Murray N. Rothbard vs. the Philosophers - Ludwig von Mises Institute
Murray N. Rothbard vs. the Philosophers - Ludwig von Mises Institute
Murray N. Rothbard vs. the Philosophers - Ludwig von Mises Institute
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MURRAY N. ROTHBARD VS. THE PHILOSOPHERS: UNPUBLISHED WRITINGS<br />
16 ON HAYEK, MISES, STRAUSS, AND POLYANI<br />
subjective nature that could be considered nei<strong>the</strong>r true nor<br />
false. <strong>Rothbard</strong> disagrees with this view of ethics; one problem<br />
he sees with it is that it appeals only to subjective values<br />
to convince o<strong>the</strong>rs that <strong>the</strong> best social system is <strong>the</strong> market<br />
economy. <strong>Mises</strong> thinks that <strong>the</strong> choice of <strong>the</strong> free market<br />
should be based on <strong>the</strong> consequences of such a preference.<br />
While not denying that value judgments are <strong>the</strong><br />
expression of essentially subjective choices, <strong>Mises</strong> thinks<br />
that practically any informed person would choose <strong>the</strong> free<br />
market. In contrast, <strong>Rothbard</strong> holds that certain facts<br />
regarding human nature will produce objective judgments<br />
about what is best for man. Moreover, <strong>Rothbard</strong> does not<br />
consider <strong>Mises</strong>’s main arguments regarding capitalism fully<br />
satisfactory. <strong>Mises</strong>’s attempt to found capitalism on a subjective<br />
basis, albeit valid as far as it goes, requires a fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />
supporting argument.<br />
<strong>Rothbard</strong> is one of those authors who maintains that, in<br />
practice, few of our judgments are “pure” in <strong>the</strong> sense required<br />
by <strong>the</strong> facts-values dichotomy. Although it is not possible to<br />
derive prescriptive statements from facts, we can derive <strong>the</strong>m<br />
from judgments on facts. This is Strauss and Philippa Foot’s<br />
position. 21 Besides this, in <strong>Rothbard</strong>’s opinion, <strong>the</strong>re are<br />
self-evident truths able to provide a basis for an objective<br />
ethics. The ownership of oneself, of one’s own body, is an<br />
example of such a truth. <strong>Mises</strong> rejects this position; and<br />
according to his way of thinking, criteria for objectively evaluating<br />
value judgments do not exist:<br />
The ultimate end of action is always <strong>the</strong> satisfaction<br />
of some desires of <strong>the</strong> acting man. Since<br />
nobody is in a position to substitute his own value<br />
judgments for those of <strong>the</strong> acting individual, it is<br />
vain to pass judgment on o<strong>the</strong>r people’s aims and<br />
volitions. No man is qualified to declare what<br />
21 See Strauss, Natural Right and History (Los Angeles and<br />
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); Philippa Foot,<br />
Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978) and Natural Goodness<br />
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001).