Protectionist Empire: Trade, Tariffs, and United States Foreign Policy ...

Protectionist Empire:
Trade, Tariffs, and United States Foreign Policy, 1890-1914
Abstract
In the 25 years before World War I, the United States involved itself in international politics in
many new ways, acquiring overseas colonies, building a battleship fleet, and intervening
increasingly often in Latin America. The widespread belief that foreign markets were necessary
for the country's prosperity contributed to this new foreign policy, but continuing demands to
protect the home market from foreign competition also influenced it. The politically dominant
Republican Party was strongly committed to trade protection. This commitment led Republican
policy makers to focus on less developed areas of the world that would not export manufactured
goods to the United States rather than on wealthier markets in Europe. It prompted them to seek
exclusive unilateral or bilateral trade concessions with individual trading partners instead of
accepting multilateral arrangements that would have resulted in lower tariffs. Efforts to gain
access to foreign markets while protecting its own also contributed to a more aggressive posture
toward European intervention in the Western Hemisphere. Although the activism of both periods
suggests some superficial similarities, American foreign policy during this period points in a
strikingly different direction than the one taken after 1945.
Benjamin O. Fordham
Department of Political Science
Binghamton University
I am grateful to the John W. Kluge Center at the Library of Congress for providing me with an
ideal place to conduct much of the research for this paper. The National Science Foundation also
supported this project through grant SES-1022546. I am also grateful to my friends and
colleagues in the Department of Political Science at Binghamton University, who commented on
earlier stages of this work. I am solely responsible for all errors of fact and interpretation.

There is no political danger discoverable to Great Britain in American
Imperialism….But to British trade American Imperialism cannot be anything but
a menace. The American Empire is a Protectionist Empire. The "open door" in the
Philippines was never anything but a myth, in which only those who did not know
America could believe (Brooks 1901, 237-8).
The 25 years before World War I are commonly remembered as the era when the United States
became a major power in international politics. The scope of American foreign policy ambition
greatly increased. The United States acquired colonies in the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico
in 1898 as a result of the Spanish-American War. American presidents broadened their
interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine's injunction against European intervention in the Americas
while taking diplomatic and military actions of their own in the hemisphere increasingly often. In
Asia, they involved themselves in the ongoing controversy among the other major powers over
the future of China. The country's military and diplomatic bureaucracy expanded to
accommodate this new foreign policy activism. The State Department had only 76 employees in
Washington in 1890, a number that grew to 234 by 1910 (Trask 1981, 42). The Army and Navy
consisted of roughly 39,000 soldiers and sailors in 1890, increasing to nearly 166,000 in 1914
(Carter et al. 2006, Table Ed26-47). The fact that things had changed was obvious to Americans
at the time, prompting much public debate about whether this new departure was wise and what
it might mean for the country's future.
What role did the American stake in international trade play in shaping this new foreign
policy? Most answers to this question have focused on the search for export markets. Historians
of the "Wisconsin School," including William Appleman Williams, Walter LaFeber, Thomas
McCormick, and others, have argued that there was an elite consensus on the need for foreign
markets. Influential Americans worried about the social and political implication of the falling
1

prices and the periodic economic crises of the late 19th Century. They became convinced that
rapid economic growth after the Civil War was producing more than the home market could
consume at price levels that provided reasonable profits to producers. Their solution was to find
foreign markets for this "surplus production." The challenges of insuring access to markets in
Asia and Latin America explain much of American foreign policy during this period. American
policy makers preferred to rely on diplomatic and economic instruments. However, they were
willing to use force when necessary to overcome resistance from economic nationalists in less
developed countries or rival major powers seeking to create exclusive economic and political
empires for themselves. Some recent work by political scientists has revisited key features of the
Wisconsin School's argument about the 1890-1914 period, particularly its stress on the political
importance of overseas markets, while adding a new and useful emphasis on party and regional
competition over foreign policy (e.g., Narizny 2007, 39-158; Trubowitz 1998, 31-95).
Accounts emphasizing the implications of finding export markets provide important
insights into the changes in American foreign policy before World War I, but they tend to
neglect the role of imports. In fact, it is difficult to understand American foreign policy without
considering both these aspects of American participation in international trade. Unlike the search
for export markets, the import side of the story is not one of consensus but of partisan political
conflict. The tariff was a critically important political issue during this period. Alongside the
demand for foreign markets, the dominant Republican Party's commitment to protectionism
influenced the policy choices its leaders made. It prompted them to emphasize markets in less
developed areas that would not export manufactured goods to the United States. It also led them
to pursue exclusive bilateral arrangements or unilateral privileges in order to gain access to these
markets, especially within the American sphere of influence. They avoided the kinds of
2

multilateral arrangements that would be the cornerstone of United States policy after World War
II. As the British observer quoted above noted, the American empire of this period was a
protectionist empire. 1 If the United States has also pursued an imperial foreign policy since
1945, it has aimed at a very different kind of empire.
Although the role of trade protection in shaping American foreign policy before World
War I has been relatively neglected since the 1960s, the argument presented here is not entirely
new. Some scholars have examined the connections between protectionism and an aggressive
foreign policy in other historical settings (e.g., Carr 1972; Crowley 1966; Milward 1977). Patrick
McDonald's work on trade protection and conflict is an especially useful recent contribution
(McDonald 2009). Moreover, as I will explain below, many contemporary observers understood
the foreign policy implications of trade protection before World War I. The goal of this paper is
to set out those implications and explain their impact on debates over American foreign policy. It
is part of a larger project that will eventually bring additional evidence to bear on the arguments
presented here.
The remainder of this paper has three parts. The first focuses on the role of trade in
American politics before World War I, including the widely shared beliefs in the importance of
foreign markets and the deep partisan divisions over the tariff. The second explains how the
Republican Party's commitment to trade protection complicated the policies needed to gain
access to foreign markets. It also examines how American elites interested in foreign policy
understood the role of trade protection at the time. The third part summarizes the implications of
this evidence for our understanding of American foreign policy and explains how it fits into the
larger project.
1 While Brooks' analysis was published in a British journal, Fortnightly Review, the editors of Literary Digest found
them important enough to be summarized for American readers in their September 14, 1901, issue (American
Imperialism as Viewed Abroad 1901).
3

International Trade, Domestic Politics, and American Foreign Policy
Any account of the role of international trade in American politics in the years before 1914 must
confront two stylized facts, one pertaining to exports, the other to imports. First, there was a
widespread belief among American elites that foreign markets were very important for national
prosperity. Documenting this shared belief is arguably the most important contribution of the
Wisconsin School. Second, the tariff was among the most important and divisive political issues
of the day. Republicans favored a protective tariff, especially for manufactured products, while
Democrats tended to prefer lower barriers to imports. This section will review the evidence for
these two premises.
The Search for Export Markets
Historians of the Wisconsin School do not overstate the prevalence of concerns about market
access and commercial advantage before 1914. They are pervasive in public discussions of
foreign policy from this period. One typical example of the role these interests played concerns
Whitelaw Reid, a Republican political leader and newspaper editor who had helped negotiate the
peace treaty in which Spain ceded the Philippines. Reid gave a series of speeches around the
United States to build support for retaining control of the islands. Naturally, he took pains to
explain that it was legally and morally permissible to do so, but he focused on their commercial
value when explaining the benefits of this course of action. He emphasized both their intrinsic
economic potential and their usefulness as an "unapproachable foothold" on even more valuable
markets in China. Surprisingly to a present-day reader, Reid had almost nothing to say about
4

their value for American national security. 2 Those who objected to the emerging emphasis on
China in American foreign policy also focused on debunking its prospects as a market for
American goods rather than asserting its irrelevance to American security. 3
Even observers who believed security concerns were more important have noted the
prevalence of economic considerations in commentary about American foreign policy before
World War I. Writing in 1951, George Kennan noted with exasperation the practice of framing
the costs and benefits of foreign policy in primarily economic terms. Brooks Adams, whom he
viewed as one of the most prescient writers of the period, had his thinking "distorted by the
materialism of the time" (Kennan 1984, 6). Writers like Adams did not simply downplay security
concerns in favor of economic interests. Instead, they argued that economic concerns defined
security threats and interests. International political conflicts were fundamentally quarrels over
economic stakes, especially access to markets. Kennan (1984, 6) thought "fear, ambition,
insecurity, jealousy, and perhaps even boredom" were just as important, even though observers
like Adams disagreed. Writers in the Wisconsin School have extensively documented elite
discourse about the role of foreign markets in insuring internal social stability in the face of
"overproduction" and falling prices. 4
2
(Whitelaw Reid 1900, 192). He struck similar themes in his commencement address to Miami University of Ohio,
the Princeton University Board of Trustees, and the Marquette Club of Chicago, all of which were published
together.
3
For example, John P. Young (1899) argued that the Chinese people lacked both the wealth and the desire to
purchase Western manufactured goods. He noted that if they ever did develop a desire for these goods, they would
be able to manufacture them so cheaply that they would undersell the Western producers even in their own home
markets, forcing wage reductions in Western countries.
4 Particularly comprehensive summaries can be found in LaFeber (1963, esp. 150-196); and McCormick (1967, esp.
21-52). It is interesting to note the close resemblance between Hobson's (1965 [1902], 71-93) famous account of
"the economic taproot of imperialism" and earlier discussions of American foreign policy such as those of Charles
Conant (1899, 1900a, 1900b). Indeed, Conant (1900a, 615) cites one of Hobson's earlier works (Hobson 1894).
While Hobson treated the imperialist search for foreign markets as part of an argument that the British should
renounce it, Conant used nearly the same logic to argue that the United States had no choice but to take part in it.
5

In addition to concerns about the domestic economy's need for foreign markets, many
commentators also argued that the economic foundation needed for survival in international
anarchy depended crucially on control of international commerce. They worried that the United
States would be severely disadvantaged if it were denied economic access to the areas that were
then being divided up into European colonial empires. For example, the leading military theorist
of the day, Alfred Thayer Mahan (1987 [1890], 25-8, 83-8), argued that control of maritime trade
had always offered a decisive advantage in world politics, something he hoped would not be
denied to the United States. Adams (1900, 40-3) was somewhat more specific, writing about
need for the United States and Britain to gain commercial control over the Pacific and East Asia
in order to compete with the coalition of Eurasian powers he expected to emerge in opposition to
them. Whether based on concern about domestic political and social stability or international
competitiveness, the bottom line was that the United States needed access to foreign markets.
Particularly under the circumstances of the late 19th Century, access to foreign markets
was not simply a private concern for traders and investors. It also had major foreign policy
implications. Accounts of state efforts to promote or regulate international trade usually focus on
policies aimed directly at private economic actors such as tariffs, subsidies, exchange controls,
and the like. To some extent, it makes sense to treat these policies separately from political-
military issues on which the stakes are potentially broader. Nevertheless, maintaining the
essential conditions for international trade has important implications for matters not usually
considered part of "foreign economic policy." Although international trade is usually carried on
by firms, the conditions that make it possible involve more than just interested buyers and
sellers. Threats to trade can come from within one of the trading partners, either through the
actions of local authorities or because of internal conflict that is beyond their control. The
6

political or military actions of third states might also endanger commerce. Even state leaders
interested not in political control but only market access for their citizens might end up
intervening politically or militarily when confronting these circumstances, a process John
Gallagher and Ronald Robinson called "the imperialism of free trade" in the context of mid-
Victorian British foreign policy (Gallagher and Robinson 1953). Scholars who emphasize the
economic sources of American foreign policy have frequently applied this idea to the United
States, noting that American leaders' interest in increasing the country's exports led them to adopt
a policy of political and military intervention overseas even though they had only a limited
interest in acquiring colonies. 5
American policy makers interested in expanding access to overseas markets during the
years before World War I confronted a variety of threats that could only be overcome through
diplomacy or military action by the state. Tariffs on American exports had long been high in
Latin America, and rose steadily in Europe after the 1870s (Coatsworth and Williamson 2004;
Findlay and O'Rourke 2007, 395-6). Internal political conflicts such as the Boxer Rebellion in
China disrupted trade and sometimes prompted American military intervention. These
interventions were far more frequent in the Caribbean Basin where American policy makers
acted not only to protect American economic interests but also to preclude similar actions by
European powers. The empire-building efforts of these powers also threatened American trade in
some parts of the world. The recent division of nearly the entire African continent into European
colonies was an ominous precedent for Americans worried about being denied economic access
to these empires. Preventing a comparable colonization process in Latin America was a
5 Explicit references to Gallagher and Robinson's concept are widespread. See, for example, McCormick 1967, 63;
Topik 1996, 4; and W. A. Williams 2009, 96. "The imperialism of free trade" was a provocative phrase in 1953
because imperialism was then generally associated with protectionism. That the phrase no longer appears ironic
reveals something important about how our understanding of "imperialism" has changed.
7

longstanding priority enshrined in the Monroe Doctrine and enforced more aggressively after
1895. Following the acquisition of the Philippines, American policy makers also sought to
prevent the partition of China, most notably through the Open Door notes of 1899-1900, an
attempt to get all the major powers to agree to allow equal economic access to the country.
The Political Importance of the Tariff
Demands for foreign markets were not the only way that international trade entered American
politics. The highly partisan conflict over the protective tariff was another. Unlike concerns
about access to overseas markets, there was emphatically not a consensus on trade protection
during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The tariff was among the most important
differences between the two parties during this period. The Republican Party was strongly
committed to trade protection, especially after 1887 (Goldstein 1993, 19-20; Bailey, Goldstein,
and Weingast 1997, 611; Bensel 2000, 457-509; Irwin and Kroszner 1999; Epstein and
O'Halloran 1996; Taussig 1910, 216-9). This was as apparent to political actors at the time as it
has been to subsequent scholars. Republican presidents could not easily abandon or even
moderate this commitment. As Bensel (2000, 457-509) explains in some detail, tariffs provided a
vital incentive for key constituencies to support other aspects of the Republican Party's program.
More than 99 percent of Republicans in Congress voted for trade protection between 1888 and
1897. Less than 4 percent of Democrats took this position (Bensel 2000, 471). Both McKinley
and Roosevelt sought to extend tariff reductions to some European states in exchange for
corresponding concessions on American exports. These efforts resulted only on attacks on their
leadership from within their own party and were quickly abandoned. 6
6 On McKinley's unsuccessful reciprocity treaties, see (Laughlin and Willis 1903, 367-401) and Schoenhof (1902).
Republican criticism of Theodore Roosevelt's comments on the need to negotiate more reciprocity treaties is
8

Demands for protection came mainly from manufacturers, though producers of wool and
sugar also played a role. By contrast, many American agricultural commodities were highly
competitive and provided the lion's share of American exports before World War I. As Figure 1
indicates, cotton was by far the largest American export through the entire period, comprising
roughly one quarter of all exports from the end of Reconstruction through 1914. Tobacco and
wheat were also quite important. Exports of iron and steel, machinery, and automobiles--a much
broader category than the other two depicted in Figure 1--were still relatively unimportant at the
time the United States began its career as a colonial power in 1898. Though manufactured
exports increased steadily, they remained less important than agriculture through 1914. Under
these circumstances, the tariff transferred wealth from farmers to manufacturers. As one scholar
wrote in the North American Review, "[o]ur farmer sells on the basis of Liverpool prices in the
market of the world. He buys home productions at a protected price, and thus he is hit both
ways" (Selbie 1893, 254). As readers of the Literary Digest were periodically informed, foreign
observers noted the same redistributive feature of the tariff in the United States (e.g., America
and Protection 1890; The McKinley Bill 1890; Protectionism in the United States 1891; The
Ruin of the American Farmer 1892; The American Tariff--Past and Future 1892).
[Figure 1 about here.]
Because manufacturing was concentrated in the Northeast, this transfer of wealth had a
regional as well as sectoral dimension. Figure 2 depicts the extent of this regional concentration
in 1900. Aside from Montana and Arizona, small populations and large mineral smelting
industries created a surprisingly large figure for value-added per capita, income from
manufacturing was heavily concentrated in the Northeast. The 15 states between New England
reported in the Literary Digest (Republican Opposition to President Roosevelt 1905). Roosevelt subsequently sought
no such treaties.
9

and the Great Lakes accounted for 77 percent of employment and output in manufacturing, and
79 percent of capital invested in the sector in 1900 (United States Census Bureau 1901). 7 By
increasing income from manufacturing at the expense of other economic activities, trade
protection redistributed income from the rest of the country to the Northeast. The fact that the
revenue from the tariff helped fund pensions for Union veterans of the Civil War further
reinforced its regional redistributive effects.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Advocates of trade protection maintained that manufacturing was simply more important
than agriculture for the future of the country. The Literary Digest summarized a debate over the
international trade between a Republican and a Democrat from The Californian in the run up to
the 1892 election. The Republican, Richard McDonald, argued that the tariff would eventually
end what he saw as overreliance on agricultural exports as well as insuring that Americans did
not import manufactured goods they could make for themselves. Arguing that "[t]he best trade is
between nations whose productions are different," he hoped that trade with Europe would
decline (Our Commercial Growth and the Tariff: A Republican View 1892). These views about
agriculture were repeated frequently both inside and outside the government. Worthington C.
Ford, a specialist on trade with the State and Treasury Departments, welcomed the growing share
of manufactures among American exports, noting that agricultural commodities were subject to
dangerous price fluctuations (Ford 1898). The manufacturer Charles R. Flint offered a series of
reasons for focusing on finding foreign markets for manufactured exports rather than agricultural
raw materials, including their higher profit margins and increasing importance in the American
7 The states included in this category are Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
10

economy. He saw Latin American markets as especially promising, provided they could be
weaned away from their preference for European products (Flint 1897).
Not surprisingly, these arguments did not convince the political representatives of most
agricultural areas of the United States. Senator George Vest of Missouri summarized their
position in North American Review prior to the 1892 election.
The existing tariff is an obstruction to healthy and legitimate commerce. It
narrows and restricts the markets for American products, and especially those of
agriculture. It is based upon the idea that the American farmer must look to the
home market alone, and if that does not give remunerative prices for his surplus,
the loss must be borne patiently and patriotically for the general welfare (Vest
1892, 402-3).
Other members of Congress representing similar interests made much the same point during
elections and tariff debates (e.g., Mills 1890; Herbert 1892; Wilson 1892). They hoped to reduce
reliance on the tariff for revenue and replace it with an income tax that they hoped would fall
more heavily on manufacturers. As Roger Mills (1894, 237) put it in defending this element of
the 1894 tariff bill, "[w]e produce over eight billions of manufactured products protected against
competition: it would not be unjust to call on it for a contribution." As congressional voting on
the issue suggests, these views were common among those representing agricultural areas
(Bensel 2000, 471).
Although tariff reformers had a few successes along the way, advocates of trade
protection retained the upper hand politically during this period. The nation's population, like its
manufacturing industries, was concentrated in the Northeast. The 15 manufacturing states in the
Northeast and Great Lakes region held 214 of the 224 electoral votes needed to win the
presidency in the 1900 election and was similarly critical in all the other elections during the
11

1890-1914 period. 8 Democratic candidates, who typically endorsed "tariff reform," needed to
win at least a few of these manufacturing states in order to gain the White House. They
accomplished this difficult task only twice in the seven elections between 1888 and 1912. By
contrast, advocates of trade protection could assemble a successful electoral coalition by gaining
only a few agricultural states, something they sought to do by protecting domestic producers of
wool and sugar in addition to manufactures. Their need for Northeastern support gave
Democratic presidents a good reason to avoid an extreme position on rolling back the tariff,
however much many prominent Democratic members of Congress wanted to do so. While the
tariff bill that Woodrow Wilson signed in 1913 indeed provided substantial reductions, the 1894
tariff bill signed by Grover Cleveland did not. 9 Overall, the political case for trade protection
was compelling, especially to Republicans, who controlled the presidency for most of the 1890-
1914 period.
The Foreign Policy Implications of Protectionism
The tendency of most scholars to focus on demands for access to potential export markets tends
to highlight the similarities between American "Open Door imperialism" after 1890 and the
British "imperialism of free trade." Yet American imperialism during this period was not
associated with free trade. Its most vociferous advocates came from the party most strongly
committed to protecting the domestic market. Republicans occupied the White House for 19 of
the 25 years between 1890 and 1914, and held both houses of Congress for nearly that long. No
8 These states also had 214 electoral votes in the 1892 and 1896 elections, when the total needed for victory was 223
and 224, respectively. The comparable numbers for the other elections were 229 of 239 votes needed in 1904, 229 of
242 in 1908, and 249 of 266 in 1912 (U.S. National Archives and Records Administration 2011).
9 The author of the bill acknowledged at the time that the Wilson Tariff did not go as far as he would have liked in
reducing trade protection, but he defended it as a reasonable beginning (Wilson 1894).
12

Democratic president won reelection between the Civil War and World War I, so their ability to
reshape American foreign policy was limited. Predictably, American protectionists denied that
their preferred commercial policy posed any problems for American foreign policy. The political
predominance of this faction and its rhetoric may have helped obscure the difficulties of building
a protectionist empire. A closer examination of the foreign policy debates of the time suggests
that these difficulties were quite real and that they became increasingly clear to both American
and foreign observers over time. This section will review the policy debates of the 1890-1914
period in order to suggest that key aspects of American foreign policy make sense only once one
considers the implications of trade protection.
I will focus on the public debate in periodicals that reached an elite audience rather than
on the deliberations within the state for two reasons. First, the foreign policy bureaucracy was
extremely small by current standards. The State Department's Washington staff in 1950 was
more than 36 times its then seemingly enormous size in 1910. The military establishment also
expanded during and after World War II to a size that would have amazed the policy makers of
1900. There is no 1900 counterpart to NSC 68 because the capacity to produce such a
comprehensive policy statement simply did not exist inside the American state at the time.
Second, there was far less official secrecy before World War I. In 1914, reporters were still able
to wander freely through the State Department's offices, reading more or less whatever they
chose (West 1978, 78). Even if they kept their correspondence away from prying journalists,
policy makers could not feel confident that it would be kept secret. The Foreign Relations of the
United States series, a standard reference for American diplomatic historians, began in 1861 as a
set of documents furnished to Congress each December as part of the president's annual message
and promptly published. The published documents dated from the current calendar year until
13

1906, when the demands of assembling an increasingly large set of records delayed its
publication by three years. The documents often revealed sources of intelligence and sensitive
policy deliberations that would now routinely be classified. The attenuation of secret policy
making processes within the state greatly increased the relative importance of the public debates
conducted in periodicals like the North American Review, Atlantic, and Forum, that circulated
among influential Americans. 10 Indeed, high-ranking military officers and State Department
officials often published articles setting out their own positions in these journals.
Republican presidents' need to respond to demands for both increased access to foreign
markets and continuing trade protection, especially against manufactured imports, influenced
their foreign policy choices in at least three ways. First, it led them to focus on markets in less
developed areas even though these were poorer and less promising than those in wealthier parts
of the world. Second, it limited the means through which they could promote American exports,
leading them to seek special bilateral arrangements or unilateral trade concessions rather than
multilateral processes like those American policy makers would pursue after 1945. Third,
protectionism gave American foreign policy an aggressive and unilateralist tone that limited
prospects for participating in broader schemes for international cooperation.
The Emphasis on Less Developed Markets
One of the most obvious difficulties with the claim that concern about export markets was at the
heart of American foreign policy during the 1890-1914 period is that policy makers focused on
relatively poor markets, slighting the wealthier parts of the world that actually imported more
American products. As Figure 3 indicates, Europe had long been the recipient of roughly 80
10 Identifying politically significant journals poses problems of its own. The approach adopted here is to focus on
those covered in Literary Digest, a magazine whose self-conscious purpose during this period was to summarize
contemporary thought on a range of current issues for an educated audience (Peterson 1964, 154).
14

percent of U.S. exports at the time the United States began acquiring overseas colonies in 1898.
Latin America and Asia gradually increased their shares during the remaining decade and a half
before World War I, but Europe remained the United States' best export market. Nevertheless, as
LaFeber (1963), McCormick (1967), and others have documented, Americans concerned about
overseas markets wrote mostly about Latin America and East Asia. The puzzle deepens when
one considers that access to longstanding European markets before 1914 entailed many fewer of
the dangerous and costly foreign policy problems that plagued market access in less developed
areas. It required neither battleships nor colonies. These regional priorities make more sense
when one considers the implications of trade protection in the United States. Maintaining high
tariff barriers, especially on manufactured goods, complicated policy makers' efforts to promote
American exports. These complications were easier to handle when dealing with less-developed
trading partners.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Advocates of free trade always argued that protectionism would interfere with American
exports. Representative Roger Mills of Texas, one of the principal Democratic advocates of tariff
reduction, made this point repeatedly during the debate on the protectionist McKinley Tariff of
1890. "When protection puts taxes on the goods of the foreigner that prohibit them from coming
here, he is rendered less able to take in exchange the surplus which we are ready and anxious to
give" (Mills 1890, 163). 11 Like other protectionists, McKinley denied that there was any
connection between exports and the tariff. "[Tariffs] put no restraint upon foreign trade"
(McKinley 1890, 747). As Terrill (1973) has pointed out, the protectionists were correct, at least
11 Many others made much the same point during other tariff debates. For example, Procter (1893) predicted the
more liberal tariff under consideration in 1893 would permit the United States to surpass Britain as the leading
commercial power. A. A. Healy (1893, 407-8) took the same view, noting that "foreign nations need more of our
products and would be glad to buy them, but they cannot buy if we will not allow the products they have to send us
in payment to our ports." See also Medley 1893.
15

in a narrow sense. In a multilateral trading system, bilateral exports and imports do not have to
balance. Moreover, flows of European investment into the United States also helped reduce
potential balance-of-payments problems during this period. Nevertheless, as the size of the
American economy and the volume of American trade steadily increased during the late 19th
century, continuing American trade protection posed increasing difficulties for the international
trading system.
The prospect of European tariff retaliation posed a more immediate threat to American
exports than long-term difficulties with the balance of payments. Protected American products
were frequently sold overseas for less than their price in the protected home market. "Dumping,"
the term used to describe this practice then and now, was a common result of tariff protection. Its
purpose, after all was to raise domestic prices above prevailing on the world market. Dumping
outraged foreign competitors as well as American proponents of free trade. 12 The Belgian
economist Gustave de Molinari summed up the European reaction to the 1890 McKinley tariff
for an American audience in the North American Review, pointing out that the bill strengthened
the hand of protectionists there and had even led to talk of a customs union directed against the
United States (de Molinari 1890). The Literary Digest summarized Molinari's comments for its
readers (The McKinley Bill in Europe 1890) and reported other European views of the McKinley
Tariff, which were uniformly negative and proposed various plans for retaliation (e.g., The
American Tariff War 1890; French Comment on the Tariff Bill 1890; America and Protection
1890; The McKinley Bill 1890). Subsequent protectionist tariff bills elicited a similar European
response that was duly reported in the American press. For example, the economist and diplomat
Jacob Schoenhof (1898, 550) warned readers of The Forum that "the new [Dingley] tariff
12 Litman (1909, 314-5) and Clark (1907) provide contemporary discussions of American dumping.
16

exercises the severest pressures against those countries which have become our best customers in
manufactured goods." Retaliation was a likely result. James Howard Gore (1899) offered a more
specific account of the German efforts to reduce its food imports from the United States in
response to the burden the Dingley Tariff imposed on its manufactured exports.
The prospect of European retaliation did not deter American protectionists. Because
Britain was both the largest European importer of American products and the only country not to
retaliate in kind against American tariffs, plans for an imperial preference system that would
discriminate against American imports were especially ominous. The Literary Digest found that
newspaper editorialists generally expected the scheme to harm the United States if it were
implemented. Some protectionist papers apparently redoubled their support for the tariff,
however. As one such editor put it "[a]ll this country needs to do is to keep on the way it has
been going. Build up its industries by protection, seek markets in South America, China, and
other such countries, and nothing that European nations can do in the way of tariff barriers will
check or stop our growth" (America and Joseph Chamberlain 1903, 494).
As this quotation suggests, protectionists interested in foreign markets saw a brighter
future in Latin America and Asia than in Europe, even though the value of exports to these areas
remained relatively small. There was little local competition for American manufactures in these
parts of the world, so the concerns about dumping and the inequities of American tariffs did not
arise. Whitelaw Reid (1900, 41-2) summarized this line of argument as part of his case for
annexing the Philippines.
That way lies now the best hope of American commerce. There you may
command a natural rather than an artificial trade--a trade which pushes itself
instead of needing to be pushed; a trade with people who can send you things you
want and cannot produce, and take from you in return things they want and cannot
produce; in other words, a trade largely between different zones, and largely with
less advanced peoples, comprising one fourth the population of the globe, whose
17

wants promise to be speedily and enormously developed. The Atlantic Ocean
carries mainly a different trade, with people as advanced as ourselves, who could
produce or procure elsewhere much of what they buy from us, while we could
produce, if driven to it, most of what we buy from them. It is more or less,
therefore, an artificial trade as well as a trade in which we have lost the first place
and will find it difficult to regain.
The idea that trade with less developed areas would not create pressure to reduce
domestic tariffs on manufactured products prompted James Blaine, Secretary of State during the
Harrison administration, to include a measure to promote trade with Latin America in the
McKinley tariff bill in 1890. Not coincidentally, Blaine was among the most prominent
Republican advocates of protectionism (e.g., Gladstone and Blaine 1890). His plan for
reciprocity agreements with Latin American states followed in the wake of the Pan-American
conference over which he had presided a few months earlier, a meeting that was also directed at
increasing United States trade with its southern neighbors (Hannigan 2002, 54-6). The
reciprocity measure in the McKinley Tariff used the threat of punitive duties on sugar and a few
other products to secure reciprocity agreements permitting American access to markets in
countries that would have little cause to complain about high American tariffs on manufactured
products (Laughlin and Willis 1903, 185-6; D. Healy 1970, 162-4). Opponents of the McKinley
Tariff argued that focusing on less-developed trading partners who would export agricultural
products to the United States would further disadvantage American agriculture, already harmed
by higher prices for protected manufactured goods (e.g., Herbert 1892; Mills 1891; Vest 1892).
The political forces backing the tariff kept Republican presidents focused on less-
developed markets even when they would have preferred a broader approach. Europe remained a
richer market than either Latin America or East Asia, even for many manufacturers. For this
reason, some Republicans hoped to use reciprocity agreements to lower European tariff barriers
as well. Democrats had managed to repeal the reciprocity provisions of the McKinley tariff in
18

1894, but the Dingley Tariff, adopted after sweeping Republican electoral victories of 1896,
revived them. The McKinley administration then negotiated reciprocity treaties with European as
well as Latin American states. The treaty with France was especially controversial, prompting
the National Association of Manufacturers to call a special "National Reciprocity Convention" so
that its members could debate the treaties publicly. Some of those present, most notably
representative of agricultural implements manufacturers, spoke out in favor of offering tariff
concessions to the French in exchange for lower tariffs on some American exports. Others were
strongly opposed, however. Some pointed out that the reciprocity plank of the 1900 Republican
Party platform had called only for trade with states that would export nothing produced in the
United States, a condition that might hold in Latin America but certainly not in Europe.
Particularly canny opponents of the treaties also pointed out that the practice of allowing some
manufacturers to be harmed so that others could benefit set a dangerous precedent. It would be
better if the "forces of protection" that the convention embodied remained united. "The country
is looking at you. If you make a blunder, and allow individual interests to lead you too far, you
may lead us between the conflicting forces of fair trade and free trade, and we may be shot to
pieces." In the end, convention endorsed reciprocity "only where it can be done without injury to
any of our home interests of manufacturing, commerce or farming." 13 The convention's verdict
carried substantial political weight. President Roosevelt tempered his support for the treaties,
which had been negotiated under his predecessor, and the Senate refused to ratify any of them
(Hoxie 1903, 208-9). Writing after the convention in Forum, editorialist E. J. Gibson (1901, 477)
13 National Association of Manufacturers 1901. For the position of agricultural implement manufacturers, see pages
14-20. Comments on the Republican Party platform can be found on pages 21 and 43, among others. Concerns about
the precedent set by concessions affecting some members of the protectionist coalition can be found on page 64. The
final resolution on reciprocity can be found on page 145. The Literary Digest documented the extensive press
coverage and editorial commentary on the convention (Net Results of the Reciprocity Convention 1901). (Laughlin
and Willis 1903, 346-8) also emphasize the importance of appeals for solidarity among protectionists at the
convention as a major reason for the failure of the McKinley administration's treaties.
19

summarized the reasons for the outcome. "When we go outside the lines laid down in the last
Republican National platform favoring treaties that 'open our markets on favorable terms for
what we do not ourselves produce,' it is very difficult to make a reciprocity treaty not in conflict
with the protective tariff."
Some policy makers recognized the political constraints that protectionism imposed even
before the failure of the McKinley administration's reciprocity treaties. Many would certainly
have preferred free trade or at least a more moderate approach than the politics of the Republican
Party would permit, but their personal opinions did not alter the political reality they faced. 14
Addressing a convention on international trade in 1899, James C. Monaghan, then a U.S. consul
in Germany and later head of the division of consular reports, noted with some frustration both
foreign complaints about the tariff and the defiant attitude of American protectionists. "The fact
that almost if not quite every foreign country or foreign delegate has entered a protest against the
tariff conditions existing in this country will be to the larger part of this people a splendid
argument in favor of the continuation of the tariff." Monaghan's assigned topic was trade with
Northern Europe. He noted that Europe was indeed a richer market but he also pointed out that
"just as long as any manufactured article or product of the machines of this country begins to be
imported in any large quantities into the countries of Europe, the statesmen of those countries
will enact protective and sometimes prohibitory duties on those articles." He concluded that "it
may be wiser and better to pay even more attention to the East and to Russia than to Europe, but
I certainly say this, let us neglect neither" (Butler 1899, 289-91).
14 For example, Ulysses Eddy, whom McCormick (1967, 42) cites as advocate of reciprocity treaties in the 1890s,
also wrote a satire attacking the tariff and other government policies that interfered with trade (Eddy 1892). Many
other Republicans were at least privately willing to consider lower tariffs (Wolman 1992).
20

The Need for Exclusive Bilateral Arrangements and Unilateral Privileges
The reciprocity agreements that Republican administrations sought to negotiate under the
McKinley and Dingley Tariffs were not steps toward broader free trade. They were intended to
be limited exceptions embedded within a strongly protectionist commercial policy framework.
They were negotiated on a few goods--ideally those not produced in the United States--and were
strictly bilateral. Until 1923, the United States did not recognize unconditional most-favored
nation (MFN) status in international trade. After 1945, unconditional MFN would form the basis
for the multilateral trading system. Through it, bilateral tariff concessions negotiated under the
rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the World Trade Organization are
generalized to the other parties to these agreements. Under the pre-1923 "American
interpretation" of MFN, trade concessions granted to another state in exchange for some special
consideration were not automatically extended to other states just because they enjoyed MFN
status. Instead, the benefits of MFN status applied only to concessions granted to other another
state without receiving a reciprocal favor in return. 15 Because nearly all other states had accepted
the unconditional interpretation of MFN status by the 1890s, the anomalous American position
caused frequent disputes with its trading partners. The United States did grant unconditional
MFN status in a few unusual instances, but it generally avoided this step even when it was costly
to do so. In 1898, the Swiss minister in Washington managed to convince the State Department
that his country's 1850 trade agreement with the United States entitled Switzerland to the same
duties accorded the French under a newly negotiated reciprocity agreement. To stave off similar
claims from other states, the United States abrogated the commercial treaty with Switzerland
after the required one-year notification period (C. L. Jones 1908, 123-4).
15 Useful discussion of conditional and unconditional MFN status include (C. L. Jones 1908; Viner 1924).
21

The conditional interpretation of MFN and provisions for bilateral reciprocity agreements
made discrimination against some trading partners and in favor of others a matter of policy--one
that rests uneasily with historical accounts that emphasize the Open Door Notes as the basis for
American policy in general. After 1899, the American diplomats indeed promoted the principle
that traders from all nations should have equal access to markets in all parts of China, regardless
of any special political influence particular powers enjoyed there. This policy must be viewed in
light of the fact that the other powers had already carved out spheres of influence in China by
1899, when American bases in the Philippines made the United States a player in the politics of
the region. A partition of China among these powers appeared likely. 16 The Open Door Notes
were an effort to secure the greatest possible economic access for the United States in one
particular country, not a general principle. The policy of non-discrimination in China did not
slow American efforts to set up exclusive bilateral arrangements in Latin America. Moreover,
Sidney Brooks' prediction, quoted at the beginning of this paper, that the United States would not
adhere to the open-door policy in the Philippines turned out to be correct. 17 The United States
kept its promise that it would not discriminate in favor its exports to the Philippines for ten years
after annexing the islands in 1899. However, this practice ended promptly in 1909, when new
legislation eliminated duties on trade between the United States and the Philippines while
16 For example, addressing the American Academy for the Advancement of Political and Social Science on U.S.
policy toward China, both Ford (1899) and Hill (1899) assumed that partition was inevitable. Some in the audience
disputed this premise, but mainly to argue that the United States needed to act more aggressively to prevent it. The
Boxer Rebellion increased speculation about partition and debate about whether the United States could (or should)
prevent it (Shall America Join in the Partition of China? 1900).
17 Brooks was not alone in his skepticism of American commitment to an open-door policy. Other British observers,
as well as British and French editorialists, all questioned it, noting especially American protective tariffs at home
(The United States and the Open Door 1900; The United States as a World Power 1899). The Literary Digest
provided ground for skepticism about the permanence of the open door policy in the Philippines, quoting Rep.
Nelson Dingley (R-ME), chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee: "It is to be borne in mind, however,
that the present talk about an 'open door' policy for the Philippines is intended to apply entirely to these islands while
under a military administration, which would be permissible, and not to apply to those islands after they shall have
been formally recognized as part of the United States" (The Open Door 1898, 680).
22

imposing a tariff on other states' exports to the islands (Culbertson 1919, 333-4). Some advocates
of tariff reform indeed argued that the principle of equal treatment implied in the Open Door
Notes should indeed be universal (Wolman 1992). Their position had little policy impact before
World War I.
The commitment to both trade protection and finding foreign markets would have made
acceptance of unconditional MFN difficult even if American leaders had been inclined to do so.
The system of strictly bilateral reciprocity allowed them to select the most promising potential
markets without making politically sensitive changes in the overall tariff rate. Extending the
same concessions they made under these agreements to all states that could claim MFN status
would have been equivalent to reducing the tariff overall. The prospect that other states might
extend the concessions they granted to the United States to their other trading partners was less
threatening, but would diminish the competitive advantage a special tariff rate gave American
exporters. Perhaps because they were accustomed to seeking these advantages through the tariff
anyway, politically active business leaders were not afraid to suggest that the government should
seek out exclusive privileges when negotiating reciprocity agreements. As Henry Dalley of the
New York Board of Trade and Transportation put it during the 1901 National Reciprocity
Convention, "[w]e can certainly justify it to ourselves if we (following the examples of other
nations) secure such advantages as we are entitled to through our commanding position in the
world of commerce" (National Association of Manufacturers 1901, 41). Others were more
specific about the advantages they had in mind. William Bass of the South Brooklyn Board of
Trade argued that a workable reciprocity arrangement had to "exclude European productions
from our Latin neighbors" (National Association of Manufacturers 1901, 37). Such exclusive
privileges were not easy to obtain from Latin American states because they served only to
23

provide a rent to the American exporter. As Taussig (1910, 240) pointed out, "[c]oncessions of
this sort, however, which do redound to the ultimate advantage of the communities giving them,
are not likely long to remain preferential."
Reciprocity agreements were not the only means through which American policy makers
sought to secure privileged market access for American exports. In any event, these agreements
did not prove particularly successful. Those negotiated under the 1890 McKinley Tariff were
repealed in 1894, when the Democrats gained control of Congress. The resurgent Republicans
reintroduced the idea in the 1897 Dingley Tariff but the Senate refused to ratify the treaties the
McKinley administration negotiated. American policy makers turned instead to other means of
obtaining privileged market access. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of setting
separate tariffs for American overseas possessions in 1901 (Wolman 1992, 15). The United
States could thus impose its preferred trade policy on U.S. colonies, an alternative to reciprocity
treaties that some observers thought undermined support for these treaties at a time when further
colonial expansion was possible. In the case of the Philippines, the military occupation
authorities solicited suggestions from American business when setting tariff rates, finding ways
of favoring American products even before the formal repeal of the open door policy there was
permissible. Meanwhile, Philippine products exported to the United States paid the full rates set
out in the Dingley Tariff until the tariff was revised in 1909 (Hoxie 1903, 210-13; United States
Senate 1902). Cuba was not formally a colony but remained effectively an American
protectorate. It had to accept a reciprocity agreement that fell far short of the free trade Cuban
political leaders had wanted (Speck 2005).
The 1909 Payne-Aldrich Tariff moved away from reciprocity treaties, adopting an
alternative approach copied from French practice. It set out both a general minimum tariff and a
24

maximum schedule to be paid by states that unreasonably discriminated against American
exporters in the president's judgment. President Taft was then able to negotiate 23 agreements
using the threat provided in the new law, ultimately declining to impose the maximum schedule
on any state (Lake 1988, 131-6, 144-5; Taussig 1931, 403-5). While discrimination against
American exports was to be punished, the Payne-Aldrich Tariff neither endorsed the
unconditional interpretation of MFN nor ruled out further efforts to secure special privileges for
American exports. Indeed, the Taft administration went on to negotiate such a trade agreement
with Canada, though the Canadians ultimately declined to ratify it.
American officials also sought access to foreign markets through less formal channels.
Trade was a central preoccupation of American foreign policy before World War I. American
diplomats as well as consuls worked to promote American exports. As the U.S. Minister to
Brazil told a meeting on international trade in 1899, "it is no violation of proper diplomatic
reserve to say that paramount in South America missions and consulates are the desire and effort
to extend our commerce" (Butler 1899, 208). The failure of the McKinley administration's
reciprocity treaties put a premium on other means for gaining market access. Hannigan (2002,
65-6) points out that informal diplomatic efforts, as well as better marketing by American firms,
became an increasingly important part of American plans to increase exports to Latin America
during the Roosevelt administration. Congress also encouraged this approach, creating a Bureau
of Foreign Commerce within the State Department in 1903 and increasing the Department's total
staff by more than ten percent in the process (Plischke 1999, 206). In 1909, the Department
reported that diplomatic intervention on behalf of American exporters "has increased at least 50
percent in the last few years" (United States Department of State 1909, 6).
25

Further research, especially in the consular reports issued by American representatives
abroad, is needed to determine the extent and specific effects of this diplomatic activity. The fact
that U.S. representatives in the small states of the Caribbean basin had greater political resources
than did their colleagues elsewhere permits a rough statistical test of whether it made a
difference. The United States intervened in the Caribbean after 1898 far more often than in any
other part of the world, occupying some countries for years at a time. Diplomats could use the
specter of military intervention to threaten local authorities with whom they disagreed and to
bolster those whom they preferred. Moreover, the American prohibition on intervention in the
region by any other power effectively ruled out the assistance of any state powerful enough to
challenge U.S. power in the region. These threats carried far less force in European colonies or in
the large states of Colombia and Venezuela, where American intervention would have been far
more costly. The United States also took control of customs revenue collection in some
Caribbean states in several instances, such as in the Dominican Republic in 1904 and Nicaragua
in 1912 (Hannigan 2002, 33-4, 42-3). These might also have provided opportunities for adjusting
local tariff rates on American exports, as had been done in the Philippines. Writing in 1929,
Benjamin Williams noted that "obtaining over certain countries a system of financial control
backed by strong protection methods" had entirely supplanted any interest in further colonies
because '[s]uch controls do not require annexation and do not affect trade through the
manipulation of the tariffs" (B. H. Williams 1929, 330-1). If American diplomatic activity really
made a difference, then the rate of growth in American exports to states in the region after the
Spanish-American War should be faster than the rate of growth in American exports elsewhere
and at other times.
26

Figure 4 depicts the growth of American exports to independent states bordering on the
Caribbean (excluding Venezuela and Colombia), as well as several comparison groups. Several
patterns are consistent with effective intervention to promote these exports. First, exports to the
Caribbean did not grow much more rapidly than did exports to Europe or the rest of the less
developed world before 1898. The United States was far less active in the region before the
Spanish American War and had fewer political and military resources at its disposal. Things
changed after 1898, and especially after the 1903 announcement of the Roosevelt Corollary to
the Monroe Doctrine, which codified the United States' more interventionist posture toward the
region. American exports toward the Caribbean grew more rapidly than did exports toward than
any of the comparison groups.
[Figure 4 about here]
Table 1 presents the results of a more formal statistical test of the hypothesis that
American exports toward Caribbean states grew more rapidly. These models examine American
exports to the countries and colonies for which the Commerce Department reported trade data.
They treat the change in the annual value of American exports as a function of the lagged value
of these exports, the lagged change, and a regional dummy variable for the Caribbean states after
1898. The regional dummy tests the hypothesis that exports to these states grew more rapidly
during this period. The other variables in the model capture the time dependence in each export
series. The four models test the hypothesis that the Caribbean differed against four comparison
groups: all states, Europe, other less developed areas, and European colonies in the Caribbean.
[Table 1 about here.]
The results suggest some qualifications to the patterns apparent in Figure 4 but they
support the principal hypothesis. Exports to independent Caribbean states indeed increased more
27

apidly after 1898 when compared to other less developed areas of the world, including other
parts of the Caribbean. Annual growth in American exports to an average Caribbean state was
about $410,000 greater than annual growth in exports to non-European states or colonies
elsewhere. However, American exports to this part of the world did not increase more rapidly
than did exports to Europe or, as a result, to the rest of the world as a whole. (European states
made up a much larger share of the total number of states during this period than they do today,
so they strongly influence the results for the world as a whole.) In spite of resentment of
American commercial policy in Europe, it remained just as much of a dynamically increasing
market for American exports after 1898 as the region in which the United States behaved most
imperialistically. If American policy makers had wanted only to find growing export markets,
this costly and controversial activity would have made little sense. However, the fact that
American policy makers also cared about protecting their home market against manufactured
exports also influenced their choices.
The Broader Implications of the Protectionist Search for Markets
Even if American policy makers had been able to set aside their commitment to trade protection,
the search for export markets would still have had important foreign policy implications. For
example, the effective pursuit of the Open Door in China might still have required an American
naval presence in the region. Moreover, American policy makers would probably have seen first
the Russians and later the Japanese as potential rivals in the region in view of these countries'
efforts to set up their own exclusive economic and political spheres of influence there. 18 The
18 At the time of the Open Door Notes, American observers identified Russia as the primary threat because of its
newly acquired concessions in Manchuria (Hannigan 2002, 96-9). Examples of this concern from Forum alone
include Low 1899; Cary 1898; Adams 1898; Moffett 1899; and W. C. Jameson Reid 1901. Japan was a potential
ally against Russia. Reviewing press commentary in January 1904, the Literary Digest (American Sympathies in a
28

British, who actually were committed to free trade during this period, generally perceived the
same threats, and for much the same reason. The patterns of greatest interest here are those that
would not have existed without the commitment to trade protection. The central role of markets
in less-developed areas and the search for privileged access to these markets are direct practical
implications of searching for overseas markets while protecting the domestic market. These
uncooperative premises had broader and less direct effects on American foreign policy. They
gave the emerging foreign policy an aggressive and opportunistic tone that accorded with
arguments that international relations were fundamentally a zero-sum struggle for survival and
dominance. Those who rejected protectionism tended to see more opportunities for cooperation.
These are precisely the dynamics Patrick McDonald suggests in his recent book linking
protectionist to an aggressive foreign policy, which includes an excellent discussion of the
American conflict with Britain over the Venezuelan border in 1895-6 (McDonald 2009, 155-84).
The documentary evidence provides further support for this interpretation.
Many observers at the time linked protectionism to a foreign policy that aggressively
sought unilateral advantage at the expense of international cooperation. David Wells, a
prominent advocate of free trade, argued that because tariffs harmed people in other states, they
were essentially hostile acts. "Restrictions on the commercial intercourse of nations differ in
form only from acts of war; and such acts inevitably tend to develop ill-feeling and acts of
retaliation" (Wells 1891, 15). The writer William D. McCrackan made a similar argument two
Russo-Japanese War 1904, 101) noted that "[n]ot a single newspaper in the country, as far as we have seen, favors
anything but absolute neutrality in the dispute between Russia and Japan; but, at the same time, most of our press
would like to see Japan win…. With Japan paramount, it is believed that American trade and influence in Asia
would enjoy a rapid growth." However, once Japan defeated Russia, it became a greater potential threat to American
interests. Press coverage quickly adjusted. The Literary Digest summarized articles citing Japanese efforts to
monopolize commerce in areas they seized from Russia, calling for greater American efforts to preserve Chinese
independence against Japan, and pointing out Japan's quest for commercial dominance in Asia (Menace of Japanese
Success 1905, 920; Our Duty to Save China from Japan 1907, 288; Our Peaceful Contest with Japan 1907, 594).
29

years later. "Under the plea of helping native industries, protection merely perpetuates bogus
international hatreds. It destroys the brotherhood of nations. It brings estrangements, jealousies,
imputations of evil motives, and misunderstandings without end." 19 This line of argument was
also common among scholars of international relations. For example, Paul Reinsch argued in his
1900 textbook that "a growth of protectionist feeling and policy is going hand in hand with the
growth of imperialism." He feared that protectionism would lead to "cutting the world up into
mutually exclusive spheres, making trade national, and accentuating still further the excessive
antagonisms between countries." 20
Among observers who favored trade protection or took its presence for granted,
commentary about the inevitability of political and military conflict over control of markets was
common. Brooks Adams and Alfred Thayer Mahan are perhaps the best-remembered of those
writing in this vein, but they were not alone. 21 For example, Charles Conant argued in a series of
articles written soon after the Spanish-American War that the United States would inevitably be
drawn into a political-military contest for market access (Conant 1899, 1900a, 1900b). He noted
that these means would not be necessary "[i]f commercial freedom were the rule among nations,"
but argued that this had never really been the case (Conant 1900a, 608). Economic competition
was commonly discussed in military terms as "peaceful combat," "conquer[ing] by commerce,"
19
McCrackan 1893, 145. McCrackan's article was summarized for a wider audience by Literary Digest (Our
Foreign Policy 1893).
20
(Reinsch 1900, 38-9). Hobson (1965 [1902], 64-70) also linked imperialism and protectionism. Some textbooks
written during the inter-war period also made the same connection (Moon 1936, 33-4; B. H. Williams 1929, 256-7).
21 Adams' "The New Struggle for Life Among Nations" is a good example of his thinking (Adams 1900, 26-53).
Mahan was less apocalyptic in tone because he wrote mainly about the past, even though he clearly intended his
histories to serve as a guide for current policy makers. Nevertheless, he also viewed military competition for control
of trade as a constant feature of human affairs. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History opens with the following
observation about the benefits of seaborne commerce: "To secure one's own people a disproportionate share of such
benefits, every effort was made to exclude others, either by the peace legislative methods of monopoly or
prohibitory regulations, or when these failed, by direct violence" (Mahan 1987, 1).
30

"peaceful conquest" and the like. 22 Then as now, advocates of free trade objected to these
metaphors, arguing that trade was not a zero-sum endeavor. For example, Edward Atkinson
wrote during the dispute with Britain over the Venezuelan border with British Guiana that "[t]he
mediaeval error that in all commerce what one nation gains another must lose, is one of the most
potent causes of the animosity against England which now depraves the minds of many people in
this country" (Atkinson 1896, 84). Republican policy makers nevertheless preferred the military
metaphors. As one harsh but not entirely inaccurate Democratic critic summarized their
perspective, "[i]ts spirit is that of conquest; its first reason, as well as its last, is force" (Gray
1895, 424).
The influence of protectionism on specific policy choices was apparent was in the
changing interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. Over the course of the 1890-1914 period,
advocates of American empire reinterpreted this longstanding policy in ways that complemented
both the regional priorities and the emphasis on unilateral privilege associated with trade
protection. 23 The Doctrine's prohibition on further European colonization undeniably involved a
non-economic security interest in that a colony in the Caribbean Basin might have been used as a
base from which to threaten the United States, or at least the proposed canal linking the Pacific
Ocean and the Caribbean Sea. However, debate over whether potentially costly actions to
enforce the Monroe Doctrine against European powers were worth the risk tended to divide
22 These terms come from Eddy 1891, 421; Blaine 1892, 522; and Carter 1894, 431, respectively.
23 Perhaps because they tended to take American security concerns less seriously, foreign observers linked the
Monroe Doctrine and efforts to gain commercial control of the Western Hemisphere relatively early. The London
Economist remarked on American efforts to establish "the Monroe doctrine in commerce for the whole Western
Hemisphere" in 1886 (The Hide and Leather Industries 1886, 6). The Literary Digest summarized the comments of
an Austrian legislator along the same lines in 1892: "The American policy is that of a great Power. Washington said
to his countrymen: Take no part in European quarrels. Monroe came and said: No European state shall in the future
found a new empire on this continent. Garfield and Blaine have gone a step beyond and said: The United States will
extend its wings over the whole American continent, North and South, and will form a 'Zollverein' of the free
countries of America" (The Commercial Policy of the World 1892, 647).
31

protectionists, who were usually Republicans, from free traders, who were usually Democrats.
From the protectionist point of view, Latin America was the most important potential target for
the exclusive trading arrangements they hoped to construct. This effort would necessarily harm
European commercial interests, perhaps leading to retaliation against American commercial
interests elsewhere. Such conflict was less costly to protectionists because they were seeking to
limit trade with Europe anyway. Free traders saw fewer benefits from trade with Latin America
and much greater costs from conflict with European trading partners. Because the non-economic
security implications of the Monroe Doctrine affected all Americans in roughly the same way,
they cannot account for the strong divisions over what it meant and how it should be enforced.
The relationship between the tariff and alternative views of the Monroe Doctrine was
clearly on display during dispute over the Venezuelan boundary with British Guiana in 1895-6.
The dispute was quite old, but the Venezuelan government hired an American publicist who
substantially increased the visibility of the matter. It provoked an extensive debate in the United
States about what the Monroe Doctrine implied for American foreign policy. Because the United
States had no immediate stake in the boundary itself, the principal issue was whether British
territorial claims violated the Monroe Doctrine and might justify an American military
response. 24 Those who argued that it did frequently cited the importance of Latin America for
the future of American commerce and thus the need to prevent Europeans from gaining or
expanding their foothold in the hemisphere. For example, two members of the House of
Representatives, Joseph Wheeler (D-MS) and Charles Grosvenor (R-OH) wrote a joint article in
24
On the details of the crisis see (LaFeber 1963, 242-83; Hannigan 2002, 57-60; D. Healy 1970, 24-8; McDonald
2009, 157-62), among others.
32

the North American Review making the case for strong action against Britain. Both cited the
commercial importance of the region as a key reason. 25
Henry Cabot Lodge was among those offering the strongest interpretation of the Monroe
Doctrine in this case (McDonald 2009, 168-71; Widenor 1980, 105-6). He asserted that the
Doctrine gave the United States special prerogatives in the region, an area in which it held
"rightful supremacy." The United States should be willing to fight to prevent any European
power from seizing additional territory in the Americas. "The supremacy of the Monroe doctrine
should be established and at once--peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must" (Lodge 1895a, 658).
Lodge presented the Venezuela boundary dispute as a key example of the Cleveland
administration's broader policy of "retreat and surrender," an approach he linked to the
Democratic Party's support for lower tariffs. He charged that Democrats had consistently failed
to drive a sufficiently hard bargain in tariff negotiations with Canada and Germany, and had
thrown away the advantages gained through Blaine's reciprocity treaties by abrogating them
under the 1894 Wilson Tariff. Among those favoring free trade, he contended, "[e]verywhere
there is opposition and abuse for the navy and sneers at any attempt to uphold the rights of the
United States against any other nation." He also attacked free traders for their concerns about the
costs of military conflict with Britain. "We have had something too much of these disciples of
the Manchester School, who think the price of calico more important than a nation's honor, the
duties on pig iron of more moment than the advance of the race" (Lodge 1895b, 8, 12-3, 14, 15).
25 (Wheeler and Grosvenor 1895). Noting that Britain used its colonial possessions to extend its commerce Wheeler
wrote that "far from receding from the strictest construction of the doctrine laid down by Monroe, my views are that
the United States should extend its policy and look to the establishment of depots and naval stations around which
American colonies would locate, sufficiently strong to encourage and protect our trade and commerce" (631). For
his part, Grosvenor argued that "[a]t this time, England seems to have special interest in South American affairs. Her
efforts to secure trade belonging legitimately to her commercial rivals, have been supplemented by an interference in
the Mosquito country which clearly manifests a disposition to control, if possible, the ownership of the great trans-
Isthmus Canal. England should not be permitted to succeed in this scheme. The building and control of that gigantic
artery of international commerce should be the dearest object of American statesmanship" (633). The Literary
Digest summarized this article for a broader audience (Our Duty in the Venezuelan Crisis 1895).
33

Advocates of free trade viewed this dispute and broader prospects for cooperation with
Britain very differently. Edward Atkinson, a New England businessman and widely published
supporter of free trade, responded to Lodge's arguments. Ridiculing Lodge's assertion that
financial considerations could not be weighed against national honor, Atkinson wrote that "when
it is proposed to dishonor the country by an aggressive and violent jingo policy without warrant
of any kind, it becomes fit to count the cost of possible war in dollars and cents in order to bring
the malignant influence of the jingo faction into most conspicuous notice" (Atkinson 1896, 74).
He argued that the United States gained far more from its close relationship with Britain than it
could from increasing its trade with Latin America or other less developed areas of the world.
Risking war with such a valuable trading partner was foolish. "The prosperity of the grain
grower of the West, of the dairyman of the Middle States, and of the cotton grower in the South
demands alike that every effort shall be asserted to overcome the prejudice and animosity which
find their expression in jingoism." 26 Just as Lodge had tied the opposition to a hard-line position
on Venezuela to support for free trade, Atkinson tied advocacy of war to protectionism:
It is perfectly logical for the advocates of a prohibitory tariff to take the position
long since taken by Henry C. Carey, who said that "he would regard a ten years'
war with England as the greatest material benefit that could happen to this
country." People are wiser now than they were when they listened to such a false
prophet, and yet there are to-day a sufficient number of ignorant persons to whom
a similar appeal is made (Atkinson 1895, 558).
David Wells, another well-known free trader, also joined the argument against Lodge and
other hard-liners during the dispute over the Venezuelan border. Writing in the North American
Review, he focused on what he characterizes as the most important source of hostility to Britain:
26 (Atkinson 1896, 82). Atkinson, who would go on to become a prominent figure in the anti-imperialist movement,
later made much the same point about the limited value of American commerce with the Far East compared to the
cost of subjugating the Philippines. "How other nations must laugh in their sleeves while witnessing what a fool
Uncle Sam is making of himself at the present time, in the matter of military aggression under the pretext of
expansion of commerce" (Atkinson 1900, 304).
34

the belief that the country was seeking to monopolize wealth and commerce of the world at the
expense of everyone else (Wells 1896, 387). After quoting a series of Republican speakers--
including Lodge--making this charge, he argued that it fundamentally misunderstood British
policy. Wells defended many aspects of British imperialism but focused special praise on their
liberal commercial policy. Americans should pay attention to this issue in the Venezuelan case,
Wells contended, because British commercial policy "is really the only involved point that
materially affects their interest, and as such is more worthy of their serious consideration than
any other" (401). Wells contended that Venezuela would restrict and tax commerce in the
disputed area, while the British would not do so. He provocatively supported this claim by
quoting an 1890 letter from the Venezuelan foreign minister to Secretary of State James Blaine,
hinting that this well-known Republican defender of trade protection was sympathetic to sinister
Venezuelan efforts to exclude foreign commerce (401-2). He concluded that the United States
would actually be better off with the area under British than Venezuelan control and that the
United States should pursue a more cooperative policy toward Britain in general (404-5).
The regional priorities of the protectionists and free traders were also reflected to lesser
extent in their attitude toward what most viewed as the Monroe Doctrine's natural correlate: non-
entanglement in European political affairs. 27 Because nearly all Americans, including those who
advocated free trade, took it for granted at the time that no such intervention would ever make
sense, there was little debate on the issue. 28 As George Kennan (1984 [1951], 4-5) noted, the
27 This injunction is clear enough in the plain language of the Monroe Doctrine, though it is not as widely discussed
as the prohibition on European expansion in the Americas. "In the wars of the European powers in matters relating
to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so."
28 There is little evidence that this assumption changed until well after the outbreak of World War I. American
leaders initially regarded the war in Europe with rather detached concern. Unlike most American diplomats, the U.S.
consul in Budapest decided that the crisis of July 1914 was at least important enough to write about to Washington.
However, he sent his message by regular mail out of concern about the cost of a cable transmission. It arrived on
July 27, the day before the war began (West 1978, 1).
35

dependence of American security on British power was not widely accepted before that time.
Alfred Thayer Mahan worried about European colonial expansion in the Western Hemisphere,
but he discounted the importance of conflicts in Europe, "whence, if disturbances arise, the effect
upon us may be but partial and indirect" (Mahan 1897, 7). Lodge also ruled out American
involvement in European conflicts in his discussion of the Monroe Doctrine during the
Venezuelan boundary dispute. "The proposition laid down by Mr. Monroe, however, is not
complicated. It is merely the corollary of Washington's neutrality policy, which declared that the
United States would not meddle with or take part in the affairs of Europe." 29 The position Mahan
and Lodge took on this issue certainly cannot be attributed to any general aversion to foreign
policy activism.
Contrary views about the possibility of American involvement in a European war were
rare. There was occasional discussion of an alliance with Britain, but it is not clear whether those
advocating this course anticipated involvement in a European war as a result. Not surprisingly,
arguments for such an alliance were typically coupled with advocacy of free trade. Sidney
Sherwood, a professor of economics at Johns Hopkins University, argued in the aftermath of the
Venezuelan boundary dispute that the Monroe Doctrine no longer served American interests in
an increasingly interdependent world where American manufactures required export markets
(Sherwood 1896). Rather than seek colonies, he advocated a formal alliance with Britain coupled
with a policy that would encourage British colonization in the Western Hemisphere in cases
where it was required to preserve order. 30 Writing two years later, John Procter, who would later
29 (Lodge 1895a, 651). Others writing on the Monroe Doctrine after the Venezuelan Crisis of 1895 took much the
same position, arguing that it ruled out American intervention in Europe. See, for example, (R. E. Jones 1899;
Chambers 1911; Taylor 1897; Moore 1896).
30 Then as now, scholars like Sherwood could write what they liked, but questioning the Monroe Doctrine was
dangerous for political leaders. For example, in 1906, Professor John W. Burgess gave a lecture in Germany arguing
that both the Monroe Doctrine and the protective tariff were "almost obsolete." Burgess was a professor at Columbia
36

serve as head of the Civil Service Commission under Theodore Roosevelt, similarly advocated
setting aside the Monroe Doctrine in favor of an alliance with Britain. He also advocated a
concomitant end to the protective tariff, "which is but one of the evils resulting from our policy
of isolation" (Procter 1898, 23). 31 Whenever the topic arose, British observers tended to point to
American protectionism as the main barrier to such an alliance (e.g., Smith 1898, 292; Mahan
and Beresford 1894, 565-7).
Overall, the policy of seeking special advantages for American exporters while closing
the U.S. market to manufactured imports lent itself to an aggressive posture toward other states.
This was particularly true in Latin America, which protectionists hoped to develop into an
American sphere of economic influence. It is difficult to see how such uncooperative premises
could have given rise to any other foreign policy. Those who rejected protectionism saw more
promising avenues for international cooperation, especially with Britain, and remained puzzled
by the stress on what they saw as relatively poor and unpromising markets. These debates
reflected more than just differences in individual opinions. The association between free trade
and cooperation--like that between protectionism and aggressive unilateralism--arose from the
practical demands of these policies.
University where he had founded Political Science Quarterly, and was then acting as Theodore Roosevelt Professor
of American History and Institutions at the University of Berlin. His statements were reported in the American press
and widely attacked by editorialists who mistakenly interpreted them as official policy. The administration quickly
distanced itself from these comments, which reportedly caused the President so much irritation that "it probably
could not be expressed in polite language" (A 'Roosevelt Professor's' Repudiation of the Monroe Doctrine 1906).
31 Procter's article on the topic was part of a small flurry of discussion about an alliance with Britain after the
Spanish-American War, in which Britain took a more favorable attitude toward the United States than did other
powers. Editorials summarized in the Literary Digest include instances of support for the idea but also substantial
opposition (Anglo-American Interests and Alliance 1898; The Chamberlain-Salisbury Anglo-American Policy
1898).
37

Conclusion
The evidence reviewed here suggests that the influence of international trade on American
foreign policy before World War depended on both the demand for foreign markets and the
partisan conflict over the tariff. There was indeed widespread concern about access to foreign
markets in elite discussion of American foreign policy. Setting aside the abstract question of
whether it was necessary for the future of American capitalism, many influential people thought
it would make the country more prosperous and favored policies to promote it. However, the
policy implications of these demands for export markets depended on the position one took on
trade protection. The dominant Republican Party's commitment to the protective tariff made
markets in less developed areas more attractive to Republican leaders because products from
these areas would not compete with American manufactures in the home market. For the same
reason, the threat of European competition and tariff retaliation made markets there seem less
promising to them. Broad tariff reductions were politically difficult for Republicans, so they
preferred limited and exclusive bilateral trade concessions or, where possible, unilateral tariff
reductions by trading partners. Multilateral arrangements based on unconditional most-favored
nation status were not politically viable. These uncooperative economic premises encouraged a
more aggressive foreign policy overall, including a willingness to take greater risks to keep
European influence out of the Western Hemisphere.
The implications of this review of American foreign policy debates before World War I
are clear enough but many gaps in the evidence remain. The larger project of which this paper is
part should help fill some of them. First, this paper reviews mainly evidence from public debate.
This debate was more important before World War I than it is today because the state's capacity
for secret (or even open) policy planning was far more limited then. Evidence from the policy
38

making process within the state could still make a difference, though. Concerns about market
access, often filtered through attitudes toward the tariff, were pervasive in the public debate.
They might have been less important inside the state, especially within the military services
because military officers were not usually directly involved in trade. Even though the military
services were far smaller than they are today, there were still bodies like the Navy's General
Board and the War Department's General Staff that had some capacity for policy planning
(Challener 1973).
Second, I have not yet tested the extent and durability of the association between trade
protection and support for the foreign policy activism of the 1890-1914 period. The fact that
Republicans tended to support both is clear enough, but my argument that trade protection was
fundamental to the politics of American foreign policy during this period still needs to be tested
systematically. There are no survey data on public opinion, of course, but there is plenty of
evidence about elite attitudes from congressional debates and roll-call voting. Districts that were
especially import-sensitive, especially with respect to Europe, should be more likely to elect
members of Congress who were supportive of key elements of the foreign policy. Constituencies
that depended heavily on manufacturing are likely to fit this description, but not all
manufacturing industries were equally import-sensitive. For example, the 1901 debate within the
National Association of Manufacturers over reciprocity treaties suggests that the representatives
of the agricultural implements sector and a few others were willing to set aside their tariff
protection in exchange for better access to European markets. Indications that export-oriented
manufacturing was associated with declining support for foreign policy activism before 1914
would provide especially strong support for the argument outlined here.
39

Third, international trade was not the only economic issue with foreign policy
implications during this period. There was of course also a debate over the gold standard that had
important consequences for American integration into the world economy. Like trade, adherence
to the gold standard had distributive effects within the United States as well as implications for
the country's relations with other states. For example, Jeff Frieden has argued that abandoning
the gold standard would have raised the price of tradable goods relative to non-tradable goods
within the United States (Frieden 1997). Adherence to the gold standard thus served the interests
of the same domestically oriented manufacturers who benefited most from trade protection and
the relatively aggressive foreign policy agenda associated with it. Nevertheless, McDonald
(2009, 171-6) points out that advocates of monetizing silver took a more belligerent posture
toward Britain during the Venezuelan boundary dispute, suggesting that monetary policy
interests might have differed from those implied by trade in some cases. Sorting out the foreign
policy implications of monetary policy merits the same kind of attention that I have offered for
trade and trade policy here.
Because the evidence is incomplete, firm conclusions about what it tells us about
American foreign policy would be premature. However, some observations about the analytical
stakes are still possible. If the patterns suggested here hold up to closer scrutiny, they will reveal
a striking discontinuity between the foreign policy activism of the pre-1914 period and the
superficially similar activism of the years since 1945. Policy makers during both periods built up
American military power and sought a larger political role for the country in world politics. A
consideration of the role of trade protection suggests the limits of these similarities. While
protectionists were the main supporters of the foreign policy activism of the 1890-1914 period,
those with an interest in free trade have been the principal backers of American internationalism
40

in the postwar era (Fordham 2008a, 2008b). Given the content of the policy, this reversal is not
surprising. After World War II, the United States worked to promote more liberal trade policies
worldwide and helped establish a multilateral trading system based on the unconditional
interpretation of most-favored nation status. Indeed, some have argued that the nation's
commitment to these and other multilateral institutions is the distinguishing feature of American
hegemony (e.g., Ikenberry 2001). 32 The logical successor to the foreign policy activism of the
1890-1914 period appears to be not the internationalism of the postwar era but rather the
isolationism of the interwar years.
This discontinuity casts doubt on explanations for the development of American foreign
policy that stress broadly or universally shared ideas or interests. These accounts have difficulty
explaining policy debates and policy changes. There were indeed many points of near-
unanimous consensus among those writing about American foreign policy during the 1890-1914
period. For example, nearly all of them agreed that American institutions were great and
exceptional and that there was a hierarchy of races, with people like themselves at the top.
However, these shared ideas did not lead them to agree on the policy issues before them. This
explanatory difficult also extends to argument emphasizing shared national interests rather than
ideas. These shared interests do not provide a basis for disagreement and debate. To the extent
that policy choice hinges on the outcome of a policy debate, with the winning side implementing
its priorities, explanations that cannot account for the differences of opinion will be
indeterminate.
32 Of course, some American leaders have remained skeptical about these institutional commitments just as others
had remained skeptical of the imperialism of the 1890-1914 period. Given their party's policy commitments before
1914, it is not surprising us that resistance to postwar American institutional commitments has come primarily from
Republicans. It is worth noting that many policy makers still active in the 1940s and 1950s would have had no
trouble remembering the years before 1914. Even though the Republican preference for trade protection was fading
by the late 1940s (Irwin and Kroszner 1999; Fordham 1998), it retained vestiges of its former policy commitments
during the construction of the postwar order.
41

Arguments about broad continuities are common in the historiography of American
foreign relations. The Wisconsin School's overemphasis on the consensus about the need for
foreign markets is an important critique of this perspective (e.g., Thompson 1973, 102-4; Field
1978, 645-6). The contrast between the foreign policy of the post-World War II and pre-World
War I eras suggest that this criticism is well taken. Agreement on the desirability of foreign
markets was only the beginning of the story, and "open-door imperialism" is probably a better
description of American foreign policy after 1945 than before 1914. The Wisconsin School used
this continuity to support a left critique of American foreign policy, what James Field (1978,
645) aptly called an "inverted Whig interpretation of history, differing from its predecessor in
that now the children of darkness triumph over the children of light." Appealing to false
continuities in American foreign policy knows no ideological bounds, however. Since the 9/11
terrorist attacks many historical accounts have found echoes of the key features of current
American foreign policy such as the promotion of democracy or the country's periodic
involvement in small wars to earlier periods of American history (e.g., Boot 2003; Kagan 2006).
These accounts support a conservative effort to give the Bush administration's foreign policy the
luster and legitimacy of longstanding tradition instead of being a radical new departure.
Regardless of their ideological bent, arguments that American foreign policy is rooted in some
set of ideas or interests that have remained consistent over time are likely to obscure more than
they reveal. If this alleged continuity, whatever its roots, can produce policies that differ as
radically as that of 1890-1914 differed from what came after 1945, then it probably does not
explain much.
42

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51

Table 1.
Models of Annual Change in American Exports to Selected Areas of the World, 1870-1913
All states Europe
Comparison Group:
Other lessdeveloped
areas
0.02*
(0.01)
-0.04
(0.02)
0.41*
(0.16)
0.09*
52
European
colonies in the
Caribbean
0.02*
(0.01)
0.18*
(0.06)
0.39*
Exportst-1
0.02* 0.02*
(0.002) (0.004)
Change in Exports t-1
-0.16* -0.17*
(0.02) (0.03)
Independent Caribbean
0.20 -0.53
State, 1899-1913
(0.60) (1.05)
(0.20)
Constant 0.41* 1.17*
-0.03
(0.14) (0.45) (0.05) (0.13)
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.10
Number of states 70 29 51 15
Observations 2,606 927 1,822 330
Note: OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Asterisk indicates statistical
significance at the p < 0.05 level. The dependent variable is the annual change in American
exports to each state or colony for which data reported in the Statistical Abstract of the United
States, in millions of 1900 dollars.

Percent of Total Exports
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
Figure 1.
U.S. Exports by Selected Commodities
Cotton
Tobacco and wheat
Automobiles, iron and steel,
and machinery
0%
1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915
Source: Historical Statistics of the United States

$77
$48
$73
$19
$24
$105
$30
Value-Added Per Capita
$0 to $25
$25 to $50
$50 to $100
$100 to $205
$100
$26
$67
Figure 2.
Manufacturing Activity by State, 1900
$11
$11
$7
$14 $16
$17
$39
$29
$51
$28
$55
$28
$44
$108
$12
$65
$65
$19
$20
$33
$93
$22
$81
$33
$18
$22
$40
$126
$31
$127
$142
$83
$84
$133
$101
$172
$205
$184

Percent of Total Exports
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Figure 3.
U.S. Exports by Region of Destination, 1866-1914
Americas
Europe
Asia
Other
1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915
Source: Historical Statistics of the United States

Index of U.S. Exports to Region
(1870=1.00)
10
8
6
4
2
0
Figure 4.
Growth in U.S. Exports by Region
Less-developed areas other than Caribbean
Caribbean states
Developed states
Caribbean colonies of European states
1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915