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The move from the "automatic self' to the "authentic self' via choice and/or deci­
sion-making, is something that those in cognitive personological circles (like George
Kelly) would approve. All present cognitive interpretations are subject to revision
and change (Kelly 1955:15), which means that no patient/client has an "interpreta­
tion-free" view ofthe world and ofhimself/herselfand his/her symptoms/problems
(Hjelle & Ziegler 1992:396). Because the logochart challenges the patient/
client to do "introspection," and to choose between his/her "self', the "automatic
self' or his/her "authentic self," the cognitive perspectives would not stand "apathe­
tic" towards this logotherapeutic aid/technique.
Aaron Beck who studied depressed patients/clients (Kendall & Hammen 1995:80)
from a cognitive-behavioral perspective pointed out the importance oftheir
distortions ofreality. These distortions are basically the result ofdistorted thinking.
Most depression is as much a disorder ofthinking as ofmood and many people are
susceptible to depression because oftheir cognitive triad - that is, the characteristic
negative ways oftbinking about the self, the world, and the future (Beck 1967, 1976).
It is an open question ifthe logochart oflogotherapist Khatami (1988:67-75), which
he uses for depressed patients/clients, strongly reflect these cognitive distortions
which Beck tried to emphasize.
Although phenomenological personologists would question the logotherapist's more
direct approach ofwriting down what he/she thinks is the real problem, instead of
verbally and non-verbally giving "I responses' to the client/patient opinions, the use
ofthe logochart for those who are depressed would be acceptable. From a Gestalt
therapeutic point ofview (Fritz Perls 1970:14), the logotherapeutic emphasis (as
manifested on the logocharts) ofkeeping the patients/clients in contact with their
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