Country Reports on Terrorism 2012
Country Reports on Terrorism 2012 Country Reports on Terrorism 2012
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Philippines coordinated with U.S. law enforcement authorities, especially regarding U.S. fugitives and suspected terrorists. An under-resourced and understaffed law enforcement and justice system coupled with widespread official corruption, however, resulted in limited domestic investigations, unexecuted arrest warrants, few prosecutions, and lengthy trials of cases. A petition filed in 2010 by the Philippine Department of Justice with the Regional Trial Court in Basilan for the proscription of the ASG as a terrorist group and 202 identified associates as terrorists, was pending action at year’s end. On February 2, the AFP launched an operation on Jolo Island that reportedly killed ASG commander Umbra Jumdail (aka Dr. Abu) and 14 other ASG members. On May 23, Philippine National Police Officer Arnold Mayo was charged with murder. Witnesses reportedly identified him as planting a bomb that exploded inside a commuter bus on a major highway in Makati City and killed five passengers in January 2011. On June 21, Alawie Pasihul was arrested in Zamboanga City on suspicion of being part of an ASG group that kidnapped American citizens Martin and Gracia Burnham and Guillermo Sobero in May 2001. (Fourteen other ASG members were convicted in 2007 and sentenced to life imprisonment for their participation in the kidnapping that resulted in the deaths of Sobero, Martin Burnham, and Philippine nurse Ediborah Yap.) In September, due to a technical issue, a regional trial court in Manila dismissed the extradition case against an ASG leader wanted in the United States to stand trial on criminal hostage-taking charges in the 1993 kidnapping of U.S. national Charles Walton. On December 14, Mohammad Noor Fikrie bin Abdul Kahar, a suspected Malaysian JI member, was killed in Davao by police after he threatened to detonate an explosive device in his backpack. The Philippines continued to improve the security of its passports. Beginning in 2007, the Philippines started to issue machine readable passports. Three million such passports remained in circulation at year’s end, the last of which will expire in 2013. In August 2009, the Philippines started to produce "e-passports" containing a biometric chip. Six million Philippine passports in circulation are e-passports, accounting for 65 percent of all valid passports, according to the Philippines Passport Office. The Philippines remained an important partner nation in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program, which provided tactical and investigative training to support the transition in the southern Philippines from military to civilian counterterrorism authority. Countering Terrorist Finance: The Philippines is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. Republic Act No. 10168, the Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act of 2012, was signed into law June 18 and took effect July 5. The law made terrorist financing a stand-alone crime in line with APG/FATF recommendations and specifically authorizes the Anti-Money Laundering Council to issue an ex parte order to freeze without delay property/funds related to the financing of terrorism or acts of terrorism, including the property/funds of individuals and entities on the UNSCs 1267/1989 and 1988 consolidated lists. 52
Republic Act No. 10167, which amended the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, was signed into law June 18 and took effect July 6. It allows the Anti-Money Laundering Council to inquire into bank accounts based on an ex parte application, without the depositor’s knowledge for a limited period of time, and allows additional courts other than the Court of Appeals to issue asset freeze orders. There is no single supervisory authority responsible for entities in the non-profit sector; coordination is insufficient. Monitoring is weak due to insufficient coordination and resources of non-profit organization regulatory bodies. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, we refer you to the 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm. Regional and International Cooperation: The Philippines participated in the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) and supported the ADMM-Plus Experts’ Working Group on Counterterrorism that met in Washington in April. Through U.S.-sponsored counterterrorism training, the PNP developed contacts with law enforcement agencies in Indonesia and Malaysia. Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: The Philippine government continued its counter-radicalization program: Payapa at Masaganang Pamayanan or PAMANA (Resilient Communities in Conflict Affected Communities). In November, the Philippines hosted the second meeting of the Global Counterterrorism Forum Southeast Asia Working Group, which focused on youth radicalization. Experts from around the region and world gathered to share best practices and experiences in countering youth radicalization. SINGAPORE Overview: In 2012, Singapore’s bilateral and multilateral engagement on counterterrorism intelligence and law enforcement cooperation was inconsistent and marked by a transactional mindset that impeded the development of broad, deep, and predictable agency-to-agency relationships. While some agencies have had success from time to time, Singapore appeared to provide selective cooperation dependent upon the issue. As of December, Singapore had detained 16 terrorist suspects. Detainees included members of Jemaah Islamiya (JI), who had plotted to carry out attacks in Singapore in the past, and members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Two persons with links to terrorist groups were newly detained in 2012. In 2012, Singapore released 23 persons on Restriction Orders (RO) and one on Suspension Direction (SD). Detainees released on ROs and SDs were monitored by the Singapore authorities and required to report to authorities on a regular basis. Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Singapore used its Internal Security Act (ISA) to arrest and detain suspected terrorists without trial. The ISA authorizes the Minister for Home Affairs (MHA), with the consent of the president, to order detention without judicial review if it is determined that a person poses a threat to national security. The initial detention may be for up to two years, and the MHA may renew the detention for an unlimited number of additional periods up to two years at a time with the president’s consent. 53
- Page 1 and 2: Country Re
- Page 3 and 4: Chapter 5. Terrorist Safe Havens (U
- Page 5 and 6: Chapter 1. Strategic Assessment The
- Page 7 and 8: While terrorism from non-state acto
- Page 9 and 10: training courses in Algeria and Mor
- Page 11 and 12: Countering Radicalization and Viole
- Page 13 and 14: Legislation, Law Enforcement, and B
- Page 15 and 16: emained an active security threat t
- Page 17 and 18: youth in positive activities. In ad
- Page 19 and 20: Legislation, Law Enforcement, and B
- Page 21 and 22: Countering Terrorist Finance: Kenya
- Page 23 and 24: (CEMOC), based in Tamanrasset, Alge
- Page 25 and 26: On September 24, Arab Maghreb Union
- Page 27 and 28: widespread destruction of property
- Page 29 and 30: While Nigeria regularly froze the a
- Page 31 and 32: DRC to encourage the FDLR and other
- Page 33 and 34: On April 4, a bombing of the nation
- Page 35 and 36: etween some South Africa government
- Page 37 and 38: Emrah Erdogan, in Dar es Salaam sug
- Page 39 and 40: (DRC); and one defunct Ugandan rebe
- Page 41 and 42: Legislation, Law Enforcement, and B
- Page 43 and 44: enforcement officers attended U.S.-
- Page 45 and 46: February, the Supreme Court rejecte
- Page 47 and 48: 1980s. Despite two rounds of DPRK-J
- Page 49 and 50: cooperated closely with the interna
- Page 51: curfews and limits on their travel
- Page 55 and 56: and was awaiting extradition to Tha
- Page 57 and 58: countries signed or ratified agreem
- Page 59 and 60: the confiscation of assault rifles,
- Page 61 and 62: On June 25, six members of the so-c
- Page 63 and 64: possession of weapons. They were se
- Page 65 and 66: agreements; and lacked the legal an
- Page 67 and 68: Prevention constitutes a key elemen
- Page 69 and 70: powers to security services for the
- Page 71 and 72: attempted murder of a U.S. consul i
- Page 73 and 74: 2012 Terrorist Incidents: The year
- Page 75 and 76: of South America against Money Laun
- Page 77 and 78: DHS/ICE provided training to Hellen
- Page 79 and 80: On January 24, an individual was se
- Page 81 and 82: On March 27, Venice prosecutors ord
- Page 83 and 84: In December, the Supreme Court of K
- Page 85 and 86: United States admissible, which was
- Page 87 and 88: Legislation, Law Enforcement, and B
- Page 89 and 90: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FB
- Page 91 and 92: For further information on money la
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- Page 95 and 96: Additional information on arrests o
- Page 97 and 98: Swedish citizen Paul Mardirossian,
- Page 99 and 100: On May 25, a policeman was killed a
- Page 101 and 102: Regional and International Cooperat
Republic Act No. 10167, which amended the Anti-M<strong>on</strong>ey Laundering Act of 2001, was signed<br />
into law June 18 and took effect July 6. It allows the Anti-M<strong>on</strong>ey Laundering Council to inquire<br />
into bank accounts based <strong>on</strong> an ex parte applicati<strong>on</strong>, without the depositor’s knowledge for a<br />
limited period of time, and allows additi<strong>on</strong>al courts other than the Court of Appeals to issue asset<br />
freeze orders.<br />
There is no single supervisory authority resp<strong>on</strong>sible for entities in the n<strong>on</strong>-profit sector;<br />
coordinati<strong>on</strong> is insufficient. M<strong>on</strong>itoring is weak due to insufficient coordinati<strong>on</strong> and resources of<br />
n<strong>on</strong>-profit organizati<strong>on</strong> regulatory bodies.<br />
For further informati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> m<strong>on</strong>ey laundering and financial crimes, we refer you to the 2013<br />
Internati<strong>on</strong>al Narcotics C<strong>on</strong>trol Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, M<strong>on</strong>ey Laundering and<br />
Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.<br />
Regi<strong>on</strong>al and Internati<strong>on</strong>al Cooperati<strong>on</strong>: The Philippines participated in the ASEAN Defense<br />
Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) and supported the ADMM-Plus Experts’ Working Group<br />
<strong>on</strong> Counterterrorism that met in Washingt<strong>on</strong> in April. Through U.S.-sp<strong>on</strong>sored counterterrorism<br />
training, the PNP developed c<strong>on</strong>tacts with law enforcement agencies in Ind<strong>on</strong>esia and Malaysia.<br />
Countering Radicalizati<strong>on</strong> and Violent Extremism: The Philippine government c<strong>on</strong>tinued its<br />
counter-radicalizati<strong>on</strong> program: Payapa at Masaganang Pamayanan or PAMANA (Resilient<br />
Communities in C<strong>on</strong>flict Affected Communities). In November, the Philippines hosted the<br />
sec<strong>on</strong>d meeting of the Global Counterterrorism Forum Southeast Asia Working Group, which<br />
focused <strong>on</strong> youth radicalizati<strong>on</strong>. Experts from around the regi<strong>on</strong> and world gathered to share best<br />
practices and experiences in countering youth radicalizati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
SINGAPORE<br />
Overview: In <strong>2012</strong>, Singapore’s bilateral and multilateral engagement <strong>on</strong> counterterrorism<br />
intelligence and law enforcement cooperati<strong>on</strong> was inc<strong>on</strong>sistent and marked by a transacti<strong>on</strong>al<br />
mindset that impeded the development of broad, deep, and predictable agency-to-agency<br />
relati<strong>on</strong>ships. While some agencies have had success from time to time, Singapore appeared to<br />
provide selective cooperati<strong>on</strong> dependent up<strong>on</strong> the issue.<br />
As of December, Singapore had detained 16 terrorist suspects. Detainees included members of<br />
Jemaah Islamiya (JI), who had plotted to carry out attacks in Singapore in the past, and members<br />
of the Moro Islamic Liberati<strong>on</strong> Fr<strong>on</strong>t. Two pers<strong>on</strong>s with links to terrorist groups were newly<br />
detained in <strong>2012</strong>. In <strong>2012</strong>, Singapore released 23 pers<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong> Restricti<strong>on</strong> Orders (RO) and <strong>on</strong>e <strong>on</strong><br />
Suspensi<strong>on</strong> Directi<strong>on</strong> (SD). Detainees released <strong>on</strong> ROs and SDs were m<strong>on</strong>itored by the<br />
Singapore authorities and required to report to authorities <strong>on</strong> a regular basis.<br />
Legislati<strong>on</strong>, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Singapore used its Internal Security Act<br />
(ISA) to arrest and detain suspected terrorists without trial. The ISA authorizes the Minister for<br />
Home Affairs (MHA), with the c<strong>on</strong>sent of the president, to order detenti<strong>on</strong> without judicial<br />
review if it is determined that a pers<strong>on</strong> poses a threat to nati<strong>on</strong>al security. The initial detenti<strong>on</strong><br />
may be for up to two years, and the MHA may renew the detenti<strong>on</strong> for an unlimited number of<br />
additi<strong>on</strong>al periods up to two years at a time with the president’s c<strong>on</strong>sent.<br />
53