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REWARDING BENEFITS THROUGH PAYMENTS AND MARKETS This report is not the place for an extensive discussion on the future organisation of international governance on trade and environment, but some concerns and observations can be raised: • It is legitimate to ask whether the WTO is the best venue for an increasing amount of dispute settlement procedures and agenda-setting on sustainability of products and production systems. Given that its primary task is to regulate the provision of a level playing field for world trade, directing the conditions under which products are produced might seem beyond its original intention; • Whilst the effects of trade liberalisation on economic development have been thoroughly investigated, this is much less true for its impacts on ecosystems and the environment (Verburg et al. 2009). Some studies have found that liberalising trade in agricultural products could lead to large biodiversity losses especially in Latin America and Africa yet would decrease losses in Europe and North America due to transfers in agricultural production (ten Brink B. et al. 2007); • Trade-offs may exist between the long and short term; between economic development and environmental and living conditions; and between natural capital and GDP. These are especially relevant for developing countries. Restricting trade in products by obliging certain production standards, or by favouring certain products over others, limits the flexibility (also in time) that developing country governments have to set their own priorities, whilst compliance can pose a significant challenge to small and medium-sized businesses in these countries. On the other hand, short-term development by ‘mining’ natural resources could mean long-term impoverishment. • Given the ecological footprint of many developed economies and the impacts of producing their imports on climate change and biodiversity loss, there is a powerful argument for them to take action on at least the aspects of production that clearly influence global commons. • Understanding and defining terms such as ‘sustainable production’ or ‘environmentally-friendly products’ is important for ensuring trade and environment policies are mutually supportive. Finding common ground amongst governments on criteria for key terms should be viewed as an important prerequisite before enacting compulsory measures focused on sustainable trade. The broader the support for these criteria, the less resistance there will be to applying them to make trade more sustainable. Another trade-off presents itself here, as front-runner countries have to balance their desire for ambitious criteria with building a coalition based on a minimum level of shared principles. Sources: Sampson 2005; UNEP and IISD 2005; Verburg et al. 2009 and ten Brink B. et al. 2007 TEEB FOR NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY MAKERS - CHAPTER 5: PAGE 55
5.6 REWARDING BENEFITS THROUGH PAYMENTS AND MARKETS “By giving a clear signal to all parties involved in the procurement process, public authorities can draw new environmental technologies into the market place that in turn have the potential to strengthen the competitiveness of European industry. Green Public Procurement will also help EU Member States meet obligations for energy-efficiency in buildings, energy services and reduced CO 2 emissions. The potential of this instrument is enormous and I recommend that public administrations, at all levels, turn policy into practice and demonstrate their willingness to 'green' Europe.” Stavros Dimas, EU Commissioner for Environment 5.6.1 OBJECTIVES AND TAKE-UP OF GPP POLICIES GREEN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT (GPP) Green Public Procurement (GPP) means that public purchasers take account of environmental factors when buying products, services or works. A product or service can only qualify as ‘green’ if it goes beyond what is required by law and beyond the performance of products commonly sold in the market. Whereas regulatory standards create a minimum baseline (see Chapter 7), GPP helps to green the markets: ecologically innovative products can increase market share and often get a price premium. Governments at all levels, public agencies and organisations can quickly make use of GPP to reduce pressures on biodiversity, drive or create markets for green products and green the supply chain. Their vast buying power – from offices and canteens to construction and transportation – can directly expand the market for products and services produced or supplied with less environmental impact (e.g. energy- and water-efficient devices and building techniques, non-hazardous or bio-degradable products, organic or seasonal food, sustainably produced timber and paper). GPP can facilitate eco-innovation because governments can take more risk when opting for new products, assuming the role of ‘launching customer’. This may create economies of scale and help companies to move up the learning curve, put innovative products on the market and create green-collar jobs. Less green products and services are progressively placed at a significant disadvantage when competing for government contracts. GPP has been rapidly developing since the early 2000s and is now being mainstreamed by environmentally ambitious governments. The EU market for government purchases alone exceeds 1,500 billon EUR/year or 16% of EU Gross National Product. The European Commission has proposed to Member States that by 2010, 50% of their purchasing should be GPP. Some have chosen to set more ambitious targets e.g. in the Netherlands, the national government intends to purchase 100% green by 2010, with levels of 50 to 75% for local and regional governments (see Box 5.29). Many other large economies – including Japan, China, New Zealand, Korea and the US – also have formal policies in place that stimulate GPP (see Box 5.30). TEEB FOR NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY MAKERS - CHAPTER 5: PAGE 56
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REWARDING BENEFITS THROUGH PAYMENTS AND MARKETS<br />
This report is not the place for an extensive discussion on the future organisation of international governance<br />
on trade and environment, but some concerns and observations can be raised:<br />
• It is legitimate to ask whether the WTO is the best venue for an increasing amount of dispute settlement<br />
procedures and agenda-setting on sustainability of products and production systems. Given that its<br />
primary task is to regulate the provision of a level playing field for world trade, directing the conditions<br />
under which products are produced might seem beyond its original intention;<br />
• Whilst the effects of trade liberalisation on economic development have been thoroughly investigated,<br />
this is much less true for its impacts on ecosystems and the environment (Verburg et al. 2009). Some<br />
studies have found that liberalising trade in agricultural products could lead to large biodiversity losses<br />
especially in Latin America and Africa yet would decrease losses in Europe and North America due to<br />
transfers in agricultural production (ten Brink B. et al. 2007);<br />
• Trade-offs may exist between the long and short term; between economic development and environmental<br />
and living conditions; and between natural capital and GDP. These are especially relevant for<br />
developing countries. Restricting trade in products by obliging certain production standards, or by<br />
favouring certain products over others, limits the flexibility (also in time) that developing country governments<br />
have to set their own priorities, whilst compliance can pose a significant challenge to small<br />
and medium-sized businesses in these countries. On the other hand, short-term development by ‘mining’<br />
natural resources could mean long-term impoverishment.<br />
• Given the ecological footprint of many developed economies and the impacts of producing their imports<br />
on climate change and biodiversity loss, there is a powerful argument for them to take action on at least<br />
the aspects of production that clearly influence global commons.<br />
• Understanding and defining terms such as ‘sustainable production’ or ‘environmentally-friendly products’<br />
is important for ensuring trade and environment policies are mutually supportive. Finding common ground<br />
amongst governments on criteria for key terms should be viewed as an important prerequisite before<br />
enacting compulsory measures focused on sustainable trade. The broader the support for these criteria,<br />
the less resistance there will be to applying them to make trade more sustainable. Another trade-off<br />
presents itself here, as front-runner countries have to balance their desire for ambitious criteria with<br />
building a coalition based on a minimum level of shared principles.<br />
Sources: Sampson 2005; UNEP and IISD 2005; Verburg et al. 2009 and ten Brink B. et al. 2007<br />
<strong>TEEB</strong> FOR NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY MAKERS - CHAPTER 5: PAGE 55