Country Reports on Terrorism 2012

events, however, but the numbers deployed were usually small. On occasion the police asked for
transportation, fuel, or extra pay.
Countering Terrorist Finance: Eritrea is not a member of any Financial Action Task Forcestyle
regional body. Eritrea’s general lack of transparency on banking, financial, and economic
matters made gathering of definitive information difficult. Eritrea does not adhere to
international standards for monitoring or regulation of remittance services. It extensively
monitored remittances and money transfers of the Eritrean diaspora, members of whom are
required to pay a two per cent foreign income tax to the government to receive passport and
other services, and it extensively monitored transfers of money out of the nation to ensure than
an artificially high exchange rate is not undercut by black market exchanges. Eritrea does require
the collection of data for wire transfers; however, this is more for tracking the “Diaspora Tax”
and hard currency outflows than for counterterrorism. For further information on money
laundering and financial crimes, we refer you to the 2013 International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes:
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.
Regional and International Cooperation: Eritrea is a member of the AU, and would like to
reactivate its membership in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Eastern Africa,
but this is opposed by Ethiopia and host nation Djibouti, both of whom have had military
conflicts with Eritrea in recent years. Eritrea’s relationship with the UN (particularly the UNSC’s
Somalia/Eritrea Sanctions Committee) is antagonistic, as Eritrea resents being placed under
economic and other sanctions. Eritrean government officials regularly accused the Somalia/
Eritrea Monitoring Group of bias and inadequacy.
ETHIOPIA
Overview: The Government of Ethiopia’s counterterrorism cooperation with the United States
included military, intelligence, and security aspects. The Ethiopian government viewed
instability in Somalia as a critical national security threat and maintained a defensive military
presence along the Somali border to stem potential infiltration of violent extremists into Ethiopia.
Ethiopian military forces continued counterterrorism operations in Somalia and were
instrumental in combating al-Shabaab in southern and central Somalia. Within Ethiopia’s
borders, the Ethiopian government successfully identified an al-Qa’ida (AQ) cell, and then
arrested and convicted cell affiliates. The government remained concerned about groups such as
the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), Oromo Liberation Front, and Ginbot 7, which its
parliament designated as terrorist groups in 2011.
2012 Terrorist Incidents: In January, five European tourists were killed and two were
kidnapped by the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unit Front (ARDUF), a violent extremist
group the Ethiopian government claimed was backed by Eritrea. In retaliation, the Ethiopian
military made incursions into Eritrea in March to target “subversive groups,” including ARDUF,
and a military base. In April, an attack by armed gunmen on a farm operated by Saudi Star
Development in the Gambella region killed at least five people. The Government of Ethiopia
regarded the January attack on tourists and the April attack on the Saudi Star compound as
terrorist attacks.
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