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mechanism, monitoring and reporting/verification methodologies (see Parker et al. 2009 for a synopsis of REDD proposals). SCOPE OF REDD AND REDD-PLUS REWARDING BENEFITS THROUGH PAYMENTS AND MARKETS Box 5.11: The costs and benefits of reducing GHG emissions from deforestation Estimated costs of reducing emissions from deforestation vary across studies, depending on models and assumptions used. In comparison to GHG mitigation alternatives in other sectors, REDD is estimated to be a low-cost mitigation option (Stern 2006; IPCC 2007c). Eliasch (2008) estimated that REDD could lead to a halving of deforestation rates by 2030, cutting emissions by 1.5-2.7 Gt CO 2 /year and would require US$ 17.2 billion to US$ 33 billion/year. It estimated the long-term net benefit of this action at US$ 3.7 trillion in present value terms (this accounts only for the benefits of reduced climate change). A study from the Woods Hole Research Centre estimates that 94% of Amazon deforestation could be avoided at a cost of less than US$ 1 per tonne of carbon dioxide (Nepstad et al. 2007). Olsen and Bishop (2009) find that REDD is competitive with most land uses in the Brazilian Amazon and many land uses in Indonesia at a carbon price of less than US$ 5 per tonne of CO2 equivalent. Kindermann et al. (2008) estimate that a 50% reduction in deforestation in 2005-2030 could provide 1.5-2.7 Gt CO2 /year in emission reductions and would require US$ 17.2 billion to US$ 28 billion/year (see Wertz-Kanounnikoff 2008 for a review of cost studies). Sources: Stern 2006; IPCC 2007a; Eliasch 2008; Nepstad et al. 2007; Kindermann et al. 2008; Wertz-Kanounnikoff 2008 A well-designed REDD mechanism that delivers real, measurable and long-term emission reductions from deforestation and forest degradation is expected to have significant positive impacts on biodiversity since a decline in deforestation and degradation implies a decline in habitat destruction, landscape fragmentation and biodiversity loss. At the global scale, Turner et al. (2007) examine how ecosystem services (including climate regulation) and biodiversity coincide and conclude that tropical forests offer the greatest synergy. These cover about 7% of the world’s dry land (Lindsey 2007) yet the world’s forests contain 80 to 90% of terrestrial biodiversity (FAO 2000). Targeting national REDD activities at areas combining high carbon stocks and high biodiversity can potentially maximise co-benefits (see Figure 5.8 on Panama below) 8 . A REDD-Plus mechanism could have additional positive impacts on biodiversity if achieved through appropriate restoration of degraded forest ecosystems and landscapes. Afforestation and refo- restation (A/R) 9 activities can provide incentives to regenerate forests in deforested areas and increase connectivity between forest habitats. However, there is a need for safeguards to avoid potential negative effects. A/R activities under a future REDD mechanism that resulted in monoculture plantations could have adverse impacts on biodiversity: firstly, there are lower levels of biodiversity in monoculture plantations compared to most natural forest and secondly, the use of alien species could have additional negative impacts. Conversely, planting mixed native species in appropriate locations could yield multiple benefits for biodiversity. Plantations can also reduce pressures on natural forests for the supply of fuel and fibre. NATIONAL AND SUB-NATIONAL BASELINES/REFERENCE LEVELS Baselines provide a reference point against which to assess changes in emissions. Various proposals have been tabled for how these could be established for REDD at national, sub-national 10 and project levels. The accounting level selected has implications for ‘carbon leakage’ i.e. displacement of anthropogenic emissions from GHG sources to outside the accounting boundary, with deforestation and/or forest degradation increasing elsewhere as a result. Such leakage <strong>TEEB</strong> FOR NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY MAKERS - CHAPTER 5: PAGE 25
could have adverse consequences for biodiversity if deforestation/degradation were displaced from an area with low biodiversity value to one with higher value. In general, national level emissions accounting is better able to account for international leakage than sub-national and/or project level accounting 11 . Another important question about REDD relates to ‘additionality’ i.e. achieving emission reductions that are additional to what would have occurred under the business-as-usual scenario and how protected areas (PAs) are treated within this context. Some high carbon/high biodiversity ecosystems may be located in legally-defined PAs, giving the impression that the carbon they store is safe and that they would not offer additional sequestration benefits. While this is true for well-managed PAs, many sites remain vulnerable to degradation through encroachment, poaching and other illegal activities (Leverington et al. 2008). This reflects inter alia the significant financing gap that exists for many PAs across the world (see Chapter 8). Ensuring carbon additionality will depend on whether and how REDD finance is extended to PAs. About 312 Gt of terrestrial carbon is currently stored in the existing PA network: if lost to the atmosphere, this would be equivalent to approximately 23 times the total global anthropogenic carbon emissions for 2004 (Kapos et al. 2008). Targeting REDD funding at PAs at risk of degradation/deforestation or which have potential for improved ecological status – rather than at ‘safe’ PAs – could yield both high carbon and biodiversity benefits. GROSS VS NET DEFORESTATION RATES REWARDING BENEFITS THROUGH PAYMENTS AND MARKETS Another issue under negotiation is whether gross or net deforestation rates will be considered when estimating emission reductions 12 . From a climate perspective, the most relevant figure is what the atmosphere actually experiences (the rationale for using net values). However, the use of net rates could hide the loss of mature (i.e. primary and modified natural) forests and their replacement with areas of new forest, either in situ or elsewhere. This could result in significant losses in biodiversity (sCBD 2008). REDD FINANCING There are three prevailing positions on how REDD financing could be generated 13 . These have different implications for how biodiversity co-benefits could be promoted and which stakeholders would be involved in decision-making processes. Market-based approaches: If REDD were financed via the regulated international carbon market, credits would need to be fungible (interchangeable) with existing Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) under the Kyoto market 14 . The unit of exchange would be tonnes of carbon equivalents (tCO 2 e). Demand for credits would be generated by the carbon market which would drive investment towards the least-cost mitigation options (subject to any restrictions that governments might place on market access for REDD credits). Given their ability to engage the private sector, market-based approaches to REDD are likely to mobilise higher levels of sustainable and long-term financing, leading to larger areas of conserved forests and larger biodiversity co-benefits. Fund-based approaches: Another approach is to mobilise REDD finance via inter alia voluntary contributions (ODA), auctioning assigned amount units (AAUs) in the carbon market and earmarking (part of) these revenues or revenues from other fees, fines and taxes. In general, fund-based approaches can be designed to disburse REDD finance based on any objectives and criteria established by donor (and host) countries. Whereas carbon market financing is tied to delivering emission reductions, fund-based approaches could be used not only to finance such reductions but also to support capacity-building needs in developing countries to make REDD operational. They may also target biodiversity co-benefits or be designed to target biodiversity benefits directly. However, the way in which funds are generated may have implications for how they are disbursed (see Karousakis 2009). In general, fund-based approaches are likely to deliver lower volumes of REDD finance over the long-run. Phased approaches: More recently, a phased approach to REDD finance has been proposed that combines market and fund-based approaches. The <strong>TEEB</strong> FOR NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY MAKERS - CHAPTER 5: PAGE 26
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Part I: The need for action Ch1 The
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ThE EcoNoMIcs of EcosysTEMs AND BIo
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THE GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY CRISIS AND
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1.2 THE GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY CRISIS
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• Enough food could be produced o
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MArINE sysTEMs THE GLOBAL BIODIVERS
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1.2.3 WHAT IS DRIVING THESE LOSSES?
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1.4 THE GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY CRISIS
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EfErENcEs THE GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY C
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THE ECONOMICS OF ECOSYSTEMS AND BIO
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10.1 WHY VALUING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES
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RESPONDING TO THE VALUE OF NATURE B
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10.2.2 BETTER LINKS TO MACRO- ECONO
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10.3 Investing in natural capital s
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as well as the value for money and
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Global National or Regional Local T
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10.4 By taking distributional issue
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has origins and impacts beyond bord
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The ‘Nobel Prize’*-winning econ
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10.5 Biodiversity and ecosystem ser
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Rewarding the provision of services
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Making this a reality will require
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GHK, CE and IEEP - GHK, Cambridge E
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Torras, M. (2000) The Total Economi
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ThE ECoNoMICS of ECoSySTEMS AND BIo
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FRAMEWORK AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES FO
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2.3 FRAMEWORK AND GUIDING PRINCIPLE
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2.3.4 BASE POLICIES ON GOOD GOVERNA
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2.4 FRAMEWORK AND GUIDING PRINCIPLE
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REfERENCES FRAMEWORK AND GUIDING PR
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THE ECONOMICS OF ECOSYSTEMS AND BIO
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STRENGTHENING INDICATORS AND ACCOUN
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3.1 STRENGTHENING INDICATORS AND AC
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Endnotes STRENGTHENING INDICATORS A
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Chapter 4: Integrating ecosystem an
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INTEGRATING ECOSYSTEM AND BIODIVERS
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4.1 INTEGRATING ECOSYSTEM AND BIODI
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6 Chapter 6 addresses the need for
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6.1.2 HOW BIG ARE EXISTING SUBSIDIE
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6.2 6.2.1 DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN
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through provision of water and ener
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6.3 6.3.1 AGRICULTURE Subsidies to
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Box 6.4: The EU Common Agricultural
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Second, it has to be borne in mind
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• increases the producer price of
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REFORMING SUBSIDIES Box 6.9: Removi
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In the agriculture sector, the pric
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Some consumer energy subsidies may
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6.4 “People who love soft methods
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6.4.2 RESISTANCE TO CHANGE Subsidie
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The multiple policy objectives ofte
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REFORMING SUBSIDIES Social impacts
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The G-20 Heads of State have recent
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REFERENCES Agnew, D.J.; Pearce, J.;
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OECD - Organisation for Economic Co
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Bernd hansjürgens, Christoph Schr
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Key Messages of Chapter 7 Rewarding
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7.1 BASIC PRINCIPLES FoR hALTING oN
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7.2 REGULATING To AvoID DAMAGE: ENv
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y reducing the release of pollutant
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y reducing uncertainties with respe
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This equivalence can involve the sa
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PoTENTIAL BENEFITS oF oFFSETS AND B
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A biodiversity offset should be des
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7.4 SETTING MoRE ACCURATE PRICES: M
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Market-based instruments can be des
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China’s first water use rights sy
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PoTENTIAL CoST SAvINGS ThRoUGh MBIS
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Despite the potential described abo
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Non-market valuation studies can he
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PoLLUTIoN AND oThER DAMAGING ACTIvI
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7.6 MAKING IT hAPPEN - PoLICy MIxES
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has shown the critical need to stre
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Gutman, P. and Davidson, S. (2007)
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T H E E C O N O M I C S O F E C O S
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