Country Reports on Terrorism 2012
Country Reports on Terrorism 2012
Country Reports on Terrorism 2012
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In December, the Supreme Court of Kosovo upheld the guilty verdict of Amir Sopa, who was<br />
sentenced in 2011 to 10 years’ impris<strong>on</strong>ment <strong>on</strong> two charges of terrorism. Sopa was found guilty<br />
of firing a rocket-propelled grenade at the office of the District Court of Pristina in 2003 and<br />
sending death threats to the former mayor of Pristina <strong>on</strong> behalf of the Albanian Nati<strong>on</strong>al Army, a<br />
violent extremist organizati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Also in December, the Government of Kosovo extradited Shukri Aliu to Maced<strong>on</strong>ia, where he<br />
was in pretrial detenti<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> terrorism-related charges at year’s end. (Aliu was born in Kosovo<br />
and also holds Maced<strong>on</strong>ian citizenship.) In 2011, Maced<strong>on</strong>ia c<strong>on</strong>victed Aliu in absentia of<br />
aggravated theft, but he is also believed to have been involved in other criminal acts in<br />
Maced<strong>on</strong>ia and to have ties to terrorist organizati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
Countering Terrorist Finance: Kosovo is not a member of a Financial Acti<strong>on</strong> Task Force-style<br />
regi<strong>on</strong>al body. In December, the Kosovo Assembly c<strong>on</strong>sidered revisi<strong>on</strong>s to the Law <strong>on</strong> the<br />
Preventi<strong>on</strong> of M<strong>on</strong>ey Laundering and Terrorist Financing, which would strengthen legislati<strong>on</strong><br />
passed in 2010. The amendments, if passed, would help Kosovo fully implement internati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
anti-m<strong>on</strong>ey laundering and counterterrorist finance standards, create enforcement mechanisms<br />
for the examinati<strong>on</strong> of reporting entities, and more narrowly define terrorist financing.<br />
In order to prevent m<strong>on</strong>ey laundering, terrorist financing, and fraud, the Central Bank of Kosovo<br />
(CBK) would benefit greatly from obtaining a code from the Society for Worldwide Interbank<br />
Financial Telecommunicati<strong>on</strong> (SWIFT). This code would facilitate the CBK’s m<strong>on</strong>itoring of<br />
cross-border banking operati<strong>on</strong>s and adherence to internati<strong>on</strong>al oversight requirements. Without<br />
this SWIFT code, Kosovo’s access to informati<strong>on</strong> about the nature of cross-border financial<br />
transacti<strong>on</strong>s is limited, and thus Kosovo is seriously hampered in its efforts to prevent terrorist<br />
financing, m<strong>on</strong>ey laundering, and other types of fraud and corrupti<strong>on</strong>. The Central Bank of<br />
Kosovo has sought to join the SWIFT system since 2004.<br />
For further informati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> m<strong>on</strong>ey laundering and financial crimes, we refer you to the 2013<br />
Internati<strong>on</strong>al Narcotics C<strong>on</strong>trol Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, M<strong>on</strong>ey Laundering and<br />
Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.<br />
THE NETHERLANDS<br />
Overview: The Netherlands c<strong>on</strong>tinued to resp<strong>on</strong>d effectively to the global terrorist threat in the<br />
areas of border and transportati<strong>on</strong> security, terrorist financing, and bilateral counterterrorism<br />
cooperati<strong>on</strong>. Cooperati<strong>on</strong> with U.S. law enforcement remained excellent. In its December<br />
quarterly terrorism threat analysis, the Dutch Nati<strong>on</strong>al Coordinator for Counterterrorism and<br />
Security (NCTV) maintained the nati<strong>on</strong>al threat level at “limited,” meaning chances of an attack<br />
in the Netherlands or against Dutch interests were relatively small but could not be ruled out<br />
entirely. The threat against the Netherlands is mainly from violent Islamist extremists, though the<br />
attenti<strong>on</strong> of the fragmented and leaderless network is mostly focused <strong>on</strong> overseas c<strong>on</strong>flict areas.<br />
Individuals traveling to those areas to fight are the main focus for Dutch authorities, but domestic<br />
l<strong>on</strong>e wolves also appeared <strong>on</strong> the radar. Resilience by the Dutch populati<strong>on</strong> to terrorism<br />
c<strong>on</strong>tinued to be high and there was a trend towards less radicalizati<strong>on</strong> and alienati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
In <strong>2012</strong>, the NCTV completed its two year internal reorganizati<strong>on</strong> process; nati<strong>on</strong>al security,<br />
counterterrorism, and cyber security are now under the NCTV umbrella.<br />
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