Murray N. Rothbard vs. the Philosophers - Ludwig von Mises Institute
Murray N. Rothbard vs. the Philosophers - Ludwig von Mises Institute
Murray N. Rothbard vs. the Philosophers - Ludwig von Mises Institute
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MURRAY N. ROTHBARD VS. THE PHILOSPHERS: UNPUBLISHED WRITINGS<br />
68 ON HAYEK, MISES, STRAUSS, AND POLYANI<br />
person’s ignorance. But while subtle, this too is a fallacious<br />
argument. For <strong>the</strong>re is nothing really mysterious about <strong>the</strong><br />
market: <strong>the</strong> fact that Hayek can explain its workings shows<br />
that reason can comprehend it; and since every single transaction<br />
benefits both parties and rewards rationality, it is not<br />
surprising that <strong>the</strong> sum of all market transactions is a beautiful<br />
and rational instrument. In short, if irrational entrepreneurs<br />
lose money and rational ones make profits, it is<br />
not surprising that a profit-run economy will be rational.<br />
To deprecate human reason by saying that none of us is<br />
or can be omniscient is absurd, for it takes an impossible<br />
standard as <strong>the</strong> judge of a possible and real condition. All of<br />
our knowledge we get from <strong>the</strong> exercise of our reason; to<br />
say that no man can be God and know everything is to take<br />
an irrational standard of evaluation.<br />
There are countless o<strong>the</strong>r examples of tortuous fallacies—for<br />
example, Hayek’s denial that a free market allocates<br />
income in accordance with merit. Here he tries to<br />
make a vague and absurd distinction between “merit” and<br />
“value,” and, of course, his denial plays into <strong>the</strong> hands of <strong>the</strong><br />
egalitarians. For Hayek attacks <strong>the</strong> very idea that justice can<br />
be known by man or that it could be applied, and says, see,<br />
since we can’t be just and reward according to merit, you’d<br />
better accept <strong>the</strong> free market. Will a man thirsting for justice<br />
accept this dictum—or that of <strong>the</strong> socialists, who promise<br />
him justice and reason? In fact, Hayek, almost incredibly,<br />
seems to identify merit with pain; if somebody enjoys<br />
achieving something, he is not meritorious, but if he suffered<br />
while doing so, <strong>the</strong>n he is meritorious. To take pain as<br />
one’s standard of <strong>the</strong> good is hair-raising indeed.<br />
On democracy, Hayek is again confused; he begins by<br />
separating liberalism neatly from democracy and finally<br />
ends by confusing <strong>the</strong>m, talking of democracy as also a<br />
good, etc.<br />
Finally, even on his revered rule of law, equality under<br />
general rules, which Hayek establishes to <strong>the</strong> exclusion of<br />
more important contentual doctrines of liberty, Hayek backtracks<br />
so much as even to eradicate that. First, he upholds