a tripartite report - Unctad

176 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A TRIPARTITE REPORT ON THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA – ZAMBIA – ZIMBABWE
dustries such as beer brewing and cigarette manufacturing,
were very much against the introduction
of competition policy and law in Zimbabwe and
therefore heavily lobbied Parliamentarians against
the passing of the Bill in Parliament. Their fears
were that the new competition authority would disband
monopolies or unbundle conglomerate companies.
They argued that Zimbabwe with its small
economy did not need a competition authority.
Other groups with sectoral interests also attempted
to hijack the whole process for the sole protection
of their special interests. Even in the public
sector there was some disquiet over the inclusion
under competition jurisdiction of parastatal organizations
with public economies in certain economic
activities.
A lot of compromises were made in the consultative
process. For example, the idea of establishing
a ‘Monopolies and Mergers Commission’
aimed at dominant companies was dropped for
the establishment of a broader based Competition
Commission. While the principle that all economic
activities in Zimbabwe should come under
that activities of statutory bodies that are expressly
authorized by other Acts of Parliament should be
exempted. The consultations and compromises
made on the Bill made it possible for its smooth
passage through Parliament in 1996.
The fear and lobby from the monopolies and near
monopolies public and private, foreign and local
has not faded away during a decade of ZCA implementation.
It is important to put these threats
on constant check, more so now that there is need
for developing the competition law to address
competition concerns based on a decade long
implementation experience.
1.2.2 Competition Policy in Reforms
In 2001, ZCA was amended to provide for the
combination of the Competition Commission and
the Tariffs Commission, to form the Competition
and Tariffs Commission. The main argument for
the combination of the two Commissions was cost
saving on the Government’s side by running one
instead of two Commissions which are interconnected
by the synergies and complementarities
between competition policy and trade (tariffs)
policies.
Following a decade of the merger of the two Commissions,
there is a need to reexamine whether the
reasons for the merger still exist in the current Zimbabwean
economy context, and if it results into
prevailing circumstances. This will be done in the
subsequent paragraphs of this report.
The Amendments Act also strengthened the Commission’s
handling of mergers and acquisitions and
expanded the list of restrictive and unfair business
practices. It further gave the Commission the added
functions of price surveillance and monitoring.
1.3 Current Issues in Implementation
of the ZCA
CTC has gathered from its implementation experience
over the years especially during the post hy-
currency
in the economy in 2009. These gaps will
be assessed and for part of recommendations that
this report bring up.
been generally described as a less litigious society;
many of the enterprises that have been summoned
to appear before the CTC have complied and appeared
without legal representation. This trend has
mainly due to the severity of penalties which are
now quoted in United States dollars as compared
to when they were quoted in Zimbabwean dollars.
According to the interviewed CTC staff, the level
cantly
in the post multicurrency period, hence the
exposure of the gaps in the ZCA and the need
protracted litigations at the Courts and CTC’s consequential
inability to intervene on cases whose
provisions are either inadequately provided for or
completely not provided by the ZCA.
2.0 LEGAL FRAMEWORK - THE
ZIMBABWE COMPETITION
ACT
The ZCA was enacted with a broad objective to
promote and maintain competition in the economy,
to provide for the prevention and control