Country Reports on Terrorism 2012
Country Reports on Terrorism 2012 Country Reports on Terrorism 2012
oader strategy during the year, the regime has attempted to portray Syria itself as a victim of terrorism, characterizing all its armed opponents as “terrorists.” Syria continued to generate significant concern regarding the role it plays in terrorist financing. Industry experts reported that 60 percent of all business transactions were conducted in cash and that nearly 80 percent of all Syrians did not use formal banking services. Despite Syrian legislation that required money-changers to be licensed by the end of 2007, many moneychangers continued to operate illegally in Syria's vast black market, estimated to be as large as Syria's formal economy. Regional hawala networks remained intertwined with smuggling and trade-based money laundering and were facilitated by notoriously corrupt customs and immigration officials. This raised significant concerns that some members of the Syrian government and the business elite were complicit in terrorist finance schemes conducted through these institutions. Syria is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. Since February 2010, Syria has been publicly identified by the FATF as a jurisdiction with strategic anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) deficiencies for which it has developed an action plan with the FATF to address these weaknesses. Since then, Syria has made limited progress on its AML/CFT regime. In February 2012, Syria was named in the FATF Public Statement for its lack of progress in implementing its action plan, including its need to address the deficiencies by providing sufficient legal basis for implementing its S/RES/1373 obligations and implementing adequate procedures for identifying and freezing terrorist assets, and ensuring that appropriate laws and procedures are in place to provide mutual legal assistance. In 2012, we continued to closely monitor Syria’s proliferation-sensitive materials and facilities, including Syria’s significant stockpile of chemical weapons, which we assess remains under the Asad regime’s control. There is significant concern, given the instability in Syria, that these materials could find their way to terrorist organizations. We are coordinating closely with a number of like-minded nations and partners to prevent Syria’s stockpiles of chemical and advanced conventional weapons from falling into the hands of violent extremists. 200
Chapter 4. The Global Challenge of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism Nonproliferation efforts have been a top U.S. national security priority for decades – reducing the amount of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) material produced and stored by states; restricting the diversion of materials and expertise for illicit use; and preventing the trafficking of CBRN weapons and related material. Yet CBRN materials and expertise remain a significant terrorist threat as evidenced by: terrorists’ stated intent to acquire and use these materials; the nature of injury and damage these weapons can inflict; the ease with which information on these topics now flows; and the dual-use nature of many relevant technologies and material. While efforts to secure CBRN material across the globe have been largely successful, the illicit trafficking of these materials persists, including instances involving highly enriched uranium in 2010 and 2011. These examples suggest that caches of dangerous material may exist on the black market and that we must complement our efforts to consolidate CBRN materials and secure facilities with broader efforts to detect, investigate, and secure CBRN materials that have fallen outside of regulatory control. We must remain vigilant if we hope to prevent terrorist groups from obtaining the means and methods for obtaining CBRN weapons. A number of international partnerships have either the explicit or the implicit purpose to combat the CBRN threat from terrorists. Organizations and initiatives concerned with chemical and biological weapons use international conventions and regulations to reduce stockpiles of material, regulate the acquisition of dual-use technology, and regulate trade of specific goods. Nuclear and radiological initiatives and programs focus on promoting peaceful uses of nuclear material and energy, safeguarding against diversion, and countering the smuggling of radioactive and nuclear material. The United States also provides technical and financial assistance to ensure that partner nations have the ability to adequately protect and secure CBRN-applicable expertise, technologies, and material. U. S. participation within, and contribution to these groups, is vital to ensure our continued safety from the CBRN threat. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI): Launched in 2003, the PSI has increased international capability to address the challenges associated with stopping the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their related components, and their means of delivery. The PSI remains an important tool in the global effort to combat CBRN material transfers to both state and non-state actors of proliferation concern. As of December 31, 2012, 102 states have endorsed the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles, by which states commit to take specific actions in support of efforts to halt the trafficking of WMD and related materials. In 2012, PSI participants engaged in the following activities: U.S. Africa Command-sponsored maritime security Exercise Phoenix Express. U.S. Africa Command-sponsored maritime security Exercise Saharan Express. U.S. Southern Command-sponsored Panama Canal security exercise PANAMAX. Bilateral Air Interdiction tabletop exercise with the United States and Panama in Panama City. Germany hosted a PSI outreach workshop in Frankfurt. Poland hosted a Critical Capabilities and Practices Workshop in Warsaw. 201
- Page 149 and 150: comprehensive and does not include
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Chapter 4.<br />
The Global Challenge of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or<br />
Nuclear (CBRN) <strong>Terrorism</strong><br />
N<strong>on</strong>proliferati<strong>on</strong> efforts have been a top U.S. nati<strong>on</strong>al security priority for decades – reducing<br />
the amount of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) material produced and<br />
stored by states; restricting the diversi<strong>on</strong> of materials and expertise for illicit use; and preventing<br />
the trafficking of CBRN weap<strong>on</strong>s and related material. Yet CBRN materials and expertise<br />
remain a significant terrorist threat as evidenced by: terrorists’ stated intent to acquire and use<br />
these materials; the nature of injury and damage these weap<strong>on</strong>s can inflict; the ease with which<br />
informati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> these topics now flows; and the dual-use nature of many relevant technologies<br />
and material. While efforts to secure CBRN material across the globe have been largely<br />
successful, the illicit trafficking of these materials persists, including instances involving highly<br />
enriched uranium in 2010 and 2011. These examples suggest that caches of dangerous material<br />
may exist <strong>on</strong> the black market and that we must complement our efforts to c<strong>on</strong>solidate CBRN<br />
materials and secure facilities with broader efforts to detect, investigate, and secure CBRN<br />
materials that have fallen outside of regulatory c<strong>on</strong>trol. We must remain vigilant if we hope to<br />
prevent terrorist groups from obtaining the means and methods for obtaining CBRN weap<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
A number of internati<strong>on</strong>al partnerships have either the explicit or the implicit purpose to combat<br />
the CBRN threat from terrorists. Organizati<strong>on</strong>s and initiatives c<strong>on</strong>cerned with chemical and<br />
biological weap<strong>on</strong>s use internati<strong>on</strong>al c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>s and regulati<strong>on</strong>s to reduce stockpiles of<br />
material, regulate the acquisiti<strong>on</strong> of dual-use technology, and regulate trade of specific goods.<br />
Nuclear and radiological initiatives and programs focus <strong>on</strong> promoting peaceful uses of nuclear<br />
material and energy, safeguarding against diversi<strong>on</strong>, and countering the smuggling of radioactive<br />
and nuclear material. The United States also provides technical and financial assistance to ensure<br />
that partner nati<strong>on</strong>s have the ability to adequately protect and secure CBRN-applicable expertise,<br />
technologies, and material. U. S. participati<strong>on</strong> within, and c<strong>on</strong>tributi<strong>on</strong> to these groups, is vital to<br />
ensure our c<strong>on</strong>tinued safety from the CBRN threat.<br />
The Proliferati<strong>on</strong> Security Initiative (PSI): Launched in 2003, the PSI has increased<br />
internati<strong>on</strong>al capability to address the challenges associated with stopping the trafficking of<br />
weap<strong>on</strong>s of mass destructi<strong>on</strong> (WMD), their related comp<strong>on</strong>ents, and their means of delivery. The<br />
PSI remains an important tool in the global effort to combat CBRN material transfers to both<br />
state and n<strong>on</strong>-state actors of proliferati<strong>on</strong> c<strong>on</strong>cern. As of December 31, <strong>2012</strong>, 102 states have<br />
endorsed the PSI Statement of Interdicti<strong>on</strong> Principles, by which states commit to take specific<br />
acti<strong>on</strong>s in support of efforts to halt the trafficking of WMD and related materials. In <strong>2012</strong>, PSI<br />
participants engaged in the following activities:<br />
U.S. Africa Command-sp<strong>on</strong>sored maritime security Exercise Phoenix Express.<br />
U.S. Africa Command-sp<strong>on</strong>sored maritime security Exercise Saharan Express.<br />
U.S. Southern Command-sp<strong>on</strong>sored Panama Canal security exercise PANAMAX.<br />
Bilateral Air Interdicti<strong>on</strong> tabletop exercise with the United States and Panama in Panama<br />
City.<br />
Germany hosted a PSI outreach workshop in Frankfurt.<br />
Poland hosted a Critical Capabilities and Practices Workshop in Warsaw.<br />
201