a tripartite report - Unctad
a tripartite report - Unctad a tripartite report - Unctad
TANZANIA prudent that the Minister and the Control/Auditor- General who, on the Minister’s instructions, must carry out a performance indicators audit and not 4.4 The Fair Competition Tribunal (FCT) The Fair Competition Tribunal (FCT) is a quasi-judicial body with appellate responsibilities on cases from the FCC. The Tribunal is established under Section 83 and consists of a Chairman who shall High Court appointed by the President after consultation with the Chief Justice, and shall serve on part time basis; and six other members appointed to serve on part time basis by the President after consultation with the Attorney General from candidates nominated by a Nomination Committee. 84 According to Section 83(3), no person shall be appointed as a member of the FCT other than the virtue of his knowledge of, or experience in industry, commerce, economics, law or public administration85 in the instrument of his appointment and shall be eligible for re-appointment unless, prior to the ex- to the President; or (b) the President, being satis- least three consecutive meetings of the Tribunal, revokes his appointment. The quorum for a meeting of the Tribunal shall be the Chairman and two other members. There is no Vice-Chair of the Tribunal and thus, in the absence of the Chair, a meeting of the Tribunal cannot take place as the members cannot legally appoint a Chair even for purposes of the meeting. The Registrar of the FCT was concerned about this scenario and it is one of the areas earmarked for amendment. The presence of a Vice-Chair could to operate with two panels of its members sitting to look at different cases. A concern was noted from the stakeholders by the Registrar that the FCT The Registrar acknowledged this and alluded it to 73 the fact that the FCT is part time, and members have full-time jobs, more so the Chair who is a full-time judge. Apart from the Registrar, the Chair does not have his own staff to assist in writing the judgments after the decisions are made. The Registrar acknowledged that the FCT needed to be more proactive in training its members in competition law and also in understanding the FCC and other regulator’s procedures. International peer learning from similar tribunals, notably the South African one in the region, were identi- what is in the FCA, the FCT members did not have a comprehensive code of conduct or ethics. While the Chairman is a Judge, his/her code of conduct/ ethics was covered under the relevant national judicial codes. In terms of judgment 86 , a judgment or order given by the Tribunal on any matter before it shall be same manner as judgments and orders of the High Court. The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction – (a) to hear and determine appeals under Part XI of the Act (which deals with matters of appeal to the Tribunal); (b) to issue warrants in accordance with section 71; (c) to carry out the functions conferred on it under the EWURA Act, 2001, the SUMATRA Act, 2001, the TCRA Act, 2003, the TCAA Act, 2003 and any other written law; (d) to exercise such other functions and powers as are conferred upon it by the Act. Tribunal may decline to hear an appeal if it considers that the person does not have a pecuniary and material grievance arising from the decision of the FCC. In reaching its decision the Tribunal shall have regard to any regulations on the matters made by the Minister under section 98 of the Act 87 . In the exercise of its functions under this Act, the FCT is guided by the rules of natural justice and shall publish its decisions and the reasons for its decisions in the Public Register maintained by the Tribunal. Under Section 85(5), the FCT has all the powers of the High Court in respect of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and examining them on oath, - TANZANIA
74 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A TRIPARTITE REPORT ON THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA – ZAMBIA – ZIMBABWE tion of documents; and the issue of a summons or request to examine witnesses abroad. security is guaranteed, which is a prerequisite for its independence. This is guaranteed and/or safeguarded under Section 87 of the Act, which lays down the funds of the Tribunal as comprising fees paid to the FCT; funds allocated to the Tribunal by Parliament; grants, donations, bequests or other contributions made to the Tribunal; and funds allocated to the Tribunal from the funds of EWURA, SUMATRA, the TCRA, the TCAA and other Regulatory Authorities as provided for in the relevant legislation. These same institutions are also expected to fund the FCC). While on paper the funding appears to be “secured”, the practical side is that the expected disbursements from the sector regula- Appeal Judgment ECONOMIC COMPETITION Providers of goods and services, consumers, CCCs and FCC Change of policies, formulation of new policies, laws and rules, introduction of competition, increased private sector investments, disengage - ment of Government from business oriented activities, review of policies and laws FAIR COMPETITION TRIBUNAL Competition Appeals Implementation of Regulatory Instruments i.e. policies, legislation, regulations, license conditions (regulatory decisions) tors are discretional and like the FCC, FCT does not have any powers to enforce payments when the regulators do not remit the funds. Under Section 89(2), the FCT is empowered to im- on a person that commits an offence such as misleading, obstructing, insulting or disturbing the Tribunal, or providing false information to the FCT, or failing/refusal to appear and/or refuse to take oath The FCT has presented its place in the institutional a linkage between and expected output of each player in the competition regime and regulatory implementation process in the United Republic of Tanzania Regulatory Appeals ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION Government Appeal Judgments ECONOMIC REGULATION: SUMATRA, EWURA, TCRA AND TCAA Change of roles and functions, setting-up Regulatory bodies such as TCAA, SUMATRA, TCRA, EWURA and FCC to regulate market/competition
- Page 28 and 29: PREFACE practical solutions, for ex
- Page 30: PREFACE In addition to formal coope
- Page 33 and 34: 28 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 35 and 36: 30 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 37 and 38: 32 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 39 and 40: 34 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 41 and 42: 36 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 43 and 44: 38 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 45 and 46: 40 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 47 and 48: 42 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 49 and 50: 44 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 51 and 52: 46 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 53 and 54: 48 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 55 and 56: 50 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 57 and 58: 52 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 59 and 60: 54 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 61 and 62: 56 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 63 and 64: 58 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 65 and 66: 60 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 67 and 68: 62 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 69 and 70: 64 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 71 and 72: 66 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 73 and 74: 68 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 75 and 76: 70 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 77: 72 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 81 and 82: 76 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 83 and 84: 78 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 85 and 86: 80 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 87 and 88: 82 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 89: 84 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 93 and 94: 88 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 95 and 96: 90 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 97 and 98: 92 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 99 and 100: 94 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 101 and 102: 96 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 103 and 104: 98 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 105 and 106: 100 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 107 and 108: 102 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 109 and 110: 104 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 111 and 112: 106 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 113 and 114: 108 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 115 and 116: 110 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 117 and 118: 112 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 119 and 120: 114 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 121 and 122: 116 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 123 and 124: 118 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 125 and 126: 120 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
- Page 127 and 128: 122 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
74 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A TRIPARTITE REPORT ON THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA – ZAMBIA – ZIMBABWE<br />
tion of documents; and the issue of a summons or<br />
request to examine witnesses abroad.<br />
<br />
security is guaranteed, which is a prerequisite for<br />
its independence. This is guaranteed and/or safeguarded<br />
under Section 87 of the Act, which lays<br />
down the funds of the Tribunal as comprising fees<br />
paid to the FCT; funds allocated to the Tribunal by<br />
Parliament; grants, donations, bequests or other<br />
contributions made to the Tribunal; and funds allocated<br />
to the Tribunal from the funds of EWURA,<br />
SUMATRA, the TCRA, the TCAA and other Regulatory<br />
Authorities as provided for in the relevant legislation.<br />
These same institutions are also expected<br />
to fund the FCC). While on paper the funding appears<br />
to be “secured”, the practical side is that the<br />
expected disbursements from the sector regula-<br />
Appeal<br />
Judgment<br />
ECONOMIC<br />
COMPETITION<br />
Providers of goods<br />
and services,<br />
consumers, CCCs<br />
and FCC<br />
Change of policies,<br />
formulation of new<br />
policies, laws and<br />
rules, introduction of<br />
competition, increased<br />
private sector<br />
investments, disengage -<br />
ment of Government<br />
from business oriented<br />
activities, review of<br />
policies and laws<br />
FAIR<br />
COMPETITION<br />
TRIBUNAL<br />
Competition<br />
Appeals<br />
Implementation of<br />
Regulatory Instruments<br />
i.e. policies, legislation,<br />
regulations, license<br />
conditions (regulatory<br />
decisions)<br />
tors are discretional and like the FCC, FCT does not<br />
have any powers to enforce payments when the<br />
regulators do not remit the funds.<br />
Under Section 89(2), the FCT is empowered to im-<br />
<br />
on<br />
a person that commits an offence such as misleading,<br />
obstructing, insulting or disturbing the Tribunal,<br />
or providing false information to the FCT, or<br />
failing/refusal to appear and/or refuse to take oath<br />
<br />
The FCT has presented its place in the institutional<br />
<br />
a linkage between and expected output of each<br />
player in the competition regime and regulatory<br />
implementation process in the United Republic of<br />
Tanzania<br />
Regulatory<br />
Appeals<br />
ECONOMIC<br />
LIBERALIZATION<br />
Government<br />
Appeal<br />
Judgments<br />
ECONOMIC<br />
REGULATION:<br />
SUMATRA,<br />
EWURA, TCRA<br />
AND TCAA<br />
Change of roles and<br />
functions, setting-up<br />
Regulatory bodies<br />
such as TCAA,<br />
SUMATRA, TCRA,<br />
EWURA and FCC<br />
to regulate<br />
market/competition
Change language