a tripartite report - Unctad
a tripartite report - Unctad a tripartite report - Unctad
ZIMBABWE tariat of technocrats, who would form the basis of decisions in terms of competition economics and law that goes with dispensation of competition justice. An alternative solution would be to limit the appeal to one jurisdiction, either High Court or Administrative Court and create a specialized competition chamber within the preferred Court. 3.7 Other Enforcement Methods 3.7.1 Compliance Agreements agreements, but Section 30 provides that the Commission can at any time during the course of its investigations negotiate the termination or dis- ticompetitive mergers or monopoly situations. The relevant provisions of section 30 read as follows: “(1) The Commission may at any time negotiate with any person with a view to making an arrangement which, in the Commission’s opinion, will – (a) ensure the discontinuance of any restrictive practice which exists or may come into existence; or (b) terminate, prevent or alter any merger or monopoly situation which exists or may come into existence; whether or not the Commission has embarked on an investigation into the restrictive practice, merger or monopoly situation concerned. (2) Where the Commission has made an arrangement after negotiations under subsection (1), it may embody the arrangement in an order. Pursuant to this provision, CTC has signed a Competition Compliance Programme and Agreement with Schweppes Zimbabwe Limited in May 2011, and with Delta Beverages in August 2011. 3.8 Agency Resources, Caseload, Priorities and Management 3.8.1 Agency Resources CTC has a human resources base of 29 staff out of which 16 are technical and 13 support staff. There is the Director, Secretary of the Commis- tion division is led by Assistant Director Competi- 195 in total 7 staff are dedicated to competition. Tariff division is led by Assistant Director Tariff together with 4 economists; in total 5 staff are dedicated to tariff. Records at CTC show that most of the current competition staff were relatively new to the Commission; 3 were hired in 2007 and 3 in 2011. The Assistant Director competition was hired in 2008. The only experienced competition expert is the Director who has been with the Commission since 1999. Among the operational staff, none has undergone competition training at University; internally there have not been any comprehensive training-inhouse training of staff. At most members of staff and Commissioners have attended short trainings 2-3 days abroad. In this area, the CTC should consider mobilising resources and organized a tailor made training aimed at addressing knowledge and skills gaps for both the Commissioners and According to the Director, there has been a high turnover of staff at the CTC mainly attributed to the economic turmoil the country has undergone since early 2000s; adding that in 2007/2008, CTC lost the entire competition division. Efforts to rebuild the division have been fruitful as evidenced by presence of the newly recruited staff; the challenge remaining for the CTC is to ensure their retention. According to observations made from information collected at the CTC and its corroboration from interviewed stakeholders; the members of staff at CTC are paid salaries pegged on civil service scales. CTC has attempted within its limited bid to raise its staff’s remuneration; nonetheless, the salaries remain generally low as compared to those paid to staff of the sectoral regulators 197 . It ary scales of the regulators as their release is guid- alternative sources that the consultant could not independently verify, the average difference between scales of CTC and regulators could be estimated at 700 per cent. comparing the salary scales at CTC and other competition authorities in within the Tripartite i.e. ZIMBABWE
196 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A TRIPARTITE REPORT ON THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA – ZAMBIA – ZIMBABWE the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia. This scenario is highly capable of triggering staff turnover and other human resources problems, hence immediate prompt remedy is called for to normalize the situation especially considering the fact that the Zimbabwean economy is recovering and creating more demand for competition related interventions. It was also learnt that CTC have attempted to raise pay of its staff, but the procedure is too bureaucratic that the Minister of Trade must consult the Minister of Finance for approval of pay rise for staff of the CTC. This not only robs the independence, given to CTC by ZCA in Section 3, but also demonstrates the myriad powers that Ministers have over CTC functions. The implication of such statutory provisions is that even in the it shall still have to struggle with approvals of the two Ministers. There is limited use of ICT and electronic documentation of proceed and archives that may lead to avoidable delays in implementation of activities at the CTC. There is no website and just recently CTC have managed to establish its own domain of emails. According to the interviewed staff, CTC does not ing with ICT; the CTC has signed service contracts mand for a full time person to manage ICT then the Commission will recruit one such person, add- iting factor to having such facilities as prudence may require. funds to carry out the broad mandate it has been statutorily given. Table 1 below shows that merger the CTC followed by Trade Development Levy 198 . CTC operates with a budget of less than a million compared to its counterpart in the United Repub- an increase in the budget of the CTC is strongly recommended, it needs, however to be noted that comparing the CTC’s budget directly with the competition authority of the United Republic of Tanzania might be misleading since unlike the latter, the Zimbabwean authority does not have ex- tensive consumer protection functions, which take up a lot of resources. Table 1: Commission’s Income Source Since 2010 Source 2010 (Actual) ($) 2011 (Actual) ($) 2012 (Estimate) ($) Government Grant 114 154 210 405 319 000 Fees 154 986 267 402 368 450 Trade Development Levy 657 620 205 986 200 000 Investment Income 0 42 683 50 000 Sundry Income 1 211 5 492 - Total 927 971 731 969 937 450 Source: CTC As per section 23, CTC receives money from Parliamentary allocation, fees and other sources any other moneys that may vest in or accrue to the Commission, whether in terms of the ZCA or otherwise (emphasis by the author). This can be con- sistent with the spirit and objectives of the ZCA; it needs to be limited to issues consistent to the ZCA. There is evidence that regulatory authorities have excess money that emanate from their regulatory functions. Other jurisdictions (United Republic of Tanzania and Turkey) have statutorily provided in their competition laws that they shall receive funds from the regulated sectors authorities. These would be examples worth emulating so as to boost CTC coffers in a bid to have the competition frontier pushed forward in tandem with the regulated sectors. This reemphasizes the need to have the need to have the relationship with the regulated sectors competition and sector regulator’s laws. 3.8.2 Caseload The CTC reports on cases that have been handled to mean all those that have been initiated irrespective of their closure. Table 2 below summa- the years. 199
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- Page 176 and 177: ZIMBABWE TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE
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ZIMBABWE<br />
tariat of technocrats, who would form the basis of<br />
decisions in terms of competition economics and<br />
law that goes with dispensation of competition<br />
justice. An alternative solution would be to limit<br />
the appeal to one jurisdiction, either High Court<br />
or Administrative Court and create a specialized<br />
competition chamber within the preferred Court.<br />
3.7 Other Enforcement Methods<br />
3.7.1 Compliance Agreements<br />
<br />
agreements, but Section 30 provides that the<br />
Commission can at any time during the course of<br />
its investigations negotiate the termination or dis-<br />
ticompetitive<br />
mergers or monopoly situations. The<br />
relevant provisions of section 30 read as follows:<br />
“(1) The Commission may at any time negotiate<br />
with any person with a view to making an arrangement<br />
which, in the Commission’s opinion, will –<br />
(a) ensure the discontinuance of any restrictive<br />
practice which exists or may come into existence;<br />
or<br />
(b) terminate, prevent or alter any merger or monopoly<br />
situation which exists or may come into<br />
existence; whether or not the Commission has<br />
embarked on an investigation into the restrictive<br />
practice, merger or monopoly situation concerned.<br />
(2) Where the Commission has made an arrangement<br />
after negotiations under subsection (1), it<br />
may embody the arrangement in an order.<br />
Pursuant to this provision, CTC has signed a Competition<br />
Compliance Programme and Agreement<br />
with Schweppes Zimbabwe Limited in May 2011,<br />
and with Delta Beverages in August 2011.<br />
3.8 Agency Resources, Caseload,<br />
Priorities and Management<br />
3.8.1 Agency Resources<br />
CTC has a human resources base of 29 staff out<br />
of which 16 are technical and 13 support staff.<br />
There is the Director, Secretary of the Commis-<br />
tion<br />
division is led by Assistant Director Competi-<br />
195<br />
<br />
in total 7 staff are dedicated to competition. Tariff<br />
division is led by Assistant Director Tariff together<br />
with 4 economists; in total 5 staff are dedicated<br />
to tariff.<br />
Records at CTC show that most of the current competition<br />
staff were relatively new to the Commission;<br />
3 were hired in 2007 and 3 in 2011. The Assistant<br />
Director competition was hired in 2008. The<br />
only experienced competition expert is the Director<br />
who has been with the Commission since 1999.<br />
Among the operational staff, none has undergone<br />
competition training at University; internally there<br />
have not been any comprehensive training-inhouse<br />
training of staff. At most members of staff<br />
and Commissioners have attended short trainings<br />
2-3 days abroad. In this area, the CTC should consider<br />
mobilising resources and organized a tailor<br />
made training aimed at addressing knowledge<br />
and skills gaps for both the Commissioners and<br />
<br />
According to the Director, there has been a high<br />
turnover of staff at the CTC mainly attributed to<br />
the economic turmoil the country has undergone<br />
since early 2000s; adding that in 2007/2008, CTC<br />
lost the entire competition division. Efforts to rebuild<br />
the division have been fruitful as evidenced<br />
by presence of the newly recruited staff; the challenge<br />
remaining for the CTC is to ensure their retention.<br />
According to observations made from information<br />
collected at the CTC and its corroboration<br />
from interviewed stakeholders; the members of<br />
staff at CTC are paid salaries pegged on civil service<br />
scales. CTC has attempted within its limited<br />
<br />
bid to raise its staff’s remuneration; nonetheless,<br />
the salaries remain generally low as compared to<br />
those paid to staff of the sectoral regulators 197 . It<br />
ary<br />
scales of the regulators as their release is guid-<br />
<br />
alternative sources that the consultant could not<br />
independently verify, the average difference between<br />
scales of CTC and regulators could be estimated<br />
at 700 per cent.<br />
<br />
comparing the salary scales at CTC and other<br />
competition authorities in within the Tripartite i.e.<br />
ZIMBABWE