01.06.2013 Views

a tripartite report - Unctad

a tripartite report - Unctad

a tripartite report - Unctad

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

TANZANIA<br />

<br />

in a dominant position and the particular conduct is anticompetitive due to misuse of that dominant position.<br />

Misuse of dominance positions include practices like excessive pricing, price discrimination, refusal to supply,<br />

tying practices, price predation, exclusive conduct and other barriers to market entry.<br />

The Commission would like to provide an elaboration of some of these practices as follows:<br />

<br />

in a fully competitive market.<br />

<br />

the same market.<br />

<br />

forcing its customers to buy at a higher price or under conditions favourable to it.<br />

<br />

price for its use (for example a ship docks charging higher prices for ship owners), and second, through<br />

“portfolio power”. Under portfolio power, the large supplier selling to the retailer has the power of offering<br />

the retailer his full range of products and the retailer is then forced to make few purchases from<br />

other suppliers. It is likely that if the other suppliers are small they may be forced out of the market<br />

altogether.<br />

<br />

After the competitors have lowered their prices and incurred losses or even closed their businesses as<br />

<br />

The foregoing listing is not exhaustive, and debatable<br />

as it is not inscribed in the law or in any of the<br />

Commission’s publicly accessible guidelines.<br />

2.3.3 Merger control<br />

The rationale for merger control has been widely<br />

endorsed through competition law, and the FCA<br />

captures merger control as well. Several academicians<br />

and scholars have addressed the issue of<br />

merger control, which has been rightly regarded to<br />

have several aims. The core purpose is understood<br />

to generally be thought that its core purpose is<br />

to ensure that mergers do not jeopardize conditions<br />

for competition. Should the focus of merger<br />

policy be on preserving competition, protecting<br />

<br />

On the other hand, are there situations where<br />

<br />

competition? Is it ever possible that economic ef-<br />

<br />

53 .<br />

The legal basis for the Tanzanian merger control<br />

system is contained in Sections 11 and 13 FCA<br />

which are complemented by merger guidelines<br />

<br />

vided<br />

for by Section 2 FCA and reads as follows:<br />

53<br />

“merger” means an acquisition of shares, a business<br />

or other assets, whether inside or outside of [the<br />

United Republic of] Tanzania, resulting in the change<br />

of control of a business, part of a business, or an asset<br />

of a business in[the United Republic of] Tanzania.:<br />

In this context, the Merger Guidelines by the Commission<br />

distinguish three types of mergers that<br />

it would look at i.e. horizontal, vertical and conglomerate<br />

mergers. 54<br />

Section 11(1) of the Act brings out the substantive<br />

test for merger review which reads as follows:<br />

“A merger is prohibited if it creates or strengthens a<br />

position of dominance in a market”. This appears to<br />

take the approach of a structural paradigm as opposed<br />

to a behavioural one for mergers. As mentioned<br />

previously, the dominance test is laid under<br />

Section 5(6) as follows:<br />

A person has a dominant position in a market if both<br />

(a) and (b) apply:<br />

(a) <br />

materially restrain or reduce competition in<br />

<br />

(b) the person’s share of the relevant market<br />

exceeds 35 per cent.<br />

The above (a) and (b) must be mutually inclusive.<br />

<br />

TANZANIA

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!