Murray N. Rothbard vs. the Philosophers - Ludwig von Mises Institute
Murray N. Rothbard vs. the Philosophers - Ludwig von Mises Institute Murray N. Rothbard vs. the Philosophers - Ludwig von Mises Institute
REVIEWS AND COMMENTS BY MURRAY N. ROTHBARD 111 We can surely agree that it is illegitimate for anyone, leftist or libertarian, to ignore and not fully consider the value-free laws of economics. But precisely because economics is neutral to ethics, this is hardly an answer. For to Mises, all ethics is “arbitrary,” and yet, even Mises must admit that no one can decide any policy unless he does make an ethical judgment. The man who understands economics and then chooses liberty is, or should be, considered by Mises to be just as “arbitrary” as the man who chooses egalitarianism, after accepting, say, the economic consequences of lessened productivity. And since either decision, according to Mises, is ultimately arbitrary, he cannot finally refute the interventionists in this way. And as for the opposition being “emotional,” this may well be, but we have seen that emotion is the only groundwork that Mises can find for ultimate values anyway. How has Mises been able to be an ethical relativist and still be the great champion that he has been of economic liberty? By what I consider an illegitimate assumption. Thus: Economics pointed out that many cherished (interventionist) policies . . . bring about . . . effects which—from the point of view of those who advocated and applied them—were even more unsatisfactory than the conditions which they were designed to alter. 59 It is this assumption—that even the advocates really are worse off—that permits Mises to say that they are “bad.” But how can Mises know what motivates the statists? Suppose, for example, the price controller wants power and doesn’t care if it creates shortages; he has power and the perquisites of a soft job in the bureaucracy; suppose that he is a Communist, and wants to create shortages (or is a nihilist and hates everyone, and wants to create shortages); suppose that someone who wants to confiscate from the rich 59 Mises, “Epistemological Relativism,” p. 119.
MURRAY N. ROTHBARD VS. THE PHILOSPHERS: UNPUBLISHED WRITINGS 112 ON HAYEK, MISES, STRAUSS, AND POLYANI has a very high time preference and doesn’t care if the economy will be wrecked in twenty years. What then? In short, it is illegitimate for Mises to assume that, knowing all the consequences shown by economics, everyone will consider himself worse off from the statist measure. When Mises says that repeal of such measures “would benefit the rightly understood or long-run interests of all the people,” and are championed by vested “short-run interests,” suppose, as we have just indicated, the time preferences of the latter are high; or suppose, even aside from the time preference, that the amount X can mulct from everyone by some interventionist measure is greater than the amount he will lose as a consumer. 60 What I have been trying to say is that Mises’s utilitarian, relativist approach to ethics is not nearly enough to establish a full case for liberty. It must be supplemented by an absolutist ethics—an ethics of liberty, as well as of other values needed for the health and development of the individual—grounded on natural law, i.e., discovery of the laws of man’s nature. Failure to recognize this is the greatest flaw in Mises’s philosophical worldview. In his final section, Mises says that “there are authors who combine praxeological relativism with ethical relativism. But there are also authors who display ethical absolutism while rejecting the concept of universally valid praxeological laws.” 61 Yes, and there is also a third category of writers: those who accept both praxeological and ethical absolutism, and recognize that both are vitally necessary for a complete philosophical view, as well as for the achievement of liberty. I hope it is clear that this extended discussion is not intended to deny the great overall merits of Mises’s paper and its importance for all scholars of human action. 60Ibid. 61Ibid.
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MURRAY N. ROTHBARD VS. THE PHILOSPHERS: UNPUBLISHED WRITINGS<br />
112 ON HAYEK, MISES, STRAUSS, AND POLYANI<br />
has a very high time preference and doesn’t care if <strong>the</strong> economy<br />
will be wrecked in twenty years. What <strong>the</strong>n?<br />
In short, it is illegitimate for <strong>Mises</strong> to assume that, knowing<br />
all <strong>the</strong> consequences shown by economics, everyone will<br />
consider himself worse off from <strong>the</strong> statist measure. When<br />
<strong>Mises</strong> says that repeal of such measures “would benefit <strong>the</strong><br />
rightly understood or long-run interests of all <strong>the</strong> people,”<br />
and are championed by vested “short-run interests,” suppose,<br />
as we have just indicated, <strong>the</strong> time preferences of <strong>the</strong><br />
latter are high; or suppose, even aside from <strong>the</strong> time preference,<br />
that <strong>the</strong> amount X can mulct from everyone by some<br />
interventionist measure is greater than <strong>the</strong> amount he will<br />
lose as a consumer. 60<br />
What I have been trying to say is that <strong>Mises</strong>’s utilitarian,<br />
relativist approach to ethics is not nearly enough to establish<br />
a full case for liberty. It must be supplemented by an<br />
absolutist ethics—an ethics of liberty, as well as of o<strong>the</strong>r values<br />
needed for <strong>the</strong> health and development of <strong>the</strong> individual—grounded<br />
on natural law, i.e., discovery of <strong>the</strong> laws of<br />
man’s nature. Failure to recognize this is <strong>the</strong> greatest flaw<br />
in <strong>Mises</strong>’s philosophical worldview.<br />
In his final section, <strong>Mises</strong> says that “<strong>the</strong>re are authors<br />
who combine praxeological relativism with ethical relativism.<br />
But <strong>the</strong>re are also authors who display ethical absolutism<br />
while rejecting <strong>the</strong> concept of universally valid praxeological<br />
laws.” 61 Yes, and <strong>the</strong>re is also a third category of<br />
writers: those who accept both praxeological and ethical<br />
absolutism, and recognize that both are vitally necessary for<br />
a complete philosophical view, as well as for <strong>the</strong> achievement<br />
of liberty.<br />
I hope it is clear that this extended discussion is not<br />
intended to deny <strong>the</strong> great overall merits of <strong>Mises</strong>’s paper<br />
and its importance for all scholars of human action.<br />
60Ibid. 61Ibid.