Carl%20Sagan%20-%20The%20Demon%20Haunted%20World
Carl%20Sagan%20-%20The%20Demon%20Haunted%20World Carl%20Sagan%20-%20The%20Demon%20Haunted%20World
THE DEMON-HAUNTED WORLD Much of the evidence regarding the Roswell 'incident' seems to point to a cluster of high-altitude classified balloons, perhaps launched from nearby Almagordo Army Air Field or White Sands Proving Ground, that crashed near Roswell, the debris of secret instruments hurriedly collected by earnest military personnel, early press reports announcing that it was a spaceship from another planet ('RAAF Captures Flying Saucer on Ranch in Roswell Region'), diverse recollections simmering over the years, and memories refreshed by the opportunity for a little fame and fortune. (Two UFO museums in Roswell are leading tourist stops.) A 1994 report ordered by the Secretary of the Air Force and the Department of Defense in response to prodding from a New Mexico Congressman identifies the Roswell debris as remnants of a long-range, highly secret, balloon-borne low-frequency acoustic detection system called 'Project Mogul' - an attempt to sense Soviet nuclear weapons explosions at tropopause altitudes. The Air Force investigators, rummaging comprehensively through the secret files of 1947, found no evidence of heightened message traffic: There were no indications and warnings, notice of alerts, or a higher tempo of operational activity reported that would be logically generated if an alien craft, whose intentions were unknown, entered U.S. territory . . . The records indicate that none of this happened (or if it did, it was controlled by a security system so efficient and tight that no one, U.S. or otherwise, has been able to duplicate it since. If such a system had been in effect at the time, it would have also been used to protect our atomic secrets from the Soviets, which history has shown obviously was not the case.) The radar targets carried by the balloons were partly manufactured by novelty and toy companies in New York, whose inventory of decorative icons seems to have been remembered many years later as alien hieroglyphics. The heyday of UFOs corresponds to the time when the main delivery vehicle for nuclear weapons was being switched from 82
Spoofing and Secrecy aircraft to missiles. An early and important technical problem concerned re-entry - returning a nuclear-armed nosecone through the bulk of the Earth's atmosphere without burning it up in the process (as small asteroids and comets are destroyed in their passage through the upper air). Certain materials, nosecone geometries, and angles of entry are better than others. Observations of re-entry (or the more spectacular launches) could very well reveal US progress in this vital strategic technology or, worse, inefficiencies in the design; such observations might suggest what defensive measures an adversary should take. Understandably, the subject was considered highly sensitive. Inevitably there must have been cases in which military personnel were told not to talk about what they had seen, or where seemingly innocuous sightings were suddenly classified top secret with severely constrained need-to-know criteria. Air Force officers and civilian scientists thinking back about it in later years might very well conclude that the government had engineered a UFO cover-up. If nosecones are judged UFOs, the charge is a fair one. Consider spoofing. In the strategic confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, the adequacy of air defences was a vital issue. It was item (3) on General Cabell's list. If you could find a weakness, it might be the key to 'victory' in an all-out nuclear war. The only sure way to test your adversary's defences is to fly an aircraft over their borders and see how long it takes for them to notice. The United States did this routinely to test Soviet air defences. In the 1950s and 1960s, the United States had state-of-the-art radar defence systems covering its west and east coasts, and especially its northern approaches (over which a Soviet bomber or missile attack would most likely come). But there was a soft underbelly - no significant early warning system to detect the geographically much more taxing southern approach. This is of course information vital for a potential adversary. It immediately suggests a spoof: one or more of the adversary's high-performance aircraft zoom out of the Caribbean, let's say, into US airspace, penetrating, let's say, a few hundred miles up the Mississippi River until a US air defence radar locks on. Then the intruders 83
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Spoofing and Secrecy<br />
aircraft to missiles. An early and important technical problem<br />
concerned re-entry - returning a nuclear-armed nosecone through<br />
the bulk of the Earth's atmosphere without burning it up in the<br />
process (as small asteroids and comets are destroyed in their<br />
passage through the upper air). Certain materials, nosecone<br />
geometries, and angles of entry are better than others. Observations<br />
of re-entry (or the more spectacular launches) could very<br />
well reveal US progress in this vital strategic technology or, worse,<br />
inefficiencies in the design; such observations might suggest what<br />
defensive measures an adversary should take. Understandably,<br />
the subject was considered highly sensitive.<br />
Inevitably there must have been cases in which military personnel<br />
were told not to talk about what they had seen, or where<br />
seemingly innocuous sightings were suddenly classified top secret<br />
with severely constrained need-to-know criteria. Air Force officers<br />
and civilian scientists thinking back about it in later years<br />
might very well conclude that the government had engineered a<br />
UFO cover-up. If nosecones are judged UFOs, the charge is a fair<br />
one.<br />
Consider spoofing. In the strategic confrontation between the<br />
United States and the Soviet Union, the adequacy of air defences<br />
was a vital issue. It was item (3) on General Cabell's list. If you<br />
could find a weakness, it might be the key to 'victory' in an all-out<br />
nuclear war. The only sure way to test your adversary's defences is<br />
to fly an aircraft over their borders and see how long it takes for<br />
them to notice. The United States did this routinely to test Soviet<br />
air defences.<br />
In the 1950s and 1960s, the United States had state-of-the-art<br />
radar defence systems covering its west and east coasts, and<br />
especially its northern approaches (over which a Soviet bomber or<br />
missile attack would most likely come). But there was a soft<br />
underbelly - no significant early warning system to detect the<br />
geographically much more taxing southern approach. This is of<br />
course information vital for a potential adversary. It immediately<br />
suggests a spoof: one or more of the adversary's high-performance<br />
aircraft zoom out of the Caribbean, let's say, into US airspace,<br />
penetrating, let's say, a few hundred miles up the Mississippi<br />
River until a US air defence radar locks on. Then the intruders<br />
83