the toxic truth - Greenpeace

82 Amnesty internAtionAl And greenpeAce netherlAnds
Chapter 7
Trafigura knew the
waste was hazardous
In 2005, before starting the caustic washing
process, Trafigura was well aware that the
process would produce waste that was
hazardous. This is clear from the company’s
internal emails, described in Chapter 2 and
above. 335 Moreover, the company had had
multiple warnings before bringing the waste to
Abidjan that the waste posed significant risks
to human health.
Warning 1: The incident in Tunisia
In March 2006 gases leaked from the
TANKMED facilities in Tunisia causing a
serious odour problem. Several workers
experienced breathing difficulties 336 and
three people were reportedly admitted to
hospital. 337 Following an investigation by
Tunisian authorities into the incident, caustic
washing was prohibited because of the risks
associated with the resulting waste. 338 The
Tunisian environmental authorities stated
that “spent caustics should be treated
through specialized and specially adapted
processes”. 339
This incident should have put Trafigura on
notice that the waste required specialist
treatment. Yet, having already undertaken
caustic washing in the only two locations
that it had been able to find on land to carry
out this process (UAE and Tunisia), Trafigura
resorted to conducting caustic washing on
board a ship.
Warning 2: The information from
the caustic soda suppliers
When Trafigura attempted to buy caustic
soda, it was put on notice that the product
was dangerous. A US-based caustic soda
supplier, Univar, warned that the product would
be “hazardous” and that Dangerous Goods
Certification would be required. 340 Trafigura
eventually purchased caustic soda from a
Dutch company, WRT, and received a Material
Safety Data sheet, which, as a Dutch court
later observed, clearly gave the company
information on the hazardous nature of
caustic soda. 341
Warning 3: Four European locations
are unable to process the waste
During a court action in 2010 in the
Netherlands, it emerged that the company
had tried to dispose of the waste in at least
four locations in Europe before the Probo
Koala arrived at Amsterdam. 342 However, none
were able to accept the waste. In at least two
cases Trafigura was again put on notice that
the waste was dangerous and proper disposal
difficult. The facility in Malta was unable
to accept the waste “due to the chemical
content”, 343 while the facility in Gibraltar told
Trafigura that “the flash point of the slops
appeared to be too low”. 344
Warning 4: Events in Amsterdam
As described in detail in Chapter 3, a portion
of the waste was offloaded to an Amsterdam
Port Services (APS) barge in Amsterdam.
Shortly thereafter, the smell associated with
the waste raised serious concern with both
APS and the authorities.
Trafigura was then told that APS, an
experienced and licensed port reception
facility, was unable to process the waste and
that it would need to be sent to a specialist
facility. Trafigura’s agent in Amsterdam, Bulk
Maritime Agencies (BMA), notified Trafigura
(via Falcon Navigation) that: “Approx. 250 cbm
slops were discharged last night. Analysis
of this slops resulted into a c.o.d. content of
500.000.” APS informed Trafigura that the
cost of processing the waste would rise from
€27 per m 3 to €1,000 per m 3 . 345
Warning 5: The Dutch police call
On 15 August 2006, while the Probo
Koala was in Nigeria, a Dutch police officer
telephoned Naeem Amhed of Trafigura Ltd
and advised him that, due to the nature of the
waste (caustic soda washings/mercaptan
sulphur), Trafigura needed to ensure that it