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In 1995, Korea introduced a volume-Based Waste Fee (vBWF) where residents pay for solid waste services by purchasing standard waste bags. In principle, the full cost of collection, transport and treatment should be included in the vBWF bag price. however, to avoid negative side effects of a sudden increase in waste treatment costs (e.g. illegal dumping), each municipality sets a different rate depending upon its financial circumstances and treatment costs. Disposal of waste without using vBWF bags or illegally burning waste is subject to a 1 million won (US$ 1,000) negligence fine. The vBWF programme has had far-reaching effects. From 1994–2004, it led to a 14 % reduction in the quantity of municipal solid waste generated (corresponding to a 20% decline in waste generation per capita) and an increase of 15% in the quota of recycled waste (up to 49%). Total waste generation (tons / day) 58,118 49,925 44,583 46,438 49,902 50,007 - thereof recycled 8,927 13,085 15,566 19,167 21,949 24,588 - thereof land filled 47,116 34,116 25,074 21,831 20,724 18,195 Per capita (kg / day) 1.30 1.10 0.96 0,98 1.04 1.03 that restrict the absolute extent for using a resource. They create an artificial market for a resource by: • determining the number of rights to use a resource (e.g. tons of timber to be cut per year); • allocating the rights (e.g. to cut one tonne of timber) to the users (e.g. logging companies or local landholders) via auction or free of charge; and • facilitating trading of rights between potential users (e.g. between different logging companies or the sale of logging rights from local landholders to commercial loggers). The permit price is set by supply and demand. The best-known example of permit trading is to control air pollution (e.g. Co 2 or So 2 ) but the concept has been successfully adapted to a range of resources and goods e.g. to manage fish stocks (see Box 7.10), regulate water abstraction (see Box 7.12) or limit urban sprawl and preserve open space (see Box 7.14). Further applications are being discussed, notably forest carbon trading (see Chapter 5 for the REDD-Plus mechanism), water quality trading or habitat trading (see hansjürgens et al. forthcoming). New Zealand’s fishing industry has grown exceptionally fast in the last century: by 2004 the seafood sector was the fifth largest export earner occupying over 10,000 workers. To ensure sustainable management of fish stocks, the government has introduced a system of tradable fishing quotas under the Fisheries Act 1986. Every year the Fisheries Ministry sets a new Total Allowable Catch (TAC), based on biological assessment of the stock, which is handed out as ‘individual tradable quotas’ to fishing companies. Companies are free to decide whether to use their quota (catch fish) or to sell or buy remaining quotas depending on their profits per catch. The results are so far quite positive: most fish stocks have been rebuilt and the country’s fishing grounds are some of the very few to achieve the conservation target of less than 10% stock collapse. <strong>TEEB</strong> FoR NATIoNAL AND INTERNATIoNAL PoLICy MAKERS - ChAPTER 7: PAGE 19
Market-based instruments can be designed to address very different environmental concerns (see examples in Table 7.2). Depending on the ecosystem or ecosystem service, there are . Prices can either be levied on: • input goods (e.g. water charges, stumpage fees, fuel taxes or land conversion fees); • processes and associated emissions (emission trading for pollutants like So 2 , No x or Co 2 ); or • output (e.g. mineral oil tax; waste fees; waste water charges or pollution taxes; fertiliser or pesticide taxes). Landfill Tax Credit Scheme Acid Rain Programme Garbage Collection Fee Reforestation Charge Tradable hunting Permit Nitrogen oxide Charge Taxes on pesticides Tradable permits on water pollution hunter River Environmental Taxes and Water Taxes Guabas River Water User Association Fees for Mountain Gorilla Tracking Water Conservation Fund Entrance fees for the Galapagos Islands UK USA Japan Liberia Mexico Sweden Sweden Australia Colombia Colombia Uganda Ecuador Ecuador Terrestrial ecosystems Air-quality management Waste reduction Forest protection Protection of big horned sheep Air-quality management Groundwater management Catchment Catchment Watershed management Forest habitat protection Biosphere Park management / financing Protected Area management / financing Re-pricing Re-pricing Re-pricing Re-pricing Re-pricing Re-pricing Re-pricing Re-pricing Re-pricing Re-pricing / Revenue-raising Revenue-raising Revenue-raising Revenue-raising Tax scheme and funding Tradable permits for the emission of sulphur Garbage fee (e.g. in Tokyo 0,43 US$ per 10 litre) Charges on felled trees (5 US$ per m³ reforestation charge) hunting quotas for the big-horned sheep in every community Charge of SEK 40 (3.9€) per emitted kilogram Nitrogen oxide Tax of 20 SEK/kg (in 2002) on pesticides Each mine is allowed to discharge a percentage of the total allowable salt load, which is calculated in relation to conductivity levels Pollution and water use is taxed Water users downstream pay fees (per litre of water received) into a fund for watershed management activities visitors have to pay a US$500 permit to go Gorilla Tracking own Financing of watershed reservoir Entrance fee for the Protected Area: 6$ for Ecuadorians / 100$ for other tourists Economics suggests that prices work better if they are directly based on emissions or close complements because this makes abatement measures more effective in terms of mitigating such emissions or harmful products (hansjürgens 1992). The term ‘MBI’ is sometimes used for other instruments that may improve market conditions, including market friction reduction policies (e.g. liability rules, see 7.2), information programmes like labelling (Chapter 5) or subsidies (Chapter 6). £1 billion of contributions paid from landfill operators to environmental projects Reduction of So 2 by 52% compared to 1990 Significant reduction of garbage in the participating cities helps to prevent the unsustainable use of forests hunting for animals does not endanger the existence of the whole population Emission of Nitrogen oxide reduced from just over 300 tonnes (1990) to 200 tonnes in 2003 65 % reduction in the use of pesticides Exceeding of permitted quotas decreased from 33% to 4% after implementation The level of BoD (the amount of oxygen required to biologically decompose organic matter in the water) dropped by two third in 4 years Revenues (about US$ 600,000 annually) used for projects to protect and regenerate degraded forests, reforest with native species, and for community organization Population of gorillas is slowly in- creasing also due to the improved management (e.g. more guards). over $301,000 were spent on water management projects in 2005, securing the important functions of the Reservoir Revenues (> US$3 million annually) help to improve the management of the National Park <strong>TEEB</strong> FoR NATIoNAL AND INTERNATIoNAL PoLICy MAKERS - ChAPTER 7: PAGE 20 Entrust (2009): how the LCF works, URL: http:// www.entrust.org.uk/home/ lcf/how-it-works US EPA (2009): Emission, Compliance, and Market Data, URL http://www.epa.gov/ airmarkets/progress/ARP_1.html http://www.unescap.org/drpad/ vc/conference/ex_jp_14_jgc.htm FAo (2009): Description of the forest revenue system, URL: http://www.fao.org/docrep/007/ ad494e/AD494E06.htm Biller (2003) Naturvardsverket (2006) Sjöberg, P. (2007) Kraemer et al. (2003) Kraemer et al. (2003) Landell-Mills (2002) ; Echavarría (2002) Uganda Wildlife Authority (2009): Gorilla permit booking, URL: http:// www. uwa.or.ug/gorilla.html; Zeppel (2007) The Nature Conservancy (2007) vanasselt (2000)
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Part I: The need for action Ch1 The
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ThE EcoNoMIcs of EcosysTEMs AND BIo
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THE GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY CRISIS AND
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1.2 THE GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY CRISIS
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• Enough food could be produced o
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MArINE sysTEMs THE GLOBAL BIODIVERS
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1.2.3 WHAT IS DRIVING THESE LOSSES?
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1.4 THE GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY CRISIS
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EfErENcEs THE GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY C
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THE ECONOMICS OF ECOSYSTEMS AND BIO
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10.1 WHY VALUING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES
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RESPONDING TO THE VALUE OF NATURE B
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10.2.2 BETTER LINKS TO MACRO- ECONO
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10.3 Investing in natural capital s
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as well as the value for money and
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Global National or Regional Local T
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10.4 By taking distributional issue
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has origins and impacts beyond bord
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The ‘Nobel Prize’*-winning econ
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10.5 Biodiversity and ecosystem ser
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Rewarding the provision of services
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Making this a reality will require
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GHK, CE and IEEP - GHK, Cambridge E
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Torras, M. (2000) The Total Economi
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ThE ECoNoMICS of ECoSySTEMS AND BIo
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FRAMEWORK AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES FO
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2.3 FRAMEWORK AND GUIDING PRINCIPLE
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2.3.4 BASE POLICIES ON GOOD GOVERNA
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2.4 FRAMEWORK AND GUIDING PRINCIPLE
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REfERENCES FRAMEWORK AND GUIDING PR
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THE ECONOMICS OF ECOSYSTEMS AND BIO
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STRENGTHENING INDICATORS AND ACCOUN
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3.1 STRENGTHENING INDICATORS AND AC
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Endnotes STRENGTHENING INDICATORS A
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Chapter 4: Integrating ecosystem an
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INTEGRATING ECOSYSTEM AND BIODIVERS
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4.1 INTEGRATING ECOSYSTEM AND BIODI
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Endnotes INTEGRATING ECOSYSTEM AND
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Economic valuation methods INTEGRAT
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ANNEx 2: sTAGEs of A PoLIcy AssEssM
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Chapter 5: Rewarding benefits throu
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REWARDING BENEFITS THROUGH PAYMENTS
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5.1 REWARDING BENEFITS THROUGH PAYM
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REGULATORY BASELINES AND ADDITIONAL
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could have adverse consequences for
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• some contained an element of te
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• ancillary provisions e.g. possi
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5.4.2 GREENING INTERGOVERNMEN- TAL
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financial flows involved. Building
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considerable patience as such optio
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CERTIFICATION OF SUSTAINABLE FISHER
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While certification systems can sig
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Endnotes REWARDING BENEFITS THROUGH
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44 http://www.mekongtourism.org/sit
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Chapter 6: Reforming Subsidies Chap
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REFORMING SUBSIDIES Key Messages of
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6 Chapter 6 addresses the need for
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6.1.2 HOW BIG ARE EXISTING SUBSIDIE
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Page 293 and 294: REFORMING SUBSIDIES Social impacts
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Page 297 and 298: REFERENCES Agnew, D.J.; Pearce, J.;
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Page 335 and 336: 7.6 MAKING IT hAPPEN - PoLICy MIxES
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Page 339 and 340: Gutman, P. and Davidson, S. (2007)
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· ·· · · · · · · · · ·
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T H E E C O N O M I C S O F E C O S
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