the toxic truth - Greenpeace

the toxic truth
was not discharged as MARPOL slops but as
chemical slops. The police also told Trafigura
that, once this operation had taken place,
the Dutch authorities would need a copy
of the discharge report for their records. 346
Once again, the company was made aware of
the fact that the waste needed appropriate
disposal.
The combined warnings
At this point, Trafigura had been given
information that the waste was dangerous
from actors across three continents. The
Tunisian operation was terminated because
of the lack of specialist waste disposal. At
least four European locations that Trafigura
approached did not have the facilities to
deal with waste of this nature, while APS had
made clear that specialist treatment would be
required at Rotterdam. Caustic soda suppliers
on two continents gave clear warnings. And,
finally, there was the phone call from the
Dutch police, during which Trafigura was
specifically told to ensure that the waste was
dealt with as chemical rather than MARPOL
waste. All of this information was in Trafigura’s
possession before it made the decision to
dispose of the waste at Abidjan.
There can be no doubt that Trafigura knew the
waste was potentially hazardous to human
health. This was also the conclusion of a
Dutch court in 2010, which found Trafigura
and the captain of the Probo Koala guilty of
“[c]omplicity in the delivery of goods, in the
knowledge that these goods are hazardous
to life or health, and for having concealed this
harmful nature,” 347 in breach of Section 174 of
the Dutch Penal Code.
In reaching this conclusion, the Dutch court
specifically stated that “Trafigura … had
knowledge regarding the hazardous nature
of the slops” as a result of the fact that
they had “arranged the gasoline washings
from start to finish”, which meant that they
“knew how much caustic soda was present
in the slops”. The court was convinced of the
hazardous nature of the waste since it could
“cause burns when coming in contact with the
skin”. 348 The judgement also cited an expert
report (Bakker NFI), which stated that “…
the conclusion that this waste is extremely
hazardous is justified.” 349 As noted by the
court, Trafigura was aware of the fact that this
was a caustic substance, since the supplier,
WRT, had sent information on caustic soda to
Naeem Ahmed of Trafigura Ltd by email in the
form of a Material Safety Data Sheet. 350
The court also held that Captain Chertov
of the Probo Koala was “obviously very well
aware of the hazardous nature of these
materials”, since he had insisted on his crew
wearing protective clothing when dealing with
the waste. 351
The Court of Appeal subsequently confirmed
the assessment of the court of first instance
that Trafigura was aware of the harmful
character of the waste.
Trafigura rejected a
safe disposal option
on cost grounds
From the time Trafigura created the toxic
waste on board the Probo Koala to the time
the waste was dumped in Abidjan – with
devastating effects – the company was
offered one safe option for disposal: in the
Netherlands. 352 Trafigura rejected this option
on the basis of the cost, 353 which would have
been in the region of half a million euros
(US$630,000). The profit Trafigura expected
to make was in the order of US$7 million
(€5.6 million) per cargo, 354 and the company’s
2006 profits were US$511 million (€407
million). 355
Therefore, a legitimate question is: was
Trafigura looking for a safe method of disposal
or a cheap method of disposal?
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Chapter 7