Jurisdictional Issues In The Aboriginal Workplace

Jurisdictional Issues 

in the 

Aboriginal Workplace 

Carman J. Overholt 

and 

Meika LaLonde 

 

Telephone: (604) 622-5165 

E-mail: carman.overholt@fmc-law.com

Jurisdictional Issues 

in the 

Aboriginal Workplace

Table of Contents 

Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1 

Jurisdiction Over Labour Realtions .................................................................. 1 

The General Rule ................................................................................................... 1 

The Functional Test ................................................................................................ 2 

The Functional Teat and “Indianness” ..................................................................... 3 

The Band Counsil as Employee .............................................................................. 4 

Aboriginal Rights and Jurisdiction ........................................................................... 6 

Labour Legislation............................................................................................ 6 

Federal or Provincial Labour Legisltion .................................................................... 6 

Parties Defined Under Codes ................................................................................. 7 

Protection of the Right to Oraganize ....................................................................... 7 

Certification ............................................................................................................ 8 

Collective Barganing and Collective Agreements...................................................... 9 

Aboriginal Self Government.............................................................................. 9 

The General Approach to Aboriginal Self Governement ............................................ 9 

Treaty Negotitations in British Columbia ................................................................ 12 

Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 12 

Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP’s Labour and Employment Group ....................... 13

Introduction 

Band Councils are assuming more and more responsibility 

in administering the affairs of Bands. The expansion of 

their role in governing Bands has had a direct impact on 

the scope of operations and the number of persons 

employed by Band Councils. Moreover, an unprecedented 

number of First Nations individuals are exerting a presence 

in the Canadian business community today. As such, 

Band Councils and First Nations’ employers are affected 

by the labour and employment legislation. For these 

reasons, it is crucial for First Nations’ employers to be 

aware of the constitutional and jurisdictional issues with 

respect to the legislation, as well as how the realization of 

Aboriginal self-government will affect the Aboriginal 

workplace in British Columbia. 

Jurisdiction Over 

Labour Relations 

The General Rule 

The source of jurisdiction over labour relations in Canada 

is the Constitution Act 1 , and the jurisprudence that has 

been created. As a general rule, labour relations falls 

within the exclusive jurisdiction of the provincial legislatures. 

Section 92(13) of the Constitution Act states that provinces 

may exclusively make laws in relation to Property and Civil 

Rights. Most labour relations and employment 

relationships are subject to provincial legislation. 

In Reference re Industrial Relations and Disputes Act (the 

“Stevedoring case”) 2 , the Supreme Court of Canada noted 

that there are exceptions to the general rule of exclusive 

provincial jurisdiction over labour relations. At page 564, 

Justice Estey explained, 

There is a jurisdiction in the Parliament of Canada 

to legislate with respect to labour and labour 

relations, even though these relations are classified 

under Property and Civil Rights within the meaning 

of s. 92(13) of the B.N.A. Act and, therefore, subject 

to provincial legislation. This jurisdiction of 

Parliament to so legislate includes those situations 

in which labour and labour relations are (a) an 

integral part of or necessarily incidental to the 

headings enumerated under s. 91; (b) in respect to 

Dominion Government employees; (c) in respect to 

works and undertakings under ss. 91(29) and 

92(10); (d) in respect of works, undertakings or 

businesses in Canada but outside of any province. 

Page 1 

The first area identified in Mr. Justice Estey’s list is relevant 

in determining jurisdiction over labour relations and 

operations involving First Nations. Section 91(24) of the 

Constitution Act provides that Parliament has primary 

legislative authority with respect to “Indians and Lands 

Reserved for Indians.” Thus, if an operation touches on 

an integral part of, or is necessarily incidental to, “Indians 

or Lands reserved for Indians,” the operation will be 

governed by federal legislation. 

In determining jurisdiction regarding labour relations in a 

particular case, the focus should not be on who the 

employer is, who the employees are or where the activity 

is taking place. In other words, First Nations employees 

and employers, and operations taking place on a reserve 

are not automatically governed by federal labour law. 

Instead, at issue is the nature of the activity concerned. 

In Canada Labour Relations Board et al v. Yellowknife, 3 a 

case concerning the jurisdiction to regulate the labour 

relations of municipal employees, the Court clarified at p. 

736 that “jurisdiction over labour matters depends on 

legislative authority over the operation, not over the person 

of the employer.” 

The traditional approach for determining whether any 

business or other enterprise falls within federal or 

provincial jurisdiction in relation to the regulation of its 

labour relations was concisely summarized by the 

Supreme Court of Canada in Northern Telecom v. 

Communications Workers 4 at p. 363: 

(1) Parliament has no authority over labour relations 

as such nor over the terms of a contract of 

employment; exclusive provincial competence is the 

rule. 

1 Constitution Act, 1867, 30 &31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K. ) [R.S.C. 1970, Appendix II, No. 5] (as am. by Canada Act 1982, c. 11 (U.K.), Schedule to the Constitution 

Act, 1982, Item 1), ss. 91(24), 92(13). 

2 Reference re Industrial Relations and Disputes Act (the Stevedoring case), [1955] S.C.R. 529. 

3 Canada Labour Relations Board et al v. Yellowknife, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 729. 

4 Northern Telecom v. Communications Workers, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 115

(2) By way of exception, however, Parliament may 

assert exclusive jurisdiction over these matters if it 

is shown that such jurisdiction is an integral part of 

its primary competence over some other single 

federal subject. 

(3) Primary federal competence over a given subject 

can prevent the application of provincial law relating 

to labour relations and the conditions of 

employment but only if it is demonstrated that 

federal authority over these matters is an integral 

element of such federal competence. 

(4) Thus, the regulation of wages to be paid by an 

undertaking, service or business, and the regulation 

of its labour relations, being related to an integral 

part of the operation of the undertaking, service or 

business, are removed from provincial jurisdiction 

and immune from the effect of provincial law if the 

undertaking, service or business is a federal one. 

(5) The question whether an undertaking, service or 

business is a federal one depends on the nature of 

its operation. 

(6) In order to determine the nature of the operation, 

one must look at the normal or habitual activities of 

the business as those of a “going concern”, without 

regard for exceptional or casual factors; otherwise 

the Constitution could not be applied with any 

degree of continuity and regularity. 

The Functional Test 

The Supreme Court of Canada applied these principles 

to determine whether federal or provincial law regulated 

First Nations’ operations in Four B Manufacturing v. United 

Garment Works of America and Ontario Labour Relations 

Board et al. 5 Four B was an Ontario corporation, carrying 

on the business of sewing shoe uppers under contract 

for a shoe manufacturing company. The business of Four 

B was located and conducted on an Indian reserve. All 

of the corporation’s issued shares were held by four 

brothers, each of whom were members of the Band. The 

Band Council in no way owned or controlled the company, 

nor did it share in the company’s profits. Four B received 

both grants and loans from the Government of Canada 

pursuant to programs of the Department of Indian Affairs 

and Northern Development. The programs were designed 

to promote cooperation between Indian and non-Indian 

businessmen in order to assist First Nations in developing 

Page 2 

and expanding viable businesses and to create jobs for 

Indians, both on and off reserves. The company 

employed 68 people, the majority of whom were Band 

members. 

At issue in the case was whether provincial labour relations 

legislation governed the activities of Four B. The company 

argued that the Ontario Labour Relations Board did not 

have the jurisdiction to certify the respondent union as 

bargaining agent for employees of the manufacturing 

plant. The Supreme Court of Canada disagreed. 

In its reasons for judgment, the Court began by 

summarizing the established principles relevant to the issue 

of legislative competence over labour relations at 1045: 

Exclusive provincial legislative competence is the 

rule, exclusive federal competence is the exception. 

The exception comprises, in the main, labour 

relations in undertakings, services and businesses 

which, having regard to the functional test of the 

nature of their operations and their normal activities, 

can be characterized as federal undertakings, 

services or businesses. . . . The functional test is a 

particular method of applying a more general rule 

namely, that exclusive federal jurisdiction over labour 

relations arises only if it can be shown that such 

jurisdiction forms an integral part of primary federal 

jurisdiction over some other federal object. 

After applying the law to the facts in the Four B case, the 

Court concluded that there was nothing about the 

company which might allow it to be characterized as a 

federal business. At p. 1046, the Court noted: 

The sewing of uppers on sport shoes is an ordinary 

industrial activity which clearly comes under 

provincial legislative authority for the purposes of 

labour relations. Neither the ownership of the 

business by Indian shareholders, nor the 

employment by that business of a majority of Indian 

employees, nor the carrying on of that business on 

an Indian reserve under a federal permit, nor the 

federal loan and subsidies, taken separately or 

together, can have any effect on the operational 

nature of that business. By the traditional and 

functional test, therefore, the Labour Relations Act 

applies to the facts of this case, and the Board has 

jurisdiction. 

5 Four B Manufacturing v. United Garment Works of America and Ontario Labour Relations Board et al, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1031 [hereinafter Four B].

Thus, the fact that Parliament has exclusive legislative 

competence to make laws relating to Indians and Lands 

reserved for Indians does not mean that all rights, duties 

and undertakings of First Nations fall under federal 

jurisdiction. The Court in Four B held that there was 

nothing inherently federal about the rights of Indians and 

non-Indians to associate for a labour relations purpose, 

for a corporation to bargain collectively with its employees 

or for a business to operate privately on reserve land, 

independent of the Band Council. 

What factors, then, would lead the Court to conclude 

that a particular operation or business does form an 

integral part of primary federal jurisdiction over Indians or 

lands reserved for Indians? The Supreme Court of 

Canada held that to be characterized as a federal business, 

such an operation would necessarily involve Indian status 

as well as rights affected by status, including registrability, 

membership in a Band, the right to participate in the 

election of chiefs and Band Councils, and reserve 

privileges. Essentially, the purposes of the business, 

undertaking or operation must be related to “Indianness” 

to be characterized as federal. 

The Functional Test and “Indianness” 

Several lower Courts have settled questions concerning 

jurisdiction by considering whether or not the labour 

operations at issue touched on the core of “Indianness” 

or Indian status. The cases provide insight into the 

approach of Courts and Labour Boards in assigning 

legislative competence. It is important to note that the 

subtle differences in the facts of each case often lead to 

markedly different outcomes. 

In Qu’Appelle Indian Residential School Council v. 

Canada, 6 the Federal Court held that the nature of the 

operations of a provincially incorporated School Council 

and its employees formed an integral part of primary 

federal jurisdiction over Indians and Indian lands. The 

School, which provided education and residential care to 

First Nations children, was located on a Reserve, 

employed mostly First Nations and received federal 

funding. The School Council, charged with the 

administration of the School, was composed of Band 

6 Qu’Appelle Indian Residential School Council v. Canada, [1988] 2 F.C. 266 (QL). 

7 Sagkeeng Alcohol Rehab Centre Inc. v. Abraham, [1994] 3 F.C. 499 (QL) [hereinafter Sagkeeng]. 

8 Westbank First Nation v. B.C. (L.R.B.), [1997] B.C.J. No. 2410 (QL) [hereinafter Westbank]. 

Page 3 

chiefs. The School Council’s objectives were to foster 

and promote Indian culture, history and traditions in the 

School’s curriculum. The Court considered such a 

purpose to be directly related to Indian status and rights 

and were consequently federal in nature. Responsibility 

for the School had previously rested with the Minister of 

Indian Affairs, who eventually surrendered control to the 

Council. Thus, the operation came under federal 

jurisdiction partly for the reason that it always had. 

In Sagkeeng Alcohol Rehab Centre Inc. v. Abraham, 7 the 

operation at issue was an alcohol rehabilitation centre 

located on a Reserve. Only a small number of those 

admitted to the centre were non-First Nations people. 

Part of the rehabilitation program focused on cultural 

awareness. In deciding that the labour relations of the 

centre were to be regulated by federal legislation, the Court 

resolved had this to say at pp. 459-461: 

The rehabilitation centre in question is engaged in 

the provision of a form of health care service designed 

and operated to meet the needs of its Indian 

beneficiaries. 

The fact that the rehabilitation centre is organized 

and operated primarily for Indians, governed solely 

by Indians, that its facilities and services are intended 

for Indians, that its staff are specially trained under 

the [National Native Alcohol and Drug Abuse 

Program] and receive First Nations training, and that 

its rehabilitation program, curriculum and materials 

are designed for Indians, all serve to identify the 

inherent “Indianness” of the centre and link it to 

Indians. 

For admission purposes, Indians are given priority 

over others. The [centre’s] focus is primarily on 

Indians and its facilities are available first and 

foremost to Indians. The question of eligibility for 

admission, therefore, is integrally bound up with 

Indian status. 

Although it shares many factual similarities with the 

Sagkeegn case, Westbank First Nation v. B.C. (L.R.B.) 8 

had the opposite outcome. In Westbank, the Court 

agreed with the British Columbia Labour Relations Board 

that a long-term care facility operated on a reserve and 

jointly funded by the federal government and the Band 

Council fell under provincial jurisdiction. The home was 

controlled and operated by the Band Council. Although

it was intended that the facility give priority to First Nations 

residents, it opened its doors to many non-First Nations 

for financial reasons. The normal or habitual activities of 

the Pine Acres Home were thus considered to be the 

provision of intermediate care to residents of the South 

Okanagan community and the involvement of non-First 

Nations groups became more than an incidental part of 

the business. The Court discussed the purpose and 

function of the home on p. 14: 

Although the ultimate goal may be to benefit 

members of the Westbank First Nation and other 

First Nations groups, the actual function of the home 

is to provide intermediate care to a much wider 

group, the majority of which are not First Nations 

people. There is a distinction to be made between 

the “means” and the “end”. While it may be argued 

that the “end only relates to First Nations people, 

the “means” to accomplish the “end” is much 

broader and relates to a majority of non-first Nations 

patients. In the Four B case, the purpose of the 

business was to benefit the Band as a whole to 

improve their economic position but the means to 

accomplish this purpose was held not to constitute 

a federal business. It is the “means”, not the “end”, 

which is the relevant consideration under the 

functional test of the nature of the business. 

In March of 2000, the B.C. Court of Appeal affirmed that 

the regulation of the labour relations of Pine Acres Home 

did not form an integral part of primary federal jurisdiction 

over Indians or Lands reserved for Indians. The operations 

at hand did not affect or touch upon Indian status or 

rights. 

Band Council as Employer 

Band Councils are the primary institution established 

under the Indian Act 9 to administer matters relating to 

Indian status, lands and other rights. To fulfill their local 

government function, Band Councils routinely pass 

by-laws authorized under the Indian Act and employ staff 

to secure the implementation of those by-laws. If the 

activities of a Council and its respective employees do 

indeed involve those contemplated by the Indian Act, the 

power generally to regulate them will form an integral part 

of primary federal jurisdiction in relation to “Indians and 

Lands Reserved for the Indians.” In other words, if a 

Council is doing that which the Parliament of Canada has 

permitted it to do by virtue of the Indian Act, the operation 

9 Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. I-6. 

Page 4 

necessarily affects “Indianness” and federal labour 

legislation will apply. 

Section 81 of the Indian Act enumerates the purposes 

for which a Band Council may make by-laws in order to 

effectively administer the affairs of Indian Bands. Some 

of those purposes include the following: 

(1) to provide for the health of residents on the 

reserve and to prevent the spreading of 

contagious and infectious diseases; 

(2) the regulation of traffic; 

(3) the observance of law and order; 

(4) the prevention of disorderly conduct and 

nuisances; 

(5) the construction and maintenance of water 

courses, roads, bridges, ditches and other 

local works; 

(6) the dividing of the reserve into zones and 

regulating the use of and the construction 

permitted in such zones; 

(7) the regulation of the construction, repair and 

use of buildings, whether owned by the band 

or by individual members of the band; 

(8) the control and prohibition of public games, 

sports, races, athletic contests and other 

amusements; 

(9) the regulation of the conduct and activities of 

those who enter the reserve to buy, sell or 

otherwise deal in wares or merchandise; 

(10) the preservation, protection and management 

of fur-bearing animals, fish and other game 

on the reserve; 

(11) the removal and punishment of persons 

trespassing upon the reserve or frequenting 

the reserve for proscribed purposes; 

(12) with respect to any matter arising out of or 

ancillary to the exercise of powers under this 

section; 

(13) the imposition on summary conviction of a fine 

or imprisonment for violation of a by-law made 

by the Band Council; 

(14) the residence of band members and other 

persons on the reserve; 

(15) to provide for the rights of spouses or 

common-law partners and children who reside 

with members of the band on the reserve with 

respect to any matter in relation to which the 

council may make by-laws in respect of 

members of the band.

Moreover, s. 83 of the Indian Act permits a Band Council 

to pass money by-laws, with permission of the Minister, 

regarding the licensing of businesses, the appropriation 

and expenditure of Band monies, the appointment of 

officials to conduct the business of a council, the raising 

of money from Band members to support Band projects, 

and taxation for local purposes of land or interests in land. 

Various other provisions of the Indian Act are illustrative 

of the extent to which a Band Council possesses authority 

to administer the affairs of an Indian Band. For example, 

s. 20 of the Act provides that no Indian is lawfully in 

possession of reserve land unless it is given to him by the 

Band Council with the approval of the Minister. A Band is 

obliged to maintain the roads, bridges, ditches and fences 

within the reserve under s. 34. Section 60 of the Act 

allows the Governor in Council to grant a Band the right 

to exercise as much control and management over the 

reserve lands as the Governor in Council deems desirable. 

Section 69 enables the Governor in Council to permit a 

Band to control, manage and expend, in whole or in part, 

its revenue moneys. Sections 74 to 80 contemplate the 

elections of chiefs and Band Councils. All employment 

and activities created by the Band Council as a result of 

such delegated federal authority will be considered federal 

undertakings to be governed by federal legislation. 

The administration of a Band by a Band Council and the 

jurisdiction to govern the labour relations of such affairs 

has been the subject of much case law. In Francis v. 

Canada Labour Relations Board, 10 (reversed on other 

grounds), an order of the Canada Labour Relations Board 

certifying a unit of employees of the St. Regis Band 

Council was upheld. The nature of the work performed 

by the unit of employees was described as the 

administration of education, Indian lands and estates, 

welfare, housing, public works and an old age home. The 

employees were also engaged in the maintenance of 

roads, schools, water and sanitation services, and garbage 

collection. The Court held that the work of the employees 

was performed pursuant to the by-laws enacted by the 

St. Regis Indian Band Council and that the labour relations 

in issue formed an integral part of primary federal 

jurisdiction over Indians or Lands reserved for Indians. 

Justice Heald further explained at p. 284: 

10 Francis v. Canada Labour Relations Board, [1981] 1 F.C. 225 (C.A.). 

11 Whitebear Band Council v. Carpenters Provincial Council Saskatchewan, [1982] S.J. No. 312 (CA) (QL). 

12 Whitebear Band Council v. Carpenters Provincial Council Saskatchewan, supra, p. 8 

13 Whitebear Band Council v. Carpenters Provincial Council Saskatchewan, supra, p. 7 

In the case at bar, the unit of employees in question 

were directly and continuously concerned with the 

election of councilors and chiefs, the matter of right 

to possession of reserve lands, the right of Indians 

on the reserve to have their children educated in 

schools on the reserve, the right to welfare when 

circumstances warrant it, the right to the facilities 

of the old age home in proper circumstances, etc. 

The total administration of the Band is continuously 

concerned with the status and the rights and 

privileges of the Band Indians. 

Page 5 

Employees of the Band Council in Whitebear Band Council 

v. Carpenters Provincial Council Saskatchewan 11 were also 

held to be directly involved in activities relating to Indian 

status and privileges. Pursuant to a program funded by 

the Federal Department of Indian Affairs and Northern 

Development, the Whitebear Band Council elected to 

undertake the construction and renovation of several 

homes on the reserve. Twenty Band members, all 

residents of the Reserve, were subsequently hired as 

carpenters and carpenter apprentices to carry out the task. 

In spite of protest from the Band Council that the province 

lacked jurisdiction over the labour relations of the 

undertaking, the Saskatchewan Labour Relations Board 

accepted the Union’s application for certification to 

represent the unit of carpenters. The Board held that 

housing construction on the Reserve, like the 

manufacturing of shoes in Four B, constituted an ordinary 

industrial activity within the Province. 

After looking at the normal or habitual activities of the 

Band Council, however, the Saskatchewan Court of 

Appeal determined that the construction of houses on 

the Reserve pursuant to the federal government program 

could not be “separated from the activity of the Band 

Council as a whole, isolated and assigned a different 

character than that of which it forms part – the general 

function of the Band Council.” 12 The Court observed 

that the primary function of an Indian Band Council is to 

provide a form of government by Indians on Indian lands 

through the enactment of by-laws. Their associated 

functions, namely “acting at once as the representative 

body of the inhabitants of the Reserve and the agent of 

the Minister with regard to Federal programs for Reserves 

and their residents, and participating in certain of the 

decisions of the Minister in relation to the Reserve,” 13 are 

very much federal in nature as well.

It is important to note, however, that not all functions or 

undertakings of Band Councils are considered federal in 

nature. Recall that in the case of Westbank, the care 

facility fell under provincial jurisdiction despite the Band 

Council’s ownership and control of the operation. The 

home had broadened the scope of its admissions and 

thereby moved into the normal commercial milieu and 

provision of health care in the province. The primary focus 

of the operation did not establish “Indianness” and the 

Band Council’s involvement could not be characterized 

general governance of the Band, as authorized under the 

Indian Act. 

Aboriginal Rights and Jurisdiction 

The division of powers between the Parliament of Canada 

and the provincial legislatures in relation to Aboriginal rights 

is relevant in the context of labour relations. The Supreme 

Court of Canada has held that provincial governments 

are prevented from legislating directly in relation to 

Aboriginal rights (i.e. rights in involving land and those that 

encompass practices, customs and traditions). Aboriginal 

rights lie at the core of “Indianness” under s. 91(24) of the 

Constitution Act, and are within the exclusive legislative 

competence of the federal government. Nevertheless, 

laws of general application, including provincial labour 

legislation, may apply to Indians and Indian lands, unless 

the laws single out Indians for special treatment. In other 

words, an operation that involves the exercise of an 

Aboriginal right, such as the right to fish, may still be 

regulated by provincial labour legislation unless it can be 

established either that the legislation interferes with the 

right. 

In R. v. Sparrow 14 , the Court set out a framework for 

assessing whether legislation has the effect of interfering 

with an existing Aboriginal right at p. 411: 

First, is the limitation unreasonable? Secondly, does 

the regulation impose undue hardship? Thirdly, 

does the regulation deny to the holders of the right 

their preferred means of exercising that right? The 

onus of proving a prima facie infringement lies on 

the individual or group challenging the legislation. 

14 R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 (QL). 

15 Celtic Shipyards (1988) Ltd. V. Marine Workers’ Union, 94 C.L.L.C. 16068 (QL). 

16 Canada Labour Code, supra. 

17 Labour Relations Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 244. 

Page 6 

In Celtic Shipyards (1988) Ltd. V. Marine Workers’ Union, 15 

the Musqueam Indian Band alleged that the activities of 

its wholly owned subsidiary, Celtic Shipyards Ltd., involved 

the exercise of the Aboriginal right to fish. The Band 

argued that the shipyard’s labour relations were thus within 

primary federal jurisdiction over Indians and Lands 

Reserved for Indians. The B.C. Labour Relations Board 

held that the building and repairing of boats, as well as 

the provision of occupational skills training to aboriginal 

fishers, did not fall under the Aboriginal right to fish. Even 

if the exercise of an Aboriginal right had been established, 

the Board was not prepared to accept that provincial 

labour legislation infringed upon the right. 

Applying the functional test from the Four B case, the 

Board instead determined that the undertaking fell within 

provincial jurisdiction. The fact that the business was 

owned by First Nations individuals and employed a majority 

of First Nations employees did not make the enterprise 

particularly Indian; rather, it was an ordinary industrial 

activity. 

Labour Legislation 

Federal or Provincial Labour 

Legislation? 

Issues of constitutional jurisdiction over labour relations 

usually arise initially before the labour relations tribunal 

board which is asked to certify a Union as the bargaining 

agent for a group of employees. Thus, the first step in 

defining the relationship between the employer and 

employees and the rights associated, is to determine if 

federal or provincial law govern the relationship and the 

particular workplace. Although the Canada Labour Code 16 

and the Labour Relations Code 17 address many of the 

same aspects of the relationship, the requirements of the 

legislation are fundamentally different in many respects. 

It is important for the parties involved to be familiar with 

the rules under both pieces of legislation to ensure thatthe

certification and collective bargaining process are efficient 

and free of conflict. bent and free of conflict. 

Parties Defined Under the Codes 

Both federal and provincial labour legislation provides that 

every employee is free to join a trade union and to 

participate in its lawful activities. 18 Employees are thus 

legally entitled to join together and to seek representation 

by a trade union to have a collective voice in determining 

their wages and other terms and conditions of 

employment. The decision as to whether or not a group 

of employees wish to be represented by a trade union is 

entirely for those employees. Employers are prohibited 

from influencing or attempting to influence that decision. 

“Employee” means a person employed by an employer 

and includes dependent contractors. 19 The definition of 

dependant contractor has been interpreted more 

restrictively under the Canada Labour Code than under 

its provincial counterpart in B.C. Managers and persons 

employed in a confidential capacity are excluded from the 

definition of employee under both pieces of legislation. 

Under provincial jurisdiction in British Columbia, those with 

a special community of interest with management are not 

considered to be employees. They are thus prohibited 

from being included in a unit of employees to participate 

in collective bargaining. 

Every employer is free to join the employers’ organization 

of choice and to participate in its lawful activities. An 

employer is any person who employs one or more 

employees. 20 Identifying the true employer can be 

problematic, particularly in the context of First Nations’ 

operations where it is common for a Band Council to 

exert control over a corporation through which labour 

relations are carried out. In deciding who has fundamental 

control over employees, the federal and provincial Labour 

Boards will consider the following factors 21 : 

(a) Which party exercises direction and control over 

the employees performing work; 

18 Canada Labour Code, supra, s. 8; Labour Relations Code, supra, s. 4. 

19 Canada Labour Code, supra, s. 3(1); Labour Relations Code, supra, s. 1(1). 

20 Canada Labour Code, supra, s. 8; Labour Relations Code, supra, ss. 1(1) and 4. 

21 Celtic Shipyards (1988) Ltd. V. Marine Workers’ Union, 94 C.L.L.C. 16068 (QL). 

22 Canada Labour Code, supra, s.3; Labour Relations Code, supra, s. 1. 

23 Canada Labour Code, supra, s. 94(1) and (2); Labour Relations Code, supra, s. 6(1). 

24 Canada Labour Code, supra, s. 94(3); Labour Relations Code, supra, s. 6(3). 

25 Canada Labour Code, supra, s.24(4); Labour Relations Code, supra, s. 32(1). 

(b) Which party bears the burden of remuneration; 

(c) Which party imposes discipline on the employees; 

(d) Which party hires the employees; 

(e) Which party is authorized to dismiss the employees; 

(f) Which party is perceived to be the employer by the 

employees; and 

(g) Evidence of an intention to create the relationship 

of employer and employees. 

Page 7 

A trade union is defined under federal and provincial labour 

legislation as any organization of employees or any branch 

or local thereof whose purpose includes the regulation of 

relations between employers and employees. 22 A trade 

union could be an international, national, local, a council 

of unions or an in-house employee association. The most 

important characteristic of a trade union is that it must be 

independent from the employer and free from employer 

influence. If certified by the relevant Labour Board, a 

trade union has the exclusive right to represent employees 

in negotiating a collective agreement with the employer. 

Protection of the Right to Organize 

Once an organizing drive has begun, an employer is 

prohibited from doing anything which could interfere with 

the right of the employees to join a Union. In an effort to 

prevent management dominated unions, the legislation 

prohibits employer participation in the formation or 

administration of a trade union. 23 An employer is also 

prohibited from discharging, suspending, laying off, or 

otherwise disciplining an employee during a union 

organizing drive, except for proper cause. 24 Moreover, 

an employer cannot, without the permission of the relevant 

Board, change rates of pay or alter terms and conditions 

of employment while an application for certification is 

pending. 25 

A common form of interference is employer campaigning 

among employees against their exercise of the right to 

join a trade union. The federal and provincial legislation

includes rules regarding the extent to which an employer 

may communicate with employees regarding an organizing 

drive. Under the Canada Labour Code, an employer may 

not seek, by intimidation, threat or penalty of any kind, to 

compel a person to refrain from becoming or cease to be 

a member, officer or representative of a trade union. 26 

Denying, or threatening to deny pension rights, insurance 

plans or benefits to which the employee is entitled, is also 

contrary to the federal legislation. 27 

The B.C. Liberal Government recently broadened the 

scope of employer speech in an amendment to the Labour 

Relations Code. 28 Although the Board has yet to define 

the exact limits of employer speech under the 

amendment, it is clear that an employer must refrain from 

using coercion or intimidation of any kind that could 

reasonably have the effect of compelling or inducing a 

person to become or to refrain from becoming a member 

of a trade union. Employer misconduct may result in an 

order for automatic certification without a vote and the 

employees in the Bargaining Unit not having an opportunity 

to express their choice. 

Labour legislation also regulates actions of Unions. It is 

prohibited under federal and provincial legislation for a 

Union to attempt to persuade employees to become 

members at an employer’s place of business during the 

employee’s working hours without the permission of the 

employer or express permission from the relevant Board. 29 

Certification 

Under the Canada Labour Code, a Union may apply to 

the Industrial Relations Board to be certified as exclusive 

bargaining agent if it claims to have a majority of the unit’s 

employees as Union members. Such support is 

evidenced by Union membership cards. The Board may 

either certify a union that has over 50% of employee 

support or dismiss the application of a Union that has 

26 Canada Labour Code, supra, s.94(1) and (2). 

27 Canada Labour Code, supra, s.94(3). 

28 Bill 42, Labour Relations Amendment Act, 3d Sess., 37 th Parl., British Columbia, 2002. 


30 Canada Labour Code, supra, s.24. 

31 Canada Labour Code, supra, s.24.1. 

32 Labour Relations Code, supra, ss. 18(1) and 24(1). 


31 Canada Labour Code, supra, s.24.1. 



Page 8 

less than 35% support. The Canada Labour Code 

requires that the Board hold a representation vote if a 

Union has obtained between 35% and 50% support. 30 

Certification may be sought at any time if no collective 

agreement exists and where no Union has been certified 

to represent the proposed unit. Where a collective 

agreement is already in force, however, the Canada Labour 

Code dictates than an application for certification may 

only be filed with the Board during the “open period” of 

that collective agreement. The open period is typically 

the last three months of the collective agreement. If a 

Union is certified to represent a unit of employees and no 

agreement is in place, an application may not be made by 

another Union until one year after the original date of 

certification. 31 Such time restrictions are meant to ensure 

the stability of federal industrial relations. 

Under the B.C. Labour Relations Code, a Union may apply 

for certification if it has the support of 45% of the 

employees of the bargaining unit, as evidenced by 

membership cards. Unlike the federal legislation, the 

provincial legislation in British Columbia requires that a 

representation vote be taken within 10 days from the date 

the Board receives the application for certification. If less 

than 55% of employees in the unit cast ballots, the Board 

may direct another vote. 32 

Restrictions also exist under the Labour Relations Code 

as to when a Union may be certified. If a Union is certified, 

another Union may apply for certification as bargaining 

agent for the same unit of employees if six months have 

elapsed since the date of the original certification. If a 

collective agreement is already in force, a Union claiming 

to have the majority of support a unit of employees may 

apply to be certified during the seventh and eighth months 

in each year of the collective agreement, or any renewal 

or continuation of it. 33 Under both federal and provincial 

legislation, any previous certification order affecting the

parties is deemed to be revoked with a new certification 

order. 

Once a Union is certified as bargaining agent for a group 

of employees, an employer may not increase or decrease 

the rate of pay or alter a term of employment until four 

months have passed or a collective agreement is executed 

under provincial legislation, 34 or thirty days have passed 

or a collective agreement is executed under federal 

legislation. 35 

Collective Bargaining and Collective 

Agreements 

Following a certification order, a party to the collective 

agreement can require the other party to commence 

collective bargaining through written notice. The Canada 

Labour Code stipulates that where the notice to bargain 

has been given, the Union and employer must meet within 

20 days after the receipt of such notice. 36 The provincial 

legislation requires the parties begin collective bargaining 

within 10 days of receiving notice. 37 

Both labour codes stipulate that the parties have a duty 

to bargain in good faith once notice has been given, and 

must make every reasonable effort to reach an 

agreement. 38 In other words, the parties must not adopt 

an uncompromising bargaining position without 

reasonable justification, refuse to recognize the legitimacy 

of the other party or partake in surface bargaining. If an 

employer and bargaining agent reach an impasse and fail 

to conclude a first Collective Agreement, the relevant Board 

may assist the parties in negotiating or the settlement of 

the terms of their first agreement. 39 

There are certain provisions that must be included in and 

some characteristics that are common to all collective 

agreements, whether falling under federal or provincial 

34 Labour Relations Code, supra, s. 45(1). 

35 Canada Labour Code, supra, s. 24(4). 

36 Canada Labour Code, supra, s. 50. 

37 Labour Relations Code, supra, s. 47. 


39 Canada Labour Code, supra, s. 80; Labour Relations Code, supra, s. 55. 




43 Labour Relations Code, supra, s. 84(1). 

Page 9 

legislation. A Collective Agreement is binding on every 

employee, bargaining agent and employer. 40 A collective 

agreement must have a minimum term of one year from 

the date on which it comes into force. 41 The Collective 

Agreement cannot be terminated earlier without the 

relevant Board’s consent. The Collective Agreement must 

be in writing and include a mechanism for resolving 

disputes, such as arbitration, without resorting to a strike 

or lockout. 42 The Labour Relations Code also stipulates 

that the agreement must contain a clause prohibiting 

dismissal or discipline except for just and reasonable 

cause. 43 

Aboriginal 

Self-Government 

The General Approach to Aboriginal 

Self-Government 

A discussion regarding jurisdiction over labour relations 

and First Nations’ operations would be incomplete without 

addressing the Aboriginal right to self-government. In its 

policy guide entitled The Government of Canada’s 

Approach to Implementation of the Inherent Right and 

the Negotiation of Aboriginal Self-Government, 44 the 

federal government provides: 

The Government of Canada recognizes the inherent 

right of self-government as an existing Aboriginal 

right under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. 

. . Recognition of the inherent right is based on the 

view that the Aboriginal peoples of Canada have the 

right to govern themselves in relation to matters that 

are internal to their communities, integral to their 

unique cultures, identities, traditions, languages and 

institutions, and with respect to their special 

relationship to their land and their resources. 

44 Federal Policy Guide: The Government of Canada’s Approach to Implementation of the Inherent Right and Negotiation of Aboriginal Self-Government, 

online: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/pub/sg/plcy_e.html (date accessed: 1 August 2002), p. 3.

How has the commitment to Aboriginal self-government 

manifested itself in government policies and Court 

decisions with respect to competence over labour 

relations? Although Labour Boards and Courts have yet 

to break new ground for First Nations, there is a growing 

recognition that traditional labour legislation may not be 

wholly appropriate or adept at handling the concerns 

unique to First Nations communities. 

A thorough review of federal labour legislation was 

conducted in 1996 by the “Sims Task Force.” The 

resulting report, entitled Seeking a Balance: Review of Part 

I of the Canada Labour Code, 45 examined First Nations’ 

labour relations and made the following recommendations 

at p. 55: 

In proceedings before the Board, and in the 

discussion of labour relations issues that affect First 

Nations, special recognition should be given to the 

role of First Nations as employers and as entities 

with responsibility for governance. 

A dialogue should be encouraged between First 

Nations and organized labour over the form of First 

Nations labour relations, particularly as this may be 

affected by the emergence of new federal-provincial 

First Nations agreements concerning selfgovernment. 

In Listuguj Mi-gmaq First Nation Council, 46 the Canadian 

Industrial Relations Board noted the comments made in 

the Sims Task Force report and stated that it fully endorsed 

the recommendations that were made. In that case, the 

Union brought an unfair labour practice complaint against 

the Employer Band Council for altering terms and 

conditions of employment in contravention of the Canada 

Labour Code. 47 The employer contended that the Board 

should interpret and apply the Code in such a way so as 

to distinguish the actions of a Band Council from such 

action by a private commercial corporation. 

The Board held that although it would take into account 

the special circumstances and responsibilities of a Band 

Council, the standards of the Canada Labour Code must 

Page 10 

be respected. Thus, despite the Board’s support of the 

Sims Task Force report, it resolved the issue using 

traditional federal labour legislation. 

In Red Bank First Nation (Re), 48 the Canada Industrial 

Relations Board was asked to review its decision to certify 

a Union as bargaining agent for a unit of Band Council 

employees. The Band Council had passed By-law no. 3 

respecting rules and procedures for personnel, including 

hours of work, holidays, conduct of employees, 

procedures for hiring, suspensions and dismissals, salaries 

and leaves, travel and staff meetings. The Council enacted 

By-law no. 3 pursuant to section 81(1)(q) of the Indian 

Act which provides that Bands may make by-laws with 

respect to any matter arising out of or ancillary to the 

exercise of powers under the section. 

The Band Council felt that its by-law set rules and 

standards that were sensitive to First Nations’ needs and 

allowed the Council to play a significant role in labour 

relations. In the opinion of the Council, the by-law 

“reflected uniquely ‘Indian’ aspects of employer-employee 

relations at Red Band First Nation and better facilitated 

traditional Mi’kmaq Tribal methods of dispute resolution 

than the more adversarial provisions of the Canada 

Labour Code.” 49 It was argued that By-law no. 3 

superceded the Canada Labour Code and that it was, in 

effect, the instrument through which the labour relations 

of the Band and its employees should be regulated. 

The Canada Industrial Relations Board did not determine 

whether section 81(1) of the Indian Act granted a Band 

Council the power to regulate labour relations of staff 

members. The Board was, however, of the view that the 

by-law could not preclude the application of federal labour 

legislation. The Board reasoned at page 6 that “in light of 

Canada’s commitment both nationally and internationally 

to promote free collective bargaining . . . clear and 

unequivocal statutory language would be needed to 

support any regulatory derogation from the basic right of 

45 Canada, Seeking a Balance: Review of Part I of the Canada Labour Code, (Ottawa: Sims Task Force, 1996) (Chair: Andrew Sims, Q.C.), cited in Listuguj 

Mi-gmaq First Nation Council, [2000] C.I.R.B.C. No. 20. 

46 Listuguj Mi-gmaq First Nation Council, [2000] C.I.R.B.C. No. 20. 

47 Canada Labour Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. L-2. 

48 Red Bank First Nation (Re), [1999] C.I.R.B. No. 5 (QL). 

49 Red Bank First Nation (Re), supra, p. 5.

association granted by Part I of the Canada Labour Code.” 

It further offered at page 8: 

While a band council may decide upon the terms 

and conditions of employment that will govern its 

employees, the liberty to impose the working 

conditions it deems appropriate ceases when its 

employees decide to opt for collective bargaining. 

In such circumstances, the rules contained in Part I 

of the Canada Labour Code then become 

applicable, as in the case of any other employer that 

falls under federal jurisdiction. 

A review of the Canadian Human Rights Act 50 was also 

conducted in June of 2000. The Canadian Human Rights 

Act is applicable to employment relations in which a 

scheme for collective bargaining is not in place. The 

recommendations regarding Aboriginal self-government 

were outlined on page 132 of the review panel’s report: 

The Panel believes something more should be done 

in order to ensure a greater say in the human rights 

rules that apply to Aboriginal self-governments. This 

would be consistent with the principle of selfgovernment. 

We think the [Canadian Human Rights Act] should 

provide that Aboriginal governments, locally or 

regionally or nationally, could create their own human 

rights law, in keeping with Aboriginal values. The 

federal and Aboriginal governments could negotiate 

the conditions in which the Aboriginal human rights 

laws take over from the Act and the basic standards 

that Aboriginal legislation should meet. 

In Ermineskin Cree Nation v. Canada, 51 the Ermineskin 

Band Council challenged the jurisdiction of the Canadian 

Human Rights Tribunal to hear an employee’s complaint 

alleging discrimination by the Council on the basis of 

physical disability. The Council argued that federal human 

rights legislation was inapplicable to its employment 

relations because of the Aboriginal right of 

self-government. It further contended that the Tribunal 

lacked the jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of 

its enabling legislation. The Court ordered a stay of the 

proceedings before the Tribunal, as it found that the 

determination of the constitutional question was indeed a 

serious one. 

50 Canada Human Rights Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. H-6. 

51 Ermineskin Cree Nation v. Canada, [1999] A.J. No. 1209 (Q.B.) (QL). 

52 Ermineskin Cree Nation v. Canada, [2001] A.J. No. 1187 (Q.B.) (QL). 

53 Manitoba Teachers’ Society v. For Alexander Indian Band et al, [1984] 1 F.C. 1109 (QL). 

Page 11 

The jurisdictional issue was consequently tried two years 

later. 52 This time, the Court determined that the Tribunal 

did have the jurisdiction to decide whether the Canadian 

Human Rights Act applied to the Ermineskin Band 

Council. It is settled law that a Tribunal may hear questions 

of a complex constitutional nature. Nevertheless, it was 

decided that a Court was better suited to hear the 

arguments of the Band Council because of some of the 

problems associated with a Tribunal’s handling of complex 

jurisdictional questions. The case is still pending and a 

decision has not yet been rendered as to whether federal 

legislation applies to the Band or if a third level of 

government, namely the Ermineskin Band Council, can 

assume jurisdiction over its own employment standards. 

Thus, it remains to be seen if the Task Force’s 

recommendations regarding Aboriginal self-government 

will become a reality in the near future. 

What is clear at present is that if a unit of employees is 

certified as one appropriate for collective bargaining, an 

employer must respect the decisions and orders of the 

relevant Labour Board regarding relations between the 

employees and employer. In Manitoba Teachers’ Society 

v. Fort Alexander Indian Band et al, 53 the Band Council, 

its Chief and members were fined in excess of $25,000 

for refusing to appear at a Board hearing regarding 

allegations of coercion and intimidation of a unit of certified 

employees. Such acts, if proven, were in contravention 

of provisions of the Canada Labour Relations Code. The 

Council contended that although the unit of teachers had 

been certified by the Board, the council was immune from 

the application of the Canada Labour Code due to the 

principles of self-determination. The Court was unyielding 

in its decision to uphold the Code as applicable to the 

Council at p. 6: 

This institution cannot tolerate disobedience, 

particularly when it comes to the protection of the 

individual teachers, collective bargaining and 

freedom of association . . . If the Council of the Fort 

Alexander Indian Band wishes to challenge the 

constitutionality of the Canada Labour Relations 

Board or of this Court, the proper procedure is to 

appear, express its views, bring forth its challenges 

and use all the legal means that are available and at 

its disposal.

Treaty Negotiations in British 

Columbia 

In the years ahead, Canada and British Columbia anticipate 

more than fifty agreements to be signed with First Nation 

communities defining both Aboriginal resource rights and 

self-government powers. The implementation of such 

agreements will undoubtedly affect the governance of 

labour relations of First Nations’ operations in the province. 

But to what extent? 

In its “Federal Policy Guide,” the Government of Canada 

outlined the scope of jurisdiction or authority that Aboriginal 

governments and institutions will possess under future 

treaties. First Nations will gain jurisdiction over matters 

such as culture, language, and education. Some areas, 

however, may “go beyond matters that are integral to 

Aboriginal culture or that are strictly internal to an Aboriginal 

group. To the extent that the federal government has 

jurisdiction in these areas, it is prepared to negotiate some 

measure of Aboriginal jurisdiction or authority.” 54 One area 

in which the government is prepared to grant First Nations 

a limited amount of control is labour relations. 

The Nisga’a Final Agreement Act 55 constitutes the first 

modern-day treaty in British Columbia. The Agreement 

includes provisions regarding fisheries, lands and 

resources, the environment, Nisga’a government and 

taxation. The Treaty also provides that all federal and 

provincial laws of general application will continue to apply 

to the Nisga’a, unless the treaty dictates otherwise. 

Certain sections of the Agreement relate specifically to 

labour relations. Sections 63-65 at Chapter 11 of the 

Nisga’a Final Agreement state: 

63. Nisga’a Lisims Government may make laws 

prescribing the aspects of Nisga’a culture, including 

aspects such as cultural leave from employment, 

to be accommodated in accordance with federal 

and provincial laws of general application by 

employers and employees’ organizations that have 

the duty to accommodate employees under those 

federal and provincial laws. 

64. If, in any industrial relations matter or industrial 

relations proceeding involving individuals employed 

Page 12 

on Nisga’a Lands, other than a matter or 

proceeding arising from a collective agreement, an 

issue arises in respect of this Agreement or Nisga’a 

culture, the matter or proceeding will not be 

concluded until notice have been served on 

Nisga’a Lisims Government. 

65. In any industrial relations matter or industrial 

relations proceeding to which paragraph 64 

applies, Nisga’a Lisims Government may make 

representations concerning this Agreement or the 

effect of the matter or proceeding on Nisga’a 

culture. 

Following the ratification of the Treaty, the British Columbia 

Labour Relations Board issued a Practice Guideline, 56 

explaining the manner in which the Board would apply 

the relevant provisions of the Nisga’a agreement. The 

Board agreed to give notice to the Nisga’a Lisims 

Government if any application made under the Labour 

Relations Code were to concern operations involving the 

Band, and to grant them the opportunity to make 

presentations with regard to the Final Agreement or 

Nisga’a culture. 

Conclusion 

Managing employees in Aboriginal communities begins 

with a careful consideration of the complex jurisdictional 

issues that exist by virtue of the Canadian Constitution 

and the right to self-government. 

Although the existing jurisprudence provides some 

guidance in determining questions of jurisdiction, the 

developing nature of aboriginal business and enterprise 

and the recognition of self-government, means that the 

law in this area is not settled. The challenge for aboriginal 

employers is to be aware of the jurisdictional issues and 

the developing constitutional law as to whether aboriginal 

government includes jurisdiction over labour relations and 

employment. 

54 Federal Policy Guide: The Government of Canada’s Approach to Implementation of the Inherent Right and Negotiation of Aboriginal Self-Government, 

55 Nisga’a Final Agreement Act, S.B.C. 1999, C.2. supra, p. 6. 

For further Information, please contact: 

 

 

E-mail: carman.overholt@fmc-law.com 

56 Statement of Practise in Respect of Nisga’a Final Agreement, online: B.C. Labour Relations Board http://lrb.bc.ca/guidelines/nisga’a.htm 

(date accessed: 1 August 2002).

Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP 

National Labour and Employment Law Group 

Fraser Milner Casgrain is a business law firm with over 500 lawyers including approximately 40 lawyers 

who practice exclusively in the labour and employment law area. For more information about our firm and 

our lawyers, please visit our website at www.fmc-law.com. 

The members of our national Labour and Employment Law Group are as follows: 

Vancouver 

Carman Overholt (604) 622-5165 carman.overholt@fmc-law.com 

Gary Clarke (604) 443-7133 gary.clarke@fmc-law.com 

Jeevyn Dhaliwal (604) 443-7138 jeevyn.dhaliwal@fmc-law.com 

Calagry 

Michael Ford (403) 268-7172 michael.ford@fmc-law.com 

Barabara Johnston (403) 268-3030 barbara.johnston@fmc-law.com 

Edmonton 

Fausto Franceschi 780) 423-7348 fausto.franceschi@fmc-law.com 

Peter Jasper (780) 970-5217 peter.jasper@fmc-law.com 

Donald Kruk (780) 423-7310 donald.kruk@fmc-law.com 

Tom Wakeling (780) 423-7342 tom.wakeling@fmc-law.com 

Joe Hunder (780) 423-7354 joe.hunder@fmc-law.com 

Toronto 

Paul Baston (416) 863-4622 paul.baston@fmc-law.com 

Lisa Goodfellow (416) 863-4726 lisa.goodfellow@fmc-law.com 

Michael Horan (416) 862-6773 micheal.horan@fmc-law.com 

Elizabeth Keenan (416) 862-3466 elizabeth.keenan@fmc-law.com 

Jamie Knight (416) 863-4560 jamie.knight@fmc-law.com 

Anneli LeGault (416) 863-4450 anneli.legault@fmc-law.com 

Audrey Mak (416) 361-2322 audrey.mak@fmc-law.com 

Catherine Osborne (416) 862-3468 catherine.osborne@fmc-law.com 

Ken Peel (416) 863-4396 ken.peel@fmc-law.com 

Mary Picard (416) 863-4469 mary.picard@fmc-law.com 

Mark Rowbotham (416) 367-6757 david.rowbotham@fmc-law.com 

Kritsin Taylor (416) 863-4612 kristin.taylor@fmc-law.com 

Janice Clugston (416) 361-2355 janice.clugston@fmc-law.com 

Nadine Cote (416) 863-4477 nadine.cote@fmc-law.com 

Rebecca Finn (416) 863-4704 rebecca.finn@fmc-law.com 

Pamela Leiper (416) 863-4596 pamela.leiper@fmc-law.com 

Blair McCreadie (416) 863-4532 blair.mccreadie@fmc-law.com 

Adrian Miedema (416) 863-4678 adrian.miedema@fmc-law.com 

Mark Tector (416) 367-6779 mark.tector@fmc-law.com 

Alexandra Tinmouth (416) 863-4650 alexandra.tinmouth@fmc-law.com 

Jordan Winch (416) 863-4761 jordan.winch@fmc-law.com 

Montreal 

Jean Bazin (514) 878-8804 jean.bazin@fmc-law.com 

Guy Lavoie (514) 878-8842 guy.lavoie@fmc-law.com 

Christian Letourneau (514) 878-8860 christian.letourneau@fmc-law.com 

Denis Manzo (514) 878-8829 denis.manzo@fmc-law.com 

Michel Towner (514) 878-8820 michel.towner@fmc-law.com 

Yves Turgeon (514) 878-8839 yves.turgeon@fmc-law.com 

Noemie Lavoie (514) 878-5858 noemie.lavoie@fmc-law.com 

Genevieve Pharand (514) 878-5808 genevieve.pharand@fmc-law.com 

Marie-Noel Massicottel (514) 878-8821 marrie-noel.massicottel@fmc-law.com 

Ottawa 

Catherine Coulter (613) 783-9660 cathrine.coulter@fmc-law.com 

Sheri Farahani (613) 783-9621 sheri.farahani@fmc-law.com 

Sean Kelly (613) 783-9654 sean.kelly@fmc-law.com

Jurisdictional Issues In The Aboriginal Workplace

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?