a tripartite report - Unctad
a tripartite report - Unctad a tripartite report - Unctad
ZAMBIA to undertake research in the distribution sector, and the second one was given in 2009 to conduct research in the dairy, poultry and beef sectors, in terms of understanding the competition levels in those sectors. The Commission was also jointly given in 2009 an IDRC grant with the competition authorities of South Africa and Egypt to establish the causes of the increase in price of stable foods. agro-sub sectors as its areas of concern. Technical assistance given to the Commission on a bilateral basis has included a 10-month internship with the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). The aims of the ACCC’s International Internship Programme were: (i) to contribute to the development of competition, consumer protection and utility regulation policies and initiatives internationally, by provid- with the opportunity to spend one year working at the ACCC; (ii) to enhance ACCC’s links with international counterpart agencies; (iii) to enable participants to develop knowledge of legislation relevant to the functioning of the ACCC, and understanding of competition, consumer protection, pricing and utility regulation issues, an awareness of the political, commercial and social environments and the management framework in which the ACCC operates; and (iv) for those parties to positively contribute to the operation of the ACCC through the completion of work placements at the ACCC. 7. FINDINGS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 7.1 Findings The report was based on extensive desk research of pertinent documents supplied by the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission on 163 its operations and practices, and of other relevant documents obtained from the internet, and on A total of 38 stakeholders from 16 organizations addition to the Commission, the stakeholders interviewed were drawn from business and consumer associations, sector regulators, other stat- organizations, and individual companies. The implementation of competition policy and law in Zambia, including consumer protection, was found to have developed considerably over the years, and was much facilitated by the new Competition and Consumer Protection Act, 2010. The business community in Zambia, as represented by the Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, is very receptive of the country’s competition and consumer protection law. In particular, the Commission’s consumer protection work is highly appreciated. The new Act removes most of the weaknesses in the legal framework that were prevalent in the old Act. The peer review however revealed some remaining or new weaknesses in the framework, which have been assessed against international best practices as suggested in the UNCTAD Model Law on Competition 176 . 7.2 Recommendations Very few things were found to be going wrong in the implementation of competition and consumer protection policy and law in Zambia. The recommendations made in the report are mostly aimed at increasing the effectiveness of that implementation. For ease of reference, the recommendations were made at the parts of the report to which they relate. These are summarized in Table 12 below. ZAMBIA
164 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A TRIPARTITE REPORT ON THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA – ZAMBIA – ZIMBABWE Table 12: Summarized Policy Recommendations I. Recommendations Directed to the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC) Observation Recommendation 1. The Act under section 10 does not give examples of other vertical agreements than re-sale price maintenance. Vertical restraints are numerous, and include agreements and arrangements on exclusive distribution and dealing, tie-in sales, quantity forcing, franchises, etc., which are all common in Zambia. While the list of vertical restraints cannot be exhaustive, it would assist the business community in complying with, and the Commission in enforcing, competition law if the common such restraints in Zambia are listed for guidance purposes. 2. The Regulations to the CCPA provide that “a merger transaction shall require authorization by the Commission where the combined turnover or as- - not realize any substantial turnover, or hold any assets, in Zambia. Merger tion of the combined turnover/asset threshold of the merging parties and a 3. Section 32(1) of the CCPA provides that the “Commission shall complete its assessment of a proposed merger and issue its determination within a period of ninety days from the date of the application for authorization of the proposed merger”. The up to 90-day merger assessment period seem to be rather long for mergers that do not raise serious competition concerns. 4. Stakeholder concerns over the Commission’s merger control activities include inadequate sensitization of the business community on issues such as of mergers. 5. Section 62(1) of the Act provides for the prohibition through injunctions or staying orders certain acts pending investigation. While staying orders are necessary in circumstances described in the Act, they need to be issued with extreme caution since they can have serious adverse effects on the competitiveness of the affected enterprise if the investigation ultimately clears the enterprise from the alleged anticompetitive practices. Such orders must 6. The Commission has negotiated Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with a number of sector regulators with competition functions on concurrent jurisdiction on competition matters. However, other statutory bodies without competition functions have indicated a willingness to cooperate with the Commission in other areas, such as the privatization of State enterprises, the promotion of small and medium enterprises, and consumer protection. Even some of those sector regulators with competition functions have indicated willingness to cooperate with the Commission in the area of consumer protection. The Commission should list through a Statutory Instrument the common types of vertical agreements and arrangements that restrain competition in Zambia for the information of the business community, and for the guidance of its competition practitioners. The list should clearly distinguish between resale price maintenance, that is per se prohibited and other forms of vertical restrictions that fall under the rule of reason. the combined turnover/asset threshold in Zambia and a minimum turnover/ The Regulations to the CCPA should provide for merger assessment in two phases, with Phase 1 involving simple transactions taking a shorter period of, say, thirty days, and Phase 2 involving more complex transactions taking up to ninety days. It is noted that under the current institutional framework of the Commission, reducing the timeframe for non-problematic transactions part-time. This could possibly be addressed by having Commissioners work fulltime so that cases can be brought to their attention on a continuous basis. An alternative would be to give the secretariat discretion on simple mergers. The Commission’s Merger Control Guidelines that are in the process of being redrafted for the adoption by the Board of Commissioners should cover pertinent ers, and any other current merger control practices and should be published together with other pertinent information on Zambia’s merger control system on the Commission’s website for easy access by the business community. The Commission in giving directions on staying or prohibition orders under orders. This should be provided for in a Statutory Instrument, with the following suggested wording: “A staying order in terms of section 62(1) of the Act shall remain in force: (a) until completion of the Commission’s investigation into the matter concerned; or (b) for a period of […] months from the date of its publication; whichever is the shorter period”. to those that it has concurrent jurisdiction on competition matters with, but should also be extended to other regulators on other areas of cooperation.
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- Page 174 and 175: ZIMBABWE FULL REPORT ZIMBABWE
- Page 176 and 177: ZIMBABWE TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE
- Page 178 and 179: ZIMBABWE This report is part of the
- Page 180 and 181: ZIMBABWE With the growing political
- Page 182 and 183: ZIMBABWE of restrictive practices,
- Page 184 and 185: ZIMBABWE competition authorities do
- Page 186 and 187: ZIMBABWE divided according to geogr
- Page 188 and 189: ZIMBABWE The Commission in 2006 whi
- Page 190 and 191: ZIMBABWE to take care of themselves
- Page 192 and 193: ZIMBABWE (under Section 9); basical
- Page 194 and 195: ZIMBABWE Full scale investigation i
- Page 196 and 197: ZIMBABWE (ii) to produce any book,
- Page 198 and 199: ZIMBABWE The fact that CTC has a co
- Page 200 and 201: ZIMBABWE tariat of technocrats, who
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- Page 204 and 205: ZIMBABWE Regarding the handling of
- Page 206 and 207: ZIMBABWE (Emphasis by the author) b
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164 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A TRIPARTITE REPORT ON THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA – ZAMBIA – ZIMBABWE<br />
Table 12: Summarized Policy Recommendations<br />
I. Recommendations Directed to the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC)<br />
Observation Recommendation<br />
1. The Act under section 10 does not give examples of other vertical agreements<br />
than re-sale price maintenance. Vertical restraints are numerous, and<br />
include agreements and arrangements on exclusive distribution and dealing,<br />
tie-in sales, quantity forcing, franchises, etc., which are all common in Zambia.<br />
While the list of vertical restraints cannot be exhaustive, it would assist<br />
the business community in complying with, and the Commission in enforcing,<br />
competition law if the common such restraints in Zambia are listed for<br />
guidance purposes.<br />
2. The Regulations to the CCPA provide that “a merger transaction shall require<br />
authorization by the Commission where the combined turnover or as-<br />
-<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
not realize any substantial turnover, or hold any assets, in Zambia. Merger<br />
tion<br />
of the combined turnover/asset threshold of the merging parties and a<br />
<br />
3. Section 32(1) of the CCPA provides that the “Commission shall complete<br />
its assessment of a proposed merger and issue its determination within a<br />
period of ninety days from the date of the application for authorization of<br />
the proposed merger”. The up to 90-day merger assessment period seem to<br />
be rather long for mergers that do not raise serious competition concerns.<br />
4. Stakeholder concerns over the Commission’s merger control activities include<br />
inadequate sensitization of the business community on issues such as<br />
<br />
of mergers.<br />
5. Section 62(1) of the Act provides for the prohibition through injunctions<br />
or staying orders certain acts pending investigation. While staying orders are<br />
necessary in circumstances described in the Act, they need to be issued with<br />
extreme caution since they can have serious adverse effects on the competitiveness<br />
of the affected enterprise if the investigation ultimately clears<br />
the enterprise from the alleged anticompetitive practices. Such orders must<br />
<br />
6. The Commission has negotiated Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs)<br />
with a number of sector regulators with competition functions on concurrent<br />
jurisdiction on competition matters. However, other statutory bodies without<br />
competition functions have indicated a willingness to cooperate with the<br />
Commission in other areas, such as the privatization of State enterprises,<br />
the promotion of small and medium enterprises, and consumer protection.<br />
Even some of those sector regulators with competition functions have indicated<br />
willingness to cooperate with the Commission in the area of consumer<br />
protection.<br />
The Commission should list through a Statutory Instrument the common<br />
types of vertical agreements and arrangements that restrain competition in<br />
Zambia for the information of the business community, and for the guidance<br />
of its competition practitioners. The list should clearly distinguish between resale<br />
price maintenance, that is per se prohibited and other forms of vertical<br />
restrictions that fall under the rule of reason.<br />
<br />
the combined turnover/asset threshold in Zambia and a minimum turnover/<br />
<br />
The Regulations to the CCPA should provide for merger assessment in two<br />
phases, with Phase 1 involving simple transactions taking a shorter period of,<br />
say, thirty days, and Phase 2 involving more complex transactions taking up<br />
to ninety days. It is noted that under the current institutional framework of<br />
the Commission, reducing the timeframe for non-problematic transactions<br />
<br />
part-time. This could possibly be addressed by having Commissioners work<br />
fulltime so that cases can be brought to their attention on a continuous basis.<br />
An alternative would be to give the secretariat discretion on simple mergers.<br />
The Commission’s Merger Control Guidelines that are in the process of being redrafted<br />
for the adoption by the Board of Commissioners should cover pertinent<br />
ers,<br />
and any other current merger control practices and should be published<br />
together with other pertinent information on Zambia’s merger control system on<br />
the Commission’s website for easy access by the business community.<br />
The Commission in giving directions on staying or prohibition orders under<br />
<br />
orders. This should be provided for in a Statutory Instrument, with the following<br />
suggested wording: “A staying order in terms of section 62(1) of the Act<br />
shall remain in force: (a) until completion of the Commission’s investigation<br />
into the matter concerned; or (b) for a period of […] months from the date of<br />
its publication; whichever is the shorter period”.<br />
<br />
to those that it has concurrent jurisdiction on competition matters with, but<br />
should also be extended to other regulators on other areas of cooperation.