Murray N. Rothbard vs. the Philosophers - Ludwig von Mises Institute

LAW AND NATURE IN THE WORK OF MURRAY N. ROTHBARD 19
In the Thomistic tradition, natural law is ethical as
well as physical law; and the instrument by which
man apprehends such law is his reason. . . .
Aquinas, then, realized that men always act purposively,
but also went beyond this to argue that
ends can also be apprehended by reason as either
objectively good or bad for man. 26
Rothbard also reproaches Bruno Leoni regarding ethical
relativism because Leoni was “scornful of the very idea that
ethical values should be rationally demonstrated,” while
“values should be demonstrated because reason is the only
sure, solid ground of conviction about values.” 27 Again, when
reviewing Freedom and the Law by Leoni, Rothbard criticizes
Leoni’s theory because it lacks a standard on which to
judge the content of laws that had evolved over time. It is
not enough to affirm the existence of a spontaneous process
from which customs and institutions developed; it is necessary
to subject them to the strict test of reason in order to
judge their conformity or otherwise with individual freedom
on the basis of an objective ethical standard. 28
Rothbard, contra Mises, thinks it possible to deduce ethical
principles from certain facts regarding human nature.
He maintains that
Individual human beings are not born or fashioned
with fully formed knowledge, values, goals,
or personalities; they must each form their own
values and goals, develop their personalities, and
learn about themselves and the world around
them. Every man must have freedom, must have
the scope to form, test, and act upon his own
choices, for any sort of development of his own
26Ibid., p. 5.
27Rothbard, “The Symposium on Relativism: A Critique”; see p.
103 in this volume.
28Murray N. Rothbard, “On Freedom and the Law,” New Individualist
Review 1, no. 4 (1962): 37–40.