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a tripartite report - Unctad

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114 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A TRIPARTITE REPORT ON THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA – ZAMBIA – ZIMBABWE<br />

The Act however recognizes that some other horizontal<br />

agreements could be competitively ben-<br />

national<br />

trade, or could be in the public interest,<br />

and should therefore not be prohibited per se but<br />

should be considered using the rule-of-reason approach.<br />

Section 18 of the Act therefore provides<br />

that applications for exemption of such agreements<br />

could be made to the Commission. In terms<br />

of section 19(2) exemptions can be granted if the<br />

agreement contributes to, or is likely to contribute<br />

to, or result in:<br />

“(a) maintaining or promoting exports from Zambia;<br />

<br />

distribution or provision of goods and services;<br />

(c) promoting technical or economic progress in the<br />

production, distribution or provision of goods and<br />

services;<br />

(d) maintaining lower prices, higher quality or greater<br />

choice of goods and services for consumers;<br />

(e) promoting the competitiveness of micro and small<br />

business enterprises in Zambia; or<br />

<br />

or would outweigh the lessening in competition<br />

that would result, or is likely to result, from the<br />

agreement.”<br />

Professional associations whose rules contain a restriction<br />

that has the effect of lessening competition<br />

in a market may also apply in terms of section<br />

22(1) of the Act for an exemption of the restriction<br />

as long as it does not constitute a per se prohibited<br />

horizontal or vertical agreement.<br />

The provisions on vertical agreements 131 are under<br />

section 10 of the Act, which simply state that “a<br />

vertical agreement between enterprises is prohibited<br />

per se, and void, to the extent that it involves<br />

re-sale price maintenance”. The above means that<br />

with the exception of re-sale price maintenance,<br />

all the other vertical agreements are considered<br />

using the rule-of-reason approach under the Act.<br />

This is in recognition of the fact that most such<br />

<br />

such as removal of pricing distortions, optimized<br />

investment levels, and avoidance of transaction<br />

costs. Re-sale price maintenance has been per se<br />

prohibited under the Act because that practice is<br />

prevalent in Zambia and has serious adverse effects,<br />

not only on competition but also on consumer<br />

welfare. Section 10(2) however provides<br />

that a “supplier or producer may recommend a<br />

minimum re-sale price to the re-seller of a good<br />

or a service if: (a) the supplier or producer makes<br />

it clear to the re-seller that the recommendation is<br />

not binding; and (b) the product has a price stated<br />

on it and the words ‘recommended price’ appear<br />

<br />

binding resale price recommendations do not<br />

constitute cases of prohibited resale price maintenance.<br />

The treatment of re-sale price maintenance under<br />

competition law differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.<br />

In some jurisdictions, particularly in developing<br />

countries whose economic activities are dominated<br />

by few players, re-sale price maintenance is<br />

per se prohibited because of its serious effects. In<br />

other jurisdictions, the practice is increasingly being<br />

considered using the rule-of-reason approach<br />

uct<br />

distribution. In its treatment of re-sale price<br />

maintenance, therefore, the Zambian competition<br />

legislation takes into account both considerations.<br />

While it prohibits per se the practice, it also provides<br />

that resale prices can be recommended. The<br />

circumstances of allowing re-sale price recommendations<br />

under the Act are very clear and do<br />

not contradict the general prohibition.<br />

The Act does not give examples of other vertical<br />

agreements than re-sale price maintenance. This<br />

may be because section 10 of the Act only deals<br />

with vertical agreements that are per se prohibited.<br />

Most vertical agreements are considered using the<br />

rule-of-reason approach. They are also numerous,<br />

and include agreements and arrangements on exclusive<br />

distribution and dealing, tie-in sales, quantity<br />

forcing, and franchises, which are all common<br />

in Zambia. While the list of vertical restraints cannot<br />

be exhaustive, it would assist the Commission<br />

in its enforcement, and the business community<br />

in complying with competition law, if the common<br />

vertical restraints in Zambia are listed for guidance<br />

purposes.<br />

It is recommended that the Commission<br />

through a Statutory Instrument lists the<br />

common types of vertical agreements and<br />

arrangements that restrain competition in<br />

Zambia for the information of the business<br />

community, and for the guidance of its<br />

competition practitioners.

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