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REWARDING BENEFITS THROUGH PAYMENTS AND MARKETS<br />

Box 5.36: Compatibility of GPP with free trade<br />

rules and disciplines<br />

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)<br />

requires States to treat foreign and domestically produced<br />

goods alike (Article III – the ‘national treatment<br />

obligation’) and prohibits discrimination against imported<br />

goods that are ‘like’ domestically produced<br />

goods, independent of how or where they have been<br />

produced.<br />

However, Article III.8(a) excludes all products consumed<br />

by a government in the course of its normal<br />

activity from the ‘national treatment obligation’<br />

e.g. furniture, hospital material or social housing. This<br />

means that GPP policies have significant scope to<br />

explicitly promote biodiversity-friendly purchasing –<br />

e.g. by specifying FSC timber based products –<br />

without infringing GATT provisions.<br />

Source: FSC 2008b<br />

Fourth, differences in criteria and/or procedures amongst<br />

different countries or administrations can create extra<br />

costs and uncertainties. Some countries are moving beyond<br />

GPP towards ‘sustainable public procurement’<br />

(SPP) which combines environmental and social criteria<br />

in purchasing decisions. Where priorities vary, procurement<br />

criteria will obviously also vary between countries<br />

or even between regional and local authorities.<br />

In some cases, such differences have raised concerns<br />

over international competitiveness. In general terms, there<br />

is always the risk that GPP targets and criteria put strain<br />

on free trade agreements or, in the case of the EU, the internal<br />

market (e.g. criteria that give preference to national<br />

producers could distort competition and create suspici-<br />

ons of protectionism). Inclusion of social criteria could also<br />

lead to conflicts under trade agreements (see discussion<br />

of environmental protection obligations in the context of<br />

the GATT/WTO in Box 5.28 and also Box 5.36 below).<br />

GPP can yield broader results when combined<br />

with development cooperation efforts and where<br />

resources for capacity building and green industry<br />

development are available. Supporting greener production<br />

in countries of origin, especially developing<br />

countries, will open up new markets to providers, improve<br />

and expand a reliable supply of green products<br />

and lower the price of green procurement.<br />

Looking to the future:<br />

• GPP is a policy instrument with considerable<br />

environmental benefits, given the huge markets for<br />

government purchases;<br />

• most quantification of benefits has been based on<br />

substitution costs (e.g. replacing virgin paper with<br />

recycled), reduction in natural resource use (e.g.<br />

water) or reduced emissions (e.g. GHG, pollution).<br />

Much more work needs to be done to quantify the<br />

benefits to biodiversity from certification and labelling<br />

programmes;<br />

• the time is right for committed governments to<br />

upscale GPP and set national goals as first<br />

lessons have been learned and criteria are being<br />

devised and revised at an increasing rate;<br />

• harmonisation where feasible could further lower<br />

costs and increase GPP’s attractiveness;<br />

• transparency and clarity are important for producers<br />

at all levels and sizes;<br />

• national GPP policies can be combined with development<br />

objectives to support the development<br />

of certified markets in other countries.<br />

Chapter 5 has looked at a range of different instruments to reward providers of benefits from ecosystem<br />

services or to reward products that have less impact on nature. The former included payments for environmental<br />

services, mechanisms for access and benefit sharing for genetic resources as well as tax breaks<br />

and transfers. The discussion of market-based reward tools has focused on certified products and the use<br />

of public procurement to expand and green the markets.<br />

Chapter 6 and 7 discuss closely-related tools. Chapter 6 considers the need for subsidy reform to<br />

ensure that subsidies reflect the value of biodiversity and respond efficiently to current and future priorities.<br />

Chapter 7 analyses ways in which regulation and pricing can minimise damage to natural capital:<br />

these tools form an essential foundation for the markets analysed in Chapter 5.<br />

<strong>TEEB</strong> FOR NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY MAKERS - CHAPTER 5: PAGE 61

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