Murray N. Rothbard vs. the Philosophers - Ludwig von Mises Institute
Murray N. Rothbard vs. the Philosophers - Ludwig von Mises Institute
Murray N. Rothbard vs. the Philosophers - Ludwig von Mises Institute
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MURRAY N. ROTHBARD VS. THE PHILOSOPHERS: UNPUBLISHED WRITINGS<br />
36 ON HAYEK, MISES, STRAUSS, AND POLYANI<br />
The fact that all law arising out of <strong>the</strong> necessity<br />
to articulate rules of conduct will of necessity possess<br />
some desirable properties not necessarily<br />
possessed by <strong>the</strong> commands of a legislator does<br />
not mean that in o<strong>the</strong>r respects such law may not<br />
develop in very undesirable directions, and that<br />
when this happens correction by deliberate legislation<br />
may not be <strong>the</strong> only practicable way out.<br />
For a variety of reasons <strong>the</strong> spontaneous process<br />
of growth may lead into an impasse from which it<br />
cannot extricate itself by its own forces or which<br />
it will at least not correct quickly enough. . . . But<br />
such occasions when it is recognized that some<br />
hereto accepted rules are unjust in <strong>the</strong> light of<br />
more general principles of justice may well<br />
require <strong>the</strong> revision not only of single rules but<br />
whole sections of <strong>the</strong> established system of case<br />
law. 64<br />
Therefore, even if reason does not have a planning and<br />
creative role in <strong>the</strong> field of <strong>the</strong> establishment of institutions,<br />
it is able and indeed has to play a corrective role. Covell<br />
underlines <strong>the</strong> fact that Hayek is not really barrenly<br />
anchored to tradition; ra<strong>the</strong>r he recognizes <strong>the</strong> fact that, “a<br />
system of predominantly judge-made law—such as English<br />
law—always stood in need of correction and amendment<br />
through an institutional procedure of statutory legislation.”<br />
65<br />
Moreover, it is perhaps worth noting that <strong>the</strong> concept of<br />
evolution is not completely foreign to <strong>Rothbard</strong>ian ideas,<br />
even if it is not one of his characteristic lines of thought. In<br />
For a New Liberty, <strong>Rothbard</strong> makes reference to <strong>the</strong> development<br />
of <strong>the</strong> common law when he considers <strong>the</strong> possibility<br />
of a libertarian legal code. In doing so, <strong>Rothbard</strong> uses <strong>the</strong><br />
same <strong>the</strong>oretical instruments as Bruno Leoni, who, as Raimondo<br />
Cubeddu notes, assimilates <strong>the</strong> rule of law to “<strong>the</strong><br />
64 Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, vol. 1, pp. 88–89<br />
65 Covell, The Defense of Natural Law, p. 132.