Country Reports on Terrorism 2012
Country Reports on Terrorism 2012 Country Reports on Terrorism 2012
On August 20, a car belonging to an Egyptian diplomat was blown up near his home in Benghazi. On September 11, terrorists attacked the U.S. facilities in Benghazi, which resulted in the death of Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three staff members. On October 13, the Benghazi police chief survived an assassination attempt. On November 21, Benghazi security chief Faraj al-Drissi was assassinated. On December 16 and 20, eight people were killed when violent extremists attacked Benghazi police stations. On December 31, attackers threw an IED at a Coptic church in the city of Dafniya. The explosion resulted in the death of two Egyptian men and wounded two others. On December 31, an IED exploded outside the headquarters of the public prosecutor in Benghazi. No one was killed or injured, but the explosion caused damage to the building. Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Following the September 11 attacks on U.S. facilities in Benghazi, senior Libyan authorities assured their U.S. counterparts that security was their top priority. In light of this and many other security incidents throughout the year, Prime Minister Ali Zeidan and his cabinet (seated on November 14) focused on bolstering the security sector in Libya and extending the reach of governmental security institutions beyond Tripoli. Significant challenges remained, however, and although the new Libyan authorities intended to make immediate improvements to the security situation, particularly in the east, they were unable to do so as security and justice sector institutions had been severely weakened following 42 years of mismanagement under Qadhafi, and eight months of violent conflict. While the Transitional National Council did not feel it had the mandate to make lasting legislation, the General National Congress and Prime Minister Zeidan have been more aggressively confronting the security situation in Libya. Yet any legislation seeking to limit the power of heavily-armed, extra-governmental militias has been difficult to enforce, and Libyan judges did not hear criminal cases for fear it could lead to revenge attacks against them. Police and military personnel and facilities were the frequent targets of attacks by pro-Qadhafi and violent Islamist extremist groups, who fiercely resisted any efforts by the government to exert its authority. Many members of the militias that continue to undermine the authority of the army and police refused to join these institutions because they claimed Qadhafi-era officials continued to occupy their ranks. The proliferation of weapons from Libya across the country’s borders was of concern. The EU developed plans to provide significant border security assistance to the Libyan authorities, and throughout 2012, the United States worked with the Government of Libya to develop a complementary border security assistance package of its own. A delegation of Libyan officials from the Ministry of Defense and Customs Authority visited the United States in mid-September, during which they expressed interest in U.S. border security best practices, and American border security technology. Nevertheless, implementation of these programs has been slow, and the Libyan authorities lacked the basic training and equipment necessary to monitor their vast land and maritime borders, and to control the flow of people and goods through their airports. Violent extremists continued to exploit these weaknesses, which threatened to destabilize the Middle East and North Africa region. The United States will cooperate with the EU and other international donors to provide further, complementary assistance in this vein, and the Libyan authorities have indicated that they will 132
intensify cooperation with their neighbors, especially Algeria and Tunisia, to exert better control over their shared borders. The United States has also provided assistance to help Libya professionalize its security sector institutions, as well as stem the proliferation of conventional weapons, and secure and destroy its chemical weapons stockpiles. Countering Terrorist Finance: Libya is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. However, Libya has yet to undergo a mutual evaluation. (Libya’s mutual evaluation assessment was scheduled for March 2011, but was cancelled due to security concerns.) After the fall of the Qadhafi regime, there was little information or reliable data on the scope of Libya’s anti-money laundering/counterterrorist regime. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, we refer you to the 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm. Regional and International Cooperation: The United States has prioritized assistance to Libya’s security and justice sectors since the end of the 2011 revolution. Libyan President Mohamed al Magariaf participated in the 67th UNGA in the wake of the September attacks on the U.S. facilities in Benghazi, and vowed to work with the international community, especially the United States, to address weaknesses in its security and justice sectors. On December 17, Libya’s international partners met in London, during which the Libyan delegation articulated its security sector assistance priorities, and the international community agreed to coordinate assistance through the UN Support Mission in Libya. Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: In 2012, member states of the AU, of which Libya is a member, signed a joint venture to create the African Center for Studies and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT). ACSRT’s broad goals include assisting AU member states to develop strategies for preventing and countering terrorism. MOROCCO Overview: Morocco’s counterterrorism efforts are comprehensive. In 2012, the Moroccan government continued its broad counterterrorism strategy of vigilant security measures, regional and international cooperation, and counter-radicalization policies. The terrorist threat in Morocco continued to stem largely from the existence of numerous small, independent violent extremist cells. Those groups and individuals, referred to collectively as adherents of so-called Salafiyya Jihadiyya ideology, remained isolated from one another, small in size, and limited in both capabilities and international connections. Morocco and the United States continued robust counterterrorism collaboration, and both countries committed to deepening this relationship during the September bilateral Strategic Dialogue in Washington, DC. Toward the end of the year, authorities disrupted multiple groups with ties to international networks that included al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM expanded its efforts to recruit Moroccans for combat in other countries and called for attacks on U.S. ambassadors in Morocco and in the region. There were reports of Moroccans attempting to join or receive training from AQIM and other violent extremists in Mali, and the government was concerned 133
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On August 20, a car bel<strong>on</strong>ging to an Egyptian diplomat was blown up near his home in<br />
Benghazi.<br />
On September 11, terrorists attacked the U.S. facilities in Benghazi, which resulted in the<br />
death of Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three staff members.<br />
On October 13, the Benghazi police chief survived an assassinati<strong>on</strong> attempt.<br />
On November 21, Benghazi security chief Faraj al-Drissi was assassinated.<br />
On December 16 and 20, eight people were killed when violent extremists attacked<br />
Benghazi police stati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
On December 31, attackers threw an IED at a Coptic church in the city of Dafniya. The<br />
explosi<strong>on</strong> resulted in the death of two Egyptian men and wounded two others.<br />
On December 31, an IED exploded outside the headquarters of the public prosecutor in<br />
Benghazi. No <strong>on</strong>e was killed or injured, but the explosi<strong>on</strong> caused damage to the building.<br />
Legislati<strong>on</strong>, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Following the September 11 attacks <strong>on</strong><br />
U.S. facilities in Benghazi, senior Libyan authorities assured their U.S. counterparts that security<br />
was their top priority. In light of this and many other security incidents throughout the year,<br />
Prime Minister Ali Zeidan and his cabinet (seated <strong>on</strong> November 14) focused <strong>on</strong> bolstering the<br />
security sector in Libya and extending the reach of governmental security instituti<strong>on</strong>s bey<strong>on</strong>d<br />
Tripoli. Significant challenges remained, however, and although the new Libyan authorities<br />
intended to make immediate improvements to the security situati<strong>on</strong>, particularly in the east, they<br />
were unable to do so as security and justice sector instituti<strong>on</strong>s had been severely weakened<br />
following 42 years of mismanagement under Qadhafi, and eight m<strong>on</strong>ths of violent c<strong>on</strong>flict.<br />
While the Transiti<strong>on</strong>al Nati<strong>on</strong>al Council did not feel it had the mandate to make lasting<br />
legislati<strong>on</strong>, the General Nati<strong>on</strong>al C<strong>on</strong>gress and Prime Minister Zeidan have been more<br />
aggressively c<strong>on</strong>fr<strong>on</strong>ting the security situati<strong>on</strong> in Libya. Yet any legislati<strong>on</strong> seeking to limit the<br />
power of heavily-armed, extra-governmental militias has been difficult to enforce, and Libyan<br />
judges did not hear criminal cases for fear it could lead to revenge attacks against them. Police<br />
and military pers<strong>on</strong>nel and facilities were the frequent targets of attacks by pro-Qadhafi and<br />
violent Islamist extremist groups, who fiercely resisted any efforts by the government to exert its<br />
authority. Many members of the militias that c<strong>on</strong>tinue to undermine the authority of the army<br />
and police refused to join these instituti<strong>on</strong>s because they claimed Qadhafi-era officials c<strong>on</strong>tinued<br />
to occupy their ranks.<br />
The proliferati<strong>on</strong> of weap<strong>on</strong>s from Libya across the country’s borders was of c<strong>on</strong>cern. The EU<br />
developed plans to provide significant border security assistance to the Libyan authorities, and<br />
throughout <strong>2012</strong>, the United States worked with the Government of Libya to develop a<br />
complementary border security assistance package of its own. A delegati<strong>on</strong> of Libyan officials<br />
from the Ministry of Defense and Customs Authority visited the United States in mid-September,<br />
during which they expressed interest in U.S. border security best practices, and American border<br />
security technology. Nevertheless, implementati<strong>on</strong> of these programs has been slow, and the<br />
Libyan authorities lacked the basic training and equipment necessary to m<strong>on</strong>itor their vast land<br />
and maritime borders, and to c<strong>on</strong>trol the flow of people and goods through their airports. Violent<br />
extremists c<strong>on</strong>tinued to exploit these weaknesses, which threatened to destabilize the Middle<br />
East and North Africa regi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
The United States will cooperate with the EU and other internati<strong>on</strong>al d<strong>on</strong>ors to provide further,<br />
complementary assistance in this vein, and the Libyan authorities have indicated that they will<br />
132