a tripartite report - Unctad
a tripartite report - Unctad a tripartite report - Unctad
ZAMBIA merges providing the Commission with all relevant information that is required for the completion of the assessment. The full cooperation of the merging parties in the assessment of mergers is therefore assured. It is further provided in section 32(2) that “where the Commission does not issue its determination regarding a proposed (1), the proposed merger shall be deemed to be approved”. The need to compel competition authorities to consider mergers as expeditiously as possible is in line with international best practice. The negotiation and conclusion of mergers involves a lot of transaction costs to the merging parties, which should not unnecessarily be increased by excessively long merger assessment periods on the part of competition authorities. The up to ninetyday merger assessment period provided for under section 32(1) of the CCPA however seem to be rather long for mergers that do not raise serious competition concerns, such as most conglomerate mergers and certain vertical mergers, whose assessment can be fast-tracked. Section 32(3) of the Act further provides that “the Commission may extend the assessment period referred to in subsection (1), by a period not exceeding thirty days”. The merger assessment period in Zambia can therefore extend to 190 days! The competition legislation of some other countries in the region, such as South Africa and Namibia, provide that the competition authority must consider and make a determination in relation to a proposed merger within 30 days after the date on which can be extended due to the complexity of the issues involved for a further period not exceeding 60 days. 144 It is recommended that the CCPA provides for merger assessment in two phases, with Phase 1 involving simple transactions taking a shorter period of, say, thirty days, and Phase 2 involving more complex transactions taking up to ninety days. The provisions of section 36 that “an approval of a merger by the Commission under this Part shall not relieve an enterprise from complying with any other applicable laws” are also relevant 121 in the context of Zambia which has a number of sector regulators with statutory competition functions. Mergers of enterprises in certain regu- tor, also need to be sanctioned by the relevant sector regulators. The merger control provisions of the new Act are by far a great improvement to those of the old Act. Stakeholder comments in that regard included the following: “the new Competition and Consumer Protection Act is very comprehensive, and its coverage of merger control is good” 145 , and “the new Act when compared with the old Act has been a milestone since it captures virtually everything on merger control” 146 on bases for approving or disapproving mergers. The Commission however had administrative guidelines to that effect, which still exist. In considering whether to grant authorization to a proposed merger, takeover or any other form of acquisition, the Commission’s main concern is to ensure that the merger or takeover will not result in a substantial lessening of competition in any market in Zambia or a substantial part of it. However, it is taken into account that mergers may larly where increased exposure to global markets costs, improve quality and service and innovate in order to become more competitive in those assessing the impact of a merger on competition The Commission’s Merger Control Guidelines were in the process of being redrafted for adoption by the Board of Commissioners by the time of this peer review. The Commission’s Directorate of Mergers and Monopolies (DMM) in January 2011 produced its Operations Manual, which cover a wide range of areas from strategic merger control objectives, through investigations, to standard letters on various merger control issues. Box 9 below shows the standard operational procedure in a typical merger case as outlined in the Manual. ZAMBIA
122 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A TRIPARTITE REPORT ON THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA – ZAMBIA – ZIMBABWE Box 9: Standard Operational Procedure in a Merger Case (i) The Act provides that a merger assessment should be completed within a period of 90 days from the date of application with possible extension a maximum of 30 days. (iii) Record on Investigations Authorization Form. (v) Executive Director makes decision as to whether to pursue the matter. (vi) The Commission issues invoice to parties. (viii) Relevant statutory fees are paid. (xi) Opposition Procedure, i.e., Third Party views. (xiii) Director submits report to the Executive Director. (xiv) Executive Director submits the preliminary report to the Technical Committee of the Board of Commissioners warrant. The Board may: (i) reject the application; (ii) approve the application unconditionally; (iii) approve the application conditionally. NB: The Commission may where necessary issue directions to parties to a merger to (a) remedy, mitigate or prevent the substantial lessening of competition; and (b) remedy, mitigate or prevent any adverse effects that have resulted from, or are likely to result from, the substantial lessening of competition. (xv) If the parties do not agree with Board decision, they have 30 days to appeal to the Competition and Consumer Protection Tribunal. Source: Operations Manual, Directorate of Mergers and Monopolies, Zambia Competition and Consumer Protection Commission, 2011. In a typical merger case, pertinent areas covered include: (i) legal provisions and assessment tests (i.e., the relevant provisions of the Act, and the effect, dominance and public interest tests); (ii) investigations conducted (i.e., methodology); (iii) etc.); (iii) competition analysis and relevant observations; (iv) conclusions; and (v) recommendations. As an example, Box 10 below shows the Executive Summary of the report on the proposed merger between Cena Farms Zambia Limited and Mount Isabelle Limited. Box 10: Executive Summary of Staff Paper Report on Proposed Merger between Cena Farms Zambia Limited and Mount Isabelle Limited Background The Competition and Consumer Protection Commission on 12th May, 2010 received an application from Chibesakunda and Company concerning an application for authorization of a merger between Cena Farms Zambia Limited (“Cena Farms”) and Mount Isabelle Limited (“Mount Isabelle”) herein referred to as the parties. The proposed transaction entails that Cena Farms will acquire 100 per cent of Mount Isabelle at a purchase price of [ ]. The parties have submitted that Cena Farms was incorporated in Zambia in 2009 under the Companies Act Cap No 4647 Beit Road in Lusaka while their business address is at Farm No. 2644 in Mkushi. The principal activity of the
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ZAMBIA<br />
merges providing the Commission with all relevant<br />
information that is required for the completion<br />
of the assessment. The full cooperation of<br />
the merging parties in the assessment of mergers<br />
is therefore assured. It is further provided in<br />
section 32(2) that “where the Commission does<br />
not issue its determination regarding a proposed<br />
<br />
(1), the proposed merger shall be deemed to be<br />
approved”.<br />
The need to compel competition authorities to<br />
consider mergers as expeditiously as possible is<br />
in line with international best practice. The negotiation<br />
and conclusion of mergers involves a lot<br />
of transaction costs to the merging parties, which<br />
should not unnecessarily be increased by excessively<br />
long merger assessment periods on the<br />
part of competition authorities. The up to ninetyday<br />
merger assessment period provided for under<br />
section 32(1) of the CCPA however seem to be<br />
rather long for mergers that do not raise serious<br />
competition concerns, such as most conglomerate<br />
mergers and certain vertical mergers, whose<br />
assessment can be fast-tracked. Section 32(3) of<br />
the Act further provides that “the Commission<br />
may extend the assessment period referred to in<br />
subsection (1), by a period not exceeding thirty<br />
days”. The merger assessment period in Zambia<br />
can therefore extend to 190 days! The competition<br />
legislation of some other countries in the region,<br />
such as South Africa and Namibia, provide<br />
that the competition authority must consider and<br />
make a determination in relation to a proposed<br />
merger within 30 days after the date on which<br />
<br />
can be extended due to the complexity of the issues<br />
involved for a further period not exceeding<br />
60 days. 144<br />
It is recommended that the CCPA provides<br />
for merger assessment in two phases,<br />
with Phase 1 involving simple transactions<br />
taking a shorter period of, say, thirty days,<br />
and Phase 2 involving more complex<br />
transactions taking up to ninety days.<br />
The provisions of section 36 that “an approval<br />
of a merger by the Commission under this Part<br />
shall not relieve an enterprise from complying<br />
with any other applicable laws” are also relevant<br />
121<br />
in the context of Zambia which has a number<br />
of sector regulators with statutory competition<br />
functions. Mergers of enterprises in certain regu-<br />
tor,<br />
also need to be sanctioned by the relevant<br />
sector regulators.<br />
The merger control provisions of the new Act are<br />
by far a great improvement to those of the old Act.<br />
Stakeholder comments in that regard included the<br />
following: “the new Competition and Consumer<br />
Protection Act is very comprehensive, and its coverage<br />
of merger control is good” 145 , and “the new<br />
Act when compared with the old Act has been a<br />
milestone since it captures virtually everything on<br />
merger control” 146<br />
<br />
on bases for approving or disapproving mergers.<br />
The Commission however had administrative<br />
guidelines to that effect, which still exist. In<br />
considering whether to grant authorization to a<br />
proposed merger, takeover or any other form of<br />
acquisition, the Commission’s main concern is to<br />
ensure that the merger or takeover will not result<br />
in a substantial lessening of competition in any<br />
market in Zambia or a substantial part of it. However,<br />
it is taken into account that mergers may<br />
larly<br />
where increased exposure to global markets<br />
<br />
costs, improve quality and service and innovate<br />
in order to become more competitive in those<br />
<br />
assessing the impact of a merger on competition<br />
<br />
<br />
The Commission’s Merger Control Guidelines were<br />
in the process of being redrafted for adoption by<br />
the Board of Commissioners by the time of this<br />
peer review.<br />
The Commission’s Directorate of Mergers and<br />
Monopolies (DMM) in January 2011 produced its<br />
Operations Manual, which cover a wide range of<br />
areas from strategic merger control objectives,<br />
through investigations, to standard letters on various<br />
merger control issues. Box 9 below shows the<br />
standard operational procedure in a typical merger<br />
case as outlined in the Manual.<br />
ZAMBIA