the toxic truth - Greenpeace

the toxic truth - Greenpeace the toxic truth - Greenpeace

greenpeace.org
from greenpeace.org More from this publisher
01.06.2013 Views

the toxic truth Some within the company appear to have been indifferent about what would become of the ship transporting the waste: “ 5k per day I think you are dreaming as this is the opex costs of a vessel like this in WAF [West Africa] and if you add amortization of current scrap prices you get over double then that to start with. In addition that implies you do not want insurance class p &I and you do not care if she sinks. ” 329 Internal emails also raise questions about whether Trafigura was trying to avoid regulatory scrutiny of its unprecedented activity on a ship. An email dated 21 June 2006 suggests that Trafigura had also considered storing the coker naphtha in the UK port of Milford Haven, but rejected this: “ We should store the PMI crap on a ship in Gibraltar rather than take it to Milford Haven. Reasons are as follows… Milford will require at least one approval. The bucket in Gib will require no 330 such thing. ” Amnesty International and Greenpeace have asked Trafigura to explain the content of these emails, but the company did not respond. In the end, Trafigura went ahead with its decision to carry out caustic washing on board a ship without having identified any safe means of dealing with the waste material that it was about to produce. The Bay and Rock of Gibraltar. © Greenpeace/Sara del río gaps in governanCe: the Mediterranean area and gibraltar waters There is no effective, integrated system of environmental governance in the Mediterranean. The present situation is characterized by a patchwork of legal and jurisdictional regimes that establish competencies on different issues and in different parts of the sea, from coastal waters and territorial seas to ecological and fisheries protection zones and the international waters of the high seas. Unlike other maritime regions, many Mediterranean coastal states have not declared Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), which means that a large part of the Mediterranean is still beyond the jurisdiction of any individual Mediterranean state. As a consequence, there has been a lack of effective control of and responsibility for the marine environment. Environmental groups, including Greenpeace, have expressed concern about serious gaps in regulatory oversight associated with shipping activity in waters around Gibraltar. In 2010, 112,843 vessels crossed the Strait of Gibraltar, 331 the gateway to the Mediterranean Sea. There is a longstanding disagreement between Spain and the UK about the jurisdiction of these waters. This disagreement, combined with intense business competition between the nearby Spanish Port of Algeciras and the Port of Gibraltar, has resulted in a situation where regulation is lax. 332 Both ports compete in the market for ships to enter the bay for port operations, especially for bunkering, but there is a lack of co-ordination between the port authorities. Failures in communication between the two port authorities have led to a number of environmental disasters, such as the collision between the cargo ship New Flame and the oil tanker Torm Gertrud in August 2007, which resulted in a major oil spill. The problem is compounded by the fact that Gibraltar enjoys a special European Union (EU) status, under which certain rules do not apply, including some concerning environmental protection. 333 As a consequence, Gibraltar waters have acquired a reputation for irregular port operations and activities that could not take place elsewhere in the EU. Because of the serious environmental and human consequences of the regulatory gaps, Greenpeace advocates governance reform, including a joint monitoring, control, surveillance and compliance mechanism for the Mediterranean. Greenpeace also advocates for a biodiversity agreement under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea to address the global gaps in oceans governance. 334 81 Chapter 7

82 Amnesty internAtionAl And greenpeAce netherlAnds Chapter 7 Trafigura knew the waste was hazardous In 2005, before starting the caustic washing process, Trafigura was well aware that the process would produce waste that was hazardous. This is clear from the company’s internal emails, described in Chapter 2 and above. 335 Moreover, the company had had multiple warnings before bringing the waste to Abidjan that the waste posed significant risks to human health. Warning 1: The incident in Tunisia In March 2006 gases leaked from the TANKMED facilities in Tunisia causing a serious odour problem. Several workers experienced breathing difficulties 336 and three people were reportedly admitted to hospital. 337 Following an investigation by Tunisian authorities into the incident, caustic washing was prohibited because of the risks associated with the resulting waste. 338 The Tunisian environmental authorities stated that “spent caustics should be treated through specialized and specially adapted processes”. 339 This incident should have put Trafigura on notice that the waste required specialist treatment. Yet, having already undertaken caustic washing in the only two locations that it had been able to find on land to carry out this process (UAE and Tunisia), Trafigura resorted to conducting caustic washing on board a ship. Warning 2: The information from the caustic soda suppliers When Trafigura attempted to buy caustic soda, it was put on notice that the product was dangerous. A US-based caustic soda supplier, Univar, warned that the product would be “hazardous” and that Dangerous Goods Certification would be required. 340 Trafigura eventually purchased caustic soda from a Dutch company, WRT, and received a Material Safety Data sheet, which, as a Dutch court later observed, clearly gave the company information on the hazardous nature of caustic soda. 341 Warning 3: Four European locations are unable to process the waste During a court action in 2010 in the Netherlands, it emerged that the company had tried to dispose of the waste in at least four locations in Europe before the Probo Koala arrived at Amsterdam. 342 However, none were able to accept the waste. In at least two cases Trafigura was again put on notice that the waste was dangerous and proper disposal difficult. The facility in Malta was unable to accept the waste “due to the chemical content”, 343 while the facility in Gibraltar told Trafigura that “the flash point of the slops appeared to be too low”. 344 Warning 4: Events in Amsterdam As described in detail in Chapter 3, a portion of the waste was offloaded to an Amsterdam Port Services (APS) barge in Amsterdam. Shortly thereafter, the smell associated with the waste raised serious concern with both APS and the authorities. Trafigura was then told that APS, an experienced and licensed port reception facility, was unable to process the waste and that it would need to be sent to a specialist facility. Trafigura’s agent in Amsterdam, Bulk Maritime Agencies (BMA), notified Trafigura (via Falcon Navigation) that: “Approx. 250 cbm slops were discharged last night. Analysis of this slops resulted into a c.o.d. content of 500.000.” APS informed Trafigura that the cost of processing the waste would rise from €27 per m 3 to €1,000 per m 3 . 345 Warning 5: The Dutch police call On 15 August 2006, while the Probo Koala was in Nigeria, a Dutch police officer telephoned Naeem Amhed of Trafigura Ltd and advised him that, due to the nature of the waste (caustic soda washings/mercaptan sulphur), Trafigura needed to ensure that it

<strong>the</strong> <strong>toxic</strong> <strong>truth</strong><br />

Some within <strong>the</strong> company appear to have been indifferent<br />

about what would become of <strong>the</strong> ship transporting <strong>the</strong> waste:<br />

“ 5k per day I think you are dreaming as this is <strong>the</strong> opex costs of<br />

a vessel like this in WAF [West Africa] and if you add amortization<br />

of current scrap prices you get over double <strong>the</strong>n that to start with.<br />

In addition that implies you do not want insurance class p &I and<br />

you do not care if she sinks. ” 329<br />

Internal emails also raise questions about whe<strong>the</strong>r Trafigura<br />

was trying to avoid regulatory scrutiny of its unprecedented<br />

activity on a ship. An email dated 21 June 2006 suggests that<br />

Trafigura had also considered storing <strong>the</strong> coker naphtha in <strong>the</strong><br />

UK port of Milford Haven, but rejected this:<br />

“ We should store <strong>the</strong> PMI crap on a ship in Gibraltar ra<strong>the</strong>r<br />

than take it to Milford Haven. Reasons are as follows… Milford<br />

will require at least one approval. The bucket in Gib will require no<br />

330<br />

such thing. ”<br />

Amnesty International and <strong>Greenpeace</strong> have asked Trafigura to<br />

explain <strong>the</strong> content of <strong>the</strong>se emails, but <strong>the</strong> company did not<br />

respond.<br />

In <strong>the</strong> end, Trafigura went ahead with its decision to carry out<br />

caustic washing on board a ship without having identified any<br />

safe means of dealing with <strong>the</strong> waste material that it was about<br />

to produce.<br />

The Bay and Rock of Gibraltar. © <strong>Greenpeace</strong>/Sara del río<br />

gaps in governanCe:<br />

<strong>the</strong> Mediterranean area<br />

and gibraltar waters<br />

There is no effective, integrated system of environmental governance<br />

in <strong>the</strong> Mediterranean. The present situation is characterized<br />

by a patchwork of legal and jurisdictional regimes that<br />

establish competencies on different issues and in different parts<br />

of <strong>the</strong> sea, from coastal waters and territorial seas to ecological<br />

and fisheries protection zones and <strong>the</strong> international waters of <strong>the</strong><br />

high seas. Unlike o<strong>the</strong>r maritime regions, many Mediterranean<br />

coastal states have not declared Exclusive Economic Zones<br />

(EEZ), which means that a large part of <strong>the</strong> Mediterranean is still<br />

beyond <strong>the</strong> jurisdiction of any individual Mediterranean state. As<br />

a consequence, <strong>the</strong>re has been a lack of effective control of and<br />

responsibility for <strong>the</strong> marine environment.<br />

Environmental groups, including <strong>Greenpeace</strong>, have expressed<br />

concern about serious gaps in regulatory oversight associated<br />

with shipping activity in waters around Gibraltar. In 2010,<br />

112,843 vessels crossed <strong>the</strong> Strait of Gibraltar, 331 <strong>the</strong> gateway<br />

to <strong>the</strong> Mediterranean Sea. There is a longstanding disagreement<br />

between Spain and <strong>the</strong> UK about <strong>the</strong> jurisdiction of <strong>the</strong>se waters.<br />

This disagreement, combined with intense business competition<br />

between <strong>the</strong> nearby Spanish Port of Algeciras and <strong>the</strong> Port of<br />

Gibraltar, has resulted in a situation where regulation is lax. 332<br />

Both ports compete in <strong>the</strong> market for ships to enter <strong>the</strong> bay for<br />

port operations, especially for bunkering, but <strong>the</strong>re is a lack of<br />

co-ordination between <strong>the</strong> port authorities. Failures in communication<br />

between <strong>the</strong> two port authorities have led to a number of<br />

environmental disasters, such as <strong>the</strong> collision between <strong>the</strong> cargo<br />

ship New Flame and <strong>the</strong> oil tanker Torm Gertrud in August 2007,<br />

which resulted in a major oil spill.<br />

The problem is compounded by <strong>the</strong> fact that Gibraltar enjoys a<br />

special European Union (EU) status, under which certain rules<br />

do not apply, including some concerning environmental protection.<br />

333 As a consequence, Gibraltar waters have acquired a<br />

reputation for irregular port operations and activities that could<br />

not take place elsewhere in <strong>the</strong> EU.<br />

Because of <strong>the</strong> serious environmental and human consequences<br />

of <strong>the</strong> regulatory gaps, <strong>Greenpeace</strong> advocates governance<br />

reform, including a joint monitoring, control, surveillance and<br />

compliance mechanism for <strong>the</strong> Mediterranean. <strong>Greenpeace</strong> also<br />

advocates for a biodiversity agreement under <strong>the</strong> UN Convention<br />

on <strong>the</strong> Law of <strong>the</strong> Sea to address <strong>the</strong> global gaps in oceans<br />

governance. 334<br />

81<br />

Chapter 7

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!