Country Reports on Terrorism 2012
Country Reports on Terrorism 2012 Country Reports on Terrorism 2012
Their extradition was upheld following a court decision that stated the prisoners did not show "new and compelling" reasons to stay in the UK. Their appeal came after the European Court of Human Rights backed successive UK courts in ruling for extradition. On October 10, two people were arrested at Heathrow Airport on suspicion of committing terrorist offenses. Police said the man and woman were being questioned as part of an investigation into travel to Syria in support of alleged terrorist activity. Countering Terrorist Finance: The UK has a wide range of anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) laws. It is a member of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and an active participant in FATF-style regional bodies to meet evolving AML/CFT threats. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, we refer you to the 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm. Regional and International Cooperation: The UK is a leader in all regional and international fora that it belongs to. It cooperates with other nations and international organizations on counterterrorism, including in the UN and UNSC, EU, NATO, Council of Europe, G-8, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IMF, World Bank, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and Interpol. The UK is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum and co-chairs its Countering Violent Extremism Working Group. Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: In 2007, the UK launched its Prevent strategy to counter radicalization. Prevent is part of the government’s overall CONTEST counterterrorism strategy. In 2011, Prevent was revised to correct several perceived problems. There had been complaints from members of Muslim organizations that UK government interaction with their communities was focused solely on security concerns. As a result, the UK divided the responsibilities for various strands of Prevent among different government organizations. The Department of Communities and Local Government took over responsibility for “integration” work, designed to ensure that Muslim communities were receiving all the government services to which they were entitled and that immigrants were given assistance to integrate into British society. The Home Office will focus on countering the ideology of violent extremism, including the identification of at-risk youth and their placement in de-radicalization pre-programs. The revised strategy calls for a much more focused effort to target those most at risk of radicalization. Finally, the government has decided that organizations that hold “extremist views,” even those that are non-violent, will not be eligible to receive government funding or participate in Prevent programs. MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA The Near East region continued to experience significant levels of terrorist activity in 2012, further complicated by ongoing regional instability across portions of North Africa and the Levant. Al-Qa’ida was not a part of the popular uprisings that led to democratic transitions across the Middle East and North Africa, but violent extremists looked for opportunities to exploit the political transitions underway. In Libya, the security vacuum in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution provided more opportunities for terrorists to operate. This vacuum, combined with the weakness of Libya’s 104
nascent security institutions, allowed violent extremists to act, as we saw too clearly on September 11 in Benghazi, when J. Christopher Stevens, the U.S. Ambassador to Libya, and three staff members, died during attacks on U.S. facilities. Al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) – even with diminished leadership and capabilities – continued to conduct attacks across Iraq, while Shia militants largely ceased attacks but continued to threaten U.S. targets in Iraq. AQI also took advantage of a significantly depleted security situation in Syria. Operating under its alias, al-Nusrah Front, the group sought to portray itself as part of the legitimate Syrian opposition and attempted to hijack Syria’s struggle for democracy. The United States designated al-Nusra as an alias of AQI in December 2012. Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has also taken advantage of the instability in the region, particularly in Libya and Mali. Kidnapping for ransom operations continued to yield significant sums for AQIM, and it conducted attacks against members of state security services within the Trans-Sahara region. In the spring of 2012, a Yemeni military offensive, with the help of armed residents, regained government control over territory in the south, which AQAP had seized and occupied in 2011. Although weakened, AQAP was not eliminated as a threat. AQAP increasingly turned to asymmetric tactics to target Yemeni government officials, pro-government tribal militias known as Popular Committees, and their leaders, soldiers, civilians, and U.S. embassy personnel. In 2012, there was a clear resurgence of Iran’s state sponsorship of terrorism, through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), its Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and Tehran’s ally Hizballah, who remained a significant threat to the stability of Lebanon and the broader region. Attacks in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and the Far East were linked to the IRGC-QF or Hizballah. In fact, Hizballah’s terrorist activity has reached a tempo unseen since the 1990s with attacks plotted in Southeast Asia, Europe, and Africa. Despite these persistent threats, governments across the region improved their own counterterrorism capabilities, effectively disrupting the activities of a number of terrorists. The Iraqi government displayed increased capability and efficacy in pursuing multiple Sunni violent extremist groups. Though AQIM's presence and activity in the Sahel and parts of the Maghreb remains worrisome, the group's isolation in Algeria grew as Algeria increased its already substantial efforts to target it. And in 2012, Yemeni forces were successful in reducing the physical territory that AQAP had previously gained in Yemen as the result of political turmoil. In Gaza, a sharp increase in the number of rocket attacks launched by Hamas and other Gazabased terrorist groups led Israel to launch Operation Pillar of Defense in November 2012. During the course of the eight-day operation, Israeli forces targeted more than 1,500 terrorist sites. Since the Egypt-brokered November 21 ceasefire, the United States has engaged with our Egyptian and Israeli counterparts to strengthen and sustain the peace, in keeping with the President’s pledge to Prime Minister Netanyahu to intensify efforts to help Israel address its security needs, especially the issue of the smuggling of weapons and explosives into Gaza. For instance, with U.S. encouragement, Egypt has increased its focus on border security and weapons interdictions. Israel has reciprocated by easing some of its economic sanctions on Gaza. The end result was a period of calm in Gaza. The United States is also in close contact 105
- Page 53 and 54: Republic Act No. 10167, which amend
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nascent security instituti<strong>on</strong>s, allowed violent extremists to act, as we saw too clearly <strong>on</strong><br />
September 11 in Benghazi, when J. Christopher Stevens, the U.S. Ambassador to Libya, and<br />
three staff members, died during attacks <strong>on</strong> U.S. facilities.<br />
Al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) – even with diminished leadership and capabilities – c<strong>on</strong>tinued to<br />
c<strong>on</strong>duct attacks across Iraq, while Shia militants largely ceased attacks but c<strong>on</strong>tinued to threaten<br />
U.S. targets in Iraq. AQI also took advantage of a significantly depleted security situati<strong>on</strong> in<br />
Syria. Operating under its alias, al-Nusrah Fr<strong>on</strong>t, the group sought to portray itself as part of the<br />
legitimate Syrian oppositi<strong>on</strong> and attempted to hijack Syria’s struggle for democracy. The United<br />
States designated al-Nusra as an alias of AQI in December <strong>2012</strong>.<br />
Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has also taken advantage of the instability in the<br />
regi<strong>on</strong>, particularly in Libya and Mali. Kidnapping for ransom operati<strong>on</strong>s c<strong>on</strong>tinued to yield<br />
significant sums for AQIM, and it c<strong>on</strong>ducted attacks against members of state security services<br />
within the Trans-Sahara regi<strong>on</strong>.<br />
In the spring of <strong>2012</strong>, a Yemeni military offensive, with the help of armed residents, regained<br />
government c<strong>on</strong>trol over territory in the south, which AQAP had seized and occupied in 2011.<br />
Although weakened, AQAP was not eliminated as a threat. AQAP increasingly turned to<br />
asymmetric tactics to target Yemeni government officials, pro-government tribal militias known<br />
as Popular Committees, and their leaders, soldiers, civilians, and U.S. embassy pers<strong>on</strong>nel.<br />
In <strong>2012</strong>, there was a clear resurgence of Iran’s state sp<strong>on</strong>sorship of terrorism, through the Islamic<br />
Revoluti<strong>on</strong>ary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), its Ministry of Intelligence and Security,<br />
and Tehran’s ally Hizballah, who remained a significant threat to the stability of Leban<strong>on</strong> and the<br />
broader regi<strong>on</strong>. Attacks in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and the Far East were<br />
linked to the IRGC-QF or Hizballah. In fact, Hizballah’s terrorist activity has reached a tempo<br />
unseen since the 1990s with attacks plotted in Southeast Asia, Europe, and Africa.<br />
Despite these persistent threats, governments across the regi<strong>on</strong> improved their own<br />
counterterrorism capabilities, effectively disrupting the activities of a number of terrorists. The<br />
Iraqi government displayed increased capability and efficacy in pursuing multiple Sunni violent<br />
extremist groups. Though AQIM's presence and activity in the Sahel and parts of the Maghreb<br />
remains worrisome, the group's isolati<strong>on</strong> in Algeria grew as Algeria increased its already<br />
substantial efforts to target it. And in <strong>2012</strong>, Yemeni forces were successful in reducing the<br />
physical territory that AQAP had previously gained in Yemen as the result of political turmoil.<br />
In Gaza, a sharp increase in the number of rocket attacks launched by Hamas and other Gazabased<br />
terrorist groups led Israel to launch Operati<strong>on</strong> Pillar of Defense in November <strong>2012</strong>.<br />
During the course of the eight-day operati<strong>on</strong>, Israeli forces targeted more than 1,500 terrorist<br />
sites. Since the Egypt-brokered November 21 ceasefire, the United States has engaged with our<br />
Egyptian and Israeli counterparts to strengthen and sustain the peace, in keeping with the<br />
President’s pledge to Prime Minister Netanyahu to intensify efforts to help Israel address its<br />
security needs, especially the issue of the smuggling of weap<strong>on</strong>s and explosives into Gaza. For<br />
instance, with U.S. encouragement, Egypt has increased its focus <strong>on</strong> border security and<br />
weap<strong>on</strong>s interdicti<strong>on</strong>s. Israel has reciprocated by easing some of its ec<strong>on</strong>omic sancti<strong>on</strong>s <strong>on</strong><br />
Gaza. The end result was a period of calm in Gaza. The United States is also in close c<strong>on</strong>tact<br />
105