Country Reports on Terrorism 2012
Country Reports on Terrorism 2012 Country Reports on Terrorism 2012
Japan hosted an air interdiction exercise, Pacific Shield 2012, in Hokkaido. The Republic of Korea hosted a Global Operational Experts Group meeting in Seoul. The Republic of Korea hosted a maritime interdiction exercise, Eastern Endeavor 2012, in Seoul. U.S. European Command co-hosted an Eastern European Interdiction Workshop with Moldova in Chisinau. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT): The GICNT, which is cochaired by the United States and Russia, is an international partnership of 85 nations and four official observers dedicated to strengthening individual and collective capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to a nuclear terrorist event. Partners engage in multilateral activities and exercises designed to share best practices and lessons learned on a wide range of nuclear security and terrorism issues. To date, partners have conducted over 50 multilateral activities, and seven senior-level meetings, in support of these nuclear security goals. In 2012, there were seven activities to promote the sharing of best practices on the topics of nuclear forensics, nuclear detection, and emergency preparedness and response. Nuclear Trafficking Response Group (NTRG): The NTRG is an interagency group focused on coordinating the U.S. government response to incidents of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials overseas, including radiation alarms. The NTRG works with foreign governments, and the international facilities where diversions occurred, to secure smuggled nuclear material, prosecute those involved, and develop information on smuggling-related threats including potential links between smugglers and terrorists. The Department of State chairs the NTRG, which includes representatives from the nonproliferation, law enforcement, and intelligence communities. Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program (PNSP): Through the Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program (PNSP), the United States utilizes outreach and programmatic capabilities to partner with key governments to broadly enhance capabilities to prevent, detect, and respond effectively to nuclear smuggling attempts. The PNSP develops joint action plans with partner governments to specify priority steps to be taken to improve capabilities. It has developed donor partnerships to assist with joint action plan implementations, resulting in foreign contributions of more than $64 million to anti-nuclear smuggling projects. To date, 14 countries have developed joint action plans and PNSP has programmatically engaged 10 countries to enhance nuclear smuggling response and nuclear forensics capabilities. PNSP also leads a U.S. effort aimed at developing specialized counter-nuclear smuggling capabilities for foreign partners that integrate law enforcement, intelligence, prosecution, and technical capabilities. All PNSP efforts advance the objectives in the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit Work Plan and 2012 Communiqué. Export Control and Related Border Security Program (EXBS): Through the EXBS Program, the Department of State leads the interagency effort to strengthen export control systems to improve national capabilities to detect, deter, interdict, investigate, and prosecute illicit transfers of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), WMD-related items, and advanced conventional arms in over 60 countries. EXBS delivered over 400 information sharing and training activities in 2012, promoting the adoption, implementation, and enforcement of comprehensive strategic trade controls. These activities improve the capability of partner states to prevent transfers of dual-use items to end-users for purposes of proliferation or terrorism. EXBS is also actively involved in efforts to combat WMD smuggling through enhanced border security and has 202
provided equipment and training to develop the ability to detect, deter, and interdict illicit smuggling of radioactive and nuclear materials, WMD components, and other weapons-related items at ports of entry and across borders. In 2012, EXBS conducted 98 bilateral and regional training activities, and delivered detection and identification equipment to bolster border security in 27 countries. EXBS works in harmony with, and complements, the Department of Homeland Security Container Security Initiative, the Department of Energy International Nonproliferation Export Control Program, the Second Line of Defense Program, the Megaports Initiative, and other international donor assistance programs. EXBS programs improve the ability of partner nations to combat WMD proliferation threats and fulfill important U.S. and international commitments, including UNSCR 1540, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Second Line of Defense (SLD): Under its SLD Program, the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) cooperates with partner countries to provide radiation detection systems and associated training to enhance their capabilities to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking of special nuclear and radiological materials across international borders. The SLD Program provides mobile radiological detection equipment to selected countries for use at land borders and internal checkpoints and includes two components: the Core Program and the Megaports Initiative. The Core Program began with work in Russia, and has since expanded to include former Soviet states in the Caucasus, Eastern Europe, and other key regions, providing equipment for land border crossings, feeder seaports, and international airports. Global Threat Reduction (GTR): GTR programs work to prevent terrorists from acquiring CBRN expertise, materials, and technology across the globe. By engaging scientists, technicians, and engineers with CBRN expertise, GTR seeks to prevent terrorist access to knowledge, materials, and technologies that could be used in a CBRN attack against the U.S. homeland. In 2012, GTR was actively engaged in countries and regions where there is a high risk of proliferation and terrorism. GTR programs have expanded to meet emerging CBRN proliferation threats worldwide and focus on promoting biological, chemical, and nuclear security in those countries where there is a high risk of CBRN proliferation. National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats: In November 2009, President Obama approved a new national strategy to provide greater policy cohesion and coordination for U.S. efforts to prevent state or non-state actors from acquiring or using biological weapons. While efforts to mitigate the consequences of the use of biological weapons are dealt with through other policy and strategic frameworks, federal agencies have developed detailed implementation plans and are actively coordinating efforts in support of the Strategy’s seven key objectives: 1. Promote global health security 2. Reinforce norms of safe/responsible conduct 3. Obtain timely/accurate insight on current/emerging risks 4. Take reasonable steps to reduce potential for exploitation 5. Expand our capability to prevent, apprehend and attribute 6. Communicate effectively with all stakeholders 7. Transform international dialogue on biological threats 203
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provided equipment and training to develop the ability to detect, deter, and interdict illicit<br />
smuggling of radioactive and nuclear materials, WMD comp<strong>on</strong>ents, and other weap<strong>on</strong>s-related<br />
items at ports of entry and across borders. In <strong>2012</strong>, EXBS c<strong>on</strong>ducted 98 bilateral and regi<strong>on</strong>al<br />
training activities, and delivered detecti<strong>on</strong> and identificati<strong>on</strong> equipment to bolster border security<br />
in 27 countries. EXBS works in harm<strong>on</strong>y with, and complements, the Department of Homeland<br />
Security C<strong>on</strong>tainer Security Initiative, the Department of Energy Internati<strong>on</strong>al N<strong>on</strong>proliferati<strong>on</strong><br />
Export C<strong>on</strong>trol Program, the Sec<strong>on</strong>d Line of Defense Program, the Megaports Initiative, and<br />
other internati<strong>on</strong>al d<strong>on</strong>or assistance programs. EXBS programs improve the ability of partner<br />
nati<strong>on</strong>s to combat WMD proliferati<strong>on</strong> threats and fulfill important U.S. and internati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
commitments, including UNSCR 1540, the Proliferati<strong>on</strong> Security Initiative, and the Global<br />
Initiative to Combat Nuclear <strong>Terrorism</strong>.<br />
Sec<strong>on</strong>d Line of Defense (SLD): Under its SLD Program, the Department of Energy’s Nati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
Nuclear Security Administrati<strong>on</strong> (DOE/NNSA) cooperates with partner countries to provide<br />
radiati<strong>on</strong> detecti<strong>on</strong> systems and associated training to enhance their capabilities to deter, detect,<br />
and interdict illicit trafficking of special nuclear and radiological materials across internati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
borders. The SLD Program provides mobile radiological detecti<strong>on</strong> equipment to selected<br />
countries for use at land borders and internal checkpoints and includes two comp<strong>on</strong>ents: the Core<br />
Program and the Megaports Initiative. The Core Program began with work in Russia, and has<br />
since expanded to include former Soviet states in the Caucasus, Eastern Europe, and other key<br />
regi<strong>on</strong>s, providing equipment for land border crossings, feeder seaports, and internati<strong>on</strong>al<br />
airports.<br />
Global Threat Reducti<strong>on</strong> (GTR): GTR programs work to prevent terrorists from acquiring<br />
CBRN expertise, materials, and technology across the globe. By engaging scientists, technicians,<br />
and engineers with CBRN expertise, GTR seeks to prevent terrorist access to knowledge,<br />
materials, and technologies that could be used in a CBRN attack against the U.S. homeland. In<br />
<strong>2012</strong>, GTR was actively engaged in countries and regi<strong>on</strong>s where there is a high risk of<br />
proliferati<strong>on</strong> and terrorism. GTR programs have expanded to meet emerging CBRN proliferati<strong>on</strong><br />
threats worldwide and focus <strong>on</strong> promoting biological, chemical, and nuclear security in those<br />
countries where there is a high risk of CBRN proliferati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Nati<strong>on</strong>al Strategy for Countering Biological Threats: In November 2009, President Obama<br />
approved a new nati<strong>on</strong>al strategy to provide greater policy cohesi<strong>on</strong> and coordinati<strong>on</strong> for U.S.<br />
efforts to prevent state or n<strong>on</strong>-state actors from acquiring or using biological weap<strong>on</strong>s. While<br />
efforts to mitigate the c<strong>on</strong>sequences of the use of biological weap<strong>on</strong>s are dealt with through other<br />
policy and strategic frameworks, federal agencies have developed detailed implementati<strong>on</strong> plans<br />
and are actively coordinating efforts in support of the Strategy’s seven key objectives:<br />
1. Promote global health security<br />
2. Reinforce norms of safe/resp<strong>on</strong>sible c<strong>on</strong>duct<br />
3. Obtain timely/accurate insight <strong>on</strong> current/emerging risks<br />
4. Take reas<strong>on</strong>able steps to reduce potential for exploitati<strong>on</strong><br />
5. Expand our capability to prevent, apprehend and attribute<br />
6. Communicate effectively with all stakeholders<br />
7. Transform internati<strong>on</strong>al dialogue <strong>on</strong> biological threats<br />
203