Country Reports on Terrorism 2012

Country Reports on Terrorism 2012 Country Reports on Terrorism 2012

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Biological Weapons Convention Inter-Sessional Work Program: A work program was developed at the December 2011 Five-Year Review Conference to restructure work for the next five years to include: Standing agenda items on strengthening national implementation measures, which are critical to nonproliferation, promoting public health, and combating bioterrorism; Identifying and responding to relevant developments in science and technology and steps to guard against the misuse of science; and Promoting greater cooperation and assistance, particularly in countering and responding to outbreaks of infectious disease. 204

Chapter 5 Terrorist Safe Havens (Update to 7120 Report) Terrorist safe havens described in this report include ungoverned, under-governed, or illgoverned physical areas where terrorists are able to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, transit, and operate in relative security because of inadequate governance capacity, political will, or both. AFRICA TERRORIST SAFE HAVENS Somalia. In 2012, many areas of Somalia remained a safe haven for terrorists, although fewer areas than in 2011. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and its successor, the Federal Government of Somalia, with the assistance of the AU Mission in Somalia, AU member states, and allied Somali militia forces, secured areas neighboring Mogadishu and drove al-Shabaab out of many of its strongholds in south-central Somalia. Most notably, the forces gained control of the port city of Kismayo on September 28. Al-Shabaab continued to control large sections of rural areas in the middle and lower Jubba regions, however, as well as the Bay and Bakol regions. Al-Shabaab also augmented its presence in northern Somalia along the Golis Mountains and within Puntland’s larger urban areas. Additionally, Somalia’s long unguarded coastline, porous borders, and proximity to the Arabian Peninsula allowed foreign fighters and al-Shabaab members to transit around the region without detection. Areas under al-Shabaab control provided a permissive environment for al-Shabaab and al-Qa’ida operatives to conduct training and terrorist planning with other sympathetic violent extremists, including foreign fighters. The capability of the TFG through August, the Government of Somalia from September on, and other Somali local and regional authorities to prevent and preempt al-Shabaab terrorist attacks remained limited. The TFG and its successor, the Federal Government of Somalia, cooperated with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. According to independent sources and NGOs engaged in demining activities on the ground, there was little cause for concern for the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Somalia. The Trans-Sahara. The primary terrorist threat in this region was al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Though its leadership remained primarily based in northeastern Algeria, AQIM factions also operated from a safe haven in northern Mali, from which it launched kidnap for ransom operations, collected arms in the wake of the Libyan Revolution from that country, and attempted to expand its safe haven but was pushed back by Algeria, Mauritania, and Niger. Mali. In 2012, the Tuareg Rebellion, aided by returning mercenary fighters and arms proliferation stemming from the Libyan Revolution, was followed by the arrival of violent extremist and terrorist groups such as al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), in northern Mali. The rebel groups, aided by violent extremists in some cases, took advantage of the political chaos in Bamako 205

Chapter 5<br />

Terrorist Safe Havens (Update to 7120 Report)<br />

Terrorist safe havens described in this report include ungoverned, under-governed, or illgoverned<br />

physical areas where terrorists are able to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate,<br />

recruit, train, transit, and operate in relative security because of inadequate governance capacity,<br />

political will, or both.<br />

AFRICA<br />

TERRORIST SAFE HAVENS<br />

Somalia. In <strong>2012</strong>, many areas of Somalia remained a safe haven for terrorists, although fewer<br />

areas than in 2011. The Transiti<strong>on</strong>al Federal Government (TFG) and its successor, the Federal<br />

Government of Somalia, with the assistance of the AU Missi<strong>on</strong> in Somalia, AU member states,<br />

and allied Somali militia forces, secured areas neighboring Mogadishu and drove al-Shabaab out<br />

of many of its str<strong>on</strong>gholds in south-central Somalia. Most notably, the forces gained c<strong>on</strong>trol of<br />

the port city of Kismayo <strong>on</strong> September 28.<br />

Al-Shabaab c<strong>on</strong>tinued to c<strong>on</strong>trol large secti<strong>on</strong>s of rural areas in the middle and lower Jubba<br />

regi<strong>on</strong>s, however, as well as the Bay and Bakol regi<strong>on</strong>s. Al-Shabaab also augmented its presence<br />

in northern Somalia al<strong>on</strong>g the Golis Mountains and within Puntland’s larger urban areas.<br />

Additi<strong>on</strong>ally, Somalia’s l<strong>on</strong>g unguarded coastline, porous borders, and proximity to the Arabian<br />

Peninsula allowed foreign fighters and al-Shabaab members to transit around the regi<strong>on</strong> without<br />

detecti<strong>on</strong>. Areas under al-Shabaab c<strong>on</strong>trol provided a permissive envir<strong>on</strong>ment for al-Shabaab and<br />

al-Qa’ida operatives to c<strong>on</strong>duct training and terrorist planning with other sympathetic violent<br />

extremists, including foreign fighters. The capability of the TFG through August, the<br />

Government of Somalia from September <strong>on</strong>, and other Somali local and regi<strong>on</strong>al authorities to<br />

prevent and preempt al-Shabaab terrorist attacks remained limited.<br />

The TFG and its successor, the Federal Government of Somalia, cooperated with U.S.<br />

counterterrorism efforts.<br />

According to independent sources and NGOs engaged in demining activities <strong>on</strong> the ground, there<br />

was little cause for c<strong>on</strong>cern for the presence of weap<strong>on</strong>s of mass destructi<strong>on</strong> in Somalia.<br />

The Trans-Sahara. The primary terrorist threat in this regi<strong>on</strong> was al-Qa’ida in the Islamic<br />

Maghreb (AQIM). Though its leadership remained primarily based in northeastern Algeria,<br />

AQIM facti<strong>on</strong>s also operated from a safe haven in northern Mali, from which it launched kidnap<br />

for ransom operati<strong>on</strong>s, collected arms in the wake of the Libyan Revoluti<strong>on</strong> from that country,<br />

and attempted to expand its safe haven but was pushed back by Algeria, Mauritania, and Niger.<br />

Mali. In <strong>2012</strong>, the Tuareg Rebelli<strong>on</strong>, aided by returning mercenary fighters and arms<br />

proliferati<strong>on</strong> stemming from the Libyan Revoluti<strong>on</strong>, was followed by the arrival of violent<br />

extremist and terrorist groups such as al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the<br />

Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), in northern Mali. The rebel groups,<br />

aided by violent extremists in some cases, took advantage of the political chaos in Bamako<br />

205

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