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REWARDING BENEFITS THROUGH PAYMENTS AND MARKETS<br />
Box 5.14: Think PINC – the ‘Proactive Investment in Natural Capital’ proposal<br />
“We propose that a new mechanism of Proactive Investment in Natural Capital (PINC) is created<br />
to promote adaptation in existing protected areas and standing forests that may not benefit directly<br />
from REDD funds.”<br />
SHAPING IPES AND GLOBAL INVEST-<br />
MENT IN BIODIVERSITY<br />
Different approaches for international transfers for biodiversity<br />
conservation and for mobilising international investment<br />
in natural capital have been proposed. Boxes 5.14<br />
and 5.15 describe some recent ideas and initiatives.<br />
Without the means to make a global ecosystem service<br />
‘excludable’ – i.e. limiting its use by non-paying benefactors<br />
– alternative ways must be found to create demand<br />
for investment in such services. This argument<br />
also applies to international agreements on access and<br />
benefit sharing (see Section 5.3 below). Global targets<br />
for contributions to biodiversity conservation can be used<br />
to determine burden sharing and/or market mechanisms<br />
can offer countries the option to deliver certain ecosystem<br />
services in a more cost-efficient way (e.g. Tradable<br />
Conservation Obligations, see Box 5.15).<br />
Whatever approach is taken, international agreements<br />
supported by national legislation are likely<br />
to be needed to ensure sustainable long-term<br />
financing for global biodiversity. Governments<br />
should seek ways to engage the private sector and<br />
to create appropriate incentives for business to reduce<br />
adverse impacts and invest in biodiversity<br />
and ecosystem services.<br />
<strong>TEEB</strong> FOR NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY MAKERS - CHAPTER 5: PAGE 33<br />
Trivedi et al. (2009)<br />
PINC, proposed by the Global Canopy Programme, seeks to<br />
act as a complementary funding stream to a REDD mechanism<br />
for large areas of standing forests that are not immediately threatened<br />
or may not benefit from REDD (depending on its design<br />
and implementation). It recognises the immense value of tropical<br />
forests in monetary and non-monetary terms and calls for a mechanism<br />
to reward the function of large areas of forests as global<br />
providers of multiple ecosystem services beyond carbon storage<br />
(e.g. biodiversity protection, rainfall generation, water supply<br />
regulation and atmospheric cooling, which are likely to<br />
become increasingly important as a result of climate change).<br />
Source: Trivedi et al. 2009<br />
Box 5.15: Stimulating international demand<br />
for biodiversity through a Green Development<br />
Mechanism<br />
The Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and<br />
the Environment (VROM), the International Union for<br />
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and the United Nations<br />
Environment Programme (UNEP), in cooperation with<br />
the CBD Secretariat, are facilitating expert discussions<br />
ahead of CBD COP-10 (Nagoya 2010) on new international<br />
incentives for biodiversity. The Green Development<br />
Mechanism (GDM) initiative seeks to<br />
create a global mechanism to stimulate demand for<br />
the preservation and sustainable use of biodiversity<br />
and to mobilise new and sustained financial support.<br />
A range of different potential instruments are being explored.<br />
Tradable Conservation Obligations are one<br />
way in which countries could commit to contribute to<br />
certain biodiversity conservation targets, within national<br />
borders or abroad (hence ‘tradable’). Other ideas<br />
include footprint compensation measures (e.g. donation<br />
levels that use footprint as one of a mix of indicators)<br />
and coordination of biodiversity offset obligations<br />
(eg ‘no net loss’ commitments) at the international<br />
level.<br />
See also: Swanson 2009; Swanson, Mullan and Kontoleon 2009