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In 2006-2008, 51% of support measures as measured by the OECD Producer Support Estimate (PSE) took the form of output-based payments (including market price support) or payments based on variable inputs. This was down from 82% in 1986-88. The reduction corresponds to a general decline in the relative level of producer support as a percentage share of total farm receipts, from 37 % in 1986-88 to 23 % today (OECD 2009). REFORMING SUBSIDIES Box 6.5: Reforming production subsidies: example of the EU CAP The ‘Agenda 2000’ reform of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) foresaw gradual reductions in market price support and increasing reliance on direct payments, coupled with rural development programmes and agri-environmental measures under the CAP’s ‘second pillar’. In June 2003, after difficult negotiations, EU farm ministers adopted a compromise providing for: • the introduction of a single farm payment for farmers that is independent from production for the CAP ‘first pillar’, whose level would be based on historical support payments; • linkage of this payment to compliance with environmental, food safety, animal health and animal welfare standards (‘cross-compliance’); • a reduction in direct payments for bigger farms (‘modulation’) and transfer of this money to the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development to finance the new rural development policy (the second pillar); and • some revisions to the CAP’s market policy. The 2008 agreement pursuant to the CAP ‘Health Check’ foresees, amongst other measures, the phasing out of some remaining coupled payments as well as increased modulation. Many agri-environment programmes under the second pillar have generally positive impacts for biodiversity and ecosystems (Boccaccio et al. 2009). However, it is noteworthy that eight years after the introduction of this reform, most support still comes under the first pillar – even though it is gradually approaching an equal share with the second pillar. Although less environmentally harmful than earlier support policies, the sheer magnitude of support under the first pillar gives reason for concern, because of the limits to decoupling as well as opportunity cost considerations. While cross-compliance and modulation do contribute to better targeting of payments for environmental and social objectives (see Alliance Environnement 2007), it is doubtful that these instruments currently maximise the cost-effectiveness of payments for such objectives. Hence, progress is clearly being made, but more reform efforts are needed: First, more than half of all support is still directly increasing production. In this context, the OECD cautions that progress on subsidy reform is uneven among OECD countries. It also notes that a significant part of the recent decline in support levels is a consequence of high world prices for agricultural commodities, without any explicit changes in government policies (OECD 2009). TEEB FOR NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY MAKERS - CHAPTER 6: PAGE 15
Second, it has to be borne in mind that decoupling can never be complete because of real-world phenomena like market imperfections, risk and political dynamics (OECD 2000b). Under imperfect capital markets, for instance, any kind of income support would be partially reinvested in agriculture, generating additional production in future years. If wealthier farmers are ready to assume more risks, any payment – by increasing their wealth – will affect their production decisions (OECD 2000b). Moreover, scale also matters: even relatively small impacts may add up to a large aggregate distortion if the overall volume of the subsidy is high. These distortions may include the production decisions of potential foreign competitors. Better targeting of decoupled support measures for specific income objectives or market failures remains a major challenge of ongoing policy reforms in OECD countries (OECD 2009). This includes agri-environment payments. A 2005 analysis of EU agri-environment payments noted generally positive effects of the measures on habitat preservation, but called for development of more impact-oriented monitoring, of evaluation procedures that are better adapted to the variety of issues, as well as for better targeting of measures for the most problematical farms and the most environmentally sensitive areas (Oréade-Breche 2005). The OECD stresses that both decoupling and targeting are among the policy principles that have shown to improve effectiveness, efficiency and equity of policies, and should continue to inspire future policy design (OECD 2009). Support measures that encourage agricultural production are considered to distort potential trade flows and are therefore slated for ‘substantial reductions’ in the agricultural trade negotiations under the Doha work programme of the World Trade Organization (WTO). These negotiations also seek to review and clarify the ‘Green Box’ criteria, while ensuring that due account is taken of non-trade concerns, including environmental objectives (WTO 2004). While the successful conclusion of the negotiations has the potential to create synergy with the objectives of preserving ecosystems and biodiversity, the positions of WTO Members are still divergent. The agricultural negotiations remain one of the major stumbling blocks to the successful conclusion of the Doha work programme. REFORMING SUBSIDIES 6.3.2 FISHERIES “More than a decade after adoption of the 1995 U.N. Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, putting an end to overfishing remains a fundamental global challenge… Progress towards improved fisheries subsidies policies has been made since 1997,…but the real work of ending harmful fisheries subsidies has just barely begun”. Achim Steiner, Executive Director, UNEP, and James P. Leape, Executive Director, WWF. Source: UNEP and WWF (2007) Although subsidies to fisheries are much less substantial than those to agriculture, they are significant both in terms of their potential impact on the environment and also relative to the size of the industry in several countries. For instance, in some EU Member States, fisheries subsidies are higher than the economic value of landings. Addressing their negative environmental impacts is a matter of particular urgency as almost one third of global marine fisheries are close to collapse or have already collapsed. According to the 2008 Fisheries Report by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO): • 28% of marine capture fish stocks monitored by FAO are either overexploited, depleted or recovering from depletion and are yielding less than their maximum sustainable yield (up from 25% in the 2006 report); • 52% are fully exploited, producing at or close to their maximum sustainable yield; • the remaining 20% are underexploited or moderately exploited (down from 25% in the 2006 report). Although this figure might imply that more could be produced, it must be borne in mind that at least some of these stocks are low-value species or consist of species for which harvesting may be uneconomical under current market conditions (FAO 2006 and 2008; map presented in Chapter 1). TEEB FOR NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY MAKERS - CHAPTER 6: PAGE 16
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Second, it has to be borne in mind that decoupling can<br />
never be complete because of real-world phenomena<br />
like market imperfections, risk and political dynamics<br />
(OECD 2000b). Under imperfect capital markets, for<br />
instance, any kind of income support would be partially<br />
reinvested in agriculture, generating additional<br />
production in future years. If wealthier farmers are<br />
ready to assume more risks, any payment – by increasing<br />
their wealth – will affect their production decisions<br />
(OECD 2000b). Moreover, scale also matters:<br />
even relatively small impacts may add up to a large<br />
aggregate distortion if the overall volume of the subsidy<br />
is high. These distortions may include the production<br />
decisions of potential foreign competitors.<br />
Better targeting of decoupled support measures for<br />
specific income objectives or market failures remains<br />
a major challenge of ongoing policy reforms in OECD<br />
countries (OECD 2009). This includes agri-environment<br />
payments. A 2005 analysis of EU agri-environment<br />
payments noted generally positive effects of the<br />
measures on habitat preservation, but called for development<br />
of more impact-oriented monitoring, of<br />
evaluation procedures that are better adapted to the<br />
variety of issues, as well as for better targeting of<br />
measures for the most problematical farms and the<br />
most environmentally sensitive areas (Oréade-Breche<br />
2005). The OECD stresses that both decoupling and<br />
targeting are among the policy principles that have<br />
shown to improve effectiveness, efficiency and equity<br />
of policies, and should continue to inspire future policy<br />
design (OECD 2009).<br />
Support measures that encourage agricultural<br />
production are considered to distort potential trade<br />
flows and are therefore slated for ‘substantial reductions’<br />
in the agricultural trade negotiations under the<br />
Doha work programme of the World Trade Organization<br />
(WTO). These negotiations also seek to review and<br />
clarify the ‘Green Box’ criteria, while ensuring that due<br />
account is taken of non-trade concerns, including<br />
environmental objectives (WTO 2004). While the<br />
successful conclusion of the negotiations has the<br />
potential to create synergy with the objectives<br />
of preserving ecosystems and biodiversity, the<br />
positions of WTO Members are still divergent. The<br />
agricultural negotiations remain one of the major<br />
stumbling blocks to the successful conclusion of the<br />
Doha work programme.<br />
REFORMING SUBSIDIES<br />
6.3.2 FISHERIES<br />
“More than a decade after adoption<br />
of the 1995 U.N. Code of Conduct<br />
for Responsible Fisheries, putting<br />
an end to overfishing remains a<br />
fundamental global challenge…<br />
Progress towards improved fisheries<br />
subsidies policies has been made<br />
since 1997,…but the real work of<br />
ending harmful fisheries subsidies<br />
has just barely begun”.<br />
Achim Steiner, Executive Director, UNEP, and James P. Leape,<br />
Executive Director, WWF. Source: UNEP and WWF (2007)<br />
Although subsidies to fisheries are much less substantial<br />
than those to agriculture, they are significant both<br />
in terms of their potential impact on the environment<br />
and also relative to the size of the industry in several<br />
countries. For instance, in some EU Member States,<br />
fisheries subsidies are higher than the economic value<br />
of landings.<br />
Addressing their negative environmental impacts is a<br />
matter of particular urgency as almost one third<br />
of global marine fisheries are close to collapse or<br />
have already collapsed. According to the 2008<br />
Fisheries Report by the Food and Agriculture Organization<br />
of the United Nations (FAO):<br />
• 28% of marine capture fish stocks monitored<br />
by FAO are either overexploited, depleted or<br />
recovering from depletion and are yielding less<br />
than their maximum sustainable yield (up from<br />
25% in the 2006 report);<br />
• 52% are fully exploited, producing at or close to<br />
their maximum sustainable yield;<br />
• the remaining 20% are underexploited or<br />
moderately exploited (down from 25% in the<br />
2006 report). Although this figure might imply<br />
that more could be produced, it must be borne<br />
in mind that at least some of these stocks are<br />
low-value species or consist of species for which<br />
harvesting may be uneconomical under current<br />
market conditions (FAO 2006 and 2008; map<br />
presented in Chapter 1).<br />
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