the toxic truth - Greenpeace
the toxic truth - Greenpeace the toxic truth - Greenpeace
the toxic truth The Main VII. The Probo Koala discharged approximately half of its waste load into this boat during its stop in Amsterdam in July 2006. The waste was later pumped back on to the Probo Koala, and exported from the Netherlands in violation of international law. © GreeNPeAce/bAS beeNtjeS » They knew that the waste which the Probo Koala had discharged to an APS barge had generated concern because of the smell. » They knew that the alarm on a measuring device used by a police official taking a sample of the waste from the Probo Koala on 4 July had gone off, indicating that the set safety values had been exceeded. 504 » They knew that people had experienced and complained of health impacts: specifically, nausea, headaches and dizziness. » They knew that tests performed by APS had found the COD, a measure of the level of contamination, to be significantly higher than the MARPOL waste usually processed by APS. The APS assumption, based on the description of the waste, was a COD of less than 2,000mg/l; APS’s test revealed that the Probo Koala’s waste had a COD of approximately 500,000mg/l. » They also knew that APS, an appointed port reception facility with substantial experience in disposing of ships’ waste, and capable of processing MARPOL Annex I–IV slops, had said that it could not handle the Probo Koala’s waste and would need to send it to a specialist facility in Rotterdam. » They were aware that the new quote for disposal of the waste was significantly higher than the original, and was based on the level of contamination 505 and the need for more specialized treatment. 109 Chapter 9
110 Amnesty internAtionAl And greenpeAce netherlAnds Chapter 9 Foreseeable risk to human health The Dutch authorities had more than enough information before them to reasonably conclude that the material being carried by the Probo Koala was hazardous, since they knew the material was highly contaminated and needed special treatment. They also knew that there were forseeable risks to human health, both because of the highly contaminated nature of the material and because people in Amsterdam had experienced health impacts, after even limited exposure to the material. They did not need to rely solely on the description of the waste provided by the Captain of the Probo Koala and nor should they have, given their obligations under Dutch law. Both the need for specialist treatment and the symptoms experienced by people at the docks were inconsistent with the description of the waste given by Trafigura and its agents, and this should have triggered further investigation. The Dutch authorities had two additional pieces of information that were relevant to their decision-making prior to the departure of the Probo Koala: » They did not know where the waste was to be delivered. » They had the anonymous fax sent on 3 July 2006 which alleged that waste would be dumped at sea – a fax they clearly took seriously, since they asked the Estonian port authorities to measure the waste to ensure it was all still on board when the Probo Koala arrived at Paldiski. Foreseeable risk of improper disposal of the waste The authorities had evidence to suspect that proper, safe disposal of the hazardous material was not guaranteed. The company was leaving Amsterdam with the waste because it was not willing to pay the costs involved in proper disposal in the Netherlands. If an appointed port reception facility in the Netherlands was unable to deal with the waste, this should have raised questions about where Trafigura intended to dispose of it. Additionally, the Dutch authorities were clearly concerned that the waste might be dumped at sea. Nonetheless they let the ship leave without any information on where safe disposal of the waste would take place. In summary, dangerous waste was in the possession of an actor about whom the Dutch had questions with regard to safe disposal. The information that the authorities in Amsterdam had over the period of 2-4 July 2006 was sufficient to provide a basis and rationale for action, at least to investigate the waste further before allowing it to leave the Netherlands. As will be described further below, the relevant legal frameworks are based on precisely the risk to human health and the environment that confronted the Netherlands: hazardous material on board a ship, being removed from the jurisdiction in circumstances that provide a reasonable basis for concern about the intention of the owner and holder of the material.
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110 Amnesty internAtionAl And greenpeAce ne<strong>the</strong>rlAnds<br />
Chapter 9<br />
Foreseeable risk to<br />
human health<br />
The Dutch authorities had more than enough<br />
information before <strong>the</strong>m to reasonably<br />
conclude that <strong>the</strong> material being carried by<br />
<strong>the</strong> Probo Koala was hazardous, since <strong>the</strong>y<br />
knew <strong>the</strong> material was highly contaminated<br />
and needed special treatment. They also<br />
knew that <strong>the</strong>re were forseeable risks to<br />
human health, both because of <strong>the</strong> highly<br />
contaminated nature of <strong>the</strong> material<br />
and because people in Amsterdam had<br />
experienced health impacts, after even limited<br />
exposure to <strong>the</strong> material. They did not need<br />
to rely solely on <strong>the</strong> description of <strong>the</strong> waste<br />
provided by <strong>the</strong> Captain of <strong>the</strong> Probo Koala and<br />
nor should <strong>the</strong>y have, given <strong>the</strong>ir obligations<br />
under Dutch law. Both <strong>the</strong> need for specialist<br />
treatment and <strong>the</strong> symptoms experienced by<br />
people at <strong>the</strong> docks were inconsistent with<br />
<strong>the</strong> description of <strong>the</strong> waste given by Trafigura<br />
and its agents, and this should have triggered<br />
fur<strong>the</strong>r investigation.<br />
The Dutch authorities had two additional<br />
pieces of information that were relevant to<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir decision-making prior to <strong>the</strong> departure of<br />
<strong>the</strong> Probo Koala:<br />
» They did not know where <strong>the</strong> waste was to<br />
be delivered.<br />
» They had <strong>the</strong> anonymous fax sent on 3<br />
July 2006 which alleged that waste would<br />
be dumped at sea – a fax <strong>the</strong>y clearly took<br />
seriously, since <strong>the</strong>y asked <strong>the</strong> Estonian<br />
port authorities to measure <strong>the</strong> waste to<br />
ensure it was all still on board when <strong>the</strong><br />
Probo Koala arrived at Paldiski.<br />
Foreseeable risk of improper<br />
disposal of <strong>the</strong> waste<br />
The authorities had evidence to suspect<br />
that proper, safe disposal of <strong>the</strong> hazardous<br />
material was not guaranteed. The company<br />
was leaving Amsterdam with <strong>the</strong> waste<br />
because it was not willing to pay <strong>the</strong> costs<br />
involved in proper disposal in <strong>the</strong> Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands.<br />
If an appointed port reception facility in <strong>the</strong><br />
Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands was unable to deal with <strong>the</strong><br />
waste, this should have raised questions<br />
about where Trafigura intended to dispose of it.<br />
Additionally, <strong>the</strong> Dutch authorities were<br />
clearly concerned that <strong>the</strong> waste might be<br />
dumped at sea. None<strong>the</strong>less <strong>the</strong>y let <strong>the</strong><br />
ship leave without any information on where<br />
safe disposal of <strong>the</strong> waste would take place.<br />
In summary, dangerous waste was in <strong>the</strong><br />
possession of an actor about whom <strong>the</strong> Dutch<br />
had questions with regard to safe disposal.<br />
The information that <strong>the</strong> authorities in<br />
Amsterdam had over <strong>the</strong> period of 2-4 July<br />
2006 was sufficient to provide a basis and<br />
rationale for action, at least to investigate<br />
<strong>the</strong> waste fur<strong>the</strong>r before allowing it to leave<br />
<strong>the</strong> Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands. As will be described fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />
below, <strong>the</strong> relevant legal frameworks are<br />
based on precisely <strong>the</strong> risk to human health<br />
and <strong>the</strong> environment that confronted <strong>the</strong><br />
Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands: hazardous material on board<br />
a ship, being removed from <strong>the</strong> jurisdiction<br />
in circumstances that provide a reasonable<br />
basis for concern about <strong>the</strong> intention of <strong>the</strong><br />
owner and holder of <strong>the</strong> material.