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Where the free provision of ecosystem services is<br />
regulated, we tend to better recognise their value – but<br />
we also modify the rights to such services. Use rights<br />
to water, fish or grazing grounds are often informally<br />
distributed and well managed under communitybased<br />
regimes. When external interventions change<br />
such informal rights – either to create markets or for<br />
other purposes linked to sustainable use – policy<br />
makers need to carefully consider whose livelihoods<br />
depend on these services.<br />
Where traditional rights are not registered, they<br />
risk being ignored unless new rules explicitly<br />
respect former uses. This process of defining and<br />
officially recognising rights to resources is fundamental<br />
for conservation and sustainable use and will determine<br />
the level of social impact that any new instrument<br />
will have – it is of particular importance for implementing<br />
PES schemes. This is highlighted in Paraguay’s<br />
experience with a new PES scheme where official<br />
RESPONDING TO THE VALUE OF NATURE<br />
recognition of such rights added financial value to<br />
land of low conventional economic value but of high<br />
importance for subsistence (Global Forest Coalition et<br />
al. 2008).<br />
Recognition of rights to resources is also about<br />
protecting collective rights – i.e. rights to enjoy public<br />
goods. Biodiversity and ecosystems are often public<br />
goods or common goods: even if they provide services<br />
and private benefits for some individuals, they still deliver<br />
collective benefits to the rest of society like<br />
fresh air, rainfall and pollination. However, when land<br />
cover is changed and some ecosystem services<br />
exploited under mere consideration of private gains, public<br />
good ecosystem services may be disturbed, (e.g.<br />
erosion control, water supply). Another case is that of<br />
common goods where regulation of access is crucial.<br />
Marine fisheries provide a challenging example: overexploitation<br />
has turned fisheries into an ‘underperforming<br />
natural asset’ (see Box 10.19).<br />
Box 10.19: Fish stocks – an underperforming natural asset<br />
Global marine capture fisheries are yielding far lower harvests and contributing far less to<br />
the global economy than they could do under stronger policies to manage fish stocks. Since industrial fishing<br />
began, the total mass of commercially exploited species has been reduced by 90% in much of the world.<br />
This tragedy results from an economic race to the sea-bottom in a ruthless competition between industrial<br />
fishing companies. Poorly regulated access to the resource and insufficient enforcement of<br />
regulations worsen the situation.<br />
The industry currently has an<br />
annual value (landed catch) of<br />
US$ 86 billion (FAO 2008).<br />
Using a stylised and simple<br />
model, a World Bank report<br />
estimates the lost economic<br />
benefits to be in the order<br />
of US$ 50 billion annually –<br />
representing the difference<br />
between the potential and<br />
actual net economic benefits<br />
from global marine fisheries.<br />
Source: World Bank<br />
and FAO 2008: 21<br />
<strong>TEEB</strong> FOR NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY MAKERS - CHAPTER 10: PAGE 24