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Murray N. Rothbard vs. the Philosophers - Ludwig von Mises Institute

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MURRAY N. ROTHBARD VS. THE PHILOSOPHERS: UNPUBLISHED WRITINGS<br />

16 ON HAYEK, MISES, STRAUSS, AND POLYANI<br />

subjective nature that could be considered nei<strong>the</strong>r true nor<br />

false. <strong>Rothbard</strong> disagrees with this view of ethics; one problem<br />

he sees with it is that it appeals only to subjective values<br />

to convince o<strong>the</strong>rs that <strong>the</strong> best social system is <strong>the</strong> market<br />

economy. <strong>Mises</strong> thinks that <strong>the</strong> choice of <strong>the</strong> free market<br />

should be based on <strong>the</strong> consequences of such a preference.<br />

While not denying that value judgments are <strong>the</strong><br />

expression of essentially subjective choices, <strong>Mises</strong> thinks<br />

that practically any informed person would choose <strong>the</strong> free<br />

market. In contrast, <strong>Rothbard</strong> holds that certain facts<br />

regarding human nature will produce objective judgments<br />

about what is best for man. Moreover, <strong>Rothbard</strong> does not<br />

consider <strong>Mises</strong>’s main arguments regarding capitalism fully<br />

satisfactory. <strong>Mises</strong>’s attempt to found capitalism on a subjective<br />

basis, albeit valid as far as it goes, requires a fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />

supporting argument.<br />

<strong>Rothbard</strong> is one of those authors who maintains that, in<br />

practice, few of our judgments are “pure” in <strong>the</strong> sense required<br />

by <strong>the</strong> facts-values dichotomy. Although it is not possible to<br />

derive prescriptive statements from facts, we can derive <strong>the</strong>m<br />

from judgments on facts. This is Strauss and Philippa Foot’s<br />

position. 21 Besides this, in <strong>Rothbard</strong>’s opinion, <strong>the</strong>re are<br />

self-evident truths able to provide a basis for an objective<br />

ethics. The ownership of oneself, of one’s own body, is an<br />

example of such a truth. <strong>Mises</strong> rejects this position; and<br />

according to his way of thinking, criteria for objectively evaluating<br />

value judgments do not exist:<br />

The ultimate end of action is always <strong>the</strong> satisfaction<br />

of some desires of <strong>the</strong> acting man. Since<br />

nobody is in a position to substitute his own value<br />

judgments for those of <strong>the</strong> acting individual, it is<br />

vain to pass judgment on o<strong>the</strong>r people’s aims and<br />

volitions. No man is qualified to declare what<br />

21 See Strauss, Natural Right and History (Los Angeles and<br />

Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); Philippa Foot,<br />

Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978) and Natural Goodness<br />

(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001).

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