a tripartite report - Unctad

More documents

Recommendations

Info

TANZANIA Improvement of the macroeconomic environment; Creation of an enabling business environment; and Competition policy and regime. It is clear that competition policy was not just a passive part of the United Republic of Tanzania’s economic policy framework but was actually recognized as one of the top three action points for the Government, which culminated in enactment of the Fair Trade Practices Act in 1994, its subsequent review and enactment of the Fair Competition Act of 2003 and other as in banking, crop marketing, energy and .insurance industries. 1.3 Foundations and History of Competition Policy During 1985–1991, the United Republic of Tanzania underwent an intensive structural adjustment programme under the auspices of the IMF and World Bank. This programme was largely successful in bringing about a real gross domestic have been some downward trends, the United Republic of Tanzania has made admirable economic gains since its independence more than 50 years ago. The United Republic of Tanzania ulation of 44.8 million people, and a total GDP 2010 World Bank statistics 23 . Of the total national bilateral aid. 24 Contribution to GDP by sector is 49 per cent agriculture; 17 per cent industry; and 6 per cent. About 33.4 per cent of the population lives below the national poverty line. The core statistics are summarized below: INDICATORS Population, total (millions) 44.8 Population growth (annual per cent) 3.0 23.1 527 GDP growth (annual per cent) 7.0 Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2010) 37 In terms of occupation, it is estimated that agriculture contributes 80 per cent, while industry and commerce contribute 20 per cent. Evidently, agriculture dominates the United Republic of Tanzania’s economy, employing more than three quarters of the working population and accounting for 64 per cent of all exports. Agriculture is a major employer and key source of wealth for the country. The country’s GDP has been on a relative upswing since the reforms of the 1990s, as shown below: Source: (table done by author) based on data from the World Bank, World Development Indicators (2010) However, despite the impressive GDP growth rate, there has been a remarkable decline in foreign direct investment, as shown in the table below: US $ millions 25 20 15 10 5 TANZANIA GDP(US$ MILLIONS) - 1989 - 2010 0 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$) (millions) 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 Source: (table done by author) based on data from the World Bank, World Development Indicators (2010) foundations of competition policy in the United Republic of Tanzania. Firstly, the independence Government of President Nyerere had fought for independence on a populist platform of bringing power and wealth to the people. At independence, much of the economic wealth in the country was still in the hands of the European and other colonial settlers. Business activity, as may have been the case in Zambia and notably Zimbabwe, revolved around well connected and entrenched networks GDP TANZANIA
38 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A TRIPARTITE REPORT ON THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA – ZAMBIA – ZIMBABWE amongst the settler-community and excluded the majority Africans who resided in the countryside. There was thus no “fair” competition that existed between the dominant economic community and the African majority. Sentiments of nationalization thus became prevalent, with the SOE recognized as the only channel through which the new Government could create fair access to employment, market opportunities and ultimately, wealth. This invariably leads to the second issue of the Arusha Declaration. Arusha Declaration propagated the ownership of the factors of production alization and expropriation were non-negotiable as the State created monopoly SOEs in key industrial sectors. The Declaration further put collective agricultural schemes at the centre of the national economy (rightly so) and introduced a programme of ‘villagization’, that is, the moving of peasant families into cooperative villages, the so-called “ujamaa” where they could supposedly be self-reliant by working together more productively and economically through common usage of agricultural inputs and machinery, such as fer- initial objectives due to certain implementational features. 25 Ujamaa removed all forms of innovativeness in the agriculture sector, while the State imposed itself as a monopsony buyer, distributor and seller of agricultural produce. Thirdly, State ownership in most of the key industrial sectors brought about mismanagement and lack of innovation, including lack of recapitalization, thereby affected economic development. Economic stagnation, oil price shocks of the 1970s and falling prices of the country’s main commodity exports contributed to economic decline in the 1980s. When President Ali Hassan Mwinyi became president in 1985 (following President Nyerere’s resignation), an economic reform programme was introduced to revamp the economic fortunes of the country. However, economic transformation required an overhaul of the whole political and legal system, which was eventually embarked upon. Fourthly, industrial structures were highly concentrated through SOEs while the private sector was largely relegated to the agricultural sector, micro retailing/convenience stores, unregulated commuter transport, small restaurants, etc. Competition was a suspicious capitalist tool as hinted in the Arusha Declaration. It was not considered a developmental tool of the then centrally planned system where the Government played the role of policy implementer and big business operator. As wealth creation at macro level was the preserve of the State, competition against the State in this context was not encouraged and where a private enterprise had grown to dominant proportions, the State had the legal grounds and a strong political will to expropriate and nationalize such companies. This was however not sustainable as by the mid-1980s, the economy needed an exposure to competition through the privatization process and the introduction of competition rules and principles. A consumer activist 26 rightly observed that the motivations in which the United Republic of Tanzania adopted its current competition laws was due to the failure of socialism and its restrictive policies to achieve the desired objectives in the United Republic of Tanzania. Infant Tanzanian industries failed to meet even the local demand due to limited internal capacity, series of oil price increments, allocation of resources. Consequently, the United Republic of Tanzania experienced severe macroeconomic hardship in- sential goods and services, falling real GDP growth Republic of Tanzania had no other option than to resort to IMF and adopt its structural adjustment programmes, including the introduction of cost sharing on all social services, staff retrenchment, liberalization of imports, interest rates and exchange controls, devaluation of the shilling, price decontrol, privatization and restructuring of SOEs 27 As part of this process, national distributional agencies, such as National Milling Corporation (NMC) and Regional Trading Company (RTC), were replaced by private companies, the former Price Commission during the controlled economy was abolished and replaced by the sector regulators and the competition authority. In August 1990, the United Republic of Tanzania promulgated the National Investment Promotion and Protection Act (NIPPA), which established the Investment Promotion Centre (IPC). The IPC was designed to seek out and assist foreign di-
Page 1 and 2: UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE
Page 4: UNITUNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TR
Page 7 and 8: 2 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A T
Page 10 and 11: COMPARATIVE ASSESMENT COMPARATIVE A
Page 12 and 13: PREFACE This comparative assessment
Page 14 and 15: PREFACE agreements. . In the United
Page 16 and 17: PREFACE Finally in the United Repub
Page 18 and 19: PREFACE be set at a percentage of t
Page 20 and 21: PREFACE the market price but constr
Page 22 and 23: PREFACE (d) the extent to which the
Page 24 and 25: PREFACE pendence is maintained and
Page 26 and 27: PREFACE the effectiveness of the or
Page 28 and 29: PREFACE practical solutions, for ex
Page 30: PREFACE In addition to formal coope
Page 33 and 34: 28 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
Page 41: 36 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
Page 89: 84 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
Page 93 and 94:
88 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A
Page 95 and 96:
Page 97 and 98:
Page 99 and 100:
Page 101 and 102:
Page 103 and 104:
Page 105 and 106:
Page 107 and 108:
Page 109 and 110:
Page 111 and 112:
Page 113 and 114:
Page 115 and 116:
Page 117 and 118:
Page 119 and 120:
Page 121 and 122:
Page 123 and 124:
Page 125 and 126:
Page 127 and 128:
Page 129 and 130:
Page 131 and 132:
Page 133 and 134:
Page 135 and 136:
Page 137 and 138:
Page 139 and 140:
Page 141 and 142:
Page 143 and 144:
Page 145 and 146:
Page 147 and 148:
Page 149 and 150:
Page 151 and 152:
Page 153 and 154:
Page 155 and 156:
Page 157 and 158:
Page 159 and 160:
Page 161 and 162:
Page 163 and 164:
Page 165 and 166:
Page 167 and 168:
Page 169 and 170:
Page 171 and 172:
Page 174 and 175:
ZIMBABWE FULL REPORT ZIMBABWE
Page 176 and 177:
ZIMBABWE TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE
Page 178 and 179:
ZIMBABWE This report is part of the
Page 180 and 181:
ZIMBABWE With the growing political
Page 182 and 183:
ZIMBABWE of restrictive practices,
Page 184 and 185:
ZIMBABWE competition authorities do
Page 186 and 187:
ZIMBABWE divided according to geogr
Page 188 and 189:
ZIMBABWE The Commission in 2006 whi
Page 190 and 191:
ZIMBABWE to take care of themselves
Page 192 and 193:
ZIMBABWE (under Section 9); basical
Page 194 and 195:
ZIMBABWE Full scale investigation i
Page 196 and 197:
ZIMBABWE (ii) to produce any book,
Page 198 and 199:
ZIMBABWE The fact that CTC has a co
Page 200 and 201:
ZIMBABWE tariat of technocrats, who
Page 202 and 203:
ZIMBABWE Table 2: Number of Competi
Page 204 and 205:
ZIMBABWE Regarding the handling of
Page 206 and 207:
ZIMBABWE (Emphasis by the author) b
Page 208 and 209:
ZIMBABWE Section 5 (1) (f) that pro
Page 210 and 211:
ZIMBABWE Whilst the arguments can b
Page 212 and 213:
ZIMBABWE Anti competitive agreement
Page 214:
ZIMBABWE by conducting its case det
Page 217 and 218:
Page 219 and 220:
Page 221 and 222:
Page 223 and 224:
Page 225 and 226:
Page 227:
Printed at United Nations, Geneva -
show all

a tripartite report - Unctad

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?