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Murray N. Rothbard vs. the Philosophers - Ludwig von Mises Institute

Murray N. Rothbard vs. the Philosophers - Ludwig von Mises Institute

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MURRAY N. ROTHBARD VS. THE PHILOSPHERS: UNPUBLISHED WRITINGS<br />

68 ON HAYEK, MISES, STRAUSS, AND POLYANI<br />

person’s ignorance. But while subtle, this too is a fallacious<br />

argument. For <strong>the</strong>re is nothing really mysterious about <strong>the</strong><br />

market: <strong>the</strong> fact that Hayek can explain its workings shows<br />

that reason can comprehend it; and since every single transaction<br />

benefits both parties and rewards rationality, it is not<br />

surprising that <strong>the</strong> sum of all market transactions is a beautiful<br />

and rational instrument. In short, if irrational entrepreneurs<br />

lose money and rational ones make profits, it is<br />

not surprising that a profit-run economy will be rational.<br />

To deprecate human reason by saying that none of us is<br />

or can be omniscient is absurd, for it takes an impossible<br />

standard as <strong>the</strong> judge of a possible and real condition. All of<br />

our knowledge we get from <strong>the</strong> exercise of our reason; to<br />

say that no man can be God and know everything is to take<br />

an irrational standard of evaluation.<br />

There are countless o<strong>the</strong>r examples of tortuous fallacies—for<br />

example, Hayek’s denial that a free market allocates<br />

income in accordance with merit. Here he tries to<br />

make a vague and absurd distinction between “merit” and<br />

“value,” and, of course, his denial plays into <strong>the</strong> hands of <strong>the</strong><br />

egalitarians. For Hayek attacks <strong>the</strong> very idea that justice can<br />

be known by man or that it could be applied, and says, see,<br />

since we can’t be just and reward according to merit, you’d<br />

better accept <strong>the</strong> free market. Will a man thirsting for justice<br />

accept this dictum—or that of <strong>the</strong> socialists, who promise<br />

him justice and reason? In fact, Hayek, almost incredibly,<br />

seems to identify merit with pain; if somebody enjoys<br />

achieving something, he is not meritorious, but if he suffered<br />

while doing so, <strong>the</strong>n he is meritorious. To take pain as<br />

one’s standard of <strong>the</strong> good is hair-raising indeed.<br />

On democracy, Hayek is again confused; he begins by<br />

separating liberalism neatly from democracy and finally<br />

ends by confusing <strong>the</strong>m, talking of democracy as also a<br />

good, etc.<br />

Finally, even on his revered rule of law, equality under<br />

general rules, which Hayek establishes to <strong>the</strong> exclusion of<br />

more important contentual doctrines of liberty, Hayek backtracks<br />

so much as even to eradicate that. First, he upholds

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