First, Third,<br />
and Winth <strong>US</strong> MOB, an3 trom 24 February 1945 to 21 IZarch<br />
1945 Tor tho %VGrLtth <strong>US</strong> ?.my and tho First Frcnah ,UXW<br />
(*.mondix 18),. This roport is in mrcommt with the factors<br />
as iinally flovclopod.<br />
b. Aftor mor ten months of exjxricrncc in supply<br />
of forcos in thc Xurcpcan Tb-oatcr ugdcr combat conditions,<br />
tho followinR factors wcrc mrkod out ae rc~irosontativr.of<br />
tho roquiromcnts for fuol and lu ricw.ts for thG Zuropoan<br />
Thoatcr undor combat conditione:B<br />
IPT-80 1.43 Gallons/man/dny<br />
Dicsol fucl .10 It<br />
Ecrcscno .om I<br />
"rhitc gasoline .002 11<br />
PhT 10 onginc oil ,0069 n<br />
SAX 30 onRinG oil ,0252 If<br />
SAX 50 ongino oil ,0105 1)<br />
RAE 90 guar o il .0122 tt<br />
Greascs 0 and 1 ,0166 pounds/man/day<br />
Groascs 2 and 3 0091 17<br />
Groaso 4 .ooll I!<br />
This represents about 177 toil# -pr divisional slioo of<br />
40,000 mon or approximatclg 11.7 pounds pcr man por day.<br />
0. Factors dOVClOpCd by tho offioo Of tho Chicf<br />
%nrtcrmastcr varicd SawWhQt fro3 thosc Rbovo. The figuro<br />
- 154 -<br />
R-E-5-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
3-E-S-T-A-T-C-T-E-D<br />
rccommondcd was 13.48 pounds pcr mnn por day, broken down<br />
11s follocvs:ll<br />
ZIT-80 12 00 pounds/man/day<br />
OthGr fUOlS 1.00 n<br />
Lubes -242<br />
Total 13.4% I<br />
Thc diacrLpnncg bctwcm thcsc factors r.nd those dcvdoncd<br />
bv thu Area Petrolam Office nppnrently liLs in tho us0 of<br />
di ffcrcdt oonsunption records RS wGll ?s difforont manpower<br />
rigurcs.<br />
23 5. Conclwions ,<br />
R. That tb mcthods and proccdures of computing<br />
loAisticnl f ectors wLro gsnerally sotisfnctory.<br />
b. Tit tho fnctors as finally dcvelopcd and concnrrod<br />
in by thc vnricus -goncibs concGrncd v&rC SntiSiWTtOIy.<br />
236. €?ccom-wnc?,atlcb. That PGrtiiIGIlt aOCtrhCS, techniques<br />
and ‘br Dooortmont publiccticns bo nmltndd. by approprIRt6<br />
Pgoriclas of the ‘ror Dcpurtnont.<br />
- 155 -<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D<br />
Bibliography<br />
Chapter 18<br />
1. Dictionarp of United Qtntas Anny T~rins,!IN 20-205, dtd<br />
18 S a 44.<br />
2. OtafT OPficor's Piold Ibnucl, Organization, TGchnicol<br />
and LoRistical nata, m 101-10 oot 43.<br />
3. nuartc-mastar Scrvicc.Rofcrcnco nata, (Section 111,<br />
Chapter 3, Volume 111, Hq, SOS, CTQIJSA, dtd 1 Tcn 44.*(19)<br />
4. stmdnrd ''ilitary VChiclcS, TI1 9-2800, dtd 6 "3r 43.<br />
6. 12th ,2131~"roup Yinal ffitcr Action Papart, ChnFtcr 4,<br />
26 rlul - 14 SCO 44. *(32)<br />
7. J,tr, '.qs, 12th O..smy Croup to Commanc?ing Goncral, EMUZA<br />
dtd 25, ?lor 45. *(bo)<br />
8. Crea Totroloum DfPicc I:xporience Rqcrt, UndatQd. *(16)<br />
10. Ccnsukytion Rates of U8 Forccs In the 71~11Advance to<br />
the XhinG, PRmF, dt2 24 ADr 45 (TrepGrod by C;totisr;ics<br />
Suction, (3-4niv.)<br />
11, n,uartsrmstcr Oporational Analysis ?lo. 4, aubj: :'Quartormastor<br />
Pounds par Ian ncr Dcy, noted, 17 movembor 1945.<br />
*Number in parentheses I s Catalog IWabcr used in Inventor<br />
or Phtori&l, ($ Study No. 109, (2lans 111<br />
~uGply7,file R ~ ol/ll.<br />
- 156 -<br />
R-E-5-T-R-I-C -T-Z-D
R-B-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D<br />
CW'JXR 19<br />
S%ICTION i<br />
LISSIOi;, ORoBilIQTIOIJ AND FUNCTION<br />
237. Ussion. The mission of the Gesglfse Sup;Lg' Company<br />
is t o opermss I11 distributint and bulk reduotion points<br />
for the supply and issue of gasoline, oil and lubricants to the<br />
using forces. It was the operatink base of Class I11 suyply<br />
in the European Theater of <strong>Operations</strong>, both in the Communications<br />
Zone and in the Combat Eone.3 It operated ht beachheads,<br />
truckheads, rpilheads, gipeline terminals, exid airfields. St<br />
also establishea roadside fillin& stations .3<br />
238. Orr.anization.1<br />
a. The Gasoline Sup,dy Company is a flexible orLanization,<br />
oomposed of a company liendquarters and tido operating<br />
platoons. Each ylatoon can operate inaependently. A total of<br />
56 laborers are provided for handline.<br />
b. There are 21 truoks, 2A-toa oargo and trailers<br />
arganio in the company for hauling gasoline a d allied proaucts..<br />
The following teohnical equipment is organic to the coupany:<br />
12 - extinauishers, fire, oarbon-dioxide, permanent<br />
sl!ut-off 1.5 pounds<br />
1 - oleaning equipaent, bun, gasoline, engine<br />
driven<br />
- tanks, colla&ble, 3,000 gallon capacity,<br />
for r;et,rolew products<br />
3200 - cans, gasoline, five gallons<br />
4. - pumps, gasoline dispensikg, 100 gallons<br />
per minute<br />
4 - p~mp~, Eaooline dispensing, 30 gallons<br />
per ninute<br />
4 - pumps, barrel, kerosene or gasoline, with<br />
hose and nozzle<br />
8 - pumps, barrel, oil dispensing<br />
Q. Experience proved the organic fire figlitiw equipment<br />
to be inadequate, unless used imclediately at the start of<br />
a fire. Once the Pire wa8 w ell started, the limit$ ran e and<br />
core of effectiveness of the extinguisher rendered it reffitjively<br />
useless, while the danger to using personnel was correspondingly<br />
hlgh.5<br />
239. Functions.<br />
a. The col;rpany is desicned to handle all matters<br />
pertahing to the receipt, storage and issue of' $aeoline and<br />
- 157 -<br />
R-E-5-T-R-ILC-T-E-D
allied prodacts.2<br />
P-E-8-T-R-I-C-T-E-D<br />
b. The corspany normally issued Lasoline on a oan-<br />
for-can exchange basis. It was res2onslble for the cleaning,<br />
refillin&a and ta@nL of the empty cans. It received gasoline<br />
in five-gallon cans or in bulk by pipeline or rail tank<br />
cars. ,men it received &asolineIn bulk, the company was res-<br />
FOnSlble for its reduction into five-gallon or 55-gaI.lon containers<br />
suitable for issue. Retail distribution of gasoline<br />
in 55-gallon drums was held to a mini" except in the Southern<br />
Line of Communications where It was extensively used. Distributlon<br />
by this method always elicited complaints I?" cammanders<br />
and $uflrtermasters of combat units because of tho difficulty<br />
in handlin; the full 55-gallon drum. The use of this<br />
method resulted in numerous cases of hei-nia and it should not<br />
be ornployed except as a last resort& The cmpany establish-<br />
ed distributing points in such a manner as to facilitate receipt,<br />
storage and issue, and take advantage of camouflage<br />
and di8,Jersion. Distributint goints were normally located<br />
within a convenient distance of the usin, units and of the<br />
souroo of sugply from the next higher echelon.<br />
0. Each operating platoon has the followink rated<br />
daily oapaoity, assuming that the trips from railheads or<br />
bulk redu tion points to issue pointo conwe an average of<br />
one hour: f<br />
Bulk reduction of 72,000 gallons of gasoline and<br />
oleaning of 3000 five-gallon buns and 300 55-gallon drums<br />
8. In the &noliean Theater of <strong>Operations</strong>, the aotual<br />
cnpaoits of gasoline supv oompanies was considerably leas<br />
than the re& capacity. lfi Lo additional labor attaolied,<br />
and a normal trip the of two houra, the company could nornal-<br />
ljr receive in bulk, reduce and issue e.Liproximately 50,000 &allons<br />
per day. :nth one Quertermester service campany attaohed<br />
for labor, and all reoeipts in five Lallon cans, the capao-<br />
ity was raised to a maximun of pOO,~v30 eallons.<br />
2110. Troop Basis and Control.<br />
ah The Commandin, General, Comunicatione Zone,<br />
allocated Gasoline Supyly Com;:anies to sections and base sections,<br />
Communicatione Zone, and to <strong>Army</strong> Groups depending upon<br />
their availability. The <strong>Army</strong> Group in turn allocated the companies<br />
to the Armies on the basis that normally one oompany is<br />
required to servioe armv troops and one coolpang to service a<br />
typ3 corps, or that a total of five to eieht companies is required<br />
for a field army.3<br />
b. The ooa1,any was normally attached to a <strong>Quartermaster</strong><br />
Battalion for administration and technical oontrol.<br />
The battalion in turn, was attached to a <strong>Quartermaster</strong> Group<br />
that operated directly under tLe &arternraster of the Advance<br />
or Base Seotions, Conununioations Zona, or under the Arqr Quartermaeter.<br />
At times, functional control was eliminated from<br />
tha <strong>Quartermaster</strong> Group and waa direct frou the Section or<br />
m v <strong>Quartermaster</strong> to the company or ba%tai.ion.b<br />
- 158 -
-R-E-S-T-RI-C-T-E-D<br />
241. Bulk Delivery and Reduction.<br />
a. Delivery of bulk gasoline was normcllp msde by<br />
pipe linc or rail tank cars. Delivery by air was exyerhsnted<br />
with and. provc?d overwhelmingly successful, notably durint the<br />
leriod 30 Xcirch to 14 b1by 1945 durin, which time an aggrecate<br />
of 43,021 net tons were successfully delivered to thti First,<br />
Third, Seventh and Rinth <strong>US</strong> Armies. This method has a distinct<br />
disadvantage, pakticularly over loni loeiutic lines4<br />
The delivery to the Bruieg just mentionod consumed almost half<br />
as much gasoline as it delivered, expressed in terns of aviation<br />
e;nd motor Lasoline roso~ctively.13 In some instances<br />
tank trucks were usod to cai-ry the bulk Essoline beyond the<br />
facilities of the pipe Uno or rail cars, ond required the<br />
punpint: of the Lasolinc frm the tank cars to tho tank trucks.<br />
This dns done by use of the 100 gallon pcr minute dispenser,<br />
and later with a 350 gallon per minute llispsnsu mounted on a<br />
trailer .7<br />
b. Bulk reduction (decanting) was acoomplished at<br />
all types of installations, althGueh normally this operation<br />
was centered in the Communications zone.3 Tho four 100 gallon<br />
per minute dispensers were utilized for this operation. Addi-:<br />
tional dispensers were often mcessary to obtain additional<br />
capcity. Large uzvitg dispensin; s2stems in lieu of power<br />
dispensers were used only in an emerF_ency,sin06 experience<br />
provod them too lieht for hLsa duty. They overheated repidly<br />
and presented a fire hazard,83,10 The uesi@ of the 100 tallon<br />
per minute dis,>cnsar proved a constant souroa of difficulty.<br />
It is suspended fron ono ond only, and as the bearin@ became<br />
worn the rotor habitually got off center and soorod the housin&,<br />
necessituting excessive ra,airs. It was necessary to mass<br />
produce 10CQlly spare cafltings for the rotor and to rebore the<br />
housine to permit the opsration of the ovorsiscd casting. A<br />
100 Callon per minuto dispnser dosiLned with %he rotor mountod<br />
in a journal at each and would have buen more aatisfactory.13<br />
c. For efficient bulk rdduction and issue it was<br />
necessary to have largo numbers of five-&allon Gasoline cans<br />
available. Tha allovranco of 3,200 cor~pqvwas insufficient,<br />
and augneotation from theater stocks was thc rule.l3 In the<br />
Communications zone, operations at pipa linc terminals required<br />
frori eicht to ll+ five-gallorh oaas daily for each five-&allon<br />
om issuod to usily units.<br />
242. Packaged Recaipts. The dalivcry of kasoline in fiva-<br />
gallon cans oliminated thL nccasity fer docanting and shplified<br />
opurations. All rocaipts en beachheads were packaged.<br />
There, distnnces wore short and rw$irQirAbnta were normally<br />
smnll.5 Rcceipts were also ,ackn,ed when air lift WOS usad<br />
for dolivery in enerbencius. Issue was mde in such cases diroct<br />
from tho airfield or fron nearby distributing points.6<br />
243. <strong>Operations</strong>.<br />
a. Tha operation of tht. company oonformed in Lcnara1<br />
with preseribcd prooedura. Aupentation in pcl'sonnel and<br />
transpcrtation was normal, The roadside fillin&, stctions which<br />
wore establishcd in many areas to serve individual vohioles<br />
provod inadequate for larLe melo consumption. They were effective,<br />
howavbr, in eliminating individual vahiolee from tho<br />
traffio of distributix pointis and truckheads.<br />
b. Accurate bookkeepinc was casuntiol in order to
R-E- S-T-R-14-T-E-U<br />
mointfiin a balanced stock of pctrolem products End to kuep<br />
higher headquartcrs informed 05 tho consumption rata cnd of<br />
the status of supply at 811 simea.12 Thdu waru 110 standard<br />
accounting forms, howt,vur, and each army prescrib~dits ovm.<br />
The genaral inexperience of tho gw compaay yursonnul in ac-<br />
counting procedure, coupled with the vsriations in procedure<br />
among the armies, resulted at timus in coafusion ond general<br />
inaccuracy of reoords.<br />
c. Trans ortotion was short. Ths maxhum rated ccpccity<br />
of the two pfatoons is 144,000 @llons. Tho 21 trucks,<br />
two and one-half ton, ossiignod arc capablo of trnns;lorting<br />
npproximatdy 16,000 gcllons, thc Pull 3 ,200 containtr allowance,<br />
esch trip. Due to thu distmoas betwcon bulk wduction<br />
points and truckhsnds or distributing points, End the thd Tuquired<br />
to Lond nnd unload vehiclos ench trip Dormfilly consumed<br />
two hours. In thu normal 10 hour &orking day, thoufore, an<br />
tiVW&gQ of only E0,000 gallons could bo transported in orkcnic<br />
vahiclQs without overloading.<br />
244. Conclusions.<br />
a. That thu rated capccity of tho Gasolind. <strong>Supply</strong><br />
Company was not attained due to S~OP~UE~ of personnel and<br />
transportation.<br />
b. That tho fire-fighting equipraaont Wac innclequate.<br />
c. That tho 3O-g&llon-p6r-s~nutt &isdenser wns not<br />
used due to its inedequzcy, snd tho nwiber of 100-~~illon-perminute<br />
dispensers ofton provbd insuffioient. The design of<br />
the 100-gallon-por-ninutu dispenser also proved inadequate.<br />
245. Recommendations.<br />
a. That tho mount of prsonnel and transportation<br />
and the number of gosolinu d.rm8 be incruased ii1 sufficient<br />
quantities to enGblo thc company to mebt its norm1 rcqdirementa.<br />
b. That EL firo-fighting sootion, with suitable<br />
eo_u.ipment, be included in each platoon.<br />
c. That pertinent doctrines, tacliniques nnd Tables<br />
of Or&.anization and dquipinmt be amended by nplpopririte agencies<br />
of the Wnr I)opartmGnt.<br />
- 160 -<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I-C -T-E-D
R-E-S-T-H-I-C-T-E-D<br />
Bibliotraphy<br />
Chaptcr 19<br />
1. Qatod 21<br />
2. ai 10-465, ;Luc.rt~..rrarister Bnndbook IIGosoline <strong>Supply</strong><br />
Company", datud 5;r.y 1943.<br />
3. Study on Ogorntions of 4.: Grsolins <strong>Supply</strong> Compcnlcs,<br />
brtliovd to hcve ori;inc:tod nt Hq ZTO<strong>US</strong>A, undcLtud. *(l3)<br />
b. Study on Oporntlous cf ;luc.rtcrmastu Gosolinu Sug?ly<br />
Caipnny, Hq 12th hFd7 Group, undated. *(34).<br />
5. First <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong> Roport of Oyiratlons, Annex No. 14, 20<br />
0ctobL.r 1943 to 1AuLust 1944. *(44).<br />
6. Aftir Action SeEort, Third <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong>, Quu.?rtewosttrr,<br />
1 Aueust 1944 t o 9 Aky 1945. (Airil C;icrntions).<br />
7. AGF Raport Bo. 830, dflted 9 April 1945. *(23 ) .<br />
a. h:amo for record - Visit to Firat cnd Ninth Armies,<br />
Re6dquorters Twelfth <strong>Army</strong> Group, Quuertermmter Section,<br />
dcted 17 1:ovsmbcr 1944. *(35).<br />
9. L;w~D C4 to Quartermastsr, F<strong>US</strong>AG, dated 13 b;ny 1944.<br />
*(41!.<br />
10. Informal Report on Ilecenting Oporetlons from Thoator<br />
Chief &uartormstm to tho Gonoral Board, undatod. *(55).<br />
11. AGF Raprt 110. 981, dated 22 1;ny 191~5. *(29).<br />
12. Oca1 Cir Lottor No. 10, HwaaoUortGr3 Seventh Amy,<br />
dated 13 April 1945.<br />
Cmients, LetterI Thootcr Chiof Quartornosttr, 13 DUO<br />
45, to tho Goncroi Board. *(56).<br />
* - Number in prcnthcsus 1s Catalog Numbvr used in<br />
Invontory of Uaterial, 0;Study No. lo9 (Class<br />
111 supply), File R 401j11.<br />
- 161 -<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
R-E- S-T-R- I-C-T-E-D<br />
CHAPTER 20<br />
CLASS In (SOLIDFUELS) OFEXATIOI.JS<br />
SICTION 1<br />
GXNEFAL<br />
246. Source and Availability_.<br />
8. The supply ~'fSolid fuels throughout opera-<br />
tions in the mropean Theater was rarely adequate, The<br />
suDplg of Coal immediately following the invasion of Normandy<br />
was critLcal. Indigenous production in France,<br />
Relgium and YOllsnd was approximately 50 percent of normal,<br />
and there was an even greater reauction in the amount of<br />
imported coal which, under norms1 c nditiom, hsd provided<br />
one-third of civilian requirements.8 Coal was requisitioned<br />
and supplied from the Uzited Kingdom. Limitations<br />
on ship transport provented large scele im@orts from either<br />
the TJnited Kingdom or the United Stntes. Accordingly, reqUb%iY3Ita<br />
were met largely from local sources, A system<br />
of priorities was established to insure that both military<br />
and essential civilian requirements were fllled.7<br />
b. The ahcrt supply of coal in the fall of 1944<br />
forced the exploltation of wood resources of fiance. Readycut<br />
wood 888 Durchased an8 cuttirlg r!ghts were secured in<br />
forests in various Tarts of France. Results, however, were<br />
not satisfactory. Transportation was short, and it waa<br />
often found that the cut wood rllocated by the French waa<br />
not available or that it could not be moved out when an<br />
attempt was made to pick it up. Of the 104,722 cords of<br />
cut wood allocated by the French government between 1 November<br />
19 4 and 30 April 1945, only 18,888 cords were de-<br />
livered. 8<br />
c. Production of coal in Germany was negiigible<br />
by 9 V:ay 1945. The overall military and civilian auropean<br />
demand exceeded the supply. Stops were taken immediately<br />
to reorganize the luines and resume production, but it was<br />
neoesswy also to or anize production of fuel wood to supplement<br />
coal supply. i!<br />
247. Comparison of F~'ilels.6 For troop <strong>US</strong>E, the fuel<br />
value of one cord of wood is considered the equlvalent of<br />
one ton of bituminous coal. With wood cutting tools and<br />
equipment normally available, production of one cord of<br />
firewood normally requires three man days. The production<br />
of on8 ton of coal normally requires one man day. In order<br />
to obtain maximum fuel value of wood 8 seasoning period<br />
of from six to eight months should be allcwed subsequent<br />
to the felllng of the tree. Coal has full heating valus<br />
as soon a8 mined. To transport a quantity Of Wood aqua1<br />
ln fuel value to a quantity of coal requires more than<br />
twice the traneportabion facilities. Thus, coal, in addition<br />
to b6hg less bulky, more effioiect and easi6r to<br />
handle than wood, is also preferable to wood from both<br />
produotion and transportation atandpoints.<br />
248. Alloflances. In order to oonserve coal and insure<br />
- 162 -<br />
R-E-8-T-R-I-C -T-E-D
R-2-S-IF-R-I-C -T-E -D<br />
its iasue for the essential requirements a system f - wjarities<br />
and allowances was established as fo1lows:g<br />
a. Hospitals - 12 pound6 per bed per day during<br />
winter, f iVG pounds per bed per day during ather. seBisons.<br />
b. Coffee Rcasters - 400 pounds per day per roaster.<br />
e. space heatin?, cooking and hot water - four<br />
pounds per man per day du&g mace' heatinpmn only.<br />
During other seasons, one and one-halP pounds Der nhn per<br />
day for cooking and hot water.<br />
d. Engineer blacksmith forges - six -Jounds per<br />
forse per day.<br />
e. Others - static bakeries, bath units, laundries,<br />
?ed cross, et- authorized by the Chlef <strong>Quartermaster</strong>.<br />
Fuel wood was substituted for coal as necessary. Local pro-<br />
ourement of solid fuels, except wood, was prohibited except<br />
where specifically authorized.<br />
249. Procedure. The su>ply of solid fuels was a Tu r<br />
termaster function ana followed normal supply c1mnnels.I: ,g<br />
The Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Sup-<br />
ply Division, was the overall controlling agency. It<br />
soreened both military and civilJan requirements, and allo-<br />
cated the fuele to the sepalate agencies based on priorities<br />
and availability or the fuels.ls2 The Qu&r',erm&ster<br />
Corps, based upon the allocation recelved, procured, stored<br />
and Issued the fuels to the uainq forces based on the pri-<br />
oiity and allowances established.<br />
250. Requirements<br />
SEOTION 2<br />
O"TOP?S<br />
a. Coal for the iriitlal invasion of the continent<br />
w4s ship_ned from the Trdted Kingdom. Shipments were made<br />
based upon estimates of requirements submitted by supreme<br />
FTeadquarters, Alliea Ex editionary Forces, and approved by<br />
the Eritish '!far Office.4 The init:.al estimate for the<br />
United states military foroes WES mads by the First <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong><br />
and submitted to the 21st <strong>Army</strong> Group for consolidation and<br />
approval. by Supreme Headquarters. As the sjtuation grogeseed<br />
the Chief <strong>Quartermaster</strong> reoeived the estimates from<br />
the armies, air fcroeg, Kavy on shore, and section <strong>Quartermaster</strong>s;<br />
edited and oonsolldated the Pequirements; and submltted<br />
the estimated total requirements for all United States<br />
Forces to supreme Heaciquar$ers, Similar eatinates of requirements<br />
by other Allied Forces were submitted for screenine<br />
and approval to Supreme Eeadquarters.9<br />
b. each estimate containod a statement of anticipated<br />
fuel consmption during t'Ie calendar nonth, a consolidated<br />
requisition for the following month, and an<br />
estimate of fuel needs for the next sucoeeding month.9<br />
- 163 -<br />
a-E-5-T-R-I-C-T-2-D
251. Responsibility.<br />
R-E-ST-R-I-C-T-E-D<br />
a. supreme Eeadquarterg maintained control throush-<br />
out the operation. As the operations on the continent pro-<br />
gressed and more countries were liberated or occupied,<br />
Suprema Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, reorgan-<br />
ized and decentralized control. It established, in each<br />
country, a Solid Fuels Sub-Seotion composed of the military<br />
and civilian representatives of governmen transportation,<br />
and the coal mines or production A9 the sub-<br />
sections were organized, the Allied Forces submitted tieir<br />
estlmates of rue1 requirements within ench coun r scparately<br />
to the sub-section of the country concerned.trg The subsection<br />
operated directly under the Solid Fuels Section of<br />
Supreme Headquarters, and was responsibls for:3<br />
Alvising on all matters pertaining to indigenous<br />
production ai solid fuels, and<br />
for carrying out instructions of Supreme<br />
Headquarters relative to Solid Fuels production.<br />
Rcrsening essential civilian requirements.<br />
Presentation of military solid fuels requireffients.<br />
lreparation of proposed a.llocations for<br />
approval.<br />
Arrangement and coordination with appro-<br />
priate civilian and military authorities<br />
for the dlstribution of solid fuels within<br />
the country to the normal divtribution<br />
cor-tera, by railway, water or road.<br />
Coordination of the movement and bistri-<br />
bution of exported or imported solld fuels.<br />
b. As ,he operating solid fuels aqency for the<br />
United States military forces, the Chlsf '),uartermaster was<br />
responsible for:4,8<br />
Submitting estimates afl required and xe-<br />
CeiVhg the allOOtitiGn8.<br />
Coordinating with the Chief of Transportation,<br />
Zuropean Thcater of Oporatlons,<br />
for the shipment and delivery of coal from<br />
continental point of origin r port to<br />
destination for consumption. t?<br />
Maintaining daily contact with the Britiah<br />
Var Office for the implementing of the<br />
agree& coal shipmGnt Drogran.<br />
Accounting for all coal received from all<br />
sources by all United Dtates forces, except<br />
some coal procbed by the Goneral<br />
%chasing Agsnt by diroct neg0tiati0n.l~<br />
c. The <strong>Quartermaster</strong>s of the field armies were<br />
re8pOnsible for submitting sstiaates of fuel required, and<br />
- 164 -<br />
R-E-S-T-R-1-C-T-E-D
R-E-S-T -R-I-C-T-E-D<br />
for the procurenent, storage and issue of solid fuels to<br />
subordinate unlts for both military and essential civilian<br />
use.<br />
252. <strong>Operations</strong>.<br />
a. The Advance Seotion, Communications Zone, began<br />
solid fuels operations on the oontinent when sacked coal<br />
began to arrive early in July l9lJ+, and the first Advance<br />
Secti n OOSl dump was eetablished In Cherbourg on 14 July<br />
1944.q Deliveries of coal thrOUghOUt the operation failed<br />
to meet the allocations establishcd by Supreme Headquarters,<br />
dua princi ally to the shortage of production and trans-<br />
portation.f2,13<br />
b. Loce ocuremnt was at times instituted by<br />
the field forces.iipCoal was procurd by requisition from<br />
local Belgian and French mines efter approval of headquarters,<br />
Advanoe Section, or Canmunioations Lone. At times,<br />
when the situation was critical, representhtives from th<br />
armfcs were stationed at the dries to expedite shi ment fo<br />
coal was also prooured from captured snamg stocks.flt12.<br />
0. Considering the entire period of operations on<br />
the continent, a supply of coal was obtained barely adequate<br />
to meet military requirements on drastically reduced standards.<br />
The supply was always critical from D-Day until<br />
April 1945, at H$ioh time small stoo!? piles were eOQUmUlated.<br />
rlequirmasnts for essentfal civill3n use wero at the<br />
minimum standard to sustain communities.<br />
253. T)istribution.<br />
a. Distribution to the using units was made on<br />
the basis of the allowances eateblished by Supreme Head-<br />
quarters, In the Third <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong>, hOWtiVBr, It was necessery<br />
to reduce the allowances in ,Tanuary 1945, from four pounds<br />
per man to two pounds, and to request a decrease of1ppercent<br />
in consumption by a?!r&y ana corps headquarters.<br />
During the winter months of 1944-45 lasue of solid fuels<br />
was made by the armies a8 received.20 It was impossible<br />
to accumulate reserve stockpilee in the army areas until<br />
later In 1945 when the weather bocame less severe.12<br />
b. Dump distribution was normally maae either<br />
at army coal dumps, whioh stocked only aolid fuels, or at<br />
army Class IT1 sJppDly pints, which stocked solid futls in<br />
addition to normal supplies. In either case, the dumps<br />
were operated by <strong>Quartermaster</strong> service oompany personnel.<br />
Using units drew dirsot from the dumps. At other times,<br />
when the <strong>Army</strong> zone of <strong>Operations</strong> inoluded the coal mining<br />
district of Germany, ardes sometimes issued direct from<br />
the mines to the using units. martermester serviae coapany<br />
personnel pwformed the administrative work at tho<br />
minee and German ctvilians performed the labor.<br />
254. Conclusions,<br />
SECTION 3<br />
COIJCL<strong>US</strong>IONS AND RECOImNDATIOW<br />
a. That for operational use oonl is greatly<br />
- 165 -<br />
R-E-9-T-R-1-C-T-E-D
R-E-3-T-R-I -C-T-E-D<br />
preferable to WOO& us fuel becnuse it minimiaos the transportation<br />
problem and requires fewer mn-dLys of production.<br />
b. That the suaply of fuel for military require-<br />
ments t,v4r$~pbfained at the minimum standard. <strong>Supply</strong> for<br />
essent€nl civilian requiremnts was at the extreme minimum<br />
standard to suppcrt communities.<br />
o. Thet transportation and coal production were<br />
short of the established requirements.<br />
d. That organization and nathods and procedures<br />
used in the supply of solid fuels were generally suitable,<br />
but that the military forces were dependent at all times<br />
on ooncessions froIc governments of liberated countries for<br />
an adequate supply of coal.<br />
255. Recomendations.<br />
a. That copl be used in preference to wood whenever<br />
possible.<br />
b. That 511 possible steps be taken in future<br />
operations to plan and provide for produotion and shipment<br />
of fuele to meet both military and civilian requirements.<br />
- 166 -<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
R-E-S-T -R-I-Cl -T-E -D<br />
Pibliography<br />
Chapter 20<br />
i. .qclriinistrative !!em WC. L4, $HAET, dzted 2P Jan L5<br />
(?SO ITT,h r 5). *(4)<br />
2. innsx A, Adnioistrntive Kemo Wo. i+L+, SYAEF, dated<br />
13 April 45. “(4)<br />
3. :,&inlstretive !.0no No. 64, =Am, doted 28 Jsn 45<br />
(sec TIT, Par 6). *(41<br />
4. Addnietrotive Marc@ No. 44, WB,doted 28 Jan 45<br />
(Sec 111, Qar 7). *(4!<br />
5. 3” Tech Cir Ltr No. 16, Hq Com 2, dated 4 April 45.<br />
*(1.2)<br />
6. Infornfil Report to The Generel Boord, Quartorcaster<br />
Slcss I11 C erations, Theater Chiai Quertermster,<br />
undcted. *PI&)<br />
7. Operational History, Advance Section, Cm“n1cotions<br />
7flne 1943-1945 (Extrect fron Chapter VTI, Section 11)<br />
*P2J<br />
8. Administrative Memo No. 44, SHtXF, deted 28 Jen 45<br />
(SFC IT, Par 9) *(4)<br />
9. SOP No. dated 4 July 44 (Coal PrC -<br />
oedure)<br />
10. First TTS <strong>Army</strong> Report of <strong>Operations</strong>, 1 August 1944-<br />
22 Pebruer 19115 (Annex No. 10, Guartermaster Section<br />
?emrt). g(4j)<br />
11. After Action Eeport, Third <strong>US</strong> <strong>Army</strong>, Quartermuster<br />
@ectioc, 1 AWuBt 1’344 - 9 Mar 1945.<br />
12. 4fter Action %port, Ninth UF, Amy, dated lh Dec 44.<br />
13. Conferenoe with Captain VI. 14, Eunney, BAEF G-4.<br />
Solid TueIs Sub-Section, 15 June 1945.<br />
11,. Confsrence ;uIth Captain J. 8. Tolbert, Fifteenth <strong>US</strong><br />
<strong>Army</strong>, Solid ‘We16 Division, 17 Nov 1945.<br />
15. Comments Letter, Theater Chiof <strong>Quartermaster</strong>, 13 Dec 45,<br />
to The General Board. *( 56)<br />
* Nunber in parentheses is Dotalop Nmber used 14<br />
Inventory of bbteriels, Stud? No. 109, (Class<br />
I11 supply), fila R 401/11.<br />
- 167 -<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
CL.qs.5 I<br />
75<br />
60<br />
75<br />
Ltr.dated 29 Hov 1942-37.D.,Sabj.<br />
Levels of supply, Em.<br />
Cable It-97113 dated 20 June 1943.<br />
?able a-6493 dated 3 irec 1543.<br />
bb Ltr. dated 20 Jan 1944-;il.D.,<br />
75<br />
subj. Levels of supply.<br />
Ltr. dated 26 aril lYM-ii.D.,<br />
subj . Levels of supply.<br />
bo Ltr. dated 26 j.$ril 1944-W.D.<br />
Subj- Levels of <strong>Supply</strong>.<br />
60 Ltr. dated 23 ~ov1$4W,r.n.,<br />
50<br />
SSj. Levels 02 su;iply.<br />
Ckljle 3iAIX-4b9ll dated 3 Larch<br />
1945.<br />
L tile levels shmn were dutliorxeo. for y'l'criJ5~, the Chief <strong>Quartermaster</strong> voluntarily elected to<br />
utfii;e t k levels ~ shown beloui. Levels shmn reamed ii effect until I&reh l%5, at w15ch time<br />
levois conl'ormed to those sho:dli above.<br />
I<br />
I1<br />
III<br />
E<br />
P.x.
400.312 (C-4 SUD)<br />
SUBJXT: Rewlsitioninr and ::oveiient of SuDplies,<br />
28 Octobcr 19/d+<br />
TO : comand l.ng General, Smmunicetions Tone, .'PO GG7,<br />
1. ''rith the concurrence of your hea0.n-uarters, represea-<br />
tatives of e-4 and the Spocial.9taff Sections of this heod-<br />
quartcrs have followed throuph, fron the tine originated<br />
until supplies vme delivered, rec;.u?.sitions which wcrc ?laced<br />
by the First fray on 2G and 30 Septenher 191:.&. ,Illmpresentatives<br />
i"w repyired to reyort on their observations while<br />
on t?ie mission, tozet!icr vith any reco;moiidetionu t&y consitered<br />
a-,yropriate.<br />
2. rertinent cozicnts in the report- of these zepresen-<br />
tatives have been extracted and ooiidensed pi13 are agpended<br />
hereto as inclosures 1 t o 12 inclusive. In acdition iiovei'nunt<br />
tables of truck and. rail Crans:>ortation aro likewise aplienfied<br />
as inclosures lj t o 17, inclusive.<br />
3. Prom th o'mervations of our representatives the<br />
followinp conclu.sions are drawn:<br />
a. The stock records of the Services in Treadquarters,<br />
Coimimications Zone are and vrill yeain inaccurete un- .<br />
ti1 proper cor.mwice.tione me established. The eutkority for<br />
dli-eotinc shipments is centralized., and procedures aholitGd<br />
by the services for thelr depots R ~ Bunifom.<br />
b. me Service re?resentatives In the Po~-md.y Base.<br />
section ?Teadque.rters nake many ChnnpS Ln the Slii??i)iw ortors,<br />
releases, or r.equisitions sent dovm frcn Puis.<br />
c. P.s Indicated in the observation Jf the 1:edical<br />
and Pinnal representatives, the desi,qatioii of only one of<br />
many de?ots for fillin,? roquisiti ons eliilinateo tyie :,ossibilitg<br />
of obtaining all itert:is recuested on the requisitions<br />
even If all are available in thc sevcral depots.<br />
d. The faot that many aystam of docmentation exist<br />
in the depots nelresmit a?Foar that no unifora procerlui'e has<br />
been established. .?roper tally outs, end mybills for rail<br />
and truck wou.ld ellainate nany errprs in shi:>mnts and vrould<br />
assist in expeditinc delivarles. .lany shi,pionts reach tho<br />
Amdes with no or little evidence as to I:.hst the itca3 me<br />
supposed to be and the identifj.cfltioon :dth my particular<br />
ahippinc ordm or Fequisition is iGlgrObnbl6, if not impossible,<br />
Any snstmi, uniformly establf shed, ~711icbvould carry<br />
tho identity of the rcquisitlcii number of the Arw, the item<br />
shipped, end the .,roper destination would lilaterial1:r I~IXCOVB<br />
the flow Of Sl?~pliQS.<br />
e. The train symbols of asslnnsd. trains iluot be<br />
aaintalned from point of oriqin to ultimate destinatiOn.<br />
Further, standard trains should be formed in such rmnnor thct<br />
they may be keyt intact fron origin to destination. This<br />
would assist In an even flow of supply and. enable the accur<br />
ate passin? of infomntion to be sent to the reglllatinCr,<br />
station.<br />
AP?m!DC: 2 of 3 pagas - 1 -
f. Lack of control of truck s!?lyaents an< delqvs,<br />
in soxe iistmces renulted in fellures to receive s n ~ q<br />
ahi:i.ients. 110 thorouc?l check could be xade at i>e Z?s along<br />
t:ia rhiite Of lnolm COilL*OgS m
R-+~;-T-BI-+T-,+L)<br />
within 24. hours of the shipped, all supplies shipped , requisitions<br />
of the .!Jmy th& cfillod tor these supplies, nethod of<br />
shiment, and if TracticaSlc, ex:?ectc& orrlval time,<br />
e. h syten of comunication be estahlished which<br />
will enable shiments to be ?roperly controlled , inforiytlon<br />
fonvarvled grom>tly, an& oontrol of trains ct railheads Imgroved,<br />
f. Eupplies beinc transferred fron truok to rail<br />
be kept to3cther by claoses and Services.<br />
e. r;u$ply ohlpents he given precedence, exce:2t for<br />
hospitfll treins.<br />
h. Information on supply ?olicies and. yrooeGures be<br />
adequately Rnd promptly' communimted to all 6uborCinel;es that<br />
handle su7ply s:iipients.<br />
i, ".hen itom o.re not aveilable, Informstion be<br />
furnished proqtly to the Amies whioh will enable them to<br />
plan on the future availability or the iten.<br />
finish,<br />
j. Trains oarry the sea3 doslpqation frm start to<br />
17 Inclosures (not included)<br />
For the A%y Grou!, Cormander:<br />
/s/ Raymond Otone Jr.<br />
RAYNOIJD.STON2 Jli.<br />
Colonel, AMI<br />
Asat Adj Cen
HOW SENT TE1 S” ”_--<br />
1. Xailhead (as of 2400) ^__-I-c<br />
2, Reporting Unit _-I--<br />
3. Total StrenLth for Rations , ________<br />
4. List of Org~~ic units w/strength (inoluda in Item 31-<br />
5.<br />
6.<br />
7.<br />
8.<br />
9.<br />
10.<br />
11.<br />
12.<br />
13 -<br />
14.<br />
15<br />
16.<br />
17<br />
18.<br />
19 m<br />
- ~ ~-<br />
Llst of Attz.ciled Units w/stren&h (inclucle in Iten 3)-<br />
-lDesi&nation of Eender Time Signed<br />
AUTIIORI!UD TO BE<br />
SENT W CLEAR<br />
signature of Officer Signcture & Grade of<br />
?ri ter<br />
Incl No. 1, 602<br />
Third uny, 1943.
SUBJJ~CT: ;uar termast er Re Guireuents ,<br />
VOC/JLD/bq<br />
7 October 191,4<br />
TO : Co~mmendingGeneral, Continental dvance Section,<br />
U. S. Lrmy, AFTdlITIOI?: <strong>Quartermaster</strong>.<br />
1. Reference letter, this headr;ucirters, dated 30 Eeptember<br />
194.4. file AG 400.213 Q.I,subjeat W,uarterxaster<br />
Requ'iretieiitsTt, effecsive upon the receipt of this letter<br />
the require~ents contained in the reference letter m e superseded<br />
by those listed below and shi-nents baled on the<br />
net7 recjuirer.ents are to begin on 15 October.<br />
a. EPIliAL - For VI Corps & .iriny 'L'roops<br />
J.<br />
(1) Class I<br />
Rations, Type nBtl 110,300. ea<br />
Rations, Type ttlO-ln-lf' 59,000 en<br />
Rations, Type 'ICq1 5,700 ea<br />
Amy Pack E77 mses<br />
Coffee 2,592 lbs<br />
bXlk 6,474 cans<br />
Sugar 6,474 lbs<br />
Soap 17,550 1bs<br />
Toilet Paper 3,510 rolls<br />
itabrine 25,000 ea<br />
Eialazorre 25,000 ea<br />
f:osp, Sip,)lenent 700 cases<br />
Vitamin Tcblets 70,000 ea<br />
Sub Total Tonnage 375.7 L.T.<br />
Brand baking ingredients<br />
Flour 60,700 ibs<br />
Yeast 910 lb8<br />
S R l t 1,210 lbs<br />
Sug&r 1,825 lbs<br />
Lard substitute 1,625 ibs<br />
t!ilk, d.rq, pwd, skim 1,210 lhS.<br />
Sub botal tonnage 30 L.T.<br />
Total Class I Tonnaie 405.7 L.T.<br />
loo,$ IIBlI ration included Tor A ir Corps<br />
strenkth of 15,000, plus.30;b build up.<br />
(2) Glass 11 - Torweeme requirenents for Class<br />
I1 @ SV from 15 Ootober l9ft.L to 21 October<br />
1944 will be 325 toils ~ e day. r This<br />
notes an increase ns to p-evious zecuii-ementa,<br />
but it is iuperative to have above<br />
tonnage so that initial issue of winter<br />
clothing (Coxlbat) eild tenttihe { heevy) can<br />
be move& into this nrea.<br />
LUNTfILLE - For XV Gorp8<br />
(1) Class I<br />
Rations,<br />
R8tiO<strong>US</strong>,<br />
TyL3e 'I3"<br />
!i3778 'llo-kl-l'l<br />
50,000<br />
45,000 ea<br />
ea
:'-&S-P-K-I-i-T-& u<br />
Rations, TJT,e ~IC?! 9,000 ea<br />
Aooy Pack 520 ctises<br />
Coffee 2,160 lbs<br />
hiilk 5,400 cans<br />
Sujar 5,400 lbs<br />
Soap 10,400 lbs<br />
Toilet Paper 2,060 rolls<br />
atabrine Tablets 17,000 es<br />
IIalazone tablets 17,050 ea<br />
IIosp Supplcunent 400 c6ses<br />
Vit min tablet s 60,000 ea<br />
Sub total toiiiihge 251.1 L.T.<br />
Bread bekin& inbredients<br />
Flour 36,000 lbs<br />
Yeast 540 lbs<br />
Selt 700 lbs<br />
Sugar 1,080 1bs<br />
Lc re, substitute 1,OGO lbs<br />
Milk, dry, pvd, skin 7U0 ibs<br />
Sub total toiffiage 18 L.T.<br />
Totnl Class 1 toimage 269.1 L.T.<br />
2. Request that supplies for each delivery pcint be<br />
loeded as a separate shiifiieilt Qad that ench railroad car be<br />
cLearly mrked rrith its destinttion.<br />
9. The obove date &iven for shi2nents to begin is<br />
based on rail COrmimicetioiiS being olened. In event they<br />
are not you will be notified by cable.<br />
DISTRIBUIPIOK:<br />
-<br />
3 0"<br />
1 - iiG<br />
1 - G-4<br />
1 - Col Lmssey<br />
1 - Oieretions<br />
2 - Bile<br />
For the Commondint General:
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D<br />
HZAD~U,QTERS SEVENTH AEE<br />
A-)O 758 U.S. ARrf WC/JLD/bq<br />
AG 400.217 Q! 7 Ootober 1944<br />
3JBJECT: N.artermaster Cluss 111 Requlrements.<br />
TC : Cowanding General Continental Advance Section,<br />
rJ.7. Amy. Attention: Petroleum Officer.<br />
1. Reference letter, this headquarters, dated 30 September<br />
1944, f ile AG 400.213 1,Subject: "<strong>Quartermaster</strong><br />
Class I11 Requirements", effective upon the receipt of this<br />
letter the requirements contalned in the reference letter<br />
are superseded by those listed below and shipnents based<br />
on the new requirements ere to begin 15 October,<br />
a, PFTU<br />
Gasoline, Y-PO 180,000 gals.<br />
Diesel Fuel Cil 7,20G gals.<br />
I'erosens 1,450 gals.<br />
Engine Oil, SAT 10 700 gals.<br />
Engine Oil, SIC? 30 3,800 Gals.<br />
Pnqine Oil, SAX 50 600 gals.<br />
Universal Gear Lub SAE 90 800 gals,<br />
Grease, Ga ql 700 lbe.<br />
cream, GP $2 400 lbs.<br />
Grease, 3 ''3 200 lbs.<br />
Grease, '13 $4 /+8 lbs.<br />
Total Tonnage 650.6 L.T.<br />
b. LLJNXVILLE<br />
Gasoline, V-80 120,000 gals.<br />
Diem*, Fuel Oil b,800 gala.<br />
Kerosene 950 jals.<br />
gn5ine Oil, 3LE 10 500 gals.<br />
Engine Oil, SM 30 2,500 gals.<br />
xngine Oil, 50 400 qal 8.<br />
Universal Gear Lub S&E 90 600 gals.<br />
Grease, G" 41 500 Ibs.<br />
crease, GP $2 300 lbs.<br />
crease, VP 'fg 150 lbs,<br />
Grease, 1% 'il, 36 lbs,<br />
Total Tonnage 43k.3 I.?.<br />
NOTX: %e ebove tonneges inolude shipment of 370 tons x'<br />
~~-80 in rail tank car9 dally es predioated ln CES<br />
oable.<br />
2. Dequest that all Easoline bB shipped by tank car<br />
or it 5 qal IT,,$. containers. xo 55 gal ~.~UJ<strong>US</strong> of V-80 gas-<br />
oline or any ,rerry cans me desired ih the <strong>Army</strong> Area.<br />
5.hipment of Diesel me1 Oil in 55 gal drums is satisfaotory.<br />
3. Supplies for each delivery nolnt to be loaded<br />
a8 a oeparate shipment and eaoh oar to be marked Clearly<br />
with its destinetion.<br />
4. he above data given for shipents to be&n is<br />
AI?P&tQIx 5 of 2 pages - 1 -
DIST31IBUT"ION:<br />
3 - co"<br />
1 - AG<br />
1 - G-&<br />
1 - Go1 Lasse?;<br />
1 - Operotioiis<br />
2 - iFile
Office of the Chief <strong>Quartermaster</strong><br />
AT0 6F7<br />
WTPJSCT: Yission of the Charlero: Depot Area,<br />
Ti! : The <strong>Quartermaster</strong>, Channel Base Sect'tcn, AFO 228,<br />
11. S, Arm (Thru Cowanding General)<br />
1. Enclosed is the mission for the Chmleroi Depot<br />
Area, Q-lF3. You will note thnt the PX mission is being<br />
shifted h"diately from Lille-Mons Depot, 6-185, t o Charleroi.<br />
2. Charleroi will be the grincipal Base Depot on the<br />
Continent for Class I supaliea, and in addition to backing<br />
up present depots, It must be prerared to assist in naking<br />
shi?ments to build up Advance Depots wtich rill be established<br />
in the future to support the First, ITinth, Third and<br />
gaventh Armies. The maximum storage mission of 240,000 long<br />
tons of Class 1 m y never be reached. Porrever, stora:e capacity<br />
to this extent auPt be held in readiness as Theater ?eserve<br />
%ace to meet suoh fluctuating requuirenents as nay<br />
arise.<br />
3. The attached iaission io substantially tte same as<br />
draft coqiea which have been discussed in detail with your<br />
office qnd repreeentatives of the De?ot, botk at Chsrlerci<br />
and in Paris. It is requested ttat you have tte Depot hi?"diately<br />
prepare a cietailed ?1an to lmpleaent this ICission,<br />
to inolude planned utilization and allooation of storage<br />
space and planned method of handlinq :n acd out tonnages.<br />
It Is further requested that the Depot and your office send<br />
their key olanninf: officers to Paris at the earliest possible<br />
date with this detailed !>lan rf operation to iron out any<br />
difficulties.<br />
/s/ aohn B. Franks<br />
Briq. Gen. <strong>US</strong>A<br />
for /t/ ROPEllT 2:. LITTIEJCEN<br />
Yajor General, IJ.3.A.<br />
Chief Quarterma st er.<br />
1 Tncl: Kission of the ChQrlerOi Depot Area.<br />
.six 6) conies to @artermster, Channel 3aae Section, APO 228<br />
six 16) conies to Gomiandin,? Officer, 52nd 31 Base Denot,<br />
AVO 228
MI36ION OF CEULQZlTEOI DEPOT AREA.<br />
-TQW)----<br />
I. Charleroi Depot area has two basic missions:<br />
a. As a Ease end Internediate Dewt it will:<br />
(1) Receive and store re~ervas of Class I supplies<br />
and make shipments to kmies and<br />
other Depots 8s requlred, Charlerol will<br />
be the pincipal source of Class I for<br />
initial stockage of Advence Depots to be<br />
established in the near future.<br />
(2) Receive and store a nortion ox the thea-<br />
ter Class I11 Fackaqed DOL reserve and<br />
make shipments forwar9 to Depots and<br />
Arffiies as required.<br />
(3) 8eceive and store reserves of sumes<br />
for First and Ninth Armies and ADRZC<br />
(north) and mke shipments as requirea.<br />
b. As a Distribution bnot it will:<br />
(1) Receive, store end distribute all classes<br />
of sugply to trooqs in the Depot Xrea as<br />
directed by the Sase Section Comnander;<br />
and receive, store and distribute aviation<br />
gas to Air Corps Units 8s designhCBd by<br />
<strong>US</strong>STAF.<br />
2. a. The ebove basic nissions are smarided a8<br />
fellows:<br />
Class I - 45 days for 600,000<br />
(Tluo ~I/C‘,OCCIL/T additional<br />
Class I)<br />
Class I1 - Retall only as djrected by<br />
Ease Section Commander.<br />
Clsss ITT - 9etail of MT e0 and Allied Produets<br />
as directed by Dase<br />
Bection Com”der.<br />
~ u l kstorage and issue of<br />
Aviation qas to Air Corps<br />
Units as deslTnoted by <strong>US</strong>SKF”<br />
rortion of theater reserves of<br />
paakaqed POL (About 42,COO<br />
L/T).<br />
Class IY - ?eta11 only a9 directed by<br />
Rase Seotlon Commnnder.<br />
7% - L5 days for 650,000 (leas gratuitous<br />
iss~e items)<br />
~5 davs for 400,000 (all item)<br />
Plue’ lg,OOO L/T additional FX<br />
civil Affairs- Aoproxlmately 25,000 L/T<br />
(Class 1)<br />
b. men Advance Depot(s) are established to support<br />
thc airst and :Tinth pm~les,the Class I ni8SiOn of<br />
Charleroi will be reduced to l+5 days for 200,000 sen, for<br />
troops in the Depot area. I!owever, all faoilities will be<br />
retailed aa theater reserve mace for use as repuired.
&&&T-.]-I-C-T-&D<br />
3. ??sthate of total tonnages to be stored and handled<br />
to nccomnlish the above mission is as follcws:<br />
Lonq Tons to be<br />
Lon.: Ton6 to handled dally<br />
be Stored (In and Out) (a)<br />
Cless I 2/0,000 6,000<br />
Class I1 AS directed by Base Section<br />
Commander<br />
ClSSS IIT M)L<br />
Retail As directed by Bbse ?ection<br />
Commander<br />
Theater Reserves of<br />
Packaged POL<br />
Aviation Cas<br />
TY<br />
Civil Affairs sunplies<br />
42,000<br />
3,000<br />
20,000<br />
25,000<br />
AB direoted by CCQK<br />
1,000<br />
PO0<br />
1,500<br />
(a) Tonneges to be hnndled reoresent<br />
the I’dxinwr. tonnape %hat the<br />
de-ot must be nrenared to k,anh?la.<br />
Actual tonnage w i l l fluotuate<br />
below these fjgures.<br />
1. To assist in oaloulating items, weights and storage<br />
snaoe, the foll0win.l; publloRtion8 of this offioe have been<br />
distributed to all deyots:<br />
Eaoio ?-ode1 Ytooks, dated 20 January 1945.<br />
Inltial Issue and Replaoemnt Taotoro, daced<br />
20 Tecer‘ber 1944.<br />
“a0kin.l: and RtriToin.: Data, datetl 1 ;Tovepiber 19L4.<br />
(::uaolerient to Q’ .Service Relerencc- Data, 7701 I1<br />
Revised)<br />
5. Vis nisoion is sat forth in detail in attached<br />
Annex A.<br />
1 Tncl. - Annex A
Class of <strong>Supply</strong><br />
--__-__-_I<br />
CLASS I<br />
iron-Perisnables -<br />
45 days for 600,000<br />
broken dom as<br />
follows:<br />
Backq for Liebe<br />
DePot (includes<br />
R>.C icits/gratuitous<br />
issue rx)<br />
Retail for<br />
Depot Area<br />
Additional Class I<br />
Wssion<br />
15 days for<br />
1,000, om<br />
45 days for<br />
2N,000<br />
Theater Reserve<br />
space<br />
to be used<br />
as iiiected<br />
by OCQM<br />
14 days for<br />
100,000<br />
10 days far<br />
Zoo, 000<br />
AS airected<br />
by Base SectionCommander.<br />
__<br />
Area Served<br />
I_<br />
First & 1Gint.h<br />
Armies and<br />
;miC (Worth)<br />
As Lirected by<br />
Base Section<br />
Coimxder<br />
Internecikte &<br />
advance Liejots<br />
Depot Area<br />
Depot Area<br />
Depot Area<br />
Lo% Tons<br />
to be<br />
Stored<br />
45,000<br />
25,000<br />
170,000<br />
700<br />
1,000<br />
kll Class I<br />
Non-Perishable%-.-<br />
-~<br />
6,000<br />
75<br />
250<br />
Represents baiance of level not stored<br />
by Lie~e(e179)for First 0 Ninth Arnies<br />
and kDSEC(1Iorth). Ilorma3J.y shipments<br />
ill be made to Liege Depot and not direct<br />
to Armies. It is planned that<br />
later this mission will be transferred<br />
to Advance Depot(s) to be established<br />
for support of First & IIinth Armies.<br />
Distritution nission.<br />
Clizrler o i will receive, sort,classify,<br />
and make balanced and balancinL ship-<br />
r,ients of Clsss I to Advince & Intermediate<br />
Depots zs required. It w ill be<br />
the principal source of initid stook-<br />
age of Adnnce Uepots to be established<br />
in the near future.<br />
Distribution nission.<br />
Distribution nlissioii. Represents local<br />
procurement to mxi~mmextent.<br />
Distribution i.ussion only as directed<br />
by Base Section Commcier .<br />
An". "x"-Fa&e 1
Class of Su>&<br />
CLASS rII<br />
Mission drea bervai<br />
Lor& Tons<br />
-Go be<br />
stored<br />
POL:<br />
hT-@ Gas Lqd<br />
f.llieti procucts<br />
As directed bg<br />
Base Section<br />
CommsnCer.<br />
Depot Area 5,000 1,000 Eistrib-ution mission. Tonn2;e to be<br />
handled represents incominb bulk POL<br />
receivec di decsmteci.<br />
1<br />
t-.<br />
0'<br />
I<br />
Y<br />
3<br />
H<br />
I<br />
c2I<br />
?<br />
M<br />
I<br />
VI<br />
I<br />
The,t er ileserve s<br />
Pachked POL<br />
viat ti on cas<br />
Soliu Fuels:<br />
cod<br />
As directed by<br />
ccU!J<br />
Bulk supply to A b Corps<br />
Air corps units un;ts 65<br />
in Depot Area desi6mted<br />
by <strong>US</strong>STAF<br />
AS directec. ty Depot Area<br />
Base Section<br />
Conmcier<br />
42,W0<br />
3,@J:,<br />
4,000<br />
1,000<br />
Torumbe to be storea:<br />
30,000 L/T packz;;eu LT Kl<br />
~2,000 LJT pec!chec: Allied protiucts<br />
Aviation Gas Storage point nust be<br />
preparec to receive a C issue up to<br />
full capacity of present facilitiest.<br />
y<br />
G<br />
5<br />
H<br />
n<br />
e3<br />
M<br />
W<br />
--<br />
viooci (See Remrks)<br />
CLASS IV<br />
A5 directed by<br />
Base Section<br />
cormdnder<br />
45 hys for First an8<br />
850, a13 iiinth grnie<br />
Supmidon oi wood-cuttin& activities t5<br />
an& procurecient of X D O ~2s ana when<br />
directed by the c&rmrmzster, Chdnnel<br />
Base Section.
P o\ CIVIL AFPAF-S<br />
I (ClSSS I)<br />
C I<br />
Uission<br />
I+5 days for<br />
400,~o<br />
Thehter Xeserve<br />
Space<br />
for use as<br />
directed by<br />
CCW.<br />
ZLLk shipments/issues<br />
DI;TAILr;D IdISSION OF CHdUROI DEPOT 2&a (Q-183)<br />
Long Tons<br />
to be<br />
Area Served Stored.<br />
-l--<br />
Depot Area Total FX<br />
1 20,000<br />
I<br />
I<br />
frou Forts to Charlsroi bj GCr&;.<br />
Autnorized<br />
agencies ir?<br />
depot are&,<br />
md to ~mies<br />
art Eegats cs<br />
reyuireu.<br />
25,000 1,500 1 Does not include Class 111.<br />
(a)<br />
Toraahes to be lientiled represent the rlIa.xiimiz<br />
tumase thLt the Gepot must be :repded to<br />
hannle. j,ctuei tonni-.ja will fluctuate below<br />
thest: iL&,WeS-
Allocation Letter No. 45<br />
AD 400-1 (Civil) GE-AGL 9 July 194.4.<br />
(SWP/G-5/SUp/2342/1<br />
- Oseration OERLORD - D plus 91 t o D idus 120.<br />
SUBmCT: AllOCatiOn of Credita - Civil Affairs Supplies/Stores<br />
TO : Commander-in-Chief 21 lcrmy Grcup.<br />
(Rear Headquarters!<br />
1. Listed below fire additional items of Supplies/Stores<br />
approvod by this headquarters for use by British and U.S. Forces<br />
under your oommend in the period D plus 91 to D plus 120.<br />
Net Weight Proourement<br />
1TCI; Long Tons Re sponeibi1it;r<br />
Biscuits 2902 UK<br />
Vit Chocolate 660 UK<br />
Salt 146 UK<br />
Flour 4355 us<br />
M&V 653 us<br />
Saup 291 us<br />
TOTAL 9007<br />
2. Allocation of milk roquirements ifi under considera-<br />
tion and will be the subjeot of a subsequent communication.<br />
3. Details of' the allocations nade by this letter are<br />
attaohed as Inclosure I. Sub-allocations between British and<br />
U.S. Zones shown therein ma;' be varied as rquired to meet operotlonal<br />
needs.<br />
4. This letter is your authority for calli^ forward<br />
the above items as operational needs tiay recuire.<br />
5. All gertinent instructions oontained in Allocatibn<br />
Letter No. 1, this headquarters, file AG 400-1 (Civil) GE-AOM,<br />
dated 13 April 1944 will bo observed in connection with tho<br />
dietribution of the Suyplies/Stores approved by this letter,<br />
1 Inal: Technical data.<br />
By cammand of General LISlUHO'3ER:<br />
E. C. HCEl-It?;E<br />
Oolonel, AGD<br />
Aajutant General
1. Details of Supplies/Stores aiproved by<br />
Allocation Letter Number 45 dated 9 July 1944<br />
for use of 21 <strong>Army</strong> Group are:-<br />
BZITISH ZOIE U.S. ZO1U Total Procue-<br />
Im,I Net JeiLht Net ;leight Not 'v:eiEht msnt<br />
tone Tons Lone Tonns Lon~Tons Rospon-<br />
- sibility.<br />
BlSCUitS 2743 159 2902 UK<br />
Tit Chocolate 216 444 660 mc<br />
Salt 138 8 146 UK<br />
Flour 4116 239 4355 us<br />
M & vf 517 36 653 us<br />
soup 275 16 291 us<br />
TOTALS: 8005 902 9007
SUBJECT: Allocation of Credits - Civil Affairs Su&plies/<br />
Stores - U.S. Forcos - Operation OTLRLORD.<br />
To : Commanding QBneral, Communication8 Zono, duropean<br />
ThGater of <strong>Operations</strong>, U.S. <strong>Army</strong>,<br />
1. The followinC supplles/etores of U.K. procuremont<br />
souroe nro approved by this hoadquartors for use by U.S.<br />
FOrCciS 8uriu, thc svriod D plus 91 to D plus 180, O,,eratlon<br />
@TdRLORD:<br />
_I Item Gross ,!eight, Lone Tons<br />
Industrial Salt 200<br />
2. This letter is your authority for calling forward<br />
these supplies/atores as requirbd.<br />
3. M1 pertinent instructions contained in Apgendlx "B-1<br />
to Allocation Lettor l?o. <strong>US</strong>/l, this headquarters, SHAZB /Q-5<br />
(Sup)/2342, datad 22 Au&urjti 194.4, will be obsertred.<br />
For the Supreme Commander:<br />
T. H. ULVIS,<br />
Briydier General, <strong>US</strong>A<br />
Adjutant General.
430 ?.qub<br />
SUBJECT: Composite riation for C.T.O.U.S.I.<br />
TO : The *~~.rtcrslaster.C-tsner~l,<br />
0 StFeet S,",<br />
%h?ngton, Deb.<br />
27 April 1943<br />
1. Waerisnoe in ITorth nJ'rioa has psoved a definite<br />
need aurin? operatiom for a coqosita-packed ration to replaoo<br />
the bttlk-gaokod m e W i ?ation.<br />
2, Rsfereme ia aade to tfio following:<br />
Exhibit A - Letter, Col. J.31.Sullive.n to rraj<br />
GQn. Ehund B. Greqory, dated 17 Elnrch l.943,<br />
with attachents.<br />
Exhibit B - Letter, Obief ?.uar"ster<br />
Hdqra. SOS .?TO to Chief Quarteiuaster<br />
AFHQ, AT0 700 dated 31 January 1983,<br />
subject: BubaIatencs Problains in Vorth Africa,<br />
with re>li?sfrffii:<br />
Lt. Col. RIA. Roas, Ora.<br />
$1 N.P. Vllli€lm, Qm<br />
Lt. Col:V;J, MacbaupUin, VrC<br />
Cant. m.D. Pratt;o&C and<br />
2nd Lt, E. 9alLard, VrC, joint<br />
Exhibit 0 - rhotographs of Class I supplies<br />
during North dfrioa cmipaign.<br />
3, Tt 18 not desirable that de?endence be ?laced on<br />
the r\ri%ish oom9osite ration (14 in 1) for futufe oprations.<br />
"Chilo it was not woful in North li.frioc;ite nonus ;re poorly<br />
adapted to :narioan tastes. ?!oreover, produotion cnpa-<br />
City on this'tn!o ration will be strained to meet British<br />
recluirenents .<br />
4.. The !pyp 5-In-1 Ration is not satisfactory for use<br />
over porids of several weeks, an6 in addition, is too<br />
for Qff'iOfiQnt han8ling.<br />
5, Difflcultiss in handlirlE and dlatributin8 the<br />
'B' Ration emphasize the need for 8 composite-paolred <strong>US</strong>.<br />
I?rmg ration. mia ration ahould have the followiap, oharacterietios:<br />
8; Eaoh 0886 should oontnin twelve rations for one<br />
basio monii. Variety Bhould be providod by offering five<br />
aiiteront >onus. proper segregation aurinp; operations<br />
foreign labor require8 simple cas0 aarkinc, f.0. BI-BZ-BJ-<br />
I34 and 13-5.<br />
-b, It should bQ IlUtritiOnallY Rdetluabe*
R-A-S- T-R-I-c-T-E-D<br />
de Except for powdared whole ml~,powdered whole<br />
eggs and fa”ClYstals, dehydrated and concentrated fooas<br />
nust be oxoluded. This is necessary booausa this ration 1.dll<br />
be used in operation whore there’will not be tiRe or oaportunity,<br />
first to purify mtor wd, seoond, to rooonstitutc dohydrated<br />
item. Cross Wight should not oxceed 75 lbs, Five<br />
proposed menus for R 12-in-1 conposite-paoircd rs.tion cre attachQd<br />
as Exhibit ‘T”.<br />
BI A Can OPQner, mntohes, cigarettes, mtor 3uyifioation<br />
element md latrine ;>apes should bc included.<br />
-f . Eaoh oaso must contain three hating units.<br />
These w ill yovide enouzh hoating units to su7oly weil .~I.oU~~S<br />
soparated from their coolciny; facilltios.<br />
8. Casos should bo of seaeonod t!’.nbor, battcnsd and<br />
suitably strappod.<br />
6. It is planned to us0 the proposcd 12-in-1 rctlon in<br />
opcrntions aftor tho initial assault phcsa. Its U ~ G:rill<br />
continuo inacfinitoly in the forward areas to vrhioh distri-<br />
bution of bulk rations is diffioult; troops in tho r6-ir ?mas<br />
~dll bo sup~iliod with Type ::Btf Ra.tion in biilk as early as<br />
praoticablo.<br />
7. It is propoacd to ;>rovido a 40 day suiyily of coqosite<br />
rations for 600,000 trooys, inolusivc of a mstsgo foctor.<br />
Total. roqulromonls Rro ostimatod et 24,000,000 retions,<br />
8. In rccowition of tho gros89nR nood, rv oifio6 hos<br />
dcmlopod a 12-in-1 cmposite-paoked ration usinn cayoncnts<br />
or tho ppo TF.” Ration aid offerin(: five ncnus. Lack of a2prcpriato<br />
items paokod in small containsrs‘will lMt this<br />
offort to rot Tiorc thm 3,OOO,OOO rations, Difficultios have<br />
been cncountaroti 01: those points:<br />
a. Cortain basic itens Faclrod in containor3 ovcraim<br />
for %he purposo havz haZ. to bc included (oX€ic~>lOS:<br />
Bacon in 12 lb. cans; arid o:gs iii 5 lb cans; proswfcd<br />
buttor in 5 Yo cans) , This has inoreased thd groas WiiW<br />
of tho omqosito pack wid v d l l unc‘oiibtedly rosult iil Sua3<br />
waste,<br />
b. CasillrP, zmtcrialo a10 In VGY s:’ort SUY~Y in<br />
tho Unitor Kingdom.<br />
0, Labor for bu.i.Xing 0886s and p.lCl:lnp, thm is<br />
also in sfiort supply.<br />
d. m1a avsraKz age of invontorics is on2 y ~ and r<br />
it is q,uostlonable that the assmiblinp, of lW30 gmtitios<br />
Of oon~oaits-paoksshould bo Rttoupted from any cXCGl)t the<br />
nowest stom.
undor authority of lettor datcd 3 Ap?il 1943, from ?onbark<br />
to Co"a6.ing C-onoral, SOS'ETO, Subjeot: Tditing pooeduro<br />
fo? ?cquIaitions fron D.K., for Lnolusion of tki6 typo.<br />
mol: (4)<br />
Xxhibit A<br />
:7 B) Plot inClUdGd in. hppcndiocs.<br />
11 fI n<br />
W I7 I1<br />
R. 14. I.ImJOHN<br />
Brig. Gcnoral, n;fC<br />
Chi. cf n,L\ur t omastor
R-E-5-T-R-I-C-TLE-D<br />
.L5 120<br />
,005 4<br />
.08 54<br />
io15 12<br />
28<br />
40000<br />
16<br />
2<br />
b000<br />
Cendy, hard - p1:ts 1 4-00<br />
GWI, chcwfng - sticlc I<br />
1 400
June 'k4<br />
July<br />
Auqust<br />
September<br />
October<br />
llovenber<br />
Mcenber<br />
January '45<br />
lebrua Ty<br />
IBrch<br />
Apr i1<br />
hlay<br />
June<br />
July<br />
Auqust<br />
Sectember<br />
Average<br />
IJR <strong>Army</strong><br />
strength in<br />
the Theater<br />
1,601,892<br />
1,725I 000<br />
1,P50,50@<br />
1,'35,000<br />
2,132,000<br />
2,407,010<br />
2,659,000<br />
2,780,500<br />
2,899,000<br />
2,999,000<br />
3,064,500<br />
3,061 ,500<br />
2,st?:!,4LO<br />
2,670,e32<br />
2,279,221<br />
1,c33 .wn<br />
Averege<br />
Da Ily<br />
Rations<br />
Issued<br />
Average daily<br />
:-umber of<br />
Rations Issued<br />
Fer Kan Per Dax,<br />
1,636,750 1.02<br />
~ 3 , 7 5 0 1.15<br />
2,3861517 1-28<br />
2,636,368 1.32<br />
2,550,162 1.19<br />
21721,197 1.13<br />
2,&?e3,e18 1.08<br />
3,038 553 1-09<br />
3,031,972 1.04<br />
3,366,966 1.12<br />
3,706,te9 1.20<br />
3,550,342 1.15<br />
3,151,352 1 .C9<br />
2,762,632 1.03<br />
2 392,7?2 1.04<br />
2 .Ot2,700 1.12
- Date<br />
June (6th-)Oth),1944<br />
July<br />
Al.l,"<strong>US</strong>t<br />
se?tenber<br />
October<br />
ITovember<br />
Deoeizber<br />
Jenuary, 1945<br />
February<br />
?:arch<br />
Type A/B<br />
-<br />
57 %<br />
52 5<br />
58 k<br />
79 %<br />
Be sg<br />
87 %<br />
91 $<br />
91 %<br />
FP<br />
7h k<br />
e7 %<br />
Type 10-in-1<br />
71 7<br />
28 $<br />
20 d<br />
14 P<br />
09 $p<br />
04 $<br />
05 $<br />
64 %<br />
03 %<br />
03 $<br />
11 $<br />
07 $<br />
ITO'OTZ: Issue 3n the Southern Line of Conmunlcations is<br />
included in sbove percenta&es from 1 April 1945 onwar&.<br />
Percentage of tvne rations iesued in the fol'hl-<br />
01, SOLOC aea ;"nious"to tint date are sliowa belovr:<br />
15 Aufyst 1944 -<br />
31 I!arcb 1945
1. The <strong>Army</strong> Catering Corps is a coi,batant corps coa-<br />
posed of personnel, as described in paragraph 2(b), for<br />
the purpose of providing the <strong>Army</strong> with;-<br />
(a) advisers and instructors who are experts in<br />
oatering End cooking.<br />
(b) efficient N.C.O. and cook 1,ersonael for units<br />
The incorporation of catering experts and qualified<br />
oooks into one corps controls their posting and<br />
ensures distribution, throughout the <strong>Army</strong>, to the best ad-<br />
vantage.<br />
Prior to the outbreak of the Ka-n a number of<br />
expert caterers were brought into the Armg direct to fill<br />
key positions as Catering Advisers. On the comencen;ent of<br />
hostilities the expansion of the <strong>Army</strong> neoessitated their<br />
Eugmentation in greatly increased numbers and Officers Pmergenoy<br />
Reserve Commissions were initially uanted caterers<br />
with qualifications as set out in paragraph 9 to fill appointments<br />
as Catering Advisers or Specialist Xessing Officers.<br />
Similarly the personnel to fill vacancies as cookery<br />
instructors were enlisted direct from the Catering industry<br />
and after a few weeks military training were appointed War-<br />
rant Officer Class 11, Staff- Sergeant Instructor of Cookery.<br />
All vacancies now occurring both for officers and<br />
for men, are filled by promotion within the corps.<br />
Cooks now receive the normal military training<br />
as Civen to all arms of the service, after whioh they are<br />
sent on cooks' courses.<br />
2. The organization include8 :-<br />
(a) Establishment -Para<br />
War Offiae Catering Branoh, S.T.!+..,.,. 3<br />
Wax Office Personnel Branch A.G.lC(c).. 4<br />
<strong>Army</strong> Caterin Corps Trainlng Centre<br />
(Adlershot?. ......................... 24<br />
Schools of Cookery (Iiome and Overseas). 25<br />
Messing Officers Training Centres.. ,,.. 26<br />
A.C.C. Reoord ond Pay Office<br />
(Edinburgh).......................... 4<br />
(b) Personnel<br />
command Catering Advisers. ............. 6<br />
Catering kavisers........,.........,... 7<br />
A.C.C. Specialist 'hssing Officers..... 12<br />
Supervising Officers, Emereency Cookery<br />
Training Centres.....,....,...... 14<br />
Chief Instruotors (Officers). .......... 17<br />
Warrant Offioers and fi.C.0. Cookery .<br />
Instructors at E.C.'?.Cs... ........... 16<br />
Travelling Cookery Instruotors......... 18<br />
APl'ENDIX 13 of 12 pages - 1 -
R-$4- T-R-I-C-T-8-D<br />
'svatrant Officers) *<br />
Staff Serjeants<br />
Ser jeants Serving as<br />
Corporfils cooks with<br />
Privht e s Units.. .............. 20<br />
S.T.4. is a Dranoh of the Uirectorote of Supplies<br />
ana Transport. As the technioal brnnch it selects all<br />
specialist personnel and is responsible for all training<br />
in catering and oooking.<br />
4. THE WAR OFFICE I.EFSONNEL BF?GXiA.G,l!+(cL<br />
A.G.lk(o) is the ersonnel branch, under the<br />
Direotor of Organization wiiah OOEtrClS SostlQs, ;.roaotion,<br />
pay, etc., through:-<br />
The Officer I/c A.C.C. Record8<br />
The Regimental Paymaster, A.C.C.<br />
5. m.<br />
The ranks of ti.C'.C. Officers in the senior appointmnts<br />
are:-<br />
-<br />
War Office Oversea.<br />
Deputy bireator<br />
Assistant Director<br />
Bputy Assistant<br />
Director<br />
Steff qaptain<br />
Chief lnspector<br />
op Training<br />
-Colonel<br />
-Lt Colonel<br />
-<br />
-I& j or<br />
-Captaifi<br />
-Lt Oolonel<br />
F!fic?~-%-~2<br />
G.H.q,<br />
<strong>Army</strong> E.L.<br />
L Of G,€.I.L,<br />
Divisional<br />
H.L.<br />
Com:i3 Lazsriu:, Kdviser -!:a jor<br />
Oateriug AdViSov (Commnd $001) -2a;tain<br />
6. Coman$-;htedni, kd-
&pproxl.mtely with that Of C.s.liS. in the Gomend carrying<br />
only bo the extent that some c.S.1)~. subsist too Any units<br />
for one G.A., while SIQalhrC.S.DS maj- be ErcuFed under one<br />
:.A. is allotted one clerk.<br />
At horLe it has been fomd in practice that this<br />
netiiod is better than attachment to Districts, heas, Divisions<br />
or brleados for the followin6 reasons:-<br />
(a) Eoonomiaally there is an obvious savinG in<br />
tice, petrol und travelling exsenses,<br />
(b) Improvement in efficiency by closer udherence<br />
to Directorate policy.<br />
(0) The state of' messing and the cook situation<br />
of newly inooming units is at once ascertained; urgent<br />
requirements can be met and close supervision civen and<br />
maintained in baoklvard units.<br />
(dl Continuous touch is kept with all bnlts through<br />
their Messing Officers or representative who must visit tte<br />
Supbly UeLot at least onoe a week.<br />
(e) The close prosimitg to Units allows ample time<br />
to visit early and late meals. t It<br />
(f) Improved knowledge of local resources of<br />
mrket produce.<br />
8. Cuterink, Advisers Overseas<br />
In order to meet operational requirements Ceter-<br />
inL xuvieers are appointed to:-<br />
G.h.L,. (Oklef catorin6 idviser)<br />
<strong>Army</strong> 11.C'.<br />
Divisional H.L.<br />
L of C Areas<br />
9. The Qualiriccitiogs of E Caterig JraViSer<br />
A Cateriq Adviser'e techniool qualfficktions mSt<br />
take precedenoe over his military qualifications. He must<br />
In fact have served an apprertioeship in the oaterine Profeusion,<br />
oommenoiq, in the kitchen and then graaUati43<br />
through the var1ou.s branches to n recognized position of<br />
responsibility. No other ohoioe of prsomel Will satisfy<br />
tho demand for organization and decision which Will be<br />
tlrust upon him a t a moments notice, To appoint 83 hterins<br />
Advisers men who are Very keen on messi~",'%now<br />
good foodtf, or who are more sympathetic catering 'Well<br />
wisherscl is disast.rous.<br />
The moat likely types are obtained from IDOW OW^^<br />
Caterers and Hoteliers who have rtrcoenized executive Or<br />
administrative organizine ability such as:-<br />
Catering rhnagers from large firm] ~ b \ - 1io oervioes, Hailway Companies<br />
'kYiiF;hen<br />
Hotel :,Imagers<br />
) ezleri-<br />
Banqueting :&nagere<br />
) ence<br />
- 3 -
10. -duties of a Ceterinp; Adviser.<br />
The duties of a Catering iidviser my be ~~~mr.arized<br />
us fo1lcws:-<br />
I<br />
a) Visits to Units<br />
b) Relations with Con!nt;iw Cfficers and Dnits<br />
Collaboration vrith Unit Ileasirg: Officers<br />
(:I Liaison with <strong>Supply</strong> Officers R1:d N.A.C.F.1.<br />
representatives<br />
Tralnlw of Gooks<br />
Assistance to Bone Guards, Cadets, Feedim of<br />
Troops in transit, et Railway Laltene do Repas, and emergency<br />
cil-tlian catering arrangemnts.<br />
(a) Visits t o Units<br />
Visits to units bear no semblance to an inepec-<br />
tion. The Catering gives the units the benefit of his<br />
exkert advice on all technical questions apperthinine to<br />
catering, thereby advising the unit how to bring about a<br />
satisfaotory high standard of caterin$. Reports are kept<br />
down to the barest minja" all. that is required by the<br />
Gutericg Adviser is to complete one copy of the roport form<br />
which is kept in his office for his inforn,ation aid for the<br />
necessary fffollowup" visits.<br />
The details of the retort form are tgbulated<br />
on a very sircplet preoiae re:,ort form which enables the<br />
InsMctily Officers to see at a glanoe the general state of<br />
meusing and the degree of urgency of such question of Fereo;mel,<br />
engineer, ordnanoe and otter requirercents ao have<br />
been brought to the notice of knit Commmders. A copy of<br />
the precise report is forwarded woeklg to the Command Oater-<br />
ing adviser for information.<br />
(b) <tions with-C~manbioR Offiaers and h i t E<br />
The Catering &viser:-<br />
(i) Gives exrert advise on fautters pertainine<br />
to catering<br />
(ii) Assists formations and units with<br />
instruct1on end demonstration either<br />
by hi~seli ox through the medium of a<br />
travelling instructor.<br />
(lil) Assists with all questions dealing with<br />
cooks an2 their suitability for Ironotion<br />
course8.<br />
(iv) Ynsures, in collaboration with the<br />
C'fficer l/c A.C.G. Reoords, that formations<br />
and units are supplied "11th a full<br />
establishment of effloient K'.G.Os. end<br />
cooks,<br />
(u) Assists Corcmendiog Offioors on questions<br />
rolative to ineffioient cooks.<br />
(0) Collaboration with Unit Idessim Officer<br />
Tho Catering Adviser!"<br />
(i) fio16s periotiical conferences for all<br />
- 4 -
:&$sing Officers at which toric31<br />
questions are disoussed and yractioai<br />
dsmoastrations are Liven.<br />
(ii) hnsures that the ration is used to the<br />
best aovanta,e and that ail waste is<br />
eliminated.<br />
(ill) Advises on the best .mans of spen~in~:<br />
the ration cash alloihnca.<br />
(iv) hdVlSeS on rtethods to be effiluoyed in<br />
obtaining the best reslllts by fin<br />
efficient use of all cooking apphrhtus<br />
with sgecial em,nLasis on ec0nGrT 01 fuel.<br />
(v) Gives izactical aavice on tho construc-<br />
tion oi. improvised fielo cookiq, approtus<br />
and on ;bas Tin Coohery.<br />
vi) When occasion arises, in conjunction with<br />
the hbssix Officer, may be oallea upon<br />
to arrawe for hot mais to be supllitld<br />
to troops in transit at Railwy iiElltos<br />
de R6paS.<br />
(a) Liaison with <strong>Supply</strong> Offioers and N.A.A.F.I.<br />
Representatives<br />
The Catering ,iuviser:-<br />
(I)Effects continuous lioison bothwen the<br />
four yhrties whose callaboretion is<br />
essential to good masing, nwly the<br />
Yu&ply Officer, N. A, A, F. I. rrjpresentotive,<br />
:desbl~Offioer and hfmeeli,<br />
(ii) In conjunction with those officers ho<br />
couvenes regular muotiiLLs for urlt Meso-<br />
1% Ofricers at Comt.n2 Yupply besots<br />
which are mtPe as interesting BR yossible<br />
by pructlcal 6emonstrLtious. For example<br />
with the asslstanoe of a bugervielng<br />
Travelling InsLruotor, instruction is<br />
Given in Fropxrim, cooklwj cni serving,<br />
new iter:s or food introuucsd lntc tho<br />
rction scale. The uvailaWl1ty of sup<br />
plies and coinpiletion of Bill8 of Fere<br />
are uiscussea an6 atttntion is drown to<br />
A.C.13. huvilig tl bearin& on cctorlx etc.<br />
(e) Trainlnl: of Gooks<br />
The Catcriny k3vieer: -<br />
(i)Is ,responsible for the efficient rwlninc<br />
of Emergency Cookery Troining Centres<br />
and enewe6 that the syllabus of training<br />
is aclhered to, throqh the medium of<br />
the Supervising Officers of E.C.T.CS.<br />
(ii)Is expeoted to taka a keen Interest in<br />
the welfare, pay, prornotion and upgrading<br />
of Cooks.<br />
(f) Assistance to Homs Guuds. Cadet_q~,troops in<br />
transit and "Blitz" feeding<br />
The Cateriq A6viaer:-<br />
- 5 -
11. Trarisport<br />
(i) Must be available if required to help<br />
Home Guard Gnits in all matters rela-<br />
ting to catering and to assist in the<br />
training of their cooks,<br />
(ii) Assist Cadet Force Camps anG Cadet Units<br />
who seek advice on oatering or training<br />
of cooks.<br />
(iii) In the event of a "Blitz", helps in prc-<br />
viding such emergency catering arranee-<br />
ments a6 may be required by the civil<br />
authorities.<br />
It will be seen from para, 10 above that the main<br />
Lutg of a Catering Auviser is t o be "out ana aboKtfl among<br />
his units and for that reason ho must be mobile and trans-<br />
port must be made available.<br />
12. Specialist Messing Officers<br />
(8) Full time Speoialist Kessing Officers are appointed<br />
Lo Training Units Where the establishment exceeds<br />
1,000, The Officers filling these appoiritments are catering<br />
experts. \,here the establishments exceaii 1500 the rank of<br />
Captain is authorized and for units over 1,000 and under<br />
1,500 the rank of the Messing Officer is that of a Lieutenant.<br />
(b) The special conditions attaching to the<br />
appointments of tlese officers are as undor:-<br />
(i) Their services 3re utilized wholly in<br />
connection with unit mossing and they<br />
are not utilized for other normel regi-<br />
mentni duties.<br />
(ii) To compensate for this specielist service,<br />
rations are unucrdrawn by the unit to<br />
the extent of 2f in every 100, subject<br />
to the unit being under reasonable ocn-<br />
tralized conctitions of cooMng and messin&.<br />
13. The kualifications of a Specialiet Xessing Officer<br />
The qualifications are the same as for a Catering<br />
Adviser. In practice the Catering hdvigers are selectad<br />
from the iJessir4 Officers who show initiative and organizing<br />
ability.<br />
The duties of a Speoialist Officer<br />
(a) To provide shroughout the week 4 adequate<br />
meals a day, including a supper mal scrvod at a time which<br />
Suits the troops evenil- habits and not before 19.00 hours.<br />
For thosc who go out in the evening there must also be a<br />
supber available on .their rcturn between 21,OO hours and<br />
22.00 hours.<br />
(b) To prepare the indents for both R.A.S.C. and<br />
N.w.A.F.1, portions of the ration and to supervise their<br />
reoeption, welght checking and distribution and URintain<br />
all requisite books or aooounts.<br />
- 6 -
R-E-8-T-R-I-C-T-E-O<br />
(c) To ensure a wise and properly balanced<br />
expenditure of the Ration Cash Allowtlncti.<br />
(d) To arrange a weekly Bill of Fare, oompiled<br />
so that the tastes of the men, as ascertained at the bn's<br />
&deesinge (which are held weekly) are provided for in the<br />
produotion of a groporly balanced diet.<br />
(u) To ensure thet duty rostera am prepared<br />
and posted for a11 personnel employed on mssing duties,,<br />
and to be responsible for the organization, work, discipline,<br />
and cleanliness of tho L.C.OS., cooks an8 mess<br />
orderlies.<br />
(f) To suporvise the preparation and oooking of<br />
the food, adjusting the timine to the prescribei meal<br />
hOWS<br />
(g) To supervise tho serving of mals and to prevent,<br />
by careful distribution, any tendency to waste due<br />
to badijr served portions, caruless cutting up of bread,<br />
or inconsideratc tabla manners.<br />
(h] To make all arrangaments for early und late<br />
mods lor guards and parties arriving, aopsrting or on<br />
speaial uuties.<br />
(1) To provide all personnel, undortakiog journeys<br />
by road or rail with adequate liavtrsack rations,<br />
(J) To see that all oookhouses, storm, diniw<br />
rooma and premises used for messing art kept scrupulously<br />
clsan and the equipment properly maintained.<br />
(k) To ensuru the conservation and tho segregation<br />
of all By-Produots and to inspect bins and swill area daily<br />
bofore Oontactor removos contents.<br />
(1) To maintain tf;s cookhouse porsonnel up to<br />
full eetablishmont in numbers add ronks, not forgetting<br />
understuiiies and learner cooks.<br />
(m) To keog himssll up to date regarding ail<br />
orders relating to tho training, uHradirw, pay and promotion<br />
of cooks and to watch that relovant entries are ma6e<br />
in tho soldier'e pay book.<br />
(n) To maintain oonstnnt liaison with his local<br />
<strong>Supply</strong> Offlaer, N.L.A.F.I. MEuiagoq Catering kdvissr, P.A.D.<br />
0.S. and D.C.R.E,<br />
(0) To effect an underbawal of 24% conplete<br />
rations providing the unit Is reasonably aentrally messed,<br />
U. supervisiuq Offiosrs of EmorRenoy Cookery Traiqinn<br />
Cdntres<br />
These Ofiicers are sclocted Prom highly qualified<br />
oivilinn chefs who havo had lzmy expericnco a6 oookery<br />
Instructors. In praotice it is found that eaoh Officer is<br />
Bblo to supervise six Emergency Cookery Training Centres<br />
(para, 15) each training 60 soldier cooks or kg h.T.3,<br />
cooks. Their rank is Lieutenant (Qr,Mr.).<br />
- 7 -
R-.E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D<br />
15. Emergency Cookery Training - Centres (Home and<br />
hbroad)<br />
(a) Trainiw Men<br />
Establishment Of 4 A.C.C. cooke,,<br />
instructors (1W.0 1 s/sjt., 2 sjts)<br />
Period of training - i’weeks<br />
Nmbers undqr training - 60.<br />
E.C.T.Cs. functian to produce trained unit cooke.<br />
Those reaching the required standard aro transferred to<br />
the A.C.C. Those bQlOVJ k.d.C. standard remain RS regimental<br />
cooks, but aro eligible for test later for transfer to A.C.G.<br />
Incluaing 0.T.S. (para. (b) below) there are<br />
up to 100 E.C.T.Cs in Commands at hcm,<br />
E.C.T.Cs are attached to units large enough<br />
to give each centre 400-600 ratiocs to cook. In moat<br />
cases, units to which 3.C.T.Cs are attached arci able to<br />
give up some or their cooks and so help the man-power situation.<br />
Eaoh cLntre trains 60 students for D weeks in 4<br />
cltlssg8, the intake beiiy arranged so that 15 atudents<br />
comb in avery fortnight and corresponding number are posted<br />
out. E.C.T.Cs are easy to open or closc down. The follow-<br />
ing are used:-<br />
(I)11 oookhouse containing a fixed range or facllities<br />
for preparation of food,<br />
(ii) A cookhouse containing gortablrr cup equipmont<br />
auoh ae Bluff ranges,Triplex ranges, Boyer<br />
stoves etc.<br />
(iii) Field kitchen where every type of improvised<br />
oveu &nd kettle tr6nCh is oonstructed by<br />
students who am roquired to cook food in<br />
the oven they have built.<br />
Among thu types apparotus constructed are tho<br />
Aillershot ovens, oil-drkm oven, kettle tronch and special<br />
stress is laid on the oil and water method of firing.<br />
E.C.T.Cs, are usually housed in Nissen huts, one<br />
of whioh is sot aside for ldoture purposos.<br />
Follows closely the arrangements for men,<br />
exce t that there are 3 instructors training 48 students<br />
for weeks. There aro 3 alhsses and the fortnight intake<br />
and output is 16. x.C.C. and A.T.S. instructors are enployed.<br />
16. Warrant Offioare and N.C.C. Cookery InstructDrS<br />
for E.C.T.Cs (Para.15)<br />
Originally selootcd as dcscribbd in para 1.<br />
Vace.noies noir fillscl by promotion from within the corps.<br />
17. chief Instructors (Of‘ficers)<br />
At tho large traidng ostabllshmcnts the Chief<br />
hStrUCt0r (and deputies are specially seleckd officers
R-E-S-T-R-Y-C-T-&D<br />
with civilian qualifioations as caterers and instructors.<br />
Those for Messing Officers Trainine Centres are soloctcd<br />
from the best of the Suporvising Offioers (para 14) having<br />
partioular regard to their ability 8s lectures and<br />
teaohers.<br />
1El. Supervising Travellinn Instructors (S.T&)<br />
'these trsvelling cookery instructors are exotrptionally<br />
good ail around chufs who have proved their cater-<br />
ing and organizing abilities as cookory Instructors at<br />
B.C.T,Cs. from which thoy arb specially sclccted. Their<br />
duties in Comands, under thc direction of the C.C.A. are<br />
to help nowly formed or backward units in their messing<br />
arrangements End in this connection to domnstratc tho<br />
oorrect methods of i\rmy cooking and catering to unit cooks,<br />
S.T,Is. usually stay several days with om unit before passing<br />
on the noxt. iill Marrunt Offioors Glass SI.<br />
They are allotted to each Gomand Pool and oycr-<br />
ato from C.S.Ds. unilor tho llpcolrt catwing Advisor (para.7).<br />
19. Flexibility of the Arqy Caterlag ilorDs<br />
b point to note in the organization of the h,G,C.<br />
is its flexibility.<br />
Any emergenoy can be met by a "switchingrf of<br />
poreonnel. For sxumple a party of advisory oxparts can bo<br />
made up by a contribution from Command Pcol~ of Gatering<br />
Advisers and Supervising Travolling Instructors. This<br />
prty, with tho addition of workin& teams of student oooks<br />
from x.c.T.0~. under thoir own instructors oan bo expandod<br />
to organize the feuding of an expuditionary force in<br />
transit or a 'tblitzedft populatiou.<br />
The Cisemination of informfitlor for thr, special<br />
guidance of the A.C.C. Offioors is effeotcid by the issue<br />
gtlriodically of Catering Circulars.<br />
20. <strong>Army</strong> Gatering Gorgs cooks sclrviiq with unit.?<br />
War establishments of all units show A,G.C, personnel<br />
as trattachedtr. Cook personnel coiisist or: -<br />
Uarrant Officers (Class 11) Cooks<br />
Staff Serjoant cocks<br />
Sorjeant Looks<br />
Corporal Cooks<br />
Private<br />
A.C.C. Standard must bo reaohod bufore unit Cooks<br />
Bre transferrcd to the A.C,C.<br />
21. A.T.5. Cooks<br />
Tho training of A.T.S. oooks is controllod by<br />
6.T.4. This service is thore olosaly linkod with the <strong>Army</strong><br />
Catering Corps.<br />
Training, classification, promotion, otc., we<br />
bsed on A.C.C, design end all instruction is given in<br />
- 9 -<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I4-T-E-D
R-G-S-T-R-1-C -T-E-I)<br />
A.J.G. controlled cookery training astablisbnts,<br />
22' %Spital Cooks (R.A.M.C. c0"itmGnt)<br />
Hoapital Cooks (R.A.Y.C. and V.A.D.) is a nora<br />
ArnW Idedical Corps commitment but tho octual trainirg, in<br />
hospital cookery is undertakan at the <strong>Army</strong> Catering Corps<br />
Trclinine Centra, hdlershot ,<br />
Catmi% Adviser test hospital oooks prior to<br />
upgradii:g and iiromotion.<br />
23. Rogimmtal Butchers<br />
Thorc are two types of butchers:-<br />
Royal <strong>Army</strong> Service Corps trbdclsmon butchers.<br />
lab! Regimnttil (Ron-tradesmen) butchers.<br />
All QXCCpt the srcallest unit a m allowed a<br />
(regimntal) non-trhhasman butcher. This t:iSa of unit<br />
porsonnel ia tr~iin~cl unaar A.C.C. Lrrangemonts controlled<br />
by S.T.L.<br />
-24. The hrmy htoring Corps Training Centre, Adlershot<br />
(a) This modern establisholrnt (a pru-war concep<br />
tion, comiAoted ,in 1940) is tho hoadqiarters of the <strong>Army</strong><br />
Cotoring Corps, It is modelled on the most practical lines<br />
to ensure that students roccive up to date instruction in<br />
cookery in all its branchcs.<br />
The A,C.C. Training Cwntre consists of:-<br />
(a) hodquartors<br />
Instructional Croup<br />
Administrative Battalion cottsisting of -<br />
En. H.(L. Aclministratfvo Coy,<br />
u. Branch Iioldlng Coy.<br />
2 Studtnt Joys.<br />
ThL principal ay&ointments arc:-<br />
Commendant - Colonel<br />
O.C. hdun. En.- Lt Oolonol<br />
CNef Xnstruotor - Major<br />
(b) Tho avorage strongth of tho whole Cantrd<br />
2,200 mado up os un6er:-<br />
620 Studcnts (including 70 Officcrs, 150<br />
A.T.S. 1<br />
180 Instructional and AWnistrative &iff.<br />
700 Holding ar.d &waiting draft.<br />
Instructors permanently detaehed to<br />
con" E.C.'?.Cs. (pra 161<br />
(c) Tho building occupies an area of 10,000 Waft<br />
and is equipped with tho lateet types of' ccokinB OquiPmnt<br />
fuullsd by gas, steam and solid fuel. The arrangomcnt Of<br />
- 10 .<br />
R-&S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D
RE-S-T-R-$-C-T-E-D<br />
the building ia cmofully pi?&ed to faCilitctQ tho e~ep<br />
rolotion of work, aonuoncing Vdth tho roooptibn of tho<br />
bulk goods into tho rnin storrgo room -nd hiatribution<br />
ChGi'lCo irlt0 vnrious l?.rduS, pcStry MOL19 2nd kitchew<br />
tho 1.crgor of whioh cro on tho ground floor,<br />
&in dotails of tho .U.y-Out X'G under:-<br />
Ground Floor - 5 oonpl~t~ ltitchcn dcportunts -<br />
kitchen - ltrdor - 3 Dining hclle<br />
sor-tin@;500, 400 cnd 60, pcetry,<br />
Officors and Sorjor.nts !Iesscs,<br />
Mninistmtion Orfioos<br />
Ihin Leoturo Hr.11 sorting 250<br />
fittod with doqonstrntion 8-8<br />
ovens nnd appmrtus r.nd oinwtogrnph<br />
Equipimt ,<br />
Vcgatrblo prG?rmtion rooms.<br />
Rntlon cnd utonsll stores.<br />
Ref rigoration ohmbcrs.<br />
Cooking cyparctus r.nd equip" .<br />
consisting of nodorn 000.1, GFS,<br />
stcrn rnd olcctric.1 nppnratua.<br />
First Floor - 10 Solf oontainctl kitchcn - clcss<br />
room GCOh COUplOtolg fitted.<br />
6 Lccturo room.<br />
Studcnts ohr.nging room providod<br />
with hot nnd cold xter,<br />
Wnsb bneins nnd individual lookers,<br />
Adninistration Ofi'i06@md stores.<br />
Outbuilding - Fully oquippod lcitohon and Borvice<br />
-<br />
supplying 700=ty hdl,<br />
hole - 2 largo fully oquippod kitohone,<br />
lardors and p,m%rlcs.<br />
Field Kitchen- Contching all typw of fiold<br />
Cookor8 rind Ovcne such CE Blufi<br />
range8 , Lldorflhot ovona, onnp<br />
bollors cnd enr.ll cqul~I2ont,<br />
Inprovisod r.ppar?.ts, drun ovons,<br />
kettlo trenohcs hot plctas cnd<br />
lnrgor dugout dtohors for<br />
dosort w.rfr.ro, *.:1 appcrrhns .<br />
opcratod by wood, cod, ooko,<br />
sr.wduSt diosol oil, OrudQ Oil,<br />
nn8 Wp.&o oil taa wntir.<br />
(d) hcporimontal work, Now idons on aoolCW<br />
nppnratus doaigns nro onoourcgcd. Now invrjr.tions, oovoring<br />
all typos of cooklrig r.pporatus, and oquipmont, nro twtd<br />
for tho Mr Offloo.<br />
(0) Bosonroh work, Cooking tests rro oarriod mt<br />
for tho Offloo in con unction with S.T.6. (SupplP<br />
Rmnch) and tho Ninistry if Food.<br />
(f) Trainin Tho mnin types of Coursos of In-,<br />
struation inold'<br />
Commanding orficors' (Inoluding ,I,T.S,~<br />
Course on Nossing<br />
R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-I!
Rogimntal iiessing Officers' Cohrsc (including<br />
A.T.S. )<br />
€&gu.icr mmy Cooks' Zourses (for post war<br />
pwposes)<br />
Sorjuants Cook&' Zourse (Men anti A.T.S.)<br />
Corporal Cooks' Course (ivIon rind A.T,S- )<br />
Cooks' Grading Coursc: (Mcn :lnd A.T.S. )<br />
Iiospital Cooks Sou.rsc ( ~.A,X.C., V,X.D.<br />
and A,T.S. )<br />
Officers ;.le~sCooks' Course (KECI~and 1i.T.S)<br />
Regimenta1 autc hers c oursc .<br />
Ytudcmts under training cook fron 5,000 to 7,000<br />
ratioiis daily for neighbouring static forffiatiolls. Fcod is<br />
convbyed hot from the Cciritro in insulated contrtincrs or<br />
coolred in tho unit cookhouses bg7 students, from advanced<br />
c1assc.s, unticr their instructors.<br />
25. <strong>Army</strong> Schools of Cookery.<br />
Schools of Cookery arc designed to train iorge<br />
numbers t it one the, as distinct from thi "sausage machine"<br />
output of 15 ctv2ry fortnight at an E.C.T.C. (para.15) ivhich<br />
can be uitr-Lchod t o an cstablishaont giving primry militxy<br />
tmirling to ftiiitakcsfffrom civil lifc.<br />
Thcr lerger tiii: numbur undcr training, tho larger<br />
t hr, building rbquircd and adminiBtrativc sta?f nccessury.<br />
<strong>Army</strong> Schools of iookory arc opuroting as under:-<br />
Micldlc bust School or Cookery<br />
London School of Cookory<br />
26. Ikssing Officers' Training Ckntres<br />
Thu c;st;lbli.shmont of a 1,Iossing Officers' Training<br />
Centrt: includes:-<br />
A Commtlndaut - Major<br />
ChiLf Instructor - Lt. Ldm<br />
Instructor - L.0, Class I1<br />
Thorc i m ; 40 Ofricers undcr traiiiing at one tine<br />
on COU~SOSof 10 d:qs duration, for thi: IgGssing; Officers'<br />
coursb, or 2 days for FI ComanLing Officers Coursu.<br />
This typt; of Ccntm, pi&rili Cosignird for the<br />
training OF ri:glmcntal messing Officers in units whose<br />
strt:rigth is 1,009 (units of 1,000 End ovcr haw an A.C.C.<br />
Spuciulist Kessing OfY'icur) is operated in 3 Home Cormnands.<br />
Mussing Of'ficers in otliur Commands arc trnined at thc *<br />
A.C.C. Tr::ining Centre.<br />
27, Trailling in Cotering and Cookin&. (Not iricludod<br />
26. Syllabus of trt>ining_ (Not included)<br />
29. Rctus of.* (Not included)<br />
30. Thc hrmy Catcrj.ng Gorp Rcgimcntal Associction<br />
(Not included)<br />
Thc War Office (S.T.) .<br />
October, 1942.<br />
- 12 -
Belt, web Waist<br />
cap, Piale, cotton, OD OT OT<br />
Cap wool, knit<br />
Coat, mackinaw<br />
Drawers, cotton, short short<br />
Drawers, wool<br />
cloves, leatrier, heavy<br />
GlOV.30, wool, OD, leuther pallii<br />
Handkerchiefs<br />
Headbands, liner, helmet, M-1<br />
Jackets, field, OD or<br />
Jackets, fidG, la-113<br />
Jackots, herringbone twill<br />
Laces, leggings<br />
Laces, shoe<br />
Le&bmS, C2JlVa8<br />
Id”,helmet, fibre<br />
lieckbmds, liner, hehaat, hi-1<br />
Overshoes, Arctic<br />
Raincoats, synthetic, OD<br />
Shirts, flannel<br />
Shoerr, sarvice or boots, camtrat<br />
socl~s,wool, cusldon sole<br />
socks, wool, likht<br />
socks, wool, eld<br />
Smater, hiLh neck<br />
‘L’rousers, herrixbone twill<br />
Trousers, rvool serge<br />
Untier8hirt, Cotton<br />
Uncershirt, wool<br />
1mwlR SuPPLm5:<br />
-ORCxNlZATIGNAL &JJJ.F’hl+T:<br />
Axe, choyp~,s-le bit<br />
Bucket, general purpose, &&I,.<br />
Y qt.<br />
Cans, cornyated, *alv.<br />
Cans, water, 5 gallon<br />
Cwtahers, round, insulated,<br />
w/inaerta<br />
Haater, water mersion typ<br />
Lantern, gasoline<br />
Lantern, kerosene<br />
Outxit, cooking, 1-burner<br />
Outfit, coolfj~~~, 2-burner<br />
Outfat, cook-, Xrnan<br />
Picks, railroad<br />
Zan~e, field, la-37, Pack” fl~lt<br />
Ranhe field, U-37, Pack W I<br />
Shwais, round ,,yneral<br />
purpose, Jhhclfzint<br />
E~UIFACI! :<br />
Ma&, canvas, fie16<br />
Bag, canvas, water, aterilizin&<br />
Ea&, cmrying, arm0<br />
6%, carryin&, rocket<br />
Ea&, sleepink, wool<br />
Delt, im6aeine, BAR<br />
Belt, cartri%e, cal. .30 dismountec<br />
Blanket, 17001, OD<br />
Can, meat<br />
Canteen, M-1910<br />
Carrier, pichttwk, intrenchkg<br />
Case, sle.eep- bat, water repellent<br />
Cover, canteen<br />
cup, canteen<br />
pork, u-26<br />
W e , L-26<br />
Pack, field. odat (Haversack and<br />
Carrior, pack ~dll be issued<br />
until exhausted)<br />
Piclaaattwk, intrenchh&<br />
Pins, tent, shelter, wood<br />
Pocket mswzine, carbine, Gal. 30<br />
pole, tent, single section (Pole,<br />
tent, shelter half will be<br />
issued until. exhausted)<br />
Carrier, shovel, intrenching<br />
Pouch, first aid packet<br />
Shovel, intrenching<br />
Spoons, K-26<br />
Strap, chrryiw., general purpose<br />
Suspenders, belt, M-1736<br />
Tag, itientification<br />
Tent, shelter half<br />
Toitel, bath<br />
r31PENDkBI.E:<br />
Broom, corn<br />
Brushee, sanitary, 17“<br />
Brush, ecrubbing<br />
Candles<br />
Calcium, hypochloride, ampUhB<br />
Crmyound, yerralcidal rinee, 3.3<br />
Insecticide, powder, body, 2 ob cat<br />
Imeoticide, spray, DDT<br />
Dubbin<br />
Handles, mop, 5LT<br />
Lime, c;hl.orinated<br />
Matches, safety<br />
Mop, cotton<br />
P~per,toilet, 1,ooO sheet rp<br />
Powrim, scouring<br />
Prophylactic 5, chemical<br />
ProphylactiCs, mechanical<br />
Sprayers, hqdd<br />
Soap, laundry<br />
Tablets hdia5011e<br />
wool, &el
~oolsets, carpenter<br />
~001sets, carpenters & wheelrkht<br />
Typewriters, portable dnZ no-portable<br />
Wta, fire for rhw-3, field, ht-37<br />
OFFICIZ SUPPLE&:<br />
I-----<br />
Envelopes<br />
Fluid, duplicstiw, apirit process<br />
Ink, mimeoyaph, 1 lb. can<br />
I&, writ-, fluid<br />
Paper, bond<br />
Paper, carbon<br />
pcper, carbon ciuplicrt-, spirit proceaa<br />
Paper, manifold<br />
Psper, mheogreph<br />
Paper, master copy<br />
paper, pint&, offset<br />
pencils, lea6<br />
stencils, waxless, dry
Galpsition of GclLona ~ e r<br />
Fames (Per Gent I h De? Day<br />
of Total)
Office of the Chief Qunrtereicister<br />
Quartermster Service Reference Data<br />
VOUJIE I1 (Revised)<br />
OPWIONS-P"G 1 JANUARY 1944<br />
--<br />
Chapter 6<br />
PER MAN PER MY FIGURhlY - POL PRODUCTS<br />
(Conbat Conditions)<br />
&llone (<strong>US</strong>) Poundsiinolud-<br />
--- ill& ooatainer)<br />
l.iT gasoline 80 0cTGiGi-<br />
(Including Pkwered Equipmect ) 1.48 128 03<br />
Diesel Fuel .27 2.12<br />
(Includin&Poiiered Squipx" :<br />
for vehicles)<br />
Total me1 IiicluGiiig Gasoline 1.75 14 I 15<br />
for Poimred Equii-nt ~ ___L___l______..__I_<br />
&is for Cookine and Heating .08 -65<br />
Total Fuel Includint gas for<br />
oooking and Beating 1.83 ll+.OO<br />
- -.....- --<br />
&cine O i l so525 .454----<br />
Gear Oil -0175 ,151<br />
Kerosene .0049 042<br />
----<br />
Total Oil ,0749 ,647<br />
Crease - PoXnds ---- .u31r--<br />
Grease - Converted to Gsls ,0032 -----<br />
TOTAL POL l.pasl--i33-RT-<br />
Gallons !'Per man der day" very irith the il&e-up of the total<br />
troop strength depciidiiig on the :Jroportion of Yield, Air and<br />
SOS Forces. The above fi[,ures are reoomisiided for uw when<br />
these proportions are not known.
POUHJ P a h.4X 12.873 3-L-649 7.762 11.763 12.964 7.527 10.689 f ll.381<br />
'KIT& EIV bAYS jj2 371 i 329 1,050 379 2 5 1,644<br />
?OI.S/r3IV/LIi.Y 1513.923 1 155.202 I 83-757 129.310 126.617 93.260 U4.544. I 123.974