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6.2<br />

6.2.1 DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN<br />

‘GOOD’ AND ‘BAD’ SUBSIDIES<br />

Subsidies are introduced or maintained for various<br />

social or economic reasons: to promote economic<br />

growth, secure employment or stabilise incomes by<br />

helping small producers. These are all ‘good’ – or at<br />

least politically rational - purposes.<br />

However, subsidies all too often end up as long-term<br />

rigidities which distort prices and adversely affect<br />

resource allocation decisions, benefiting some producers<br />

to the detriment of others (including foreign producers).<br />

For analytical purposes, it is therefore important to<br />

distinguish between the stated objectives of subsidies<br />

and their actual effects.<br />

The difference between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ subsidies<br />

often comes down to their specific design and implementation.<br />

Key questions (Pieters 2003) include:<br />

• do they serve (or continue to serve) their intended<br />

purpose (effectiveness)?<br />

• at what cost (efficiency)?<br />

• how are the costs and benefits distributed (equity)?<br />

• last but not least, are they harmful for the environment<br />

in general and for ecosystem services and<br />

biodiversity in particular (environmental impact)?<br />

Answering these questions requires a careful assessment<br />

covering all three dimensions of sustainable<br />

development (economic, environmental and social)<br />

(De Moor and Calamai 1997; OECD 2005). The assessment<br />

process can help identify priorities for phasing<br />

out or reform; for instance, subsidies that have clearly<br />

outlived their rationale should receive close attention.<br />

When a subsidy programme is launched, policy-makers<br />

are often not fully aware of all its implications, including<br />

the risk of environmentally harmful effects. Ex ante<br />

REFORMING SUBSIDIES<br />

HOW SUBSIDIES CAN<br />

MISS THEIR MARK<br />

strategic impact assessments, undertaken as an<br />

integral part of policy formulation, can help minimise<br />

or avoid such effects and many of the other pitfalls<br />

associated with subsidies (see Chapter 4). They can<br />

also help identify opportunities for better instrument<br />

design.<br />

In reality, subsidy programmes rarely seek to implement<br />

a single clearly-defined policy objective. They tend to<br />

have a long, complex and somewhat chaotic history,<br />

having been introduced and amended over decades,<br />

often under political pressure, often without a long term<br />

strategic vision and frequently for multiple objectives<br />

(Barde and Honkatukia 2003).<br />

This mix of explicit and implicit objectives sometimes<br />

creates a daunting barrier to reform. It means that subsidies<br />

can too easily be presented as ‘multifunctional’ –<br />

the argument being that we cannot afford to remove<br />

them. Disentangling the effects and purposes of subsidies<br />

and separating myths from reality are important<br />

preconditions for successful reform. This makes the<br />

issue of cost-effectiveness in achieving stated goals a<br />

very useful test (OECD 2003a).<br />

We can see this clearly by looking at subsidies defended<br />

on social grounds, for instance, to support smaller<br />

marginal producers in critical sectors such as agriculture<br />

or fisheries. However, a careful analysis of<br />

distributive effects reveals that many subsidies<br />

are actually not well targeted, which means they<br />

may not be very cost-effective. In agriculture for<br />

example, a 2003 study showed that most subsidies<br />

in OECD countries went to larger farms (which tend to<br />

be the richer farms) and that only 25% of market price<br />

support ended up as net income gain for farmers;<br />

that is, the bulk of the difference ended up somewhere<br />

else in the value chain (OECD 2003c).<br />

<strong>TEEB</strong> FOR NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY MAKERS - CHAPTER 6: PAGE 8

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