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REWARDING BENEFITS THROUGH PAYMENTS AND MARKETS Box 5.19: Ecological fiscal transfers in Brazil 12 out of 27 Brazilian states have adopted the ‘ICMS 26 Ecológico’ (see map) and others are preparing relevant legislation. Different states have implemented different ecological indicators for redistribution of state value added tax income to municipalities but all use Conservation Units (CUs) as the ecological indicator related to PA categories for biodiversity conservation. Paraná was the first state to introduce the ecological ICMS, in 1992. 2.5% of the amount distributed at local level is allocated according to the quantity and quality of CUs; another 2.5% considers water protection areas within a municipality’s territory. By the year 2000, CUs had increased by 165% and municipalities with larger shares of protected areas had considerably benefited from increased revenues. Source: May et al. 2002; Ring 2008b Box 5.20: Modelling intergovernmental fiscal transfers for conservation in Germany This model of Saxony’s fiscal transfer system from state to local level is based on administrative, social and economic data from 2002. It has been enlarged by the conservation units (CU) indicator to take account of local ecological services whose benefits cross municipal borders. CUs are standardised areas within the borders of a municipality that belong to existing categories of protected areas defined by Saxony’s nature conservation law (Figure 5.10). The map in Figure 5.11 shows relative changes in general lump sum transfers if CUs are used in addition to existing indicators (inhabitants and schoolchildren) to calculate the fiscal need of a Saxon municipality. Figure 5.10: Protected areas overlaid over municipal borders in Saxony, Germany Figure 5.11: Percentage change in general lump-sum transfers when the Saxon fiscal transfer system 2002 was expanded to include designated protected areas. Source: Ring 2008a <strong>TEEB</strong> FOR NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY MAKERS - CHAPTER 5: PAGE 43
financial flows involved. Building on existing transfer schemes and integrating suitable ecological criteria (e.g. protected area coverage in hectares as a percentage of territory covered) can help decision makers promote innovative solutions to raise funds for conservation. For Switzerland, Köllner et al. (2002) have developed a model for intergovernmental transfers to the local level, based on biodiversity indicators and cantonal benchmarking. For Germany, Ring (2008a) suggested ways of incorporating protected areas into the intergovernmental fiscal transfer system in Saxony (see Box 5.20). 5.4.3 COMPENSATING LAND USERS FOR WILDLIFE DAMAGE REWARDING BENEFITS THROUGH PAYMENTS AND MARKETS Compensation payments are designed to indemnify land users, mostly farmers and fishermen, for the damage caused by particular wildlife species e.g. damage to livestock by wolves (Fourli 1999) or to fishing gear by seals (Similä et al. 2006). These kind of payments can be controversial but many have proven to be effective and are accepted by local stakeholders. Compensation schemes have been set up in many developed and developing countries (see example in Box 5.21 and also the India/ elephants reward programme case in Chapter 8). Box 5.21: Goose Management Scheme, Scotland This scheme aims to promote conservation and a sustainable goose population by compensating farmers for damage to agricultural crops caused by wintering wild geese. It requires a specific area on each farm to be set aside for geese, which may then be scared away from the remaining farm areas. At the start of this initiative, payments were made on the basis of geese headage which involved high transaction costs. Payments are now made on an area basis. The maximum payment is £ 301.55 (about 338 EUR) per hectare of rotational grass or arable land. The payments are made by the UK government according to the five-year agreement in place. Source: MacMillan et al. 2004 Although compensation payments for wildlife damage are sometimes essential to prevent hunting or culling of protected and highly endangered species, they are often associated with – or may even create – a negative perception of wildlife. In many countries, perspective is shifting away from damage compensation schemes (i.e. seeing wildlife as a cost) towards developing public payments that reward the presence of wild animals on private lands or support measures to provide feeding habitats for protected species (i.e. seeing wildlife as positive and making related payments) (Similä et al. 2006; Suvantola in preparation; see Box 5.22 and the discussion on PES in Section 5.1). Box 5.22: Rewarding conservation of golden eagles by the Sami in Finland The scheme provides compensation for losses caused by golden eagles to reindeer husbandry in Northern Finland. As recently amended, it aims to promote the conservation status of the species rather than focusing primarily on damage. Payments are now based on nesting and reproduction of the species and actively involve the Sami people in monitoring nesting sites. Participants have access to information on nesting sites and also provide information to conservation authorities on newly discovered sites. In this way, the scheme discourages disturbance of the eagles during nesting and encourages creation of nesting sites rather than their destruction. There is also ongoing followup to build trust between the authorities and those who are subject to the negative impacts of the species’ recovery. Source: Similä et al. 2006; Suvantola in preparation <strong>TEEB</strong> FOR NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY MAKERS - CHAPTER 5: PAGE 44
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Part I: The need for action Ch1 The
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ThE EcoNoMIcs of EcosysTEMs AND BIo
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THE GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY CRISIS AND
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1.2 THE GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY CRISIS
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• Enough food could be produced o
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MArINE sysTEMs THE GLOBAL BIODIVERS
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1.2.3 WHAT IS DRIVING THESE LOSSES?
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1.4 THE GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY CRISIS
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EfErENcEs THE GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY C
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THE ECONOMICS OF ECOSYSTEMS AND BIO
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10.1 WHY VALUING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES
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RESPONDING TO THE VALUE OF NATURE B
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10.2.2 BETTER LINKS TO MACRO- ECONO
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10.3 Investing in natural capital s
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as well as the value for money and
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Global National or Regional Local T
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10.4 By taking distributional issue
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has origins and impacts beyond bord
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The ‘Nobel Prize’*-winning econ
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10.5 Biodiversity and ecosystem ser
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Rewarding the provision of services
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Making this a reality will require
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GHK, CE and IEEP - GHK, Cambridge E
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Torras, M. (2000) The Total Economi
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ThE ECoNoMICS of ECoSySTEMS AND BIo
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FRAMEWORK AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES FO
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2.3 FRAMEWORK AND GUIDING PRINCIPLE
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2.3.4 BASE POLICIES ON GOOD GOVERNA
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2.4 FRAMEWORK AND GUIDING PRINCIPLE
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REfERENCES FRAMEWORK AND GUIDING PR
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THE ECONOMICS OF ECOSYSTEMS AND BIO
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STRENGTHENING INDICATORS AND ACCOUN
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3.1 STRENGTHENING INDICATORS AND AC
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Endnotes STRENGTHENING INDICATORS A
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Chapter 4: Integrating ecosystem an
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INTEGRATING ECOSYSTEM AND BIODIVERS
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4.1 INTEGRATING ECOSYSTEM AND BIODI
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Some consumer energy subsidies may
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6.4 “People who love soft methods
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6.4.2 RESISTANCE TO CHANGE Subsidie
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The multiple policy objectives ofte
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REFORMING SUBSIDIES Social impacts
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The G-20 Heads of State have recent
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REFERENCES Agnew, D.J.; Pearce, J.;
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OECD - Organisation for Economic Co
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Bernd hansjürgens, Christoph Schr
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Key Messages of Chapter 7 Rewarding
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7.1 BASIC PRINCIPLES FoR hALTING oN
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7.2 REGULATING To AvoID DAMAGE: ENv
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y reducing the release of pollutant
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y reducing uncertainties with respe
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This equivalence can involve the sa
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PoTENTIAL BENEFITS oF oFFSETS AND B
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A biodiversity offset should be des
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7.4 SETTING MoRE ACCURATE PRICES: M
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Market-based instruments can be des
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China’s first water use rights sy
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PoTENTIAL CoST SAvINGS ThRoUGh MBIS
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Despite the potential described abo
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Non-market valuation studies can he
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PoLLUTIoN AND oThER DAMAGING ACTIvI
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The 1973 CITES treaty (Convention o
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7.6 MAKING IT hAPPEN - PoLICy MIxES
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has shown the critical need to stre
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Gutman, P. and Davidson, S. (2007)
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T H E E C O N O M I C S O F E C O S
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