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Murray N. Rothbard vs. the Philosophers - Ludwig von Mises Institute

Murray N. Rothbard vs. the Philosophers - Ludwig von Mises Institute

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REVIEWS AND COMMENTS BY MURRAY N. ROTHBARD 73<br />

even looser than I had thought. For not only does he admit<br />

at one point that <strong>the</strong> rule of law cannot be precisely defined,<br />

and that it must be suspended in emergencies, but he also<br />

would only apply <strong>the</strong> rule to what Hayek calls “coercive”<br />

activities of <strong>the</strong> State. There is a vast area of State activity<br />

which Hayek calls “noncoercive” and where <strong>the</strong> State can<br />

act perfectly legitimately. “Coercive” activities are thus confined<br />

to such direct acts of tyranny as price controls, fixing<br />

production, socialist planning, etc. But a government supply<br />

of a service—such as public housing, etc.—is not considered<br />

coercive, and <strong>the</strong>refore cannot be opposed on principle<br />

according to Hayek. For such “noncoercive” activities, says<br />

Hayek, <strong>the</strong> proposed activity must be considered case by<br />

case, ad hoc, in a pragmatic, utilitarian manner.<br />

Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, even such clearly coercive activities of <strong>the</strong><br />

government as conscription are not considered really coercive<br />

by Hayek because <strong>the</strong>y are general rules, applying to<br />

everyone in a certain defined category (although, as Hayek<br />

sometimes admits, <strong>the</strong>se categories can be widened and narrowed<br />

flexibly). Everyone knows in advance that he will be<br />

drafted, he can predict it, etc. (Of course, in practice, <strong>the</strong><br />

draft is nei<strong>the</strong>r universal nor predictable, but that is ano<strong>the</strong>r<br />

problem.)<br />

Hayek’s devotion to <strong>the</strong> relatively unimportant rule of<br />

law principle, and his hostility to rationalism, distort his<br />

historical sections so as to make <strong>the</strong>m virtually valueless<br />

(although, as I said above, <strong>the</strong> footnote references are<br />

most important). Thus, Hayek tries to erect <strong>the</strong> categories<br />

of <strong>the</strong> “English tradition” (good) and <strong>the</strong> “French tradition”<br />

(bad). Jefferson, Paine, Price, etc.—fine libertarians all—<br />

are dismissed hostilely as being in <strong>the</strong> bad French tradition,<br />

while <strong>the</strong>ir direct ancestor, John Locke, is hailed as<br />

a “good” English empiricist. Actually, <strong>the</strong>re was little difference<br />

between <strong>the</strong>m. Condorcet, surely a “bad” French<br />

rationalist by Hayek’s standards, somehow comes out<br />

“good” because he favored a constitution for France and is<br />

<strong>the</strong>refore supposed to be in favor of <strong>the</strong> rule of law. And<br />

while favoring <strong>the</strong> American Constitution, <strong>the</strong> Bill of

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