the toxic truth - Greenpeace

the toxic truth - Greenpeace the toxic truth - Greenpeace

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the toxic truth What should have been done Much more complete information would be required to assess the effects of dumping on a population, including: 1 Full details about the waste » its composition and variability; » its pH, and how that varied initially and over time; » where it was dumped and in what quantities; » what it was dumped into and whether the receiving fluid or soil would alter the waste and in what manner; » the method of dumping and whether this may result in aerosolization of material; » measurement of air concentrations of all chemicals downwind of the dumping and particularly in areas where there is any human habitation; » repeat measurements of air concentrations and at various locations to encompass all exposed populations and to enable modelling to be done to estimate exposures; » details about rainfall and measurement of the composition of the waste at different times to monitor how it might be changing to support modelling of the likely exposure of the population; » wind direction and speed, at least for the period when exposure is likely to be significant, to again model exposure patterns. 2 The health effects of exposure to all the chemicals in the waste with which people may come into contact and the concentrations likely to be injurious. 3 Monitoring of the health records for the local population to see if there had been any change in the frequency of admissions to hospitals/health centres/or visits to local medical practitioners in the period immediately prior to the dumping of the waste compared with the period after the dumping, and to note the symptoms of which individuals complained. If changes in reporting frequencies had occurred, to follow up with those who had complained after the dumping to see if their complaints were consistent with exposure to components of the waste. 4 a proper epidemiological study of the population (to assess any changes in health or increased mortality) which may have been exposed to the chemicals from the waste and to have a matching control group of individuals who could not have been exposed. The study would need to be of sufficient size and power to detect changes and would have to match individuals according to age, sex, general environment and any other variable to ensure as far as possible that the only difference between the exposed group and the controls was possible exposure to chemicals in the waste. 221 ANNEX I

222 Amnesty internAtionAl And greenpeAce netherlAnds ANNEX NotEs 1. NFI expert report, Ministry of Justice, Netherlands Forensic Institute, 29 January 2007, Odour incident, APS Amsterdam. 2. Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, National Commission of Enquiry on the toxic waste in the district of Abidjan, 15 November 2006, French version. In the annexes the AVR analyses are included dated 3 July 2006. 3. ATM Afvalstoffen Terminal Moerdijk, Analysis of sample 3 July 2006. Date of report publication, 8 September 2006. 4. Amnesty International English translation of verdict on Trafigura Beheer BV, LJN (National Case Law Number): BN2149, District Court of Amsterdam, 13/846003-06 (PROMIS), para 8.3.3.9. 5. NFI measured a pH of 14 and AVR and ATM Moerdijk measured a pH of 12.9. 6. “On the same day, Mr Marrero emailed Captain Kablan confirming the contents of the conversation by stating: Trafigura wished to disclose of 528m 3 of slops from the Probo Koala ariving at Abidjan on 19 August 2006. Trafigura Amended Defence 5 December 2008 (Yao Essaie Motto & Others v Trafigura Limited and Trafigura Beheer BV in the High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Claim No. HQ06X03370), paras 163 and 163.1. And the Amsterdam court evidence says: “The report from Dr Geoffrey Bound of Minton, Treharne & Davies Ltd dated 6 April 2010 states the ratio of the oil and water fractions in the slops in Abidjan (p5): “2.6 In summary, I have concluded that the slops onboard the Probo Koala prior to its arrival in Abidjan comprised 183m 3 of hydrocarbons derived from the Brownsville cargoes (weighing 137 mt) and 344.8m 3 of aqueous solution (weighing 379 mt and representing 199m 3 of added caustic wash solution combined with other water delivered with the cargoes) as follows…” Note: This evidence can only be used in the Trafigura case; it is excluded from the Chertov and Ahmed cases. It must be pointed out that Bound arrives at a total amount of 527.3m 3 , whereas there were still about 544m 3 in the slop tanks in Amsterdam. Captain Chertov states, in his “letter of protest” of 5 July 2006 that over 16m 3 less was returned to the Probo Koala than was delivered to APS. We also refer to an email message from Gampierakis (Falcon Navigation) to Ahmed et al of 26 July 2006 stating that the captain found that 528,308m 3 of slops were on board at that point (360,260m 3 in the port tank and 168,048m 3 in the starboard tank). Source: p28 from Evidence Overview for Trafigura Beheer BV, N Ahmed, S Chertov, Facts: section 174 of the Dutch Penal Code and section 225 of the Dutch Penal Code. This evidence is part of the files of the Dutch public prosecutor. 7. NFI expert report, English, 10.1 p35/63. The analysis by CIAPOL (part of the Ministry of Environment of CDI) in Abidjan of traces found on the quay alongside the Probo Koala after the dumping of the waste show a figure of 0.6% of hydrogen sulphide which is in the same range as NFI results. 8. NFI expert report, English 2.1.2 Analysis of the watery phase, p 43/63 and 44/63. 9. Trafigura Responses to Amended requests for Clarification of the Defence Pursuant to Part 18 of the CPR 03 Dec 2008.pdf (Yao Essaie Motto & Others v Trafigura Limited and Trafigura Beheer BV in the High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Claim No. HQ06X03370) 10. Carter-Ruck Reply, in the High Court of Justice Queen’s Bench Division, Claim No. HQ09X02050 between Trafigura Limited v British Broadcast Corporation served 20 November 2009. Para 51 and 69. Reasons why Trafigura does not consider the CIAPOL/SIR results a reliable analysis include: “The sample was taken from material said to have been dumped on the wharfside in Abidjan and not from the Slop tanks themselves, with an obvious potential for cross contamination.” And: “There is no indication in the results as to the method of testing, particularly whether the presence of hydrogen sulphide was recorded as a result of a acidification process or a process which required all sulphides to be measured as hydrogen sulphide.” 11. Analysis of chemical composition is based on the Amsterdam NFI Chemical Analyses. Weight is based on 379 tonnes (344.8m 3 ) aqueous slops at a density of 1.1 for 10 per cent caustic. 12. The NFI report labels the 0.5% as Hydrogen Sulphide. Trafigura gives it a different description in their list (Inorganic Sulphur (Sulphide and Bi-Sulphide as S) as NFI identified the H2S in a mixture which had been acidified. 13. Analysis of chemical composition is based on the Amsterdam NFI Chemical Analyses. Weight is based on 137 tonnes (183m 3 ) at a density of 0.75 measured in Abidjan by CIAPOL on 22 August 2006 (from a sample drawn on 21 August 2006). 14. The sampling of the waste present in the slop tanks of the Probo Koala in Amsterdam was carried out using a jar that was lowered to the bottom. This wouldn’t necessarily have detected any sludgy sediments. To test for sediments, they would have had to use specialist sampling equipment (absolute bottom sampler), designed to pick up sediments from the bottom of tanks. The choice of NFI to take a running sample was deliberate as it would give a better reflection of the composition of the waste than the combination of a top, middle and bottom sample (p 9 NFI report Expert Report “Op 3 juli 2006 heeft het NFI (dhr Bakker) de politie (dhr. J.vd Kamp) geadviseerd over de monsterneming, Door het NFI is voorgesteld om, indien praktisch mogelijk, monsters te nemen over de gehele diepte van de te bemonsteren tank (zogenaamde running sample), omdat een running sample in principe een completer beeld van de samenstelling van de lading geeft dan de combinatie van een top,- midden, en bodemmonster. English translation: “On 3rd July 2006 NFI (Mr F Bakker) notified the police (Mr J vd Kamp) of the sampling exercise. NFI proposed that, insofar as possible, samples should taken from all depths of the tank concerned (so called running samples), because in principle a running sample provides a clearer picture of the cargo’s composition than the combination of a top, middle and bottom sample.” Police officer J vd Kamp has confirmed to Greenpeace that they had not sampled the sediment of the Probo Koala waste, 21 March 2012. 15. This was reported during the criminal court hearing in Amsterdam, on 10 June, 2010 and the judge read out an email saying: “It is very likely that we find solid residues in the cargo tanks and slop tanks due to the caustic washings, these may include caustic soda, sodium sulphide, sodium hydrosulphide and sodium mercaptides.” 16. Report Accident investigation following the Vest Tank explosion at Slovag, Revision O3 – English version, Bergen, 26-09- 2008, p18: “T3 (4000m 3 , ID 18 m, TT 16 m) contained about 270m 3 liquid at the time of the accident: 50m 3 precipitated waste from the treatment of coker gasoline, 205m 3 waste water from tank T61, and 14-15m 3 hydrochloric acid (filling of acid from a tank truck was going on when the accident occurred)”,p27, p62: “From October 2006 to March 2007, the company Vest Tank had periodically treated shiploads of a petroleum product called coker gasoline in order to reduce the content of malodorous sulphur containing components, especially mercaptans (thiols). The essential chemical principle behind this process was the high solubility of mercaptans in alkaline solutions of sodium hydroxide and water (caustic soda), compared to the solubility in coker gasoline. The cleaning process took place in two atmospheric storage tanks, T3 and T4, and resulted in the precipitation of solid waste that over time accumulated in the bottom of the tanks. The amount of dissolved or precipitated waste eventually reached a level where it was no longer possible to treat further tank loads of coker gasoline. The purpose of the process that went on when the accident took place was to dissolve the precipitated waste in tank T3, and at the same time reduce the pH value in the alkaline solution, by adding hydrochloric acid.” 17. Carter-Ruck Reply, in the High Court of Justice Queen’s Bench Division, Claim

222 Amnesty internAtionAl And greenpeAce ne<strong>the</strong>rlAnds<br />

ANNEX NotEs<br />

1. NFI expert report, Ministry of Justice, Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands<br />

Forensic Institute, 29 January<br />

2007, Odour incident, APS Amsterdam.<br />

2. Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, National Commission<br />

of Enquiry on <strong>the</strong> <strong>toxic</strong> waste<br />

in <strong>the</strong> district of Abidjan, 15 November<br />

2006, French version. In <strong>the</strong> annexes<br />

<strong>the</strong> AVR analyses are included dated 3<br />

July 2006.<br />

3. ATM Afvalstoffen Terminal Moerdijk,<br />

Analysis of sample 3 July 2006. Date of<br />

report publication, 8 September 2006.<br />

4. Amnesty International English translation<br />

of verdict on Trafigura Beheer<br />

BV, LJN (National Case Law Number):<br />

BN2149, District Court of Amsterdam,<br />

13/846003-06 (PROMIS), para 8.3.3.9.<br />

5. NFI measured a pH of 14 and AVR and<br />

ATM Moerdijk measured a pH of 12.9.<br />

6. “On <strong>the</strong> same day, Mr Marrero emailed<br />

Captain Kablan confirming <strong>the</strong> contents<br />

of <strong>the</strong> conversation by stating: Trafigura<br />

wished to disclose of 528m 3 of slops<br />

from <strong>the</strong> Probo Koala ariving at Abidjan<br />

on 19 August 2006. Trafigura Amended<br />

Defence 5 December 2008 (Yao Essaie<br />

Motto & O<strong>the</strong>rs v Trafigura Limited and<br />

Trafigura Beheer BV in <strong>the</strong> High Court of<br />

Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Claim<br />

No. HQ06X03370), paras 163 and<br />

163.1.<br />

And <strong>the</strong> Amsterdam court evidence says:<br />

“The report from Dr Geoffrey Bound of<br />

Minton, Treharne & Davies Ltd dated 6<br />

April 2010 states <strong>the</strong> ratio of <strong>the</strong> oil and<br />

water fractions in <strong>the</strong> slops in Abidjan<br />

(p5):<br />

“2.6 In summary, I have concluded that<br />

<strong>the</strong> slops onboard <strong>the</strong> Probo Koala prior<br />

to its arrival in Abidjan comprised 183m 3<br />

of hydrocarbons derived from <strong>the</strong> Brownsville<br />

cargoes (weighing 137 mt) and<br />

344.8m 3 of aqueous solution (weighing<br />

379 mt and representing 199m 3 of added<br />

caustic wash solution combined with<br />

o<strong>the</strong>r water delivered with <strong>the</strong> cargoes) as<br />

follows…”<br />

Note: This evidence can only be used in<br />

<strong>the</strong> Trafigura case; it is excluded from <strong>the</strong><br />

Chertov and Ahmed cases.<br />

It must be pointed out that Bound arrives<br />

at a total amount of 527.3m 3 , whereas<br />

<strong>the</strong>re were still about 544m 3 in <strong>the</strong> slop<br />

tanks in Amsterdam. Captain Chertov<br />

states, in his “letter of protest” of 5 July<br />

2006 that over 16m 3 less was returned<br />

to <strong>the</strong> Probo Koala than was delivered<br />

to APS.<br />

We also refer to an email message<br />

from Gampierakis (Falcon Navigation)<br />

to Ahmed et al of 26 July 2006 stating<br />

that <strong>the</strong> captain found that 528,308m 3<br />

of slops were on board at that point<br />

(360,260m 3 in <strong>the</strong> port tank and<br />

168,048m 3 in <strong>the</strong> starboard tank).<br />

Source: p28 from Evidence Overview for<br />

Trafigura Beheer BV, N Ahmed, S Chertov,<br />

Facts: section 174 of <strong>the</strong> Dutch Penal<br />

Code and section 225 of <strong>the</strong> Dutch Penal<br />

Code. This evidence is part of <strong>the</strong> files of<br />

<strong>the</strong> Dutch public prosecutor.<br />

7. NFI expert report, English, 10.1 p35/63.<br />

The analysis by CIAPOL (part of <strong>the</strong><br />

Ministry of Environment of CDI) in Abidjan<br />

of traces found on <strong>the</strong> quay alongside<br />

<strong>the</strong> Probo Koala after <strong>the</strong> dumping of <strong>the</strong><br />

waste show a figure of 0.6% of hydrogen<br />

sulphide which is in <strong>the</strong> same range as<br />

NFI results.<br />

8. NFI expert report, English 2.1.2 Analysis<br />

of <strong>the</strong> watery phase, p 43/63 and<br />

44/63.<br />

9. Trafigura Responses to Amended<br />

requests for Clarification of <strong>the</strong> Defence<br />

Pursuant to Part 18 of <strong>the</strong> CPR 03 Dec<br />

2008.pdf (Yao Essaie Motto & O<strong>the</strong>rs<br />

v Trafigura Limited and Trafigura Beheer<br />

BV in <strong>the</strong> High Court of Justice, Queen’s<br />

Bench Division, Claim No. HQ06X03370)<br />

10. Carter-Ruck Reply, in <strong>the</strong> High Court of<br />

Justice Queen’s Bench Division, Claim<br />

No. HQ09X02050 between Trafigura<br />

Limited v British Broadcast Corporation<br />

served 20 November 2009. Para 51 and<br />

69. Reasons why Trafigura does not consider<br />

<strong>the</strong> CIAPOL/SIR results a reliable<br />

analysis include: “The sample was taken<br />

from material said to have been dumped<br />

on <strong>the</strong> wharfside in Abidjan and not<br />

from <strong>the</strong> Slop tanks <strong>the</strong>mselves, with an<br />

obvious potential for cross contamination.”<br />

And: “There is no indication in <strong>the</strong><br />

results as to <strong>the</strong> method of testing, particularly<br />

whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> presence of hydrogen<br />

sulphide was recorded as a result of a<br />

acidification process or a process which<br />

required all sulphides to be measured as<br />

hydrogen sulphide.”<br />

11. Analysis of chemical composition is<br />

based on <strong>the</strong> Amsterdam NFI Chemical<br />

Analyses. Weight is based on 379<br />

tonnes (344.8m 3 ) aqueous slops at a<br />

density of 1.1 for 10 per cent caustic.<br />

12. The NFI report labels <strong>the</strong> 0.5% as Hydrogen<br />

Sulphide. Trafigura gives it a different<br />

description in <strong>the</strong>ir list (Inorganic Sulphur<br />

(Sulphide and Bi-Sulphide as S) as NFI<br />

identified <strong>the</strong> H2S in a mixture which had<br />

been acidified.<br />

13. Analysis of chemical composition is<br />

based on <strong>the</strong> Amsterdam NFI Chemical<br />

Analyses. Weight is based on 137<br />

tonnes (183m 3 ) at a density of 0.75<br />

measured in Abidjan by CIAPOL on 22<br />

August 2006 (from a sample drawn on<br />

21 August 2006).<br />

14. The sampling of <strong>the</strong> waste present in<br />

<strong>the</strong> slop tanks of <strong>the</strong> Probo Koala in<br />

Amsterdam was carried out using a jar<br />

that was lowered to <strong>the</strong> bottom. This<br />

wouldn’t necessarily have detected any<br />

sludgy sediments. To test for sediments,<br />

<strong>the</strong>y would have had to use specialist<br />

sampling equipment (absolute bottom<br />

sampler), designed to pick up sediments<br />

from <strong>the</strong> bottom of tanks. The choice of<br />

NFI to take a running sample was deliberate<br />

as it would give a better reflection<br />

of <strong>the</strong> composition of <strong>the</strong> waste than <strong>the</strong><br />

combination of a top, middle and bottom<br />

sample (p 9 NFI report Expert Report<br />

“Op 3 juli 2006 heeft het NFI (dhr<br />

Bakker) de politie (dhr. J.vd Kamp) geadviseerd<br />

over de monsterneming, Door het<br />

NFI is voorgesteld om, indien praktisch<br />

mogelijk, monsters te nemen over de gehele<br />

diepte van de te bemonsteren tank<br />

(zogenaamde running sample), omdat<br />

een running sample in principe een completer<br />

beeld van de samenstelling van de<br />

lading geeft dan de combinatie van een<br />

top,- midden, en bodemmonster. English<br />

translation: “On 3rd July 2006 NFI (Mr<br />

F Bakker) notified <strong>the</strong> police (Mr J vd<br />

Kamp) of <strong>the</strong> sampling exercise. NFI proposed<br />

that, insofar as possible, samples<br />

should taken from all depths of <strong>the</strong> tank<br />

concerned (so called running samples),<br />

because in principle a running sample<br />

provides a clearer picture of <strong>the</strong> cargo’s<br />

composition than <strong>the</strong> combination of a<br />

top, middle and bottom sample.”<br />

Police officer J vd Kamp has confirmed to<br />

<strong>Greenpeace</strong> that <strong>the</strong>y had not sampled<br />

<strong>the</strong> sediment of <strong>the</strong> Probo Koala waste,<br />

21 March 2012.<br />

15. This was reported during <strong>the</strong> criminal<br />

court hearing in Amsterdam, on 10 June,<br />

2010 and <strong>the</strong> judge read out an email<br />

saying: “It is very likely that we find solid<br />

residues in <strong>the</strong> cargo tanks and slop<br />

tanks due to <strong>the</strong> caustic washings, <strong>the</strong>se<br />

may include caustic soda, sodium sulphide,<br />

sodium hydrosulphide and sodium<br />

mercaptides.”<br />

16. Report Accident investigation following<br />

<strong>the</strong> Vest Tank explosion at Slovag, Revision<br />

O3 – English version, Bergen, 26-09-<br />

2008, p18: “T3 (4000m 3 , ID 18 m, TT<br />

16 m) contained about 270m 3 liquid at<br />

<strong>the</strong> time of <strong>the</strong> accident: 50m 3 precipitated<br />

waste from <strong>the</strong> treatment of coker<br />

gasoline, 205m 3 waste water from tank<br />

T61, and 14-15m 3 hydrochloric acid (filling<br />

of acid from a tank truck was going<br />

on when <strong>the</strong> accident occurred)”,p27,<br />

p62: “From October 2006 to March<br />

2007, <strong>the</strong> company Vest Tank had periodically<br />

treated shiploads of a petroleum<br />

product called coker gasoline in order to<br />

reduce <strong>the</strong> content of malodorous sulphur<br />

containing components, especially<br />

mercaptans (thiols). The essential chemical<br />

principle behind this process was <strong>the</strong><br />

high solubility of mercaptans in alkaline<br />

solutions of sodium hydroxide and water<br />

(caustic soda), compared to <strong>the</strong> solubility<br />

in coker gasoline. The cleaning process<br />

took place in two atmospheric storage<br />

tanks, T3 and T4, and resulted in <strong>the</strong><br />

precipitation of solid waste that over<br />

time accumulated in <strong>the</strong> bottom of <strong>the</strong><br />

tanks. The amount of dissolved or precipitated<br />

waste eventually reached a level<br />

where it was no longer possible to treat<br />

fur<strong>the</strong>r tank loads of coker gasoline.<br />

The purpose of <strong>the</strong> process that went<br />

on when <strong>the</strong> accident took place was to<br />

dissolve <strong>the</strong> precipitated waste in tank<br />

T3, and at <strong>the</strong> same time reduce <strong>the</strong> pH<br />

value in <strong>the</strong> alkaline solution, by adding<br />

hydrochloric acid.”<br />

17. Carter-Ruck Reply, in <strong>the</strong> High Court of<br />

Justice Queen’s Bench Division, Claim

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