Murray N. Rothbard vs. the Philosophers - Ludwig von Mises Institute
Murray N. Rothbard vs. the Philosophers - Ludwig von Mises Institute
Murray N. Rothbard vs. the Philosophers - Ludwig von Mises Institute
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MURRAY N. ROTHBARD VS. THE PHILOSPHERS: UNPUBLISHED WRITINGS<br />
106 ON HAYEK, MISES, STRAUSS, AND POLYANI<br />
any selections or make any judgments about values—as<br />
Leoni indicates, and <strong>Mises</strong> shows elsewhere, making judgments<br />
of relevance or about values does not imply a value<br />
judgment on <strong>the</strong> part of <strong>the</strong> scholar.) For, in <strong>the</strong> final analysis,<br />
Leoni has to concede that ultimate ends—ultimate ethical<br />
values—are arbitrary and personal, and in fact, in an<br />
explicitly antirational section, he is scornful of <strong>the</strong> very idea<br />
that ethical values should be rationally demonstrated. To<br />
say, as Leoni does, that “if we need to ‘demonstrate’ <strong>the</strong><br />
validity of our values to ourselves, this possibly means that<br />
we actually do not believe <strong>the</strong>m enough to give up that<br />
‘demonstration’ . . . if we try to demonstrate our values to<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r people, this is by no means <strong>the</strong> surest way of convincing<br />
<strong>the</strong>m to accept those values,” is sheer antirational obscurantism.<br />
55 Values should be demonstrated because reason is<br />
<strong>the</strong> only sure, solid ground of conviction about values—far<br />
more solid than <strong>the</strong> emotional whims upon which Leoni<br />
would apparently base <strong>the</strong>m. Strauss is right that <strong>the</strong> Weber<br />
position is, in <strong>the</strong> end, ethical relativism, because it holds<br />
that ethics are purely subjective and arbitrary, and not subject<br />
to rational demonstration; Strauss is right because he<br />
believes in <strong>the</strong> possibility and demonstrability of rational,<br />
objective ethics.<br />
Leoni is also on shakier ground than <strong>Mises</strong>, because<br />
<strong>Mises</strong>’s main discussion is on keeping economics and praxeology<br />
apart from ethics—which is a perfectly sound position—whereas<br />
Leoni is trying to keep ethics out of “political<br />
science.” Now, while economics is a self-subsistent, wertfrei<br />
science, “political science” is not; modern political science<br />
is an empty, pretentious, quasi-ma<strong>the</strong>matical set of<br />
“model building,” and when we peel away <strong>the</strong> pretension, we<br />
find that “political science” is divisible into two parts: current<br />
history of political institutions or political thought, and<br />
political philosophy. And <strong>the</strong> very essence of political philosophy<br />
is <strong>the</strong> carving out of an ethical system—strictly, a<br />
subset of ethics dealing with political ethics. Ethics is <strong>the</strong><br />
55 Ibid., p. 163.