Country Reports on Terrorism 2012
Country Reports on Terrorism 2012 Country Reports on Terrorism 2012
Yemen’s economy and development. Many political leaders and groups (including the former opposition Joint Meeting Party alliance) publicly condemned terrorism and violent attacks, while stressing that a unified army and security service would help to eradicate terrorism. Many Yemeni officials and media professionals have expressed support for expanding messaging efforts aimed at countering violent extremism, but point to a lack of resources and expertise that impede their efforts. SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA South Asia remained a front line in the battle against terrorism. Although we have seriously degraded the al-Qa’ida (AQ) core in Afghanistan and Pakistan, AQ still has the ability to plan and conduct attacks from its safe havens. AQ looked to consolidate power by forging closer ties with other terrorist organizations in the region such as Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Haqqani Network (HQN). These alliances continued to provide the group with additional resources and capabilities. In 2012, terrorists in South Asia carried out operations in heavily populated areas and attempted to expand networks across the region and beyond. Afghanistan in particular continued to experience aggressive and coordinated attacks by the Afghan Taliban, HQN, and other AQ-affiliated groups. A number of these attacks were planned and launched from these groups’ safe haven in Pakistan. Afghan Security Forces are now providing security throughout most of Afghanistan as the transition to full Afghan leadership on security continues in anticipation of the 2014 withdrawal of U.S. and Coalition Forces (CF). Afghan and CF, in partnership, took aggressive action against terrorist elements in Afghanistan, especially in Kabul, and many of the eastern and northern provinces. Pakistan continued to experience significant terrorist violence, including sectarian attacks. The Pakistani military undertook operations against groups that conducted attacks within Pakistan such as TTP, but other groups such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba were able to continue to operate in Pakistan. Pakistan did not directly target the Afghan Taliban or HQN, although it supported efforts to bring both groups into an Afghan peace process. Although terrorist violence was lower than in previous years, India remained severely impacted by and vulnerable to terrorism, including from groups based in Pakistan. The Government of India, in response, increased its own counterterrorism capabilities and expanded its cooperation and coordination with the international community and regional partners. Bangladesh, an influential counterterrorism partner in the region, continued to make strides against domestic and international terrorism. The government’s ongoing counterterrorism efforts have made it more difficult for transnational terrorists to operate in or use Bangladeshi territory. In addition, Bangladesh and India improved and expanded counterterrorism cooperation. Despite the absence of major terrorist incidents on their territory, governments in the five Central Asian states were concerned about the possibility of a growing threat connected to changes in the international force presence in Afghanistan in 2014. While some sought to reduce their countries’ vulnerability to the perceived terrorist threat, the effectiveness of their efforts was in some cases undercut by failure to distinguish clearly between terrorism on one hand and political opposition, or non-traditional religious practices, on the other. 152
AFGHANISTAN Overview: Though the primary responsibility for security in Afghanistan is transitioning from U.S. and international forces to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), the United States is committed to continued political, diplomatic, and economic engagement in Afghanistan as a strategic partner. The United States fully supports Afghan efforts to professionalize and modernize the security forces to take ownership of the security and counterterrorism efforts. The United States continued its role as a facilitator in improving Afghanistan’s relations with its regional partners, fostering democracy, reintegration, and economic development. In 2012, the United States and others in the international community provided training and resource assistance to Afghanistan, including democratic institution building, humanitarian relief and assistance, capacity building, security needs, counter-narcotic programs, and infrastructure projects. The Government of Afghanistan’s response to the spate of insider attacks has led directly to an increased focus on the vetting and training of security force personnel. This has led to a more professional force. 2012 Terrorist Attacks: In 2012, insurgents conducted some of the largest vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attacks since 2001, targeting Provincial Reconstruction Teams, large Coalition Forces (CF) bases, and Afghan government buildings, mostly in eastern Afghanistan. The number of insider attacks increased significantly compared to 2011, though actions taken by ISAF and ANSF in response resulted in a significant decrease in these attacks in the latter half of the year. Insurgents across Afghanistan used a variety of tactics to target Afghan security personnel and CF in major cities and rural areas, seeking to expand their territorial influence and control. In major cities, these attacks were well-coordinated, complex attacks to garner media attention while they targeted the ANSF in rural areas. Insurgents carried out several targeted assassinations of Afghan leadership. As in previous years, a greater number of attacks occurred during the summer months. This year, however there were three high-profile attacks in December compared with one in 2011. Helmand, Kandahar, Ghazni, and Kunar represented the most dangerous provinces for Afghan security personnel and CF. High-profile attacks included: On February 25, an Afghan Ministry of Interior officer conducted an insider attack that killed two American military personnel embedded inside the Ministry of Interior compound in Kabul City in Kabul Province. On April 15, 14 insurgents embarked on an attack in three separate areas of Kabul City. Insurgents occupied three high-rise buildings in Kabul City in Kabul Province, and attacked the U.S. Embassy, several foreign embassies, Camp Warehouse, and Parliament. Insurgents simultaneously conducted attacks in Jalalabad City in Nangarhar Province against the Provincial Reconstruction Team, in Pul-e Alam District in Logar Province against Afghan government buildings, and in Gardez in Paktiya Province against Afghan government and security locations. The attacks resulted in massive casualties, with at least 50 killed and hundreds wounded in the four provinces. 153
- Page 101 and 102: Regional and International Cooperat
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- Page 123 and 124: The PASF detained terrorists in the
- Page 125 and 126: The State Security Court (SSC) is J
- Page 127 and 128: Countering Terrorist Finance: Kuwai
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- Page 131 and 132: Overview: In 2012, Libya was marked
- Page 133 and 134: intensify cooperation with their ne
- Page 135 and 136: In December, authorities dismantled
- Page 137 and 138: territorial waters. In addition, th
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- Page 141 and 142: Overview: Tunisian security forces
- Page 143 and 144: the presidential amnesty granted af
- Page 145 and 146: Tunisia. Tunisian authorities inten
- Page 147 and 148: In March, ICE and CBP provided BCS
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- Page 151: There were a number of arrests of t
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- Page 157 and 158: established by President Karzai in
- Page 159 and 160: In December, the Indian government
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- Page 165 and 166: Countering Terrorist Finance: Maldi
- Page 167 and 168: Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), which cont
- Page 169 and 170: Pakistan did not conclude the trial
- Page 171 and 172: organizational remnants have contin
- Page 173 and 174: Annual Report to Congress on Intern
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- Page 177 and 178: took place in Switzerland. Argentin
- Page 179 and 180: Overview: Canada is an indispensabl
- Page 181 and 182: Canada has a rigorous detection and
- Page 183 and 184: On April 27, in a complex attack in
- Page 185 and 186: expert to Peru to provide instructi
- Page 187 and 188: Executive Decree 448 of December 28
- Page 189 and 190: Department. Estimates of membership
- Page 191 and 192: Peruvian population in border areas
- Page 193 and 194: ut instead choose to rejoin SL upon
- Page 195 and 196: Chapter 3. State Sponsors of Terror
- Page 197 and 198: of millions of dollars in support o
- Page 199 and 200: In June 2010, four Sudanese men sen
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Yemen’s ec<strong>on</strong>omy and development. Many political leaders and groups (including the former<br />
oppositi<strong>on</strong> Joint Meeting Party alliance) publicly c<strong>on</strong>demned terrorism and violent attacks, while<br />
stressing that a unified army and security service would help to eradicate terrorism. Many<br />
Yemeni officials and media professi<strong>on</strong>als have expressed support for expanding messaging<br />
efforts aimed at countering violent extremism, but point to a lack of resources and expertise that<br />
impede their efforts.<br />
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA<br />
South Asia remained a fr<strong>on</strong>t line in the battle against terrorism. Although we have seriously<br />
degraded the al-Qa’ida (AQ) core in Afghanistan and Pakistan, AQ still has the ability to plan<br />
and c<strong>on</strong>duct attacks from its safe havens. AQ looked to c<strong>on</strong>solidate power by forging closer ties<br />
with other terrorist organizati<strong>on</strong>s in the regi<strong>on</strong> such as Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the<br />
Haqqani Network (HQN). These alliances c<strong>on</strong>tinued to provide the group with additi<strong>on</strong>al<br />
resources and capabilities. In <strong>2012</strong>, terrorists in South Asia carried out operati<strong>on</strong>s in heavily<br />
populated areas and attempted to expand networks across the regi<strong>on</strong> and bey<strong>on</strong>d.<br />
Afghanistan in particular c<strong>on</strong>tinued to experience aggressive and coordinated attacks by the<br />
Afghan Taliban, HQN, and other AQ-affiliated groups. A number of these attacks were planned<br />
and launched from these groups’ safe haven in Pakistan. Afghan Security Forces are now<br />
providing security throughout most of Afghanistan as the transiti<strong>on</strong> to full Afghan leadership <strong>on</strong><br />
security c<strong>on</strong>tinues in anticipati<strong>on</strong> of the 2014 withdrawal of U.S. and Coaliti<strong>on</strong> Forces (CF).<br />
Afghan and CF, in partnership, took aggressive acti<strong>on</strong> against terrorist elements in Afghanistan,<br />
especially in Kabul, and many of the eastern and northern provinces.<br />
Pakistan c<strong>on</strong>tinued to experience significant terrorist violence, including sectarian attacks. The<br />
Pakistani military undertook operati<strong>on</strong>s against groups that c<strong>on</strong>ducted attacks within Pakistan<br />
such as TTP, but other groups such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba were able to c<strong>on</strong>tinue to operate in<br />
Pakistan. Pakistan did not directly target the Afghan Taliban or HQN, although it supported<br />
efforts to bring both groups into an Afghan peace process.<br />
Although terrorist violence was lower than in previous years, India remained severely impacted<br />
by and vulnerable to terrorism, including from groups based in Pakistan. The Government of<br />
India, in resp<strong>on</strong>se, increased its own counterterrorism capabilities and expanded its cooperati<strong>on</strong><br />
and coordinati<strong>on</strong> with the internati<strong>on</strong>al community and regi<strong>on</strong>al partners.<br />
Bangladesh, an influential counterterrorism partner in the regi<strong>on</strong>, c<strong>on</strong>tinued to make strides<br />
against domestic and internati<strong>on</strong>al terrorism. The government’s <strong>on</strong>going counterterrorism efforts<br />
have made it more difficult for transnati<strong>on</strong>al terrorists to operate in or use Bangladeshi territory.<br />
In additi<strong>on</strong>, Bangladesh and India improved and expanded counterterrorism cooperati<strong>on</strong>.<br />
Despite the absence of major terrorist incidents <strong>on</strong> their territory, governments in the five Central<br />
Asian states were c<strong>on</strong>cerned about the possibility of a growing threat c<strong>on</strong>nected to changes in the<br />
internati<strong>on</strong>al force presence in Afghanistan in 2014. While some sought to reduce their<br />
countries’ vulnerability to the perceived terrorist threat, the effectiveness of their efforts was in<br />
some cases undercut by failure to distinguish clearly between terrorism <strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong>e hand and political<br />
oppositi<strong>on</strong>, or n<strong>on</strong>-traditi<strong>on</strong>al religious practices, <strong>on</strong> the other.<br />
152