Murray N. Rothbard vs. the Philosophers - Ludwig von Mises Institute

MURRAY N. ROTHBARD VS. THE PHILOSPHERS: UNPUBLISHED WRITINGS
98 ON HAYEK, MISES, STRAUSS, AND POLYANI
there will be a linkage between the Prince and the 26th
chapter of the Discourses. (Note the odd “reasoning”:
“Since the Prince consists of twenty-six chapters and the
Prince does not give us any information as to the possible
meaning of this number, we turn to the twenty-sixth chapter
of the Discourses.” Note the “since,” as if this had the sweet
logic of a syllogism.) Naturally, in this 26th chapter, Strauss
finds mention of a “new prince,” which sends him off on a
lengthy flight of fancy—presented by him as scientific theory—where
the true key to the Prince is found deep in the
26th chapter of the Discourses. On and on we go, until
finally, on page 52, Strauss makes his crazy numerology
explicit: “This is not the place to give further examples of
Machiavelli’s use of the number 26 or, more precisely, of 13
and multiples of 13. It is sufficient here to mention some further
features of his work which would seem to indicate that
numbers are an important device used by him.” 47 And off we
go further expecting at any moment to be introduced
solemnly to the Mysteries of the Great Pyramid and the manacle
of Dr. Fu Manchu.
I grant that this is a particularly wild instance, but it is
typical of the crackpot methodology that Strauss employs
throughout. For example, in another place, Strauss says
that Machiavelli, dedicating his Prince to Lorenzo de
Medici, called upon him to “lead Italy to the promised land”
by liberating her from barbarian rule and unifying her. To a
sane reader, I submit, this is a complimentary call on
Lorenzo to be another Moses. But to Strauss’s odd mind,
this is really a sly dig at Lorenzo, for after all Moses wasn’t
so great: he died before reaching the Promised Land. Therefore
(sic), Machiavelli was really slyly deprecating Lorenzo
as not good enough to reach the Promised Land, and subtly
saying that only he, Machiavelli, was good enough. Another
typical example of Strauss’s nonsensical ratiocination.
47 Ibid., p. 52.