Murray N. Rothbard vs. the Philosophers - Ludwig von Mises Institute
Murray N. Rothbard vs. the Philosophers - Ludwig von Mises Institute
Murray N. Rothbard vs. the Philosophers - Ludwig von Mises Institute
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LAW AND NATURE IN THE WORK OF MURRAY N. ROTHBARD 21<br />
this conception. The common good means that group of<br />
institutions allowing citizens within <strong>the</strong> polis to enjoy <strong>the</strong><br />
necessary conditions for <strong>the</strong> good life or, ra<strong>the</strong>r, to live as<br />
human nature requires. 32 For <strong>Rothbard</strong>, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand,<br />
<strong>the</strong> concept of <strong>the</strong> justice of private property makes any kind<br />
of taxation—and <strong>the</strong>refore <strong>the</strong> state—unacceptable.<br />
There are also profound differences with Passerin d’Entrèves,<br />
whom <strong>Rothbard</strong> quotes in support to <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory of<br />
<strong>the</strong> continuity between natural law and natural rights. He<br />
obviously does not agree with him regarding <strong>the</strong> conception<br />
of <strong>the</strong> state. The question of <strong>the</strong> relationship between<br />
Veatch and libertarianism merits fur<strong>the</strong>r examination. In<br />
fact, as regards <strong>the</strong> idea of <strong>the</strong> common good not as an end<br />
in itself but ra<strong>the</strong>r as an instrument or an intermediate<br />
objective, Veatch declares his own intellectual debt to Douglas<br />
Den Uyl and Douglas Rasmussen. What is more, in<br />
Human Rights: Fact or Fancy? besides thanking <strong>the</strong> libertarians,<br />
he recognizes <strong>the</strong> stimulus and support he received<br />
from Den Uyl, Rasmussen, and <strong>Rothbard</strong>. 33<br />
Although he says he is not a libertarian, Veatch clearly<br />
appreciates <strong>the</strong> support of <strong>the</strong> libertarians for individual<br />
rights and “<strong>the</strong>ir determination to find a proper philosophical<br />
justification for such rights.” 34 However, when Veatch goes<br />
on to consider <strong>the</strong> libertarian basis for individual rights, he<br />
seems to examine only one particular version of libertarian<br />
ethics, defined as ethical or rational egoism. According to<br />
rational egoism, <strong>the</strong> consequences of a lack of respect for<br />
agreed rights and obligations is so serious that everyone<br />
should consider it in his own personal interest to conform to<br />
<strong>the</strong> rules guaranteeing <strong>the</strong> respect of individual rights.<br />
Veatch writes, “rational individualism . . . is often associated<br />
with present-day libertarianism.” 35 While, on <strong>the</strong> one hand,<br />
32 Veatch, Human Rights, p. 122.<br />
33Ibid., p. ix.<br />
34Ibid. 35Ibid., p. 39.