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, but care needs to be given to their interpretation and application. In particular, Principle 3 is often misinterpreted. A key objective of its mitigation hierarchy is to reduce the risk of biodiversity loss from developers taking easy least-cost actions, i.e. using offsets and biodiversity banking as a ‘licence to trash’. on the other hand, authorities insisting on extremely expensive mitigation measures (e.g. tunnels or viaducts) may not obtain good value for money. It is also clearly inappropriate to expect project proponents to take preventive measures for low-level impacts if much greater benefits could be obtained by simple compensation measures that trade up to provide higher biodiversity benefits. The term ‘appropriate’ is therefore central to the mitigation hierarchy principle. The specific aim should be to . The question of reliability must be considered in accordance with the precautionary principle. Uncertainty can affect all types of mitigation and compensation measures depending on the circumstances: some mitigation measures may be more reliable than compensation measures or vice versa. The weight given to the reliability of measures should increase with the importance and irreplaceability of the habitats and species that may be impacted. For biodiversity of high conservation importance, measures should therefore focus on avoidance actions (assuming they are most likely to be reliable) rather than risky compensation options. An advantage of established biodiversity banks, noted above, is to reduce uncertainty over the amount and quality of compensation that will be realised, given that credits already exist and can be measured directly in terms of their ecological value and ecosystem benefits. however, it is still important to assess the ongoing value of the benefits (e.g. in relation to climate change or other external pressures) as well as their additionality. There is growing evidence that, (MBI) that help businesses compensate for the residual unavoidable harm from development projects. over 30 countries now require some form of compensation for damage to biodiversity or have established programmes requiring offsets. Countries with legal requirements for offsets include Brazil, South Africa, Australia and the United States, which probably has the most advanced example of a biodiversity mitigation market (Bean et al. 2008; Carroll et al 2007). Box 7.8 provides examples of practice to date in two countries. habitat banking system is known as BioBanking. It provides that where land use conversion and associated biodiversity loss are inevitable, alternative sites can be restored or put in conservation. This acts as an incentive measure to encourage biodiversity conservation on private land and provide compensation for biodiversity loss at other locations. No economic data are available yet as the programme is still in an early stage. More than 400 wetland banks have been established, creating a market for wetland mitigation worth more than $3 billion/year. There are also more than 70 species banks which can trade between $100 million and $370 million in species credits each year. The EU has strict legal requirements for compensation measures for ‘unavoidable impacts’ on protected areas of European importance (i.e. Natura 2000 sites). Some EU Member States (e.g. France and Germany) have additional legislation and policies requiring or enabling offsets and habitat banking. Further information on offsets, including references and best practice guidance, is available at the BBoP website (http://bbop.foresttrends.org/). <strong>TEEB</strong> FoR NATIoNAL AND INTERNATIoNAL PoLICy MAKERS - ChAPTER 7: PAGE 17
7.4 SETTING MoRE ACCURATE PRICES: MARKET-BASED INSTRUMENTS Franklin D. Roosevelt upon introducing the first US income tax in the 1940s. Jacqueline McGlade (EEA) speech at the 8th Global Conference on Environmental Taxation (Munich, 18 october 2007). MBI (e.g. taxes, charges, fees and fines, commercial licences as well as tradable permits and quotas) send economic signals to private actors. They can be adjusted to discourage activities harmful to biodiversity and ecosystem services by increasing the tax or charge on the use of certain services or by requiring users to purchase tradable permits. Targeted increases of this kind can provide a catalyst to develop more environmentally-friendly alternatives. In principle, the same is true for direct environmental regulation (see 7.2 above). however, MBIs give private actors more choice (i.e. whether to pay the higher price or find an alternative) depending on what is more costefficient for them. which determine a price that has to be paid when an ecosystem is used, e.g. charges for water abstraction or sewage fees, entry prices for a national park, a carbon tax, deposit–refund systems or waste fees (see Box 7.9 and also Box 7.11 below). <strong>TEEB</strong> FoR NATIoNAL AND INTERNATIoNAL PoLICy MAKERS - ChAPTER 7: PAGE 18
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Part I: The need for action Ch1 The
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ThE EcoNoMIcs of EcosysTEMs AND BIo
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THE GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY CRISIS AND
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1.2 THE GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY CRISIS
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• Enough food could be produced o
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MArINE sysTEMs THE GLOBAL BIODIVERS
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1.2.3 WHAT IS DRIVING THESE LOSSES?
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1.4 THE GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY CRISIS
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EfErENcEs THE GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY C
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THE ECONOMICS OF ECOSYSTEMS AND BIO
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10.1 WHY VALUING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES
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RESPONDING TO THE VALUE OF NATURE B
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10.2.2 BETTER LINKS TO MACRO- ECONO
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10.3 Investing in natural capital s
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as well as the value for money and
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Global National or Regional Local T
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10.4 By taking distributional issue
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has origins and impacts beyond bord
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The ‘Nobel Prize’*-winning econ
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10.5 Biodiversity and ecosystem ser
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Rewarding the provision of services
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Making this a reality will require
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GHK, CE and IEEP - GHK, Cambridge E
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Torras, M. (2000) The Total Economi
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ThE ECoNoMICS of ECoSySTEMS AND BIo
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FRAMEWORK AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES FO
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2.3 FRAMEWORK AND GUIDING PRINCIPLE
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2.3.4 BASE POLICIES ON GOOD GOVERNA
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2.4 FRAMEWORK AND GUIDING PRINCIPLE
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REfERENCES FRAMEWORK AND GUIDING PR
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THE ECONOMICS OF ECOSYSTEMS AND BIO
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STRENGTHENING INDICATORS AND ACCOUN
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3.1 STRENGTHENING INDICATORS AND AC
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Endnotes STRENGTHENING INDICATORS A
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Chapter 4: Integrating ecosystem an
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INTEGRATING ECOSYSTEM AND BIODIVERS
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4.1 INTEGRATING ECOSYSTEM AND BIODI
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Endnotes INTEGRATING ECOSYSTEM AND
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Economic valuation methods INTEGRAT
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ANNEx 2: sTAGEs of A PoLIcy AssEssM
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Chapter 5: Rewarding benefits throu
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REWARDING BENEFITS THROUGH PAYMENTS
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5.1 REWARDING BENEFITS THROUGH PAYM
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REGULATORY BASELINES AND ADDITIONAL
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could have adverse consequences for
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• some contained an element of te
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• ancillary provisions e.g. possi
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5.4.2 GREENING INTERGOVERNMEN- TAL
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financial flows involved. Building
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considerable patience as such optio
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CERTIFICATION OF SUSTAINABLE FISHER
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While certification systems can sig
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Endnotes REWARDING BENEFITS THROUGH
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44 http://www.mekongtourism.org/sit
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REFORMING SUBSIDIES Key Messages of
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6 Chapter 6 addresses the need for
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Page 297 and 298: REFERENCES Agnew, D.J.; Pearce, J.;
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Page 339 and 340: Gutman, P. and Davidson, S. (2007)
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· ·· · · · · · · · · ·
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T H E E C O N O M I C S O F E C O S
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